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Abstract 
The resolution of the Iraq-Kuwait crisis depended on the leading role played 
by the US in managing the crisis and eliciting the international and regional 
support needed to uphold international law and restore the legitimacy and 
sovereignty of the Kuwaiti state. In that Saudi Arabia and the UN immensely 
aided the US. The focus of the study will be on this particular contribution of 
the Security Council and Riyadh to the resolution of the chsis. 
Saudi Arabia's leading regional role in support of Kuwait and its willingness to 
participate in the war waged against Iraq from its territory shows the extent of 
its concern over the strengthening of Iraq as a dominant force in the Gulf area 
as well as over Iraqi violation of the Charters of the UN and the Arab League. 
The international response was also motivated by similar concerns, in addition 
to Iraq threatening the strategic interests of the US. It was this direct threat to 
the US that motivated Washington to use the Security Council as the most 
appropriate vehicle to manage the crisis by emphasising adherence to 
international law and UN Charter. 
There was no doubt that Iraq violated international law, but the domination of 
the international coalition and the Security Council by the US tainted the role 
of the UN and emphasised the fact that Desert Storm was not merely about 
restoring Kuwaiti sovereignty but also about the destruction of Iraqi power. 
The severity of the sanctions and their continuation for more than a decade is 
further evidence that Washington's objectives go beyond the needs of 
upholding international law and maintaining peace and stability. The Gulf war 
restored Kuwaiti sovereignty but did very little to restore stability and peace in 
the region. Divisions among Arab states have been accentuated, the Arab 
league is totally marginalised and the GCC lacks the ability to create a viable 
order to safeguard the sovereignty and stability of the Gulf area. Thus the 
consequences of the war on the region and on Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq 
have been extensive and devastating. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 2 August 1990 presented the Arab regional 
system and the international system with a serious challenge as to how to 
respond to such an act of aggression against a sovereign state. This 
challenge was taken up successfully by the international community led by the 
US and was able within a very short time to restore the legitimacy of the 
Kuwaiti state and end its occupation. The Arab regional system, on the other 
hand failed miserably in it efforts to manage the crisis on its own, hence 
making international intervention necessary and leading to further inter-Arab 
divisions and tensions as well as intensifying the presence of the Americans 
in the area. This came at a time where inter-regional relations were already 
suffering from divisions and lack of any coherent Arab strategy on the 
economic and political levels. The Iraqi misadventure in Kuwait can be seen, 
in fact, as a reflection of this disarray in the Arab regional system. 
Iraq after its eight years war with Iran ended up with huge debts exceeding 
$80 billion, a total cost of the war estimated at $160 billion and a 
reconstruction bill of $220 billion. This internal financial and economic crisis 
that was threatening the stability of the Iraqi regime was foremost responsible 
for the dramatic decision by the Iraqi government to invade Kuwait. The Gulf 
states and particularly Kuwait were aware of the immense pressures on the 
Iraqi government. The public campaign waged by Iraq against Kuwait 
accusing it of overproducing oil and pumping from the Rumaila oil field without 
the prior knowledge of the Iraqi government, in addition to demands to forgive 
its debt to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and Emirates were clear indications of the 
desperation of Iraq. However, neither the GCC nor the Arab League were 
capable of acting in time to diffuse the situation and prevent the catastrophe 
that befell the region. 
Iraq's action, thus, did not come as a total shock, rather it was the scale of the 
aggression that took the region and the international community by surprise. 
Most predictions thought that Iraq would move to take Rumaila oil field or 
occupy Warbah and Bubiyan and not to occupy the whole of Kuwait and 
annex it to Iraq. On the Iraqi side, they did not expect the international 
community led by the US to react in such a determined and quick manner in 
support of Kuwait. They also did not expect Saudi Arabia to take the decision 
to invite foreign troops onto its territory. This situation of misperceptions led to 
disastrous consequences for the whole region. On the Iraqi part it led to the 
destruction of Iraq and the loss of thousands of lives during the war while the 
sanctions regime have undermined the socio-economic structure of Iraq for 
years to come. For the Gulf states the crisis highlighted their security problem 
and dependence on the West for defence of their sovereignty and 
independence, and the limited capability of the GCC to act during times of 
crisis. 
The uniqueness of the circumstances of the Gulf crisis is not limited only to 
the extent of the aggression of Iraq and the inability of the Arab system to deal 
with a serious inter-Arab dispute, but also in the international reaction to the 
invasion. This international response is partly attributed to Iraq's clear 
violation of international law and customs in that a member of the UN attacked 
and occupied another member of the organisation. In addition, both Iraq and 
Kuwait are members of the Arab League whose charter has been violated too. 
The other reason relates to the end of the Cold War. That helped immensely 
the Security Council to function with out any major power using its veto power. 
It explains the successful passing of resolutions that ranged from condemning 
the invasion to taking military action to restore the Kuwait's sovereignty. 
The absence of Cold War politics, also, helped the US to dominate the anti-
Saddam coalition, highlighting the significance of the Gulf area to Western 
powers. Gulf oil was once used as a weapon against the West, during the 
1973 October War with Israel, threatening the industries and the livelihood of 
the West, and was followed by a massive increase in oil prices. The Iranian 
Revolution and the Iran-Iraq war, also, caused interruption in oil supplies and 
increases in oil prices. In 1990, the West was determined to fight off any such 
consequences by the coalition that quickly gathered in support of Kuwait and 
the rest of the Gulf states. In addition, the international response was in 
recognition of the sovereignty of Kuwait and was intended to prevent the 
strengthening of Iraq as a regional power. 
I. Objectives of the Research 
The US from the onset of the crisis led and organised the manner in which the 
international community responded to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and its 
violation of international law and the Charters of the UN and Arab League. In 
that it needed the support and co-operation of Saudi Arabia as well as the 
involvement of the UN. The first aim of the research is to analyse the crucial 
role played by Saudi Arabia in restoring the legitimacy and sovereignty of 
Kuwait. Saudi Arabia's traditional foreign policy approach of keeping a low 
profile and balancing between the various regional actors was overnight 
transformed into a more public one, that took a firm position against a 
brotherly Arab country. Moreover, the government quickly abandoned its 
cautious policy of no open US presence in the country and invited Western 
troops onto its territory. A sense of betrayal and fear of Iraq can only explain 
such major departures in policy. Iraq's action was perceived as threatening to 
the balance of power in the Gulf. A dominant and aggressive Iraq was not a 
welcomed development for either Saudi Arabia or the rest of the Gulf states. 
In addition, a challenge to the territorial boundary of a Gulf state sets a 
dangerous precedent in an area plagued with territorial disputes. 
The second aim relates to examining the role played by the UN, especially the 
Security Council in light of the end of the Cold war. The UN over its fifty years 
of existence has faced many regional conflicts and territorial disputes that 
threatened international peace and security. However, on very few occasions 
was the UN able to intervene quickly and successfully. That begs the 
question of the circumstances and factors that allowed the UN to play such a 
determining role in the case of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict, and a very successful 
one in terms of restoring the sovereignty of Kuwait. To some this was 
welcomed as a sign of ushering a new era for the international organisation to 
play the role designated to it by its Charter. Others were sceptical and saw 
the success of the UN as a consequence of the willingness of the US to play a 
leading role in order to protect its strategic interests in the Gulf region. 
The third and last objective relates to analysing the consequences of the 
military action on the region. The manner in which the chsis was resolved in 
the end depended on using force and initiating military action against Iraq. 
This, on the one hand, succeeded in liberating Kuwait and restoring its 
legitimate government, but on the other it had many repercussions. It caused 
massive damage to Iraq, increased the divisions and differences among the 
Arab states, and more importantly expanded the military presence of the 
Americans in the Gulf. In addition, it exposed the weak defence of the Gulf 
Arab states and their high dependence on Western technology and 
manpower. Attention will be given, also, to the overall environmental 
consequences of the war on the area. Much emphasis was put on the 
damage done by the burning of oil fields, while ignoring the much wider and 
extensive environmental damage of the war itself. 
II. Hypothesis of the Research 
The main argument of the study is that the successful resolution of the Iraq-
Kuwait crisis depended on the leading role played by the US in managing the 
crisis. That management depended on a strategy of escalation to the point of 
war in order for the international coalition to achieve its objective of a total win 
over the Iraqi regime. A combination of fortuitous circumstances aided the US 
and its allies in adopting the escalation approach rather than a negotiation 
approach and in not showing any serious inclination for compromise or 
appeasement. 
Firstly is the clarity of the Iraqi violation of international laws and the Charter 
of the UN made it relatively easy to gather international support for the anti-
Saddam coalition. It helped, also, in contextualising the crisis in a legal frame 
of reference and made the military action of the coalition appear more in 
support of upholding the rule of law, rather than a sever punishment of Iraq for 
daring to challenge the existing balance of power in the region. Thus, 
upholding international law was only part of the overall picture that helped in 
the successful resolution of the crisis. The political interests of Saudi Arabia 
and the strategic interests of the US in the area were determining factors in 
the execution of the war. The containment and the punishment of the Iraqi 
regime were as important as adherence to international law. 
Secondly, the absence of Cold War politics helped the US to elicit the support 
and co-operation of the Russians and made the functioning of the Security 
Council more efficient. The case showed the extent of which the international 
system being dominated with one superpower can function to the advantage 
of one group against another. In this case it was Iraq against the majority of 
Western countries. Hence, those that talked about New World order and a 
new role for the UN were too optimistic and ignored in their analysis the 
political interests that brought together such a strong coalition against 
Saddam. The convergence of such political of the key players in this crisis, 
namely the US, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia as well as other western countries 
was a key element in the management of this crisis. 
The co-operation of Saudi Arabia with the US and its commitment to the 
Kuwaiti cause were paramount for the success of the American approach of 
escalating the crisis to the point of leaving no option open except war. In this 
Riyadh was primarily motivated by its fear of Saddam's regime, its political 
interests in maintaining the status quo in the Gulf area, in addition to support 
of international law and the Charters of the UN, Arab League, and the GCC. 
For Saudi Arabia such overt co-operation with the US against an Arab country 
was a departure of the manner in which it conducts its regional and 
international affairs, necessitated by the special circumstances that Saddam's 
invasion imposed on the region. Thus we see Riyadh after the end of the 
crisis has reverted back to its traditional policy of low profile and behind the 
scene activities to conduct its foreign affairs. Being in the public eye is 
something that the Saudis prefer to avert. 
III. The Methodology of the Study 
The study utilises the concept of crisis management as its tool of analysis for 
understanding the manner in which the crisis was controlled with a special 
focus on the role played by Saudi Arabia and the UN. This concept has 
gained grounds in the literature of international relations since the Cuban 
missile crisis of 1962. Robert McNamara, Secretary of state of the US duhng 
the crisis made his renowned statement" there is no longer any such thing as 
strategy, only crisis management". ^ This crisis generated a great deal of 
academic interest in crisis management since the two superpowers, the US 
and the Soviet Union, came very close to a nuclear confrontation and caused 
the birth of a new field of research in international relations focusing on crisis 
management. The objectives of crisis management can be summed as 
follows: 
1. to find satisfactory solution to the parties involved; 
2. to understand the causes of war and hence attempt to control the 
forces driving towards escalation of conflicts; 
3. to diffuse the crisis by attempting to resolve the underlying conflict and 
4. to create and develop institutions that are capable of dealing with future 
crises. ^ 
However, crisis management acknowledges that there are some conflicts that 
will not be avoided by resorting to crisis management and that is why some 
crises lead to war while others are defused and resolved. ^ Such crises are 
considered inherently unmanageable because of the presence of a variety of 
variables such as irreconcilable objectives, unwillingness to compromise or 
accept defeat, the personality of the adversaries and more importantly if one 
side wants to have a total win; in other words wants war. 
There are many definitions for international crisis, however these can be 
divided under two major approaches; the systematic approach and the 
decision-making approach. 
The systematic approach: This approach takes a global view of state 
interaction and describes how a crisis taking place between two or more 
states within a given international system and how it fits into that system and 
is affected by it.* A useful definition of the crisis is used by Kintner: a crisis is 
any confrontation of national wills during which one or more powers act in 
such a manner that a significant departure from normal relationships is 
reached. This departure is usually marked by a greater emphasis on the use 
or suggested use offeree than on negotiation and diplomacy. ^ This approach 
focuses on two elements change and conflict since a crisis is seen as a point 
of transformation in the system and that a crisis increases the probability of 
war and the use of military force. Some of the criticisms levelled at this 
definition concern the following; 
1. It ignores the variables in decision making process and its effects on 
the development of the crisis; 
2. Not ail crises cause system change while others might increase the 
possibility of change; 
3. It exaggerates the relation between international crises and war. ^ 
The decision-maker approach: This approach depends on the perception of 
a single state as to the existence of a crisis. This perception of a situation as 
constituting a crisis requires three necessary conditions: 
1. a surprise situation: events creating the crisis takes the decision-maker 
by surprise; 
2. a threat situation: usually it is a threat to the core-values and high 
priority values held by the decision-making group and 
3. a situation that restricts the amount of time available to the decision-
maker in order to respond before the situation is transformed rendering 
the decision useless.'' 
Thus in this approach it is perception and not the objective reality, as in the 
systematic approach, that is at the core of decision-making and behaviour 
during a crisis. Some consider the surprise element, taken into account the 
intelligence systems that operate nowadays especially in developed countries 
as too exaggerated in importance. According to a study conducted by 
Howard Inter in the US concerning the concept of crisis, 92 percent of those 
surveyed said that international crisis that involve the US may be the result of 
the behaviour of the US government itself. One wonders if Gulf crisis is 
among that percentage? ^ 
The tension that exists in crisis management between taking risks to gain 
objectives while also trying to avoid the outbreak of war or the escalation of 
hostilities led to the development of two schools of thought on the matter. The 
first sees crisis management as an exercise in winning. The main objective 
here is to get the opponent / enemy to capitulate and grant the concessions 
demanded. Thus it is seen as an opportunity to enhance ones interests and 
status in the international system and the focus is on the opponent / enemy 
rather than on the crisis itself. High risks are taken in order to achieve the 
objectives. Winning is the most important factor during the crisis. ^  
The other school adopts the contrary. It sees the importance of cnsis 
management in avoiding war through the peaceful resolution of the conflict. 
Thus success is measured by the avoidance of war. The parties to the 
conflict see the danger of the probability of war and hence share a mutual 
desire to avoid it and a commitment to find a peaceful alternative. °^ As to 
which school of thought prevails during a crisis that depends on 
circumstances and will exist in different proportions in any one crisis. " 
Crisis management has at its disposal two different instruments for resolving a 
crisis; coercive means that escalate the crisis such as embargo, attacking 
civilian or military targets, the taking of hostages civilian or military or by 
taking steps that closes all opportunity of peaceful solutions, hence forcing the 
adversary to initiate force or to capitulate. Also coercive means include 
threats that aim to influence the choices and alternatives of the adversary and 
which escalates the crisis to a great extent verging into war as happened with 
UN resolution 678. The use of these instruments shows a propensity for the 
national interests to prevail over any common interests that may link the 
adversaries. 
The other instruments are primary conciliatory aiming at reducing the level of 
the crisis and preparing the grounds for a settlement. By choosing to use 
these instruments the focus is on the common interests between the 
adversaries, which encourages them to pursue ways to avoid a catastrophe. 
This includes either major conciliatory moves such as a clear indication by 
one party of its readiness to compromise or sending messages indicating 
willingness to compromise and suggesting ways of settling the crisis. A 
reduction in the level of the crisis involves a variety of moves, responses and 
exchanges, all aiming and indicating in essence a willingness and a 
commitment to bring the crisis to a peaceful end. 
In a real situation the tendency is towards utilising a combination of both 
instruments in order to diffuse a crisis. There are factors that influence which 
of the two instruments will prevail and/or what combination of the two will be 
used. These include the balance of power between the two sides, the 
legitimacy of the demands of the adversary as well as the significance of the 
national interest that each side aims to achieve. 
IV. Applying the Concept of Crisis Management to the Gulf Crisis 
First we must start by illuminating the special elements of the Gulf crisis that 
sets apart from any other international crisis. To some degree this is true of 
all international crises; they are never similar either in causes or 
consequences. But in this particular crisis the absence of cold war politics 
and the dominance of the system with one superpower make it particularly 
unique. These elements include; 
The actors in the crisis: although the conflict lies between Iraq and Kuwait, 
the major actors have been Iraq and the US. From the moment of the 
invasion the US and Iraq were set as the two adversaries fighting and 
competing with each other to achieve their own set of objectives. The US was 
very successful in legitimising its interference and leadership by involving the 
Security Council from the onset of the crisis and by eliciting the co-operation 
of Saudi Arabia. Without the commitment of Saudi Arabia the US could not 
have maintained the coalition against Saddam and could not have launched 
war. 
The issue of the crisis: UN resolutions and the public statements of the US 
and its allies indicate that the issue is the invasion and occupation of Kuwait 
by Iraq. Hence the aim of the coalition was to restore the legitimacy of the 
Kuwaiti government and end the occupation. However the real issue was in 
fact the balance of power in the region and the elimination of Iraq as a 
regional power in order to safeguard the interests of the West in the area, 
namely oil and to safeguard the security of the other Gulf Arab states. Iraq's 
violation of international law and its non-compliance of UN resolutions gave 
the coalition legitimacy and validity and focused attention on the overt 
objectives rather that the covert ones. 
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The costs of the crisis: This involves a variety of costs: political, economic 
financial, human lives and the environment. The highest price was paid by 
Iraq, followed by the Gulf states particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, whose 
financial commitment to the coalition was huge. Also the effects of the 
invasion and the war was detrimental to the environment of the whole region. 
As for the coalition, since the brunt of the cost of Desert Shield and Desert 
Storm was carried by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and because of the escalation 
of armament build up in the Gulf, they were in effect better off financially, 
especially the US. Loss of life for the coalition was insignificant if compared 
with Iraq or Kuwait and the war took place far away from their own countries 
that their environment was not affected. Thus in terms of total costs of the 
crisis the regional system suffered most on all fronts; politically, the 
economically, financially and environmentally. 
The management of the crisis: Measuhng the management of this crisis 
against the aforementioned concept of crisis management it is clear that the 
crisis has been mismanagement. War was not avoided and the use of force 
was necessary to end the crisis. However if one is to take into account the 
manner in which the US led coalition escalated the crisis and closed all 
windows of negotiation in the face of Iraq's resolve not to back down, war 
perhaps was a desired objective. At no point in the crisis did the US show 
any serious interest in co-operating with Iraq to find a way out that would save 
face for Iraq. Statements such as "Iraq must be stopped" and the "US has 
crossed the no return point", affirmed such a lack of willingness. Iraq 
needed a face saving formula but the US was intent on denying it that. Thus 
one of the major conventions of crisis management was denied to Iraq. The 
essence of this convention is that the concerned parties to a conflict are in the 
same boat and must resist teaching each other a lesson. The crisis must be 
settled in a way acceptable to all without a humiliating loss of face for those 
involved. Moreover both sides must be able to demonstrate that the solution 
is a partial victory for it. That is exactly what was needed and was denied. 
The US led coalition was intent on teaching Iraq a lesson and offered nothing 
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in terms of face saving to allow Iraq to de-escalate and to comply with all UN 
resolutions. 
If these considerations are to be taken into account then one is inclined to say 
the chsis was managed successfully and succeeded in achieving what seems 
to be the real reason for the war; the destruction of Iraq's military power, the 
prevention of its strengthening as a regional power and the maintenance of 
the status quo in the region in favour of Western interests. It gave the US the 
total win it aspired for. 
One must add that the perception of threat played a significant part in the 
decision making group in Saudi Arabia to invite foreign troops to the country, 
without which the US could not have executed its plans and achieved it 
objectives. Whether this threat was real, imagined or exaggerated is of an 
academic interest only. The reality is that Saudi Arabia's approach of the 
crisis was based on that factor. The time factor also played a role in that 
Saudi Arabia needed to pre-empt action on the part of Iraq since it was fearful 
of the consequences of what may follow the massing of Iraqi troops on its 
borders. 
As for Iraq the management of the crisis proved to be disastrous. It took huge 
risks without having the power to face up to such an extensive build up of 
military power, unseen before in the region. The build up was rapid and 
enormous yet the Iraqi regime believed till the very end that the US will not 
initiate war and that it will offer some sort of compromise. Perhaps Saddam 
was trapped. On the one hand the coalition was unwilling to offer any face 
saving formulas and he could not be seen to back down or perhaps he 
actually did believe that he can inflict heavy losses of life to force the coalition 
to retreat. He took huge a risk in not complying with the UN resolution 678 
before the dead line expired. In contrast to the total win of the coalition his 
loss was total. His escalation of the crisis in the hope that he can force the 
international community to accept the fait accompli backfired on him. All this 
could have been avoided if only the Iraqi regime could have seen how serious 
and intent was the coalition on executing their threats. The perceptions held 
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by the Iraqi till the very end that the US will back off and will not initiate war 
proved to be detrimental to Iraq. Personalities and perceptions of the 
adversaries were of great significance in this crisis. 
One last remark on the way the crisis was resolved. It failed to take account 
of the new emphasis in the literature of conflict resolution on the concept of 
conflict transformation. That entails a focus on the idea that a resolution had 
to encompass a long-term process of reconciliation and healing and in many 
cases a radical change in the relationship between adversaries. Thus conflict 
resolution should aim at something better than a cold peace and tries to deal 
with the question "after the agreement, what?" That is precisely what has 
been lacking in the resolution of this crisis. The continuous isolation of Iraq 
and the persistence of sanctions for over a decade has intensified the tension 
and frustration of the Iraqi regime and has put a wedge between Kuwait and 
Iraq and the rest of the Gulf states that will take years to heal. Also the 
stability of the boundary demarcation is doubtful because Iraq has accepted it 
under sever pressure and not out of free will. This situation in effect creates 
the seeds for further conflict in the area. 
V. Sources of the Research 
This research benefited from both primary and secondary sources of 
information and data. One must note that there is an abundant literature on 
the Iraq-Kuwait crisis and Desert Storm. The uniqueness of the situation 
created such academic interest on a wide range of issues cutting across 
many fields, economics, politics, international law, military and environmental 
studies. Thus in terms of finding secondary sources of information and data 
the researcher did not face any difficulty. 
As for primary sources, the researcher faced some difficulty in getting some 
data, such as economic data, and information about the environmental 
damage to Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Thus, the researcher depended on 
secondary sources when primary sources were preferred. On the other hand 
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the UN documents pertaining to the crisis were extremely useful as well as 
some Saudi documents. Another valuable source of original data was 
collected through the method of the interview of officials that were directly 
involved in the decision making process during the crisis and other interested 
parties such as academics. The interviews with high level officials in Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, and Egypt were also meant to enrich the research from the 
face to face interpersonal situation of the interview. These were not 
structured interviews but more an open discussion on a variety of issues 
related to the crisis. However the researcher faced some constraints 
concerning carrying out the interviews as follows: 
1. The sensitivity of the subject made many of the interviewees hesitant to 
make definite comments or refused to answer some questions. 
2. The problem of time manifested itself in two ways. Some of the 
interviews were cancelled in the last minute after much time had been 
spent in arranging for them, or were frequently rescheduled. 
3. Some of the respondents refused to consent to a tape recording, 
preferring note-taking. Taping is a much better method because it 
gives a permanent record and does not leave any room for the 
interviewer's bias or misinterpretation. However, the researcher found 
himself during many of the interviews taking notes due to the 
preference of the interviewee. 
The field trips to carry out the interviews were made in two stages. Stage one 
included the following; 
1. A trip to Saudi Arabia, in January 1997, during which contact was made 
with the ministry of foreign affairs, consultative council, the diplomatic 
institute in the ministry of foreign affairs, the secretariat of the GCC, the 
Kuwaiti ambassador in Riyadh, department of political science at King 
Saud University, also the office of Prince Khalid bin Sultan, chief of the 
military staff during the crisis. The exchange of information with the Saudi 
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officials was beneficial in understanding the extent of the pressure that the 
Saudis were under to take a firm action against Saddam because of their 
fear of his ascendancy as a dominant force in the region. In addition, they 
had a responsibility to come to the defence of Kuwait as a member of the 
GCC and as presenting a strategic depth to Saudi Arabia. The political 
national self-interest of Saudi Arabia overrode any other brotherly or Arab 
consideration especially in light of Saddam's uncompromising position 
from the very start of the crisis. Yet, the Saudis were unwilling, as the 
abrupt end of the war showed, to see a divided Iraq and a collapse of its 
internal unity. That too is not in the national self-interest of Saudi Arabia 
and the Gulf region. 
2. A trip to Egypt, in May 1997, during which interviews were held with some 
Egyptian officials such as the minister of education, the director of Cairo 
University, some ambassadors at the ministry of foreign affairs and 
members of the Wafd Party. Egypt played a crucial role in the Arab anti-
Saddam coalition and assessing the Egyptian point of view was essential. 
The opinions expressed by these interviewees reflected opposition to the 
use of force in solving Arab problems and disputes, and the need to 
uphold the Charters of the Arab League and UN by punishing those who 
violate them. Some expressed concern over the impact of the UN 
sanctions regime and the need to reassess its futility in light of the 
suffering of the Iraqi people. 
During the second stage, I undertook a trip to Kuwait, in May 1998. I met with 
some of the staff at Kuwait University and members of the National Assembly. 
My interviewees came from both Sunni and Shi'ite Muslim sects and a variety 
of political affiliations. The views expressed by the interviewees showed that 
the Kuwaitis were still in shock of the Iraqi action and believe they were 
unjustly treated by the Iraqi regime, especially considering the immense 
support Kuwait provided Iraq during its war with Iran. Another striking feature 
of the response of the interviewees is the lack of any willingness for 
conciliation with Iraq as long as Saddam remains in power. A change of 
regime is a prerequisite for any kind of normalisation or reintegration of Iraq 
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into the regional system. There appear to be a deep-seated mistrust and fear 
of Saddam, and an acute awareness of Kuwait's vulnerability and hence its 
need to depend on Western support. It is seen as more secure and 
dependable than any other regional arrangement. 
VI. Scope of the Research 
The study is divided into five chapters in addition to this introductory chapter 
and the conclusion. The focus of chapter two is on the historical development 
of the Iraq-Kuwait border dispute up until the end of the 1980s. It highlights 
the persistence of the dispute between the two countries and the inability to 
reach any sort of peaceful settlement over the past years. Chapter three 
follows the events preceding the invasion and occupation of Kuwait and 
focuses on analysing the motives of Iraq for invading Kuwait. It also 
discusses the important Jedda meeting and the escalation of tension between 
the two countries, which led eventually to the invasion. 
Chapter four investigates the role played by Saudi Arabia through out the 
crisis. It emphasises how significant that was for maintaining the legitimacy of 
the coalition, and the successful waging of the war to liberate Kuwait. It 
touches also on the role played by the Saudi ulama in thwarting opposition 
inside Saudi Arabia and maintaining internal unity in support of Al Saud. In 
addition, the chapter discusses the failure of the GCC to respond to Kuwait's 
occupation without outside assistance as well as the failure of the Arab 
League to contain the crisis and to find an Arab solution. 
Chapter five moves on to analyse the role played by the UN and the many 
resolutions passed by the Security Council since the start of the crisis. 
Among these, resolution 660, resolution 661, resolution 662, resolution 678 
and resolution 687 are discussed in some length. Followed by the debate 
over the legality of some of these resolutions especially resolution 678. The 
regulations and articles of international law and the UN Charter that pertain to 
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the crisis are, also, discussed to highlight the legal frame of reference of the 
chsis and the international response. 
Chapter six is devoted to analysing the consequences of the invasion and the 
Gulf war on Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In addition, it touches upon the 
whole issue of the security of the Gulf that has been highlighted by this chsis. 
The chapter analyses in some detail the political economic, military and 
environmental repercussions of the war on these three counthes and 
highlights the heavy cost of the chsis to the region as a whole. 
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Chapter Two 
The Historical Background of the Iraq-Kuwait Border Dispute 
The legacy of colonialism and the haphazard way in which the Gulf area was 
divided into states is the source of present day territorial disputes. These 
contemporary border disputes are arguably not exclusive to Iraq and Kuwait, 
they include the unresolved border disputes between Iraq and Iran over Shaft 
Al-Arab, and between Iran and United Arab Emirates over the island of Abu 
Musa. Saudi Arabia has its share of border disputes with its neighbours. These 
include firstly its maritime border dispute with Kuwait, which has been agreed to 
only recently. The two countr ies signed an agreement demarcating their 
marit ime border on 2 July 2000.^ Secondly it has a border dispute with Oman 
which has been resolved also recently. A treaty was signed by King Fahd and 
Sultan Qaboos in May 1990, which formalised an agreement, defining their 
common border that was reached in March 1990.^ The border dispute between 
Saudi Arabia and Qatar has been addressed in 1993 in an accord ratified by 
both parties, with Egypt as a guarantor. However the border is still in doubt 
because of the secrecy surrounding the boundary agreement; the details of the 
agreement remains unpubl ished. ^ In other Gulf states there is the renowned 
border dispute between Bahrain and Qatar. Both sides claim the Hawar group 
of islands lying off the West Coast of Qatar and which sits on top of a large gas 
reserve. ^ 
However, the Iraq-Kuwait border dispute stands out because of its long history 
and lack of progress over the years to f ind a satisfactory solution to both parties. 
In order to assess the signif icance of this border dispute and provide the 
background to the decision by Iraq to invade Kuwait in 1990 it is important to 
understand its historical development . This will be done by discussing the 
policies of the colonial powers towards Iraq and Kuwait and the evolution of the 
territorial problem between the two countries in its various stages and up to the 
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1980's. A number of maps are enclosed to demonstrate the historical 
development of this border dispute. 
I. Colonial Powers and the Boundaries of Iraq and Kuwait 
The modern political history of the Arab region has been to a certain extent 
def ined by the great powers of the day: the British, the Ottoman and Russian 
empires. This was the case, especially, from the beginning of the nineteenth 
century up to the Second World War. Also, Germany and France had a 
powerful influence, though not as pervasive in so far as Arabia was concerned. 
The British and the Ot tomans had played the major role in defining the limits of 
their spheres of influence in the Arabian Peninsula up to 1920. From this point 
on , Britain played the dominant role in delimiting the boundaries within its 
colonial domains, particularly in the Arabian Peninsula and surrounding areas. 
A t the San Remo conference in April 1920 Britain received the mandates of 
Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan, while France revieved the mandates of Syria 
and Lebanon. The Peace Treaty of Sevres, which was renegotiated in 1923 at 
Lausanne gave the principle allied powers the nght to all former Ottoman non-
Turkish territories. The British Colonial Office became the major power 
controll ing the delimitation of boundaries in the Arab littoral in the Persian Gulf.^ 
Several local factors also contributed to border problems, such as the migratory 
trends of indigenous tr ibes in search of resources for survival (water, pasture 
and agriculture and sea foods), the lack of conspicuous physical features in the 
desert which blurred border delineation, trade routes which were important on 
coastal and inland regions, and the feudal system of the tribes and its 
hierarchical system perpetuating the rivalry between the dominant tribes and 
their sheikhdoms. Moreover, the power, influence and ambition of Arab states, 
after their independence, compounded with super powers' influence and 
interests, especially during the Cold War era have complicated settlements of 
boundaries. 
In so far as the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border dispute is concerned, overlapping 
authorit ies of the British empire, the rivalry and disagreements between the 
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Foreign Offfce and the Government of India, and lack of a singular British 
department with exclusive jurisdiction over the territories also played an 
important role in further complicating the territorial issue. The territorial claims 
on the part of Iraq were initially based on the need for an outlet to the Gulf. The 
country has access only to shallow waters of nearly 36 miles, while Kuwait had 
far greater and deeper waters of nearly 310 miles. For Kuwait the border issue 
was a matter of territorial sovereignty as well as economic well being, national 
identity and prestige. When oil was discovered, the importance of Kuwait as a 
distinct country increased significantly for both the Kuwaiti ruling family and for 
the West, whose interests in the region has expanded. 
II The Kuwaiti Boundary Issue Before World War I 
It is very important to appreciate that the origin of the conflicts between the 
various tr ibes in the Arabian Peninsula s temmed mainly from ethnic, religious 
and personal rivalries. However, later with the advent of increased commerce 
and trade, and especially with the discovery of oil, they turned sometimes into 
border issues, with economic underpinnings. The British Political Resident, Sir 
Rupert Hay, in describing the Arabian boundaries in the late 1950s, noted that.-
Before the advent of oil, the desert was in many ways similar to 
high seas. Nomads and their camels roamed across it at wil l, 
and though there were vague tribal limits, there were few signs 
of the authority of any establ ished government outside the ports 
and oases. Now every state concerned is anxious to claim as 
large a slice of the desert as possible in the hope that it may 
cover vast quantities of the precious liquid. Histoncal proof of 
the exercise of sovereignty in the past over an uninhabited 
waste is, however, difficult to produce.^ 
In the case of Kuwait its borders became a source of concern to the British 
government in 1902, in particular, fol lowing the occupation by Ottoman troops of 
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three areas: the Safwan, Umm Qasr and the eastern tip of Bubiyan island.'' The 
initial response of the Foreign Office to this came from Foreign Secretary, Lord 
Lansdowne, dated 21 March 1902 when stating that:-
W e have saddled ourselves with an impossible client in the 
person of the Sheikh. . . no one knows where his possessions 
begin and end, and our obligations towards him are as ill 
def ined as the boundaries of his Principality. ® 
The Sheikh of Kuwait responded to the Ottoman occupation by claiming his 
jur isdict ion over these three localities. He based his claim to Safwan on the 
al legiance of certain bedouin tr ibes and that up to ten settled Safwan families 
had paid him tribute for the last forty years. As to Umm Qasr he claimed that 
Kuwait i tr ibes occupied it in the nineteenth century during the reign of Jabir, who 
also erected a fort there. The Foreign Office considered Mubarak's claims too 
shadowy for them to protest against the Ottoman occupation. This lack of 
action on the part of Britain encouraged the Ottomans to go ahead and 
establ ish a garrison of twenty men at Ras - al - Gait on the eastern tip of the 
Bubiyan Island. Mubarak, subsequently, tried to claim Bubiyan on the basis 
that f ishermen from the Awaz im tribe, who paid him allegiance, kept their nets 
there. That too was considered by Britain as insufficient evidence to act upon.^ 
The Baghdad Railway Project played a major role in motivating the Porte to put 
its hands on these localities in order to "Keep an outlet for the railway under 
their own protection, since difficulties had been raised about Kuwait". ^°The lack 
of a desire on the part of Britain for a show down with the Porte was also due to 
a di f ference in British opinion about the railway. Lansdowne was in favour of a 
full British role in the railway project while Curzon, the viceroy of India, opposed 
it completely. In the end this opposition forced Lansdowne to reject 
participation in the project. 
Fol lowing that, Curzon himself showed interest in the future of Kuwait by his 
visit to the area. It was the first t ime that India's Viceroy had come to the area. 
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Curzon suggested that the Kuwaiti Sheikh's claim to Bubiyan, which formed the 
south-western shore of the Khawr Abdul lah, should be actively supported, thus 
pre-empting any possible development of Umm Qasr/Warbah as a railhead by 
the Germans and the Porte. Subsequently, Sheikh Mubarak concluded a 
secret agreement with Major Knox, the British Political Agent in Kuwait, on 15 
October 1907. The deal called for a perpetual lease of Bandar Shuwaikh and 
British rights of pre-emption over Kazima Bay, Warbah and any other territory 
over which the Sheikh of Kuwait might exercise jurisdiction. 
Mubarak, also, repeated his pledge of the 1899 secret agreement not to "grant, 
sell, or lease to a foreign government, and in this is included the Ottoman 
government" any land without Britain's consent. On the other hand Britain 
acknowledged that Kuwait and its future boundaries belong to Sheikh Mubarak 
and his heirs. The 1899 agreement was prompted by British desire to block 
any Russian or German extension of influence in the Persian Gulf. The 
agreement was kept a secret because a formal assertion of a British 
Protectorate over Kuwait would have produced diplomatic complications in its 
dealings with other powers. In addition it would have complicated issues 
closer to home where Ottoman cooperation was needed. 
After drawn-out discussions and meetings between the Sheikh, Ottoman and 
British representatives regarding the political status of Kuwait and its borders 
with Basra, the Gulf Agreement (Anglo-Turkish Convention) was signed on 29 
July 1913. On the Ottoman side was the Foreign Minister, Ibrahim Haqqi Pasha, 
and on the British side was Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey. Accordingly, 
the Porte and Britain agreed on the one hand that Kuwait would be an 
autonomous qadha (district) of the Ottoman Empire, and the Ottoman Empire 
would on the other hand recognise the validity of the 1899 agreement. It also 
agreed to refrain f rom any political, military, and administrative interference in 
the affairs of Kuwait, and the Kuwaiti f lag should be of the Ottomans, but also 
includes the emblem of Kuwait on one of the flag's corners. 
The borderlines of Kuwait were stipulated as beginning from the coast at the 
mouth of Khawr al-Zubair on the north-west which crosses exactly south of 
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Umm Qasr, Safwan and Jabal Sanam and continues on to al-Batin, al-Hiba, 
Warbah and Anta, until it reaches the sea near Jabal Manifa (see map 1). As for 
Kuwait 's land border with Iraq, it was the outer "green line" which was 
subsequent ly adopted as the frontiers (see also map 1). One should note that 
the islands of Warbah and Bubiyan-later to become the subject of contention-
fell within the "inner zone" where "complete autonomy" of the Kuwait Sheikh 
was recognised. ^^The Anglo-Ottoman Agreement reflected the success of the 
British policy in denying to the Ottoman empire and its German ally deep water 
access to the Gulf. The inclusion of Warbah and Bubiyan within the Kuwaiti 
Sheikh's sphere of influence prevented the extension of the Berlin-Baghdad 
Railway to the northern Gulf littoral. 
When the First Wor ld War (1914-1918) eventually broke out. Sheikh Mubarak's 
al l iance with Great Britain proved very important and helpful for the continuation 
of Kuwait 's independence. Britain was concerned about protecting Kuwait's 
northern boundaries with Iraq, and in accordance with the 1899 agreement, it 
kept the Ottoman Empire away f rom these borders by denying any foreign 
interest the use of Kuwait's coast as the terminal point of the Berlin-Baghdad 
railway. '^^  
III Kuwait's Border Issue after World War I 
After the end of the Great War, Britain received the mandate for Iraq on 25 of 
Apri l 1920 at the San Remo Conference, while Kuwait, continued to be 
recognised as a principality under British protection, as set out in the declaration 
of 1914 between British and Sheikh Mubarak. 
Dunng this t ime of heavy British involvement in the politics of the area the 
borders between Najd and Kuwait, and Najd and Iraq were settled by the Uqair 
Conference on 2 December 1922. In this conference Sir Percy Cox, the British 
High Commiss ioner in Baghdad gave Ibn-Saud, the Kuwaiti representatives and 
Iraqi representat ives five days to propose boundary lines. When the time 
lapsed and they could not reach an accord. Cox took out his famous red pencil 
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and unilaterally drew the map of the region. Thus, Cox had a free hand in 
drawing the frontiers, giving Iraq a large part of territory claimed by Najd, and to 
pacify Ibn-Saud, gave him a great part of the territory claimed by Kuwait. In 
addit ion, he outl ined the two neutral zones, one between Najd and Kuwait, and 
the other between Najd and Iraq. 
Accordingly, the frontiers between Iraq and Kuwait remained in 1923 as they 
had been initially derived in the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Convention. An exchange 
of correspondence between the British Political Agent, Major, J. C. More, in 
Kuwait, and Sir Percy Cox, during 1923, defined the boundary between the 
protectorate of Kuwait and the British mandated territory of Iraq, as running 
along the zone of the Green Line of the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Convention. ^° 
Before Iraq gained its admission to the League of Nations as an independent 
state on 3 October 1932, Kuwait's boundaries with Iraq were reconfirmed 
through an exchange of memoranda between Nuri al-Sa'id, Iraq's Prime 
Minister and the British High Commissioner, Sir F. Humphrys, on 21 July 1932. 
The acceptance of these boundaries were reaffirmed by the ruler of Kuwait, 
Sheikh Ahmmad al-Jaber, in a letter written to the British Political Agent in 
Kuwait dated 10 August 1932. Nuri Al-Sa'id described in his letter the existing 
frontier between the two countries as follows: 
From the intersection of the Wadi El Audja with the Batin and 
thence Northwards along the Batin to a point just south of the 
Latitude of Safwan; thence Eastwards passing south of SaWjan 
wells, Jebal Sanam and Umm Qasr, leaving them to Iraq and so 
on to the junction of Khor Zobeir with Khor Abdul lah. The 
islands of Warbah, Bubiyan, Maskan (or Mashjan), Failakah, 
Auhah, Kubbar, Qaru and Umm-el- Maradim appertain to 
Kuwait. 2^ 
As for the letter f rom Sheikh Ahmad it said: 
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His Majesty's Government approves of the frontier proposed by 
the Iraq Prime Minister. And, therefore, we beg to inform you 
that we agree to reaffirm the existing frontier between Iraq and 
Kuwait as descr ibed in the Iraq Prime Minister's letter. 
Through this agreement Britain was trying to show that Iraq possessed settled 
boundaries before its admission to the League of Nations. However, many 
claims and complaints were raised regarding these boundaries, including a 
historical claim to the whole of Iraq. Taufiq al-Suwaidi, Iraqi Foreign Minister 
indicated to Sir Maur ice Peterson, the British Ambassador in Baghdad, in April 
1938, that by right Kuwait should belong to Iraq to reflect its former position as 
part of the Ottoman Wi layat (province) of Basra. He further expanded on this 
in his aide memoire of 28 September 1938 by stating: 
Just before the War of 1914-1918, Kuwait was an autonomous 
qadha of the Wilayat of Basra. The Iraqi Government as the 
successor to the Ottoman government in the Wilayats of Mosul, 
Baghdad and Basra, considers that Kuwait should properly be 
incorporated in Iraq. If incorporation should take place, Iraq would 
agree to maintain the local autonomy of Kuwait with a guarantee in 
the form of a special statute, but of course without prejudice to 
sovereignty. 
Al-Suwaidi 's historical claim was rejected outright by Britain, and he was told on 
6 October 1938 by the British Embassy that "Kuwait finally became completely 
independent of Turkey and Kuwaiti nationality finally came into existence on the 
same date as Iraq and Iraqi nationality". 
However, the British Government was wil l ing to discuss the possibility of 
granting Iraq port facil it ies, after al-Suwaidi indicated in March 1938 that Iraq 
would like to possess an alternative outlet to the Gulf other than the Shatt al-
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Arab, preferably an Iraqi-controlled port on Kuwait Bay, or along the Khawr al-
Zubair. 
During that year various departments of the British government were involved 
in discussing such a possibility. For that end a survey was undertaken in 1939 
by Colonel Sir John Ward of Khawr Zubair which established that the most 
suitable site for a port was at a point two and a half miles south east of Umm 
Qasr. Iraq for the effective protection of the port needed Kuwait to cede the 
islands of Warbah sand Bubiyan. The letter dispatched on 16 December 1939 
from Lacy Baggallay of the Foreign Office to the India Office in CO 723/16/17 
supported an Iraqi control of the Khawr Abdullah. He stated that 
It is understandable that the state which controls the 
Mesopotamian plain should desire to have undivided control of 
at least one good means of access to the sea, and Lord Halifax 
thinks that on a long view it is likely that, if Iraq were given this 
access, it would make for steadier conditions in that part of the 
world in years to come.^'' 
The Government of India and their staff in the Persian Gulf argued against an 
Iraqi control from the point of view that such an eventuality would threaten the 
economic well being of Kuwait which might itself want to develop port facilities 
on the inlet. Also Sheikh Ahmad expressed no intention of ceding these 
islands to Iraq. According to Lieutenant Colonel Charles Prior, the Political 
Resident, the Kuwaiti ruler stated that he would give Iraq "nothing at al l" and 
that "all he wanted...was that they should keep out of Kuwait 
Subsequent ly the lack of progress on this issue turned British attention to 
demarcat ing the land boundary. In July 1939 the British Ambassador in 
Baghdad Sir Basil Newton prepared a draft exchange of notes arranging for the 
demarcat ion of the Kuwait-Iraq boundary. By Feb 1940 all relevant British 
departments had given their approval to Newton's interpretation of the 
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boundary. As a result the British Ambassador to Baghdad recommended in his 
letter dated 7 October 1940 to the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs the following 
scheme for demarcat ion: 
1. "Along the Batin" the frontier line shall fol low the thalweg, i.e. the line of the 
deepest depression. 
2. The "point just south of the latitude of Safwan" shall be the point on the 
thalweg of the Batin due West of the point a little to the south of Safwan at 
which the post and notice board marking the frontier stood until March 1939. 
3. From the Batin in the neighbourhood of Safwan the frontier shall be a line 
along the parallel of latitude on which stands the above-mentioned point at 
which the post and notice board formerly stood. 
4. The "junction of Khawr Zubair with the Khawr Abdullah" shall mean the 
junction of the thalweg of Khawr Zubair with the thalweg of the north watery 
arm of the Khawr Abdul lah known as the Khawr Shetana. 
5. From the neighbourhood of Safwan to the junction of the Khawr Zubair with 
the Khawr Abdul lah the frontier shall be the shortest line between the point 
defined in sub-paragraph (2) above and the point defined in sub-paragraph 
(4) above. But if this line shall be found, when followed on the ground, to 
strike the right bank of Khawr Zubair before it reaches the point defined in 
sub-paragraph (4), it shall be modified in such a manner as to follow the low 
water line on the right bank of the Khawr Zubair until a point on the bank 
immediately opposite the point defined in sub-paragraph (4) is reached, thus 
leaving the whole of the Khawr Zubair to Iraq. 
6. From the point def ined in sub-paragraph (4) to the open sea, the boundary 
shall fol low the thalweg of the Khawr Abdul lah. 
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Kuwait has officially approved this scheme while Iraq officially communicated its 
answer to Sir Newton in March 1941 indicating that any demarcation before the 
islands of Warbah and Bubiyan are ceded by Kuwait is not possible. 
Following the independence of India, the famous Foreign Office - Government 
of India rivalries and disagreements were gone and that helped in creating a 
more conducive atmosphere for a concerted policy towards the demarcation of 
the boundary between Kuwait and Iraq. Thus during the mid-1950s there was 
a great deal of effort to sort out the boundary issue between the two countries. 
For example, in order to obtain solid foundations for the future expansion of the 
town and port of Umm Qasr, the Iraqi government announced in May 1955 its 
desire to advance its frontier to a depth of some four kilometres covering a 
desert strip besides the island of Warbah and the waters of Khawr Abdul lah 
(see map 1).^° 
Sir Michael Wright, the British Ambassador in Baghdad, linked this proposal 
with the project to pipe fresh water f rom the Shaft al-Arab across the Fao 
peninsula to Kuwait. He also suggested that both the Umm Qasr scheme and 
Shaft al-Arab water carrier scheme should be arranged on long-lease of 99 
years terms. Al though, Sheikh Abdullah al-Salem gave his provisional approval 
in June 1955, he retreated, and the boundary remained undemarcated at the 
end of 1957.^^ 
After Kuwait rejected joining the 1955 Baghdad Pact, Nuri al-Sa'id attempted, in 
February 1958, an Arab Federation between the Hashemite monarchs of 
Baghdad and Amman. He hoped to draw Kuwait into this federation. Waldemar 
J. Gal lman, the US Ambassador in Baghdad, perceived that al-Sa'id was 
desperate, wil l ing to concede almost anything to win Kuwait's participation 
including demarcat ion of the frontier on Kuwaiti terms and a guarantee of the 
Sheikh's sovereignty. Any such proposal disappeared when the Hashemite 
monarchy was overthrown by the revolution of 14 July 1958 and a republican 
regime was installed in Baghdad. 
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IV Iraq's Claim over Kuwait during the Qassem Era 1958-1963 
General Abdul Karim Qassem and the Free Officers took over the Government 
of Iraq and of course the Kuwait-Iraq boundary dispute now had new faces 
involved in the negotiations. The relationship between Iraq and Kuwait became 
warm and friendly. In fact, Iraq encouraged Kuwait to pursue its independence 
from Britain. Accordingly, the Sheikh took up Iraq's advice, and asked Britain to 
allow it to pursue direct relationship with other Arab states and conduct its own 
international affairs. General Qassem received the Kuwaiti Amir, Sheikh 
Abdul lah al-Salem, in October 1958 to discus bilateral relations but once again 
little progress was made over the critical border question. 
During late 1960 Sheikh Abdul lah began discreet negotiations with Britain 
concerning the full independence of Kuwait. At the end of these negotiations 
the state of Kuwait gained its independence on 19 June 1961 by an exchange 
of notes between Sir Wil l iam Luce, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, 
and Emir Abdul lah. The fol lowing conclusions were reached in the course of 
these negotiations: 
1. The 1899 Agreement shall be terminated as being inconsistent with the 
sovereignty and independence of Kuwait. 
2. The relations between the two countries shall continue to be governed by a 
spirit of close friendship. 
3. When appropriate the two governments shall consult together on matters, 
which concern them both. 
4. Nothing in these conclusions shall affect the readiness of Her Majesty's 
government to assist the government of Kuwait if the latter request such 
assistance. ^ 
29 
Provisions 3 and 4 particularly incensed the Iraqis and they accused Britain of 
having merely pretended to grant Kuwait independence. On 25 June 1961, 
General Qassem announced in a press conference that Kuwait was part of Iraq 
and declared his intention to issue a decree appointing Sheikh Abdullah al-
Salem a Qa'im Maqam of al-Kuwait qadha. He also said: 
W e will l iberate this section of the Iraqi territory...We are capable of 
obtaining all our rights. But we always resort to peaceful mean...I 
assure you that peaceful methods are useless with imperialism. 
On 26 June 1961, the Iraqi government issued a memorandum to Arab and 
foreign embassies in Baghdad, in which it explained the historical and legal 
basis of its claim to Kuwait. It also stated that British imperialism had been 
penetrating the Arab World for its military and economic interests since the 14th 
century. For these reasons, the British government gradually took over Kuwait 
and separated it f rom Iraq. Because of the Iraqi perception that foreign 
powers were both exploit ing and oppressing the Arab nation, the government 
began to take act ion to reinforce its claims. The British Ambassador in 
Baghdad, Humphery Trevelyan, in his book. The Middle East in Revolution, 
stated that shortly after Qassem's territorial and sovereignty claims over Kuwait, 
evidence suggested that Iraqi troops were being mobilised towards the Kuwaiti 
border. However, the key question remains whether Iraq was ever intending 
to invade or whether its troops' mobilisation was merely a show of force. 
Sheikh Abdul lah, as a result of Iraqi mobilisation called on Kuwait's allies to 
assist in its defence. On June 30 1961 he dispatched a note to the British 
Consul General in Kuwait, John Richmond, saying: 
In view of the military movements which have been undertaken 
by the Iraqi Government on the borders of Kuwait and which are 
such as to threaten the security of Kuwait, I have decided to 
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submit a request to Her Majesty's Government in accordance 
with the notes which I exchanged with Sir Will iam Luce, the 
political resident on June 19, 1961.^® 
In addit ion, he sent an urgent telegram to King Saud Ibn Abdul-Aziz pleading 
Kuwait's case as follows: 
Broadcasting stations yesterday announced reports regarding 
the press conference which was held by General Abdul Karim 
Qassem, in which he demanded to annex the independent Arab 
country Kuwait to Iraq. W e therefore, condemn this 
announcement which contradicts with the principles of 
International Law. W e are very sure, that your Majesty 
appreciates the Kuwait's Government resolute stand for the 
defence of Kuwait's independence, and which is hopeful to find 
in your government support in facilitating its legitimate rights for 
defence of its independence. 
Al though, most of the Arab states hesitated at the beginning of the crisis to 
show their support for Kuwait, King Saud duly replied to the Kuwaiti Amir in the 
following telegram: 
Your telegram has outlined what General Qassem declared, and in 
actual fact, this stand is astonishing and sorrowful, but we are with 
you in happiness and sadness, and we would be faithful to whatever 
we had agreed upon. We are fully ready to confront any threat which 
Kuwait may face. ^° 
In addit ion. King Saud declared later in a press conference that " if General 
Qassem puts himself the bequeather of the Ottoman empire, then his power 
ought to extend from Middle Europe to the limits of Asia and Africa". 
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From this perspective, it seems that Saudi Arabia was the first country to 
support Kuwait morally and materially. The Saudi gesture was due to its 1942 
fr iendship treaty with Kuwait that developed in 1947 into the Saudi-Kuwaiti 
mutual defence treaty. This treaty was in reality a pledge from Saudi Arabia to 
secure and defend Kuwait politically and/or militarily from the threat of any 
outside power. Saudi Arabia offered Kuwait strong support because Iraq 
indirectly threatened not only Kuwait but also the small Arab sheikhdoms as 
wel l . To the extent that Iraq was aspiring to be the dominant power in the Gulf 
region, this represented a perceived threat to the national security of Saudi 
Arabia. Consequently, the Saudi ambassador to Iraq was instructed to officially 
inform the Iraqi government that any military aggression against Kuwait would 
be considered a direct aggression against Saudi Arabia. ''^ 
In order to bolster Kuwait 's security, Britain announced on 1 July 1961 that the 
ruler of Kuwait had asked for assistance and subsequently a detachment of 
British t roops arrived by air f rom Kenya the very same day. Already, Britain on 
29 June 1961 had ordered its aircraft carrier. Victorious, and other warships in 
different locations in the Middle East and Africa to head to Kuwait. By the end 
of June 7,000 British t roops were entrenched in defensive positions along 
Kuwait 's northern and western borders supported by air and naval forces. 
Another 150 Saudi Arabian troops were employed in the defence of the Iraqi-
Kuwait i - Saudi boundary at the junction of batin with Wadi al Aujah. 
Between 2-7 July 1961 the Security Council met at the request of the United 
Kingdom (on behalf of Kuwait) to discuss the threat to peace and security 
created by hostile Iraqi movements against Kuwait. After four meetings the 
Security Council voted on two resolutions. The first was presented by Great 
Britain call ing for full recognit ion of the independence and territorial integrity of 
Kuwait. The Soviet Union vetoed this resolution because it did not call for the 
wi thdrawal of British t roops from Kuwait. The second was submitted by the 
United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria) calling for the withdrawal of British 
forces f rom Kuwait. This resolution also failed because it did not get the 
required votes of the members of the Security Council. 
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Dunng the deliberations of the Security Council Iraq gave assurances that it will 
not use military force to solve its problem with Kuwait, and announced its desire 
for a peaceful settlement. It also criticised the military intervention by Britain 
and accordingly asked for the withdrawal of such forces. Iraqi diplomacy 
succeeded, thus, in turning the situation from being about Iraq's aggression to 
one about foreign interference in the region and British imperialism versus Arab 
nationalism. 
A strong British military presence in Kuwait inflamed the anti-imperialist 
sentiment of the general Arab populace and some Arab governments, 
especially Egypt. In order to diffuse the tension, the Moroccans and Saudis 
came up with a formula for Kuwait's admission to the Arab League at the 
Council meeting on 20 July 1961.' '^ Accordingly, the Council issued resolution 
1777-35 containing three parts. The first part included the undertaking of the 
Kuwaiti government to request the withdrawal of British forces from Kuwaiti 
territory as soon as possible while the Iraqi government undertakes not to use 
force in the annexation of Kuwait to Iraq. As for the Council, it undertook on 
its part to support every wish Kuwait may express for a union or a federation 
with other Arab countries in accordance with the League's pact. The second 
part included the Council 's decision to welcome the state of Kuwait as a 
member of the Arab League and to assist it in joining the United Nations. Whi le 
the third part included the pledge of Arab states to provide effective assistance 
for the preservation of Kuwait's independence upon its request. 
The Arab League's peacekeeping force was sent to Kuwait during the period 
September-October 1961 after it became a full member of the organisation. 
The contingent comprised about 3,300 men divided among Arab states as 
follows: 1,200 from Saudi Arabia; 1,200 from U.A.R; 400 from Sudan; 300 from 
Jordan; and 200 from Tunisia, under the command of the Saudi Major-General 
Abdullah al-'Isa. No military clashes were reported between the Arab 
peacekeeping troops and Iraqi forces along the border. Moreover, Iraq had 
withdrawn its regular customs police to Basra city in order to minimise the 
probability and risk of such clashes. In response to the initiative of the Arab 
33 
League, British military forces left Kuwait between 10-11 October 1961 except 
for some advisors. 
On 30 November 1961, Qassem's regime scored a diplomatic victory when 
Kuwait's application for membership to the United Nations was vetoed by the 
Soviet Union in the Security Council. The Iraqi Foreign Minister Hashim Jawad 
declared on 26 December 1961 that "Iraq would have to reconsider her attitude 
regarding her diplomatic relations with countries who established such relations 
with Kuwait". Iraqi ambassadors, subsequently, were recalled from all 
countries that had received Kuwait's ambassadors. During 1962 the list was 
extended to include some friendly countries such as Jordan, Lebanon and 
Tunisia in the Arab world, and Japan, India and the United States outside the 
Arab region. ^° It should be noted that by the end of 1961 the total number of 
countries that recognised Kuwait was 62. 
V. The Iraqi-Kuwaiti Border Dispute in the 1960s 
On 8 February 1963, President Qassem was overthrown and summahly 
executed the following day. His deputy, Abdul Salam Muhammad Aref, was 
nominated as president. Aref refused Qassem's plea for clemency despite the 
fact that Qassem had pardoned him in 1961 after he had been sentenced to 
death for trying to kill Qassem. The Amir of Kuwait was relieved by the change, 
and a new warm relationship seemed to develop between the two rulers. The 
Arab League troops were withdrawn from Kuwaiti territory and the Soviet Union, 
which had previously opposed the admission of Kuwait to the United Nations, 
dropped its objections. Kuwait was admitted on 7 May 1963 to the United 
Nations as its 111th full member. 
In order to express its brotherly attitude towards Kuwait as an internationally 
recognised state in the region, senior Iraqi governmental officials, including the 
defence and foreign ministers, visited Kuwait on 13 May 1963 with the view to 
negotiate a new bilateral agreement concerning relations between the two 
34 
countries. However, as a precondition to the agreement, Iraq attempted to 
persuade Kuwait to abrogate the Anglo-Kuwaiti treaty of 19 June 1961. 
Although the Kuwaiti government declined Iraq's suggestion, the negotiations 
which were hosted in Baghdad finally ended on 4 October 1963 with the 
intended Kuwaiti-Iraqi agreement. 
This agreement entitled The Agreed Minutes Regarding ttie Restoration of 
Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters has three main features. 
The first is the recognition by Iraq of the independence and complete 
sovereignty of the state of Kuwait with its boundaries as specified in the 1932 
correspondence. The second is the emphasis of the two governments to work 
towards reinforcing the fraternal relations between the two countries, inspired by 
their national duty, common interests and aspiration to complete Arab Unity. 
The third is the reference to the two governments' intention to work towards 
establishing cultural, commercial and economic co-operation and the exchange 
of technical information. 
Iraq's recognition of Kuwaiti sovereignty costed Kuwait 30 million Kuwaiti Dinars 
in the form of a loan. This loan was interest-free to be repaid in 19 instalments 
over twenty five years. As a result of this arrangement, diplomatic relations 
were established and ambassadors were exchanged shortly, thereafter. Also, 
the two countries entered into several different agreements, the most 
comprehensive of these was the Iraqi-Kuwaiti Agreement on Economic Co-
operation and Protocol on Investment that was signed on 25 October 1964. " 
Although the 1963 agreement terminated Iraq's claim to sovereignty over 
Kuwaiti territory, land claims by Iraq over Kuwait took a different form. It 
surfaced as a border dispute instead. Consequently, the period between 1963 
and 1972 was marked by several incidents on the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border. Iraq had 
three major motives in its pursuit of control over part of the Kuwaiti territory. 
First, this dispute as mentioned before was based on Iraq's need to build a 
deeper water tanker temninal. By extending its borders deep into Kuwaiti 
territory, Iraq would have been more disposed to greater access to the Gulf. 
Second, the rise of Iran as a regional power, especially after Britain's withdrawal 
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from the Gulf, accentuated Iraq's need for more territory, particularly on the 
Persian Gulf, in order to challenge Iran and to strengthen its strategic location. 
Third, economic interest played a major role in Iraq's territorial designs on its 
neighbour, given Kuwaiti's oil revenues and deposits. 
Given the persistence of the Kuwaiti border disputes, the government started to 
look for lasting border solutions with its neighbours. Accordingly, in 1965 
Kuwait succeeded in reaching an agreement with Saudi Arabia over the 
boundary line between them. In a similar way Kuwait sought to arrive at an 
acceptable agreement with Iraq. In fact, the Amir of Kuwait, Sheikh Subah 
Salim al-Sabah, initiated a visit to Iraq in June 1966 precisely for this purpose. 
The two governments reached an agreement and finally issued a joint 
communique proposing to establish a committee to delineate the boundaries 
between the two countries in the very near future. ^ However, it was not until 
February 1967 that the committee actually met. 
The committee held its first meeting in Baghdad duhng the period 26 February-
3 March 1967. These sessions were not positive. The Kuwaiti delegation 
hoped to delineate the boundaries as described in the 1932 agreement while 
the Iraqi delegation sought to present new proposals instead of dealing with the 
mandated agreement. For instance Baghdad raised the issue of its territorial 
claim for an outlet to the Gulf through the Khawr Abdullah, which is almost 
entirely blocked by Kuwait's Bubiyan and Warbah islands. Consequently, the 
negotiations failed as no movement was made on the border issues. 
On 18 April 1967, an Iraqi border force violated Kuwaiti territorial sovereignty 
and tore down tents belonging to some Kuwaiti citizens inside the country. This 
incident prompted a swift reaction from the government of Kuwait who 
condemned the attack and moved additional troops to the frontier. In addition, 
Kuwait recalled its ambassador to Iraq for briefing. Baghdad followed suit by 
ordering troops build-up in the conflict area. It also summoned its ambassador 
to Kuwait for consultations. However, Iraq later considered the incident a 
mistake and the crisis was diffused, but the border dispute remained 
unresolved. 
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VI. The Iraqi-Kuwaiti Border Dispute during the 1970s 
On 30 July 1968, Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr took over as the new Baathist president 
of Iraq. It had been al-Bakr who signed the 1963 agreement that recognised 
Kuwait's independence and territorial sovereignty. However, the behaviour of 
successive Iraqi leadership clearly indicated that Baghdad had not really taken 
its recognition of Kuwait seriously and tensions over the border persisted. 
The first encroachment of Kuwaiti sovereignty by Iraq during the 1970s 
occurred in December 1972. A road-building crew, under the protection of an 
Iraqi military brigade, crossed the Kuwaiti border and started building a road 
leading to the Gulf. This was followed by Iraq massing its troops along the 
border. Some believed that this sudden move against Kuwait was an attempt 
by Baghdad to force Kuwait to provide it with financial assistance because of its 
huge foreign exchange shortages. ^ However, Iraq justified its action on the 
grounds of national defence because of a perceived military threat from Iran. 
The second, more serious, incident took place at the beginning of March 1973, 
after Kuwait rejected a draft treaty that would accord extensive rights to Iraq, 
including oil export facilities. The Iraqis reacted to this by erecting an 
installation at al-Samitah-, which is a strategic spot, located two kilometres 
inside Kuwait, south west of the important Iraqi port of Umm Qasr. The Kuwaitis 
tried to stop the work of the Iraqis and as a result, on 20 March 1973, the Iraqi 
army penetrated the Kuwaiti border and occupied a police post at al-Samitah. 
This incident resulted in the death of two Kuwaiti policemen, one Iraqi, and 
several were injured. 
Immediately following the Iraqi action, the Amir of Kuwait sought a diplomatic 
and political solution to the crisis. He sent an urgent message to the leaders of 
the Arab world explaining the situation between the two countries. He further 
suggested that rapid Arab mediation to block the possibility of any further 
military escalation in the border conflict between the two countries should occur 
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as soon as possible. Moreover, the Kuwaiti government protested directly to 
the Iraqi government and requested the immediate withdrawal of its troops from 
al-Samitah border post and urged it to solve the crisis through negotiation. 
Considerable diplomatic efforts, subsequently, ensued in the region in order to 
diffuse the crisis. Saudi Arabia appealed to both countries to exercise "patience 
and self restraint" and to settle the dispute peacefully. Although it was 
rumoured that Saudi troops have entered Kuwait, these reports were denied by 
the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister. The movement of Saudi troops on their northern 
borders appeared to be limited to defensive position against any possible Iraqi 
attempt to solve its border dispute with Saudi Arabia. ^° 
Arab reaction to the Iraqi attack was disapproving and the Arab League, the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the Front line states, of Egypt, 
Syria and Jordan, were actively involved in containing the dispute in light of the 
difficult period the Arab world was passing through and the prospect of an 
imminent war with Israel. ®^  The two Western powers with interests in the area 
the US and UK adopted a hands-off policy. Britain did not feel the security of 
Kuwait was seriously threatened while the US had no leverage in Iraq. It was 
the Soviet Union that showed at the time much interest in the crisis by 
supporting Iraq morally through announcing a visit by Gorshkov and Soviet navy 
to Iraq during the period 3-11 April. The Soviet Union was showing support for a 
border adjustment, which would lessen Iraq's dependence on its neighbours for 
the protection of its maritime and petroleum operations. However they were at 
the same time pressuring the Iraqis to cool down the crisis. After the visit of 
Iraq's Vice President to the Soviet Union Iraq agreed to resume talks with 
Kuwait and to withdraw from the border post. ^ 
Thus Soviet pressure and Arab mediation played a major role in dampening the 
crisis. Most of the Iraqi troops started to withdraw from Kuwait on 5 April 1973 
and talks were held between Iraq and Kuwait between 6-8 April 1973. 
However, no terms of agreement were reached to settle the dispute. 
38 
Saddam Hussein, the Vice President at that time, stated in August 1973 that 
the Iraqi penetration of Kuwait in March was a mistake by the Iraq police. He 
further offered his country's co-operation with all the Gulf Arab states regarding 
conflicts in the region. During a meeting held in August 1973 between the 
Kuwaiti Crown Prince and Prime Minister, and Vice President of Iraq the same 
disagreements prevailed. The Kuwaitis refused to cede or rent the two disputed 
islands in exchange for the delineation of the boundary. However they 
maintained that all kinds of cooperation is possible once the boundary is 
delineated according to the previous treaties of 1932 and 1963. 
The Kuwaiti Minister of Defence, in an interview with Abdul Latif al-Rumaihi, 
pointed out that the Kuwaiti government firmly believed that the Iraqi 
government had never been serious in seeking a solution to the problem. He 
added that the Iraqis had been keen to prolong the problem so that they can 
always put pressure on Kuwait in order to achieve financial and political gains. 
There were a few proposals during the period 1975-1977 for a resolution of 
the border dispute and the islands in question. But these proposals were not 
entirely new and contributed very little to resolving the dispute. 
VII. The Iraqi-Kuwaiti Dispute during the 1980s 
During the Iran-Iraq war a mutual dependency developed between the Iraqi 
regime and the Gulf states. Saddam was seen as the only regional power 
capable of containing the Iranian threat to the security and stability of the area, 
while the Gulf states had the financial resources to support the Iraqi regime in 
its war effort. The Gulf states from the onset of the war provided substantial 
financial and logistics support to Iraq. During the period between Nov 1980 -
September 1981 Saudi Arabia provided transhipment of military and civilian 
supplies as well as $ 10 billion in financial assistance. Estimates put the total 
assistance offered to Iraq by Saudi Arabia at around $27 billion. 
Kuwait's support to Iraq was also substantial. It provided Baghdad with interest 
free loans and grants totalling $10 billion. This facility had been extended in two 
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major phases. By the end of 1981, $6 billion had been loaned to Iraq on 
interest free terms, to be repaid within ten years. As a result of the Iranian 
capture of al-Faw peninsula in early 1986 - which considerably increased 
Kuwait's sense of vulnerability - support for the Iraqi war effort was expressed in 
a much more overt manner than had hitherto been the case. Consequently, 
there was another surge in financial aid to Baghdad. From 1983 until the 
cease-fire in 1988, Kuwait provided Iraq with the revenue derived from a daily 
production of up to 125 thousand barrels from fields in the northern sector of the 
former Kuwaiti-Saudi neutral zone. The trans-shipment facilities from Mina 
Shuwikh, granted to Iraq in late 1979, remained open to Baghdad's government 
throughout the war. °^ 
Also economic co-operation throughout the war increased substantially. An 
important aspect of this co-operation was the May 1986 agreement between 
Kuwait and Iraq, whereby Kuwait received on average 200 million cubic feet per 
day of associated gas from the southern Iraqi Rumaila field. This agreement 
provided Iraq with a $250 million annually. The invasion of Kuwait put a stop to 
this mutually beneficial deal. ''^  
Despite the warming of relations between Iraq and Kuwait and the invaluable 
support, financial and other wise, the two countries remained strained by the 
issue of Warbah and Bubiyan. In fact the war highlighted the importance of 
these two islands to Iraq. The first discussion, during the 1980s between the 
Kuwaiti government and Baghdad took place in Feb 1981. Iraq was ready to 
demarcate the land boundary according to the 1932 and 1963 agreements on 
the condition that Kuwait leased Warbah and Bubiyan. The Kuwaitis on top of 
their usual reservations about this were fearful of Iran, since it had threatened to 
drag them into the war if they lease the islands to Iraq. Another discussion took 
place in Nov 1984 between the Iraqi Foreign Minister and the Crown Prince and 
Prime Minister of Kuwait. That meeting raised hopes that an acceptable 
proposal between the two parties was imminent. Unfortunately no progress 
was made on the issue. 
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During the Iran-Iraq war Kuwait had the opportunity to assert its sovereignty 
over the islands and the northern zone. It established a military presence, an 
agricultural settlement, a new town was planned for Sabiya and a bridge built 
across the Khawr Sabiya to Bubiyan island. The regime in Iraq in the face of 
Kuwait's reluctance to compromise over the issue and its need for Kuwaiti help 
and support put the issue on the back burner in the last two years of the war. 
Well after the cease-fire with Iran, Iraq in late 1989 renewed its proposal to 
exchange demarcation of the land border for Bubiyan and Warbah islands. In 
addition, it promised to offer Kuwait relatively well-watered inland strips of Iraqi 
territory. "^^  The Kuwaiti government was still unwilling to accept this 
compromise and the situation was left to deteriorate until the invasion occurred. 
VIII Conclusion 
The seeds of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border dispute were planted during the colonial 
period. By the end of 1957, Britain had failed to reconcile Iraq to the boundary it 
had earlier agreed to in the official correspondence of 1932. Iraq consistently 
demanded the cession or the lease of the islands as the basis for the 
demarcation of boundary, while Kuwait refused to entertain any Iraqi objectives 
before boundaries were secure. Britain had by 1951 finally decided on what 
was the boundary line that was fixed in 1932. However, that demarcation was 
hardly satisfactory and a poor attempt at improving the patchy definition of 
1932. Thus by the end of 1957 the boundary remained untriangulated and 
undemarcated. 
Attempts by successive governments in Baghdad to reach a satisfactory 
solution on the issue failed. Kuwait was unwilling to neither relinquish Warbah 
and Bubiyan, nor exchange the demarcation of borders with their lease. The 
Iraqi regime twice asserted a historical claim to Iraq. The first was in 1938 and 
the second, the more serious one was during the Qassem era, when the Iraqi 
regime mobilised its troops on the border. The crisis was quickly diffused by the 
readiness of Saudi Arabia and Britain to engage their troops in the defence of 
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Kuwait. Such a claim and a readiness to act upon it were not to be repeated 
until the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 
Yet incursions and encroachments on the sovereignty of Kuwait were common 
culminating in the major al-Samitah incident in 1973. That incident was 
extremely important in raising the territorial consciousness of the Kuwaitis; 
ships, businesses and shops began to be named after the northern border 
region. It was also the second time Saudi Arabia demonstrated solidarity with 
Kuwait in dealing with Iraq's territorial ambitions. It is interesting to note that 
Iraqi Vice President, Saddam Hussein, at the time of the incident denounced 
the Iraqi action as a mistake and offered to co-operate with Kuwait. 
The war with Iran and the dispute over the Shaft al-Arab took priority and 
relegated the border dispute with Kuwait to the background. Also, the help and 
support needed from Kuwait and other Gulf states was a much more pressing 
and crucial element for Baghdad than the border issue with Kuwait. Still some 
attempts were made during the war to reach a solution but without any success. 
The last attempt by Iraq occurred in 1989 as President Saddam Hussein sought 
the lease the Warbah and Bubiyan Islands for a period of 22 years or 99 years 
in exchange with relinquishing Iraq's claim to all of Kuwait. This proposal was 
rejected by Kuwait and the problem lingered until the Iraqi invasion and 
occupation of Kuwait. 
During the entire period of the Kuwait - Iraq territorial and border dispute, three 
features stand out. Firstly, the Saudis were the foremost regional state that 
supported fully the sovereignty of Kuwait. Secondly, foreign support for Kuwait 
was always assured as the British ensured that Kuwaiti territorial integrity was 
never permanently violated. Events following the Gulf Crisis in 1990 pointed to 
history repeating itself: the Saudis and Western powers swiftly assured the 
defence of Kuwait. Lastly is the intransigence of both parties, reflected in the 
longevity of this dispute and the inability to find any grounds for compromise. 
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Chapter Three 
Prelude to the 1990-1991 Gulf Crisis 
The previous chapter showed that the border dispute between Iraq and Kuwait 
has been of long standing, and had its origins in a mixture of territorial, 
economic and political issues, most paramount among them is the issue of 
access to the Gulf. The end of the Iran-Iraq war, in August 1988, increased the 
pressure on Iraq to improve access to the Gulf, since the war ended without the 
point of contention about the delineation of the Shaft al-Arab being resolved. 
Under the Algiers Agreement in 1975, Iraq accepted thalweg (deepest 
navigational channel or line of continues deepest soundings) as the frontier. ^ It 
was this agreement that Iraq repudiated as a prelude to the Iran-Iraq war, only 
to return to it after invading Kuwait. The insecure status of the Shaft al-Arab 
made the resolution of the border dispute with Kuwait, especially the issue of 
access to the islands of Warbah and Bubiyan more acute. 
The capacity of Basra, Iraq's principal port at the mouth of the Shaft al-Arab has 
been saturated since the seventies. The alternative for Iraq was the 
development of its second port, Umm Qasr, situated on the Khawr Zubair inlet. 
Kuwait's ownership of Bubiyan and Warbah limits Iraq's control over this inlet 
and the Khawr Abdullah link. Thus Iraq has been forced to utilise the Khawr 
Shetana channel which needs constant dredging to remain navigable. The 
blocking of the Shaft al-Arab with debris of war and accumulated silt, the need 
to improve access to the Gulf, the protracted never ending negotiations with the 
Kuwaitis, and the deteriorating economic situation, were some of the factors 
pushing the Iraqis towards a military venture to capture these two islands and 
the resources of Kuwait. 
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When Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990 the surprise was not all 
due to lack of intelligence information about the movements of the Iraqi army or 
the intentions of the Iraqi regime. Such information was available to intelligence 
agencies regionally and internationally, and Saddam had made several 
announcements declaring his intention to act if negotiations with the Kuwaitis 
failed. The surprise was in the scale of the invasion. The expectation of both 
Arabs and Americans was that any action on the part of Iraq would be of a 
limited nature and not a full invasion of Kuwait. 
This chapter will concentrate on the developments that directly preceded the 
invasion, and analyse the conditions and factors that prompted the Iraqis to take 
such a course of action. 
I Escalation of Tensions in the Gulf 
One can discern in the political climate of the Gulf area over the months directly 
preceding the invasion two major visible Iraqi orientations. The first is the 
intensification of the propaganda campaign against Israel and the second is the 
escalation of tension with Kuwait. The following is a discussion of each 
separately. 
A. The Propaganda Campaign against Israel 
By heightening the propaganda campaign against Israel, the Iraqi regime was 
aiming at exploiting the anti-Israeli Arab feelings in order to cultivate Arab 
sympathy and a public image of Iraq as a powerful Arab country capable of 
challenging Israel. ^ When Arab support for Iraq was at its peak, Iraq played on 
its differences with Kuwait escalating them into a crisis in the hope that Arabs 
would accept its takeover of Kuwait as a first step towards the liberation of 
Palestine. The linkage between the Palestinian question and the Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait was, therefore, not an outcome of the crisis, but was part of the 
regime's strategy. And Saddam "was no more sincere about Palestine than 
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Bush was sincere about upholding international law and Justice over Kuwait". ^ 
It was simply an extremely potent issue to rally Arab support around the Iraqi 
regime. 
Iraq since the end of its war with Iran, and contrary to expectations that it would 
focus its efforts and its resources on the socio-economic development of Iraq, 
choose instead to focus on re-building its military capabilities and its air defence 
systems while doubling its production of chemical and biological weapons 
beyond the defence needs of Iraq. Hence the Iraqi army was considered one of 
the biggest armies in the region and the fourth largest growing army in the 
world. Its total regular armed forces stood at 1,000,000 in comparison to 
20,300 for Kuwait and 67,800 for Saudi Arabia. Its battle tanks were 5,500 and 
armoured combat vehicles were 7,500 while its air force included 40,000 
regulars and 689 combat aircraft. Saudi Arabia on the other hand had 550 
battle tanks and 1,600 armoured vehicles and Kuwait had 245 battle tanks and 
445 armoured vehicles. Kuwaiti air force had 2,200 regulars and 35 combat 
aircraft while Saudi Arabia had 22,000 regulars and 189 combat aircrafts (all 
these figures are for the year 1990). '* 
On 2 April 1990 Saddam made his statement that "he would set half Israel on 
fire, if it ever attempted to strike at Iraq". Saddam uttered these words as a 
warning to Israel not to blast the missile launching platforms reportedly built in 
Iraq, and indicating that Iraqi missiles are capable of reaching Tel-Aviv. ^ The 
threats to burn Israel with chemical weapons succeeded in arousing counter 
reactions in the United States and Israel. American President Bush suggested 
the withdrawal of these declarations. He called upon Iraq to renounce the use 
of chemical weapons saying "these declarations neither help Middle East peace 
nor secure Iraqi interests". ^ 
Nevertheless, the Iraqi leadership persisted in escalating its threatening 
declarations against Israel. On April 12, Saddam said to a delegation of US 
congressmen that "orders have been given to commanders of airbases and 
missile formations that the minute they hear of an Israeli atomic attack on Iraq, 
they should mobilise all chemical weapons towards Israel". ^ Thus, the Iraqi 
regime succeeded in creating a general Arab impression that Iraq's pivotal 
cause, now that the war with Iran has come to an end, was the Palestinian 
issue, and that the main reason for developing arms is to deter Israel and to 
counter Israel's nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. One must 
admit that Iraq despite its military power, prior to its invasion to Kuwait, was 
neither capable of burning half of Israel nor destroying it as claimed by the Iraqi 
leadership. But the psychological advantages of such a propaganda campaign 
against Israel paid off in terms of gaining the support and sympathy of the Arab 
masses. 
Saddam tried to exploit the Baghdad summit. May 1990, to gain the backing of 
Arab states for the Iraqi stance against Israel, the United States, and indeed all 
powers seeking to marginalise the Arabs. A number of resolutions were passed 
mainly concerned with the Palestinian question. However Iraq managed to rally 
the support of the summit for is own causes. Thus the summit stressed its right 
to take whatever measures it deemed necessary to ensure its national security. 
° The summit, also, supported the peace negotiations between Iraq and Iran 
based on Security Council resolution 598 and the agreement of 8 August 1988 
between the two countries. Paradoxically it supported at the same time Iraq's 
"historical right and sovereignty over the Shaft al-Arab". ^ 
Despite the strong and threatening rhetoric of the Iraqi regime, Saddam during 
a meeting with Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi Ambassador to the US, asked the 
assistance of the Saudis to mediate with Israel so as not to threaten Iraq by air 
raids. °^ Such a request indicates the wariness of the Iraqis of the military power 
of Israel and more significantly it exposes the true intention of Saddam's open 
threats to Israel as only means to gain the support of the Arab masses. There 
is a view that suggests if Saddam's objective was to restore the rights of the 
Palestinians and the Arabs he would not have used speeches to threaten Israel. 
Instead he could have either insisted on its compliance with UN resolutions 
within a certain time limit and threatened to attack if it does not comply, or to 
attack Israel without prior notification as Israel has done, in July 1981, when it 
attacked the Iraqi nuclear facility without prior warning. 
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The campaign against Israel and the linkage between the Gulf crisis and the 
Palestinian problem succeeded in helping the regime gain immense support 
and sympathy across the Arab worid, especially that most Arabs believed the 
American and Iraqi propaganda about the might of the Iraqi forces. There was, 
subsequently, a widespread conviction in the Arab world that Saddam would 
confront and deliver a serious blow to both the US and Israel. But in the end, 
the true nature of the strength of the Iraqi forces and the true intentions of 
Saddam were exposed. In practical terms, all Arab support and sympathy did 
not stop the attack of Western powers on Iraq and the destruction of Iraqi 
military and economic base. 
B. Heightening of Tension with Kuwait 
The period between the cease-fire with Iran August 1988 and the Jedda 
meeting in July 1990 saw an escalation of hostility and tension in the Gulf 
especially between Iraq and Kuwait. The geographical proximity, memory of 
past conflicts and territorial claims, the still unresolved question of border 
demarcation and the stark military imbalance in the relative strength of the two 
states made Kuwait an obvious pressure point for the Iraqi regime. It was also 
relatively easy to single out Kuwait, as well as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
for very substantial pressure because of their over production of oil. 
The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), responding to a 
glut in the worid market, had laid down quotas for each member and set the 
price of oil at $18 a barrel. Saddam accused Kuwait and the UAE of deliberately 
exceeding their quotas, forcing the price down as they flooded the market. In 
the closed session of the Arab heads of states during the Baghdad summit 
Saddam claimed that "for every single dollar drop in the price of a barrel of oil, 
our loss amounts to $1 billion a year ".^^ This led him to demand an end to 
quota violations, an increase of Iraqi production and a price rise to at least $25 
a barrel. Furthermore, he specifically accused Kuwait of "stealing" Iraqi oil by 
slant drilling beneath the border in Rumaila oilfield, and demanded 
compensation of $2.5 billion. The Kuwaitis angrily denied the accusation and 
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refused to negotiate, maintaining oil-production levels and refusing to forgive 
any wartime loans to Iraq. To Saddam this was tantamount to a Kuwaiti 
declaration of "economic war". In reference to that he said: 
War is fought with soldiers, and much harm is done by explosions, 
killings and coup attempts - but it is also done by economic means. 
Therefore we would ask our Arab brothers who do not mean to wage 
war -1 am now speaking only as far as Iraqi sovereignty is concerned 
- I say to those who do not mean to wage a war on Iraq: This is in 
fact a kind of war against Iraq...We have reached a point where we 
can no longer withstand pressure. 
According to al-Bazzaz (an ex-Iraqi official and a member of the opposition at 
present) the war with Kuwait was inevitable, had Iraq continued to let Kuwait 
flood the oil market, Iraqi oil revenues would have not covered half its internal 
domestic economic needs, let alone service its debt. Thus economic 
considerations were primary in motivating Iraq's sustained propaganda against 
Kuwait, which centred around Kuwait's disregard for OPEC quotas and the 
financial damage that Kuwait's policies were inflicting on Iraq. Al-Bazzaz 
argues further that:-
After eight years of attrition, Iraq could not build on its previous 
economy. It became necessary, therefore, to find a permanent 
solufion to its economic predicament and debt burden. It needed a 
solufion - which can only be geo-political - that would provide new 
sources for the Iraqi economy. 
Responding to the Iraqi accusation that Kuwait was flooding the oil market and 
breaking the policy of OPEC, Deputy Secretary-General for Military Affairs of 
the GCC, Faleh al-Shatti, says: 
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Iraq's accusafion of Kuwait that it has been exploifing the Rumaila -
Ratga oilfield and that it has been overproducing is an excuse used 
by the Iraqi regime in order to invade Kuwait. I believe oil matters 
were just an excuse used by the Iraqi regime to justify its invasion 
while other reasons including Iraqi ambifions in the area constituted a 
strong motive. Iraq believed that it could get away with its 
aggression considering the vast gap in military power between the 
two countries. It also aimed at engaging its cifizens with a new 
external crisis so as to take their attention away from the 
deteriorating internal situafion. 
Saddam's opening speech to the Baghdad summit bound all the themes of 
Iraq's political campaign together namely that the Arabs had reached a historic 
juncture and a basic improvement in the Arab condition was now possible, a 
scenario of war with Israel and how it should be fought as well as a focus on the 
liberation of the Palesfinian people. This increased the pressure on the Gulf 
states especially with the strong language used by the Iraqi leader as he urged:-
As twenty one states, one must present a solid front against whoever 
deviates from pan-Arab security within our ranks so that we can 
contain his aims and policies...The Arab masses believe that pan-
Arab security is an integral whole and that for pan-Arab security to 
become a reality, we can not afford to regard it half heartedly - it 
must be practised in every aspect of life. 
The Iraqi president went on to talk about pan-Arab coordination, and later 
claimed that Kuwait and the UAE had been directly informed that their deviant 
oil policies were regarded as deliberately harmful to Iraqi interests. In support 
of that the summit as mentioned before affirmed Iraqi right "to reply to 
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aggression by all means they deem fit to guarantee their security and 
sovereignty". 
In an attempt to solve the intensifying dispute over oil production, Iraq 
dispatched Sa'dun Hamadi, 23 June 1990, on a mission to the GCC states to 
follow up Saddam's appeal to resolve, through negotiation, the issues raised 
over oil prices and overproduction. The four Gulf Arab states, Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Qatar, seemed to be agreeable to holding a 
smaller Arab summit provided that it was preceded by a preparatory meeting of 
the Arab oil ministers. Sa'dun Hamadi met with several Arab heads of states 
and their oil ministers, the majority of whom seemed to have been sympathetic 
to Iraq's position. ^ ° 
The Gulf states, with the exception of one or two, appreciated the difficult 
financial situation of Iraq after its war with Iran and the huge debts it 
accumulated, as well as its need to rebuild and reconstruct the economy. But 
by invading Kuwait Iraq accelerated the chsis to a level where it became 
impossible for any Gulf state to show any sympathy to the Iraqi cause. 
Ironically Iraq's main objective of the invasion was to improve its economic 
conditions, but its action resulted in a worsening of its domestic situation. 
During the month of June 1990, Saddam held several joint meetings of the 
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), in which, among other things, Iraq's 
differences with Kuwait were discussed. As Kuwait had shown no sign that it 
was ready to settle those differences, it was decided to bring them before the 
Arab League for consideration in its forthcoming meeting in July. On 16 July 
1990, Saddam publicly raised Iraq's differences with Kuwait in his speech on 
the occasion of the twenty second anniversary of the Ba'th revolution. In that 
speech he accused the Gulf Arab rulers of consciously lowering the price of oil 
which had the consequence of reducing Iraq's income from the sale of its oil 
and adversely influencing its programme for economic development. 
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Commenting on the economic situation in Iraq and responding to Iraqi claim that 
Gulf states especially Kuwait are responsible for the deterioration of the 
economic situation of Iraq, Ismail al-Shatti (an ex-member of parliament) says: 
Arab countries that are considered poor are not so in effect. They 
have rushed into political and economic experiences that 
impoverished them and killed productivity in their people. The 
solution thus does not lie in the redistribution of the wealth of the 
Gulf, since that will be temporary, rather in the appropriate planning 
and management of wealth. We ask ourselves who impoverished 
Sudan, one of the most fertile among Arab countries, also who 
caused the huge indebtedness of Iraq. Why should the wealthy Arab 
countries be responsible for the mismanagement and the waste of 
resources in these countries? Why should they redistribute their 
wealth to pay for the mistakes of others? 
On 15 April 1990 the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, sent a memorandum to 
al-ChadIi al-Qulaibi, the Secretary-General of the Arab League reiterating Iraqi 
list of grievances against Kuwait. Foremost among them was the accusation 
that Kuwait took advantage of Iraq's entanglement in the war with Iran and 
embarked on establishing military and oil installations, police installations and 
farms on the Iraqi territories. He argued that Kuwait showed hesitance in 
accepting the Iraqi offer during the 1988 Alergia summit to start negotiations on 
the border issue and instead proceeded with its encroachments establishing 
more oil and military installations, farms and police stations. 
Secondly was Iraq's accusation of Kuwait of carrying out a deliberate policy to 
undermine Iraq in co-operation by United Arab Emirates by glutting the oil 
market and exceeding their OPEC's oil production quotas. He further argued 
that this over production caused a reduction in the price of a barrel of oil from 
$18 to $11-13. Consequently Iraq had lost in the period 1981-1990, around $89 
billion. Aziz made another major point concerning the assistance received by 
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Iraq from Kuwait during the war with Iran. He explained that the larger part of 
that assistance was recorded as debt. Considering the huge losses and 
sacrifices that Iraq has made in defending Arab security and the wealth of Gulf 
states it was more appropriate to write off that debt. 
Kuwait responded to the Iraqi memorandum with its own memorandum to the 
Secretary - General of the Arab League attempting to lessen the level of tension 
and the unjustified acceleration of the problem with Iraq. It also denied Iraqi 
accusations and requested the Arab League to investigate the border dispute. 
Although the memorandum asked for the formation within the framework of the 
Arab League of a committee to decide on the question of demarcation of the 
boundaries between the two countries, the Kuwaitis continued to assert that 
Rumaila field falls within Kuwait territory. As mentioned in the memorandum: 
Iraqi claims concerning the border dispute with Kuwait and including 
Kuwait acceleration of infringements on Iraqi lands by constructing 
military installations, petroleum installation and farms are distortions 
of reality and facts. Kuwait has continuously sought the delineation 
of borders with Iraq and an end to unresolved issues. Those who 
followed the issue of oil prices understand that the determination of 
prices has an international dimension to it and include producers and 
consumers from OPEC and outside it. As to the Iraqi claim about 
petroleum installations on the southern part of the Rumaila oil field, 
the truth is that Kuwait started explorations inside its territory since 
1963 and it stopped the operations for reasons well known to the 
Iraqis. Kuwait restarted its operations again in 1976 and production 
began at the end of the seventies. It must be emphasised that 
Kuwaiti operations take place on the part of the oil field that is within 
its territory. 
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As mentioned in the previous chapter Kuwait had provided Iraq with massive 
financial and logistical support, and thus felt it had done enough to support Iraq 
and was not willing to concede more. 
Three months later, on 16 July 1990, the Iraqi Foreign Minister restated Iraqi 
demands for an end to oil-quota violations and to Kuwaiti activities in the 
Rumaila oilfield. Saddam, twenty-four hours later, openly accused Kuwait and 
the UAE of conspiring with "world imperialism and Zionism" to destroy the 
economic livelihood of Iraq. He even went so far as to say that, if a peaceful 
solution was not forthcoming, he would "have no choice but to resort to effective 
action to put things right". Saddam's threat to use force to achieve his goals 
were meant to frighten the Gulf states to concede to his demands. 
In another attempt to solve the dispute over oil prices, a meeting of five oil 
ministers from the Gulf region was held in Jedda on 12 July 1990. Saudi Arabia 
convinced both Kuwait and UAE to pledge to hold their own output to the quota 
of 1.5 million barrels. Kuwait was producing about 1.7 million barrels a day and 
the UAE, about two million a day. On 20 July 1990 Kuwait and the UAE agreed 
to adhere to OPEC quotas, under intense pressure from Saudi Arabia, Iran and 
Iraq, but would go no further in their concessions. To Saddam this was merely 
reinforcement of their arrogance and intransigence; it may well have been at 
this point that he finalised his plans for invasion, since Iraqi forces from the 21 
July started massing close to the border with Kuwait. 
II Motives for the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait 
This section will focus on analysing the motives that lie behind the historical and 
unprecedented decision for an Arab country to invade another. These motives 
can be divided into two major ones the economic and the political. We shall 
discuss each of these separately. 
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A. Economic Motives 
The discussion above indicated how significant the economic factor was in 
heightening the tension in the Gulf. Iraq's economic situation after its long war 
with Iran was deteriorating rapidly and the expectations of the Iraqi people, after 
the end of a long war, of prosperity, development and progress exacertjated the 
situation further. Iraq presumed its war with Iran to be short, and that it would 
come out of it with a quick victory especially that Iran was suffering from internal 
problems and instability. But these calculations of the Iraqi leadership proved to 
be wrong. ®^ The gruelling eight year war destroyed the Iraqi economy and 
made it even more dependent on oil production despite its enormous 
agricultural and industrial potential, and made the Iraqi people less self-reliant 
than ever before. Moreover, Iraqi huge debts created a deficit in its balance of 
payments, increased unemployment and food prices. 
The Iraqi leadership had limited options in order to overcome this economic 
situation. One possible option was the reduction of the size and burden of its 
military and security apparatus to a level suitable to its real economic 
capabilities. But that would have threatened Saddam's regime and might have 
caused its demise or internal disturbances. Also this requires long-term vision 
and the gradual erosion of the military basis of the Iraqi society. The political 
changes that swept away with totalitarian and military political systems in 
Eastern Europe isolated the Iraqi regime further, especially with the end of US-
Soviet superpower rivalry and the domination of the international scene by the 
US. Such a situation exerted further pressure on Iraq to transform its 
totalitarian system towards a more pluralistic one. Hence Iraq attempted to 
appease its people by promising democratic reforms, political pluralism and 
public freedoms. ^° It is difficult to assess whether the regime was at any point 
seriously contemplating taking this liberal option. 
The second option was to direct the people to an external venture and by using 
the military apparatus to gain access to much needed economic resources. By 
annexing Kuwait, the Iraqi regime would have been able to pay off its debt 
within seven years. This debt is variously estimated between $80-200 billion, 
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the Iraqi regime itself admits to $40 billion. It would have also gained access 
to substantial oil wealth. As indicated by 1989 figures, Kuwait's production of 
1.8 million barrels a day created a Gross National Product (GNP) of $22.1 
billion. Saddam certainly needed it, for although Iraq was itself producing 2.8 
million barrels a day, creating a GNP of $67 billion a year, the country was 
effectively bankrupt. 
In August 1988, when Iraq celebrated its self-proclaimed victory in the eight-
year war with Iran, it was estimated that rebuilding the state to its pre-1980 
condition would cost a staggering $230 billion, the equivalent of devoting every 
dollar of oil revenue for nearly 20 years to reconstruction. That this was 
impossible was shown by the fact that, in 1989, Saddam could not even 
balance the book. Oil revenues were around $13 billion, imports totalled $17 
billion, with debt repayments of $5 billion on top of that. Annexing Kuwait 
would have meant also that Iraq would control 20 per cent of the world's oil 
reserves. This gives Iraq a substantial influence in OPEC and would be able to 
compete with Saudi Arabia, which effectively controls the organisation. ^ 
The difficulty of the economic situation of Iraq after the war caused some 
concern within the quarters of international creditors about Iraq's ability to pay 
its debts, especially that estimates suggested that Iraq would have needed 
$220 billion to implement its reconstruction plans. Iraq's income in 1990 was 
around $13 billion, of that $ 5 billion were spent on the military, while $11 billion 
were spent on food and civilian expenditure. In the same year Iraq had liquidity 
to cover only three months of imports. Half of Iraq's debt was owed to other 
Arab countries, mainly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The cancellation of this debt 
and the restoration of financial assistance would have allowed Iraq to fund its 
reconstruction and rearmament plans without having to resort to borrowing from 
non-Arab creditors, especially that non-Arab creditors were unwilling to lend 
Iraq. This unwillingness undermined the government's attempts to purchase 
the needed civil and military technology of the West. 
Iraq, therefore, saw its invasion of Kuwait as an end to all its economic 
problems and at the same time its chance to preserve the regime. Saddam's 
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ultimate solution to Iraq's economic problems was outlined as early as February 
1990, at an Arab Co-operation Council (ACC) meeting in Amman. He asked 
King Hussein of Jordan and President Mubarak of Egypt to put pressure on the 
Gulf states not only to declare a moratorium on all wartime debts to Iraq, but 
also to make an immediate additional grant of $30 billion. Saddam's justification 
was that Iraq had fought for eight years against Iranian fundamentalism on 
behalf of the Gulf states, so they owed him reparations. This demand was 
accompanied by a direct threat to Gulf states as expressed clearly in these 
words: 
Let the Gulf states know that if they do not give this money to me, I 
would know how to get it. 
The significant role played by the economic factor has been visible in the 
specific issues that were raised by the Iraqi regime throughout the period of 
escalation of tension between the two countries. It started with the issue of 
overproduction of oil, the cancellation of Iraqi debt to Kuwait accumulated 
during the Iran war, the compensation over the oil allegedly taken from the 
Rumaila oilfield, and ended with the request for an Arab "Marshal plan" for Iraq 
to support its recovery from the war. Thus, by late July, convinced that Kuwait 
was following a deliberate policy of economic sabotage against Iraq, coupled 
with the lack of progress on the border issue, Saddam decided to act. 
B. Political Motives 
The rivalry among the major Arab actors to lead the Arab world has been 
endemic to Arab politics. Iraqi leaders like their Egyptian and Syrian 
counterparts strived for this leadership. Saddam's regime hoped to replace 
Egypt as the pivotal Arab country following its isolation in the wake of its peace 
treaty with Israel in 1979. Yet the Iraqi regime was indebted to the Egyptians 
for human and military assistance during its war with Iran. In 1987 Iraq restored 
diplomatic relations with Egypt and supported the return of the Arab League 
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headquarters to Cairo. It also invested in a formal alliance, the Arab 
Cooperation Council (ACC), which consisted of Iraq, Egypt, Jordan and North 
Yemen. The council was formally established on 16 February 1989 and was a 
response to the creation of the GCC whereby Iraq was excluded. Saddam 
hoped the alliance would limit opposition to the Iraqi regime in its future plans 
and contain these countries especially Egypt. It also aimed to isolate Iraq's 
traditional rivalry, Syria from the main regional coalitions: the GCC and the 
ACC. Iraq went as far as signing a non-aggression treaty with Saudi Arabia, 
hoping to guarantee its neutrality in future conflicts in the region. Strictly 
speaking this treaty is not necessary since the charter of the Arab League 
prohibits aggression among member states. 
An Iraqi official was quoted in the Washington Post indicating that Iraq's Gulf 
policy would take shape in the wake of the end of the war with Iran as follows: 
"Iraq would do everything in its power to block any quick restoration of 
diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, it would seek to establish a 
new Arab axis with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, it would compete with 
Iran's regional influence, economic development would be one of its main foci, 
and Iraq was unlikely to join the GCC". Seeking a dominant role for Iraq in the 
region has been the hallmark of Saddam's rule, and as the war with Iran has 
shown, he is willing to use any means to attain such a goal. To establish a 
powerful position for Iraq after the war he needed both to curtail Iran's influence 
and to rebuild Iraq economically and militarily, hence his emphasis on inter-Arab 
relations, especially his relation with Gulf states. 
Despite the improvement in relations between Iraq and Egypt, they continued to 
compete for the loyalties of other Arabs, especially the Palestinians and the 
Jordanians. They both sought closer relations with Gulf states which Iraq 
considered its sphere of influence. '*° Moreover the Iraqi regime sponsored an 
approach to peace in the region opposed to the Egyptian's approach, based on 
improving Arab standing militarily and economically. Saddam believed that 
Israel and the world would not take the Arabs seriously unless they enhanced 
their pan-Arab strategic strength. To do that oil revenues must be used to 
underpin such a project Saddam's tough talk and stress on inter-Arab 
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obligations worried Arab rulers, but had tremendous appeal among the Arab 
people because it touched a chord with the Palestinians and touched the chord 
of widespread resentment towards the oil-rich Arab states. ''^  Also, "by seizing 
Kuwait's oil wealth and ports, he must have calculated that he could ensure his 
strategic hegemony as well as his grassroots support". Access to Kuwaiti oil 
would solve the regime's economic crisis, help in the reconstruction of Iraq, and 
maintain its powerful and dominant place in the region. Such an enhanced 
economic position would dispel the widespread dissatisfaction of the Iraqis and 
improve their living standards, and re-ignite public support for the regime. It 
would also enhance Iraq's popularity among Arab masses. 
The regime, after its war with Iran, emphasised its historical role in protecting 
"the Eastern Gateway" and the dreadful cost it paid in Iraqi lives and material 
assets. Saddam saw this achievement as a confirmation of Iraq's leading and 
historical role in the Gulf and the region as a whole. In his view it gave the 
Iraqi regime the right to seek the leadership of the Arab world as opposed to 
Syria and Egypt in particular. It also imposed on Iraq two major responsibilities: 
the duty to deter Israel and to counter Western attempts to undermine the pre-
eminence of Iraq after the Iran war. This explains the escalation of the 
propaganda campaign against Israel in the months preceding the invasion and 
the references to American and Western dominance in the region. During the 
summit of the ACC in Amman, Saddam in his speech said: 
The United States, which have the most influence in the Gulf region, 
will maintain its super power position without any rival. The people of 
the Gulf and the Arabs in general are not alert to this danger and 
their future will be governed by US wishes and interests. 
Despite this rhetoric Saddam in a meeting with John Kelly, Assistant Secretary 
of State for Middle Eastern Affairs, in February 1990, expressed his views about 
the international situation following the declining position of the Soviet Union 
and its impact on American relations with Iraq. He said that the Soviet Union as 
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a world power was finished, and the United States could have a "free hand" in 
the Middle East. Saddam was obviously sending a message that he was ready 
to co-operate with the United States in the maintenance of peace and security 
in the Middle East. That shows that Saddam wanted to carve for himself a 
leading role in the region from a position of power and strength, and was not 
seeking confrontation with the Americans. 
Saddam saw the possibility of achieving this leading regional position erode 
because of mounting internal political and economic pressures, after his 
exhausting war with Iran. The regime's fear of the eclipse of the effectiveness of 
its repressive system in general, and the loyalty of the military in particular 
played a major role in contemplaflng the take-over of Kuwait. Saddam 
succeeded in creating a docile and highly politicised military leadership resting 
on the principles of personal loyalty and kinship and counter balanced by the 
expansion in the party's militia, the Popular Army. '^^  The military's unquestioned 
support has been essential for the survival of Saddam's rule, thus, the increase 
in the number of coup attempts put Saddam on the elert and he "experienced 
deep anxiety over the future of his personal rule". '^ ^ In all probability Saddam 
believed that a foreign venture would protect the regime against the growing 
dissent and dissatisfaction prevalent among the Iraqis. Kuwait with its long 
history of dispute with Iraq, its wealth and its location was the most suitable 
target for such a venture. Saddam hoped he would emerge after the invasion of 
Kuwait as an Arab leader as well as a more powerful leader at home. 
Some suggested that Iraq also needed the invasion of Kuwait to cover its 
concession to Iran over Shaft al-Arab. Iran refused categorically to change the 
1975 agreement - which Saddam spent eight years of war trying to reverse, 
killing in the process more than a quarter of a million Iraqis and half a million 
Iranians - and insisted on its acceptance by Iraq as Iran's price for formally 
ending all hostilities and finalising exchange of prisoners. Although the 
announcement of the Iraqi concession came on the 15 August 1990, under 
what Saddam tenned as a " good will " initiative towards Iran, the Americans 
were informed of it as early as 25 July during the meeting between Saddam and 
April Galspie, the American Ambassador to Iraq. This initiative was the 
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culmination of the direct correspondence between Saddam Hussein and the 
president of Iran Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanaji which covered the period 21 April 
- 8 August. ^° In the last letter of Rafsanaji to Hussein the Iranian position was 
reiterated by saying 
Peace talks should be based on the 1975 Algiers accord because in 
the absence of any commitment to the previous agreements, 
especially the agreement which bears your own signature, one can 
not be expected to trust on what is being said today. 
He went on to say "it would not be necessary to search for anything else than 
the 1975 treaty to delimit frontiers both on land and in the river". Another 
condition the Iranian insisted on is the time scale of the withdrawal from Iranian 
territories and the release of prisoners of war. Rafsanaji indicated that a two 
month period as initially suggested by Saddam can not be justified and instead 
proposed a shorter period of two weeks, and a three months period for the 
release of POWs. Saddam's initiative did respond to these conditions 
positively as seen in its three main items:-
1. Iraq's ratification of the 1975 agreement of Algiers regarding the 
demarcation of the boundaries in Shaft al-Arab between the two countries. 
2. Withdrawal of the Iraqi forces from the Iranian territories, effective as of 17 
August. 
3. Immediate embarkation on the complete exchange of prisoners of war, 
effective as of the same date. 
A multitude of economic and political factors, therefore, played a role in the Iraqi 
decision to take over Kuwait, in order ultimately to maintain Saddam's regime 
and to protect the repressive political-military system he so painstakingly 
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developed over the years. The problem for the Iraqi regime was in the fact that 
it based its historic decision on some erroneous considerations. These can be 
summarised as follows: 
1. Iraq presumed that the American administration was not in a position to 
intervene militarily directly against Iraq. 
2. Saddam misunderstood the nature of change that had taken place in the 
international arena including the decline of Soviet role in international affairs. 
3. Saddam misunderstood the importance of the Gulf area within the 
international economic system as well as within the international strategic 
arrangements following the end of the Cold War. In particular the fact that 
Europe and the US were unlikely to allow any party to disturb the existing 
political equation in the Gulf area and would not accept any disturbance to 
this equation. 
4. Saddam believed that Saudi Arabia would accept the invasion of Kuwait and 
that it would not call upon foreign forces to protect it and to protect the Gulf 
area, as well as help in liberating Kuwait. 
5. Saddam thought the entry of Israel as a regional party in any war against 
Iraq will push Arab states to prevent them from supporting any military action 
against Iraq. 
Iraq, therefore, miscalculated on many fronts especially on account of the 
reaction of Western powers. The international system was passing through 
drastic changes with the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold 
War, yet changes in the political map of the Gulf region was not open for 
renegotiations. The stability of the oil region and the maintenance of the 
balance of power in favour of Western powers were essential. Iraq believed 
that chances for a military confrontation was very limited if non-existing, 
considering the international mood, present at that moment, which has been 
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geared towards calming international tensions. Desert Storni proved how 
wrong Iraq had been. 
ill The Failure of Jedda Meeting and the Invasion of Kuwait 
The Iraqi-Kuwaiti dispute had proved over several decades to be intractable, 
and the ability to find an acceptable solution to both parties seemed virtually 
impossible, despite all the attempts at negotiation and conciliation. This trend 
continued in the months prior to the invasion. Commenting on the method the 
Arabs use in their dialogue and negotiations over various issues al-Shazli al-
Gulaibi, Secretary-General of the Arab League from 1979-1990, has noted: 
In the political sphere it appears that our states have not had 
sufficient experience in the method of mediation and conciliation to 
bring opinions closer especially when differences appear concerning 
critical issues. They have a tendency to use the method of oration 
without trying to use argumentative methods, which helps to avoid 
escalating matters at hand...and in the case that no solution is found 
or conciliation is not possible, states tend to resort to comments and 
language that is beyond diplomacy and appropriateness in 
conducting state affairs. 
This might partly explain the difficulties associated with conciliation and 
negotiation among Arab states. But the Iraqi-Kuwaiti dispute has been of such 
long standing that failure at negotiations must lie somewhere else, in more 
objective factors relating to notions of sovereignty, economics and territorial 
integrity. Both parties naturally have continuously accused the other of 
stubbornness, protraction and unwillingness to negotiate. The particular 
conditions that pushed Iraq towards military action were, as discussed before, a 
combination of acute economic and internal political problems as well as the 
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regime's vision of itself as the most deserving among Arab states to lead the 
Arab region. The clearest indication of the regime's thinking of a take over of 
Kuwait or some sort of a military action was demonstrated by Saddam during 
his meefing with the US Ambassador in Iraq. 
On 25 July 1990, President Saddam summoned the United States Ambassador, 
April Glaspie, in the last high-level contact between the two governments. From 
this meeting Saddam wanted to convey to the Americans Iraqi requests that he 
considered rightful and just, and to make it clear that Iraq was suffering from a 
very distressing economic situation. He indicated to Glaspie that;-
Iraq is facing another war. Military war kills people after spilling their 
blood and economic war kills the humanity of people...We as you are 
aware gave rivers of blood in a war that lasted eight years...Kuwait 
and UAE reduced oil prices in a planned and purposeful manner and 
without any commercial or economic reason. Their aim is the 
humiliation and subjugation of Iraq. The Kuwaiti state, while we were 
engaged in war, was expanding on the expense of our territory. 
Turning to the question of oil prices, Glaspie pointed out that the US did not 
want the price of oil to go too high. The Iraqi government proposed a rise to 
$25 a barrel, since the drop in the price to $12 a barrel had resulted in a 
reduction in the income from oil of some six to seven billion US$. Glaspie's 
answer to that was "we have many Americans who would like the price to rise 
above $25, since they are from oil producing states". ®^ That appeared to be a 
frank and open discussion about the need of Iraq for higher oil prices and 
American backing of it as long as the price suited American interests. On the 
tension in the region and the Kuwaifl-lraqi dispute, the Ambassador said: 
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We do not have an opinion on Arab-Arab differences such as your 
border dispute with Kuwait...We hope you will be able to solve this 
problem in a suitable manner through Kulaibi or President Mubarak.^^ 
Iraq understood that to mean that the US administration would not interfere in 
Arab disputes and that it would see the solution of such a dispute being 
discussed within the framework of the Arab League, or by mediation from Arab 
rulers such as King Hussein, King Fahd or the Egyptian president. ^° Glaspie 
was undoubtedly reflecting the opinion of the State Department which was 
convinced that Saddam was doing no more than "sabre-rattling" to force Kuwait 
to negotiate, but Saddam understood the American position as giving him the 
green light. This perception was reinforced, on 31 July, when the BBC World 
Service carried reports of a meeting of a US House of Representatives Middle 
East subcommittee at which the Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle 
East, John Kelly, admitted that the USA had no defence treaties with the Gulf 
states - a clear indication to Saddam that no military response was likely or, 
indeed, possible. Glaspie herself admitted indirectly that she was aware of 
Saddam's intention of attacking Kuwait but not all of it. She said "obviously, I 
did not think - and nobody else did - that the Iraqis were going to take all of 
Kuwait". ®^  
The understanding of the Iraqi leadership of the position of the West was, 
therefore, distorted by these initial American signals as well as President Bush's 
initial mild reaction to the invasion. It gave the Iraqis encouragement in their 
undertaking. However the entrenchment of the Iraqi regime in the face of 
international condemnation and the quick steps it took to consolidate its take-
over of Kuwait made the American and its western allies very wary of the 
regime's regional ambitions. Neither the Americans nor their Western allies 
were willing to accept a change in the balance of power in the Gulf region and 
Saddam's apparent defiance to their demands strengthened their resolve to 
stand up against his undertaking. The protection of Western interests in the 
area according to M. Mubarak, an academic at Kuwait University, is a legitimate 
endeavour. 
64 
Of course there is an active superpower in the Gulf region, especially 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dominance of the 
international system with one superpower. The US has vital interests 
in the region and we can not deny the presence of these interests as 
well as Western interests. US presence in the region will continue in 
order to protect these interests. The area is rich with oil and the US 
will be the centre that the West depends on to protect their interests 
in the area. ^ 
On the eve of the Jedda meeting there was hope that the dispute would be 
solved peacefully. According to Jordanian sources, Kuwait was ready to cancel 
all of Iraq's debt in return "for security arrangements in the form of agreement 
on the de facto Iraqi-Kuwaiti border". ®^  Iraq had encroached on the de Jure 
border, since 1961, in the areas south of the Umm Qasr and south of the legal 
border of the Rumaila area. However, Kuwait was still unwilling to accept the 
demands of the Iraqis to hand over the Ratga field (the southern tip of the 
Rumaila oilfield), while the lease of Warbah seemed open to discussion. 
Indicating this position. Sheikh Sabah speaking after the invasion said that:-
Iraq asked us to drop the debt and we did not object. Iraq asked for 
Bubiyan island, we agreed to give them Warbah island instead. 
From the Iraqi perspective debt relief and Warbah alone were not incentive 
enough to agree to a permanent demarcation of borders, especially taking into 
account Iraq's worsening economic situation and its dire need for huge amounts 
of capital, and the absence of a definite solution for the Shaft al-Arab. Hence 
the Jedda meeting ended in failure. The statements of both sides indicated that 
clearly. Sa'dun Hammadi noted that:-
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No agreement has been reached on anything because we have not 
felt that the Kuwaitis are serious about redressing the grave damage 
inflicted on Iraq as a result of their recent behaviour and positions 
against Iraq's basic interests. 
On the other hand Kuwaiti officials indicated that the talks "collapsed because 
Kuwait did not give in to Iraqi demands to write off debts and to relinquish some 
of its territories". 
Despite the failure of Jedda no one expected a full scale invasion of Kuwait. 
Most scenarios expected a limited action such as the annexation of Ratga, or 
an attack on Warbah and Bubiyan. Even the Americans believed any action on 
the part of Iraq would be of a limited nature and there was a sort of tolerance at 
the beginning of the invasion from the Americans towards Iraq's need for 
improved access to the Gulf. Thomas Pickering, the United States Ambassador 
to the UN, through a message relayed to the Iraqis by Jordanian officials said 
that: 
We acknowledge your need for an opening on the Gulf, and the issue 
of access to the islands is one that we could look on favourably. 
Yet Iraq's action entailed a full invasion of Kuwait and prompted fears of its 
territorial ambitions in the Gulf area. In the early hours of 2 August, 100,000 
Iraqi troops swept across Kuwaiti territory and captured the Royal Palace and 
other important buildings in a blitz attack. Initially Iraq claimed that its troops 
marched into Kuwait in response to calls of the Kuwaiti people that had toppled 
the ruling family, and announced the fomnation of "The Interim Government of 
Kuwait". By this act it alleged the dethroning of the Emir and dissolved the 
Kuwaiti National Council. On the 4 August Iraq announced that this Interim 
Government was presided over by Colonel Alaa' Hussein Aly - believed to be 
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Saddam Hussein Son-in-law and included majors and Lt.Generals - later they 
were confirmed to be Iraqis. ^° 
The Iraqi news agency on the 5 August claimed the start of a pull-out of Iraqi 
invasion troops from Kuwait in agreement with the so called Kuwait Interim 
Government. However, the following day the Iraqi government equated the 
Kuwaiti Dinar to the Iraqi Dinar as a first step towards economic integration 
between the two countries. It also moved thousands of Iraqi families to settle in 
Kuwait. Kuwaiti sources put the number of people moved at around 4 million. 
This was seen as part of a scheme contemplated to change the demographic 
structure of Kuwait. ''^  These steps pushed around 40,000 Kuwaities to flee 
Kuwait and head for Saudi Arabia on the 7 August. On the same day the 
Interim Government claimed the return to normal of work in government circles, 
banks and services in Kuwait and according to radio Baghdad it also declared a 
Republic in Kuwait. The official declaration of the annexation of Kuwait came 
on 8 August. This annexation aimed to obliterate Kuwait's internationally 
recognised independent identity. 
Thus, events in the first week of the invasion moved very quickly and decisively 
and the Iraqi regime, while reinforcing itself in Kuwait continued to come out 
with pretexts and allegations to justify the invasion and occupation of Kuwait. 
This might have stemmed from the fact that the precise nature of the future of 
Kuwait was not contemplated at the moment of invasion. In other words, 
Saddam did not have a determined strategy but a series of improvised moves.^^ 
The Iraqi regime vacillated from claiming that Iraq came to the support of a 
revolutionary coup in Kuwait to invoking the principle of historical right to justify 
Kuwait's occupation. This principle has been unanimously renounced by all 
developed and developing countries, because if this principle is ever adopted it 
would open the door to an overwhelming chaos in international relations (a 
detailed discussion of international law and Iraq's violation of international law is 
included in chapter four). This is why Europe recognised the post-world war II 
boundaries, despite the unfairness of many of them. And also the reason why 
Africa pledges to respect post-independence boundaries. It follows that any 
admission of the colonial nature of most of Arab political boundaries does not at 
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all justify any attempt to re-demarcate these boundaries. This would just give 
rise to further disputes and conflicts. '"^  
Yet in Saddam's eyes the dispute represented on one level all that was wrong 
with territorial arrangements in the region. The issue to him was clear. Kuwait 
existed as a separate state only because of boundaries imposed by the British 
in the aftermath of the First World War and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire 
and, in reality, the area known as Kuwait was part of Iraq, having originally 
existed as a qadha (lesser district) in the Vilayet (province) of Basra. Thus any 
military action on behalf of the Iraqi regime is therefore a correction of a 
historical injustice especially in light of the continuous lack of progress in solving 
the dispute by peaceful means. 
On another occasion, the Iraqi regime claimed that the essence of what Iraq 
had done was to materialise Arab unity and to eliminate the artificial boundaries 
drawn between parts of the Arab nation by colonialism. The rational behind 
such a claim is to justify the armed subjugation and arbitrary annexation of a 
sovereign country by another. It should be noted here that the democratic and 
voluntary work towards unity was not an overlooked value in modern Arab 
politics. For example Gamal Adul Naser, on the 29 September 1961, ordered 
the dispatch of some Egyptian army units to Latakia when Syria defected from 
the United Arab Republic. Realising that there was a possibility of armed 
confrontation between Egyptian forces and the pro-defectionist movement in the 
Syrian army, Naser immediately cancelled these measures, and in an address 
to the nation on 30 September stated that:-
Unity is a popular will. On my part, I do not accept - under any 
circumstances - to transform unity into a military operation. This is 
why yesterday I issued orders to cancel the military action.'''' 
Moreover, Iraq reiterated that the occupation and annexation of Kuwait was 
based on the principle of fair distribution of Arab wealth between the rich Arabs 
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of the Gulf and the poor Arab countries. As regards this particular argument 
one must point out to the fact that Kuwait and other Gulf Arab states had given 
Iraq massive material and political support in its war with Iran. Also Iraq, like 
the other Gulf states, was a potentially rich oil producing state, but its war 
venture with Iran debilitated it financially and economically. 
IV Conclusion 
The prelude to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait shows an Iraqi regime under 
massive political and economic pressures, attempting to find a solution to its 
predicament and using all means at its disposal for that purpose. The eight-
year war with Iran ended with a hollow victory and more importantly totally 
debilitated the Iraqi economy and created massive debt. Rumbles of discontent 
among the military and civilian population indicated to Saddam that his 
meticulously built repressive political system is under threat and his personal 
rule might not survive for long. 
The drop in oil prices further aggravated the Iraqi situation and directly 
influenced the country's income levels. In that context targeting Kuwait for its oil 
price policy seemed the best possible option for the regime to squeeze out a 
deal on the border dispute and access to more funds. Saddam, therefore 
escalated the tension and the threatening rhetoric against Kuwait in the hope 
that it would fright Kuwait into accepting his demands on mainly: the 
cancellation of debt, compensation of lost oil revenues and an agreement on 
the two disputed islands, Bubiyan and Warbah. When that strategy failed and 
the last hope for reaching an agreement was dashed at the Jedda meeting, 
Saddam decided to take military action. He believed that he had reached an 
understanding with the Americans during his meeting with Glaspie and was not 
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expecting the kind of reaction the invasion produced in both the West and the 
Gulf states. 
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Chapter Four 
Saudi Arabia During the Gulf Crisis 
The involvement of Saudi Arabia has been pivotal to the American direction of 
the crisis. Saudi Arabia is the major power in the Gulf Cooperation Council and 
has a leading role in the protection and maintenance of the security and 
stability of region. The aim of this chapter is to explore Riyadh's involvment in 
the management of the crisis and show its importance in deterring further Iraqi 
aggression and liberating Kuwait and restoring its legitimate government. 
This role has two major aspects to it, a political and a military one. The political 
aspect manifests itself in the Saudi government stance against the Iraqi regime 
and its active participation in gaining regional and international support for the 
Kuwaiti cause, and in maintaining the Western coalition against Iraq. As for 
the military aspect it is mostly visible in the historic decision to invite US and 
foreign troops to assist in its defence as well as the stationing of the coalition 
forces on Saudi territory. These two aspects of Saudi role were decisive in the 
successful resolution of the crisis. 
The chapter will begin by analysing the manner in which the Gulf Cooperation 
Council acted during the crisis, which was a test to its ability to react to such a 
direct threat to the stability and security of the Gulf. It will be followed by an 
analysis of the manner in which the collective Arab system reacted through 
looking at the Arab League during the crisis and the limited and ineffective role 
it played. The third section will deal with the management of Saudi Arabia of 
the crisis showing the influence of the Americans in the shift in Saudi approach 
form the initial mild reaction to the aggressive and more risky approach 
involving the willingness and commitment to go to war in order to force Saddam 
to comply to UN resolutions. The fourth section will discuss the contribution 
and participation of Saudi Arabia to the military preparation and execution of 
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Desert Storm. The fifth section deals with the role of Saudi ulama (religious 
elite) in supporting and giving legitimacy to the Saudi government during the 
crisis, which was pivotal in maintaining internal unity and security. Lastly the 
chapter will discuss the legal basis upon which King Fahd based his decision to 
invite Western troops into the country. 
I. The Gulf Cooperation Council and the Invasion of Kuwait 
The GCC was founded in 1981 and is made up of six Gulf Arab countries-
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. 
The total size of these countries is 2,653,000 square kilometres and their total 
population is around 30 million. ^ The aim of the GCC is to coordinate 
cooperation between member states and protect them from external threats, 
and maintain the security and stability of the Gulf area. The member states 
have been particularly concerned with their security since the Iranian revolution 
because of the Shi'ite population in these countries. Bahrain has 60 percent of 
its population Shi'ite, a third in Kuwait and Oman and most of eastern Saudi 
Arabia is Shi'ite. By creating the GCC the member states were attempting to 
create a regional coalition in response to the Islamic revolution in Iran, to the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq war. 2 
The Secretary-General of the Arab League, al -Shazli al-Qulaibi, described the 
creation of the GCC as a pioneering step for Arab cooperation, while Habeeb al 
Shatti, the Secretary-General of the Organisation Of Islamic Conference saw it 
as a strong pillar for the Arab nation. On an international level the US and 
Britain welcomed the creation of the GCC in the hope that it would provide the 
opportunity for achieving regional cooperation with the West for maintaining the 
security of the Gulf area. ^ The Council has not been very successful in 
increasing cooperation in the economic, political and other fields, but has 
proved a useful conduit through which to meet regularly, discuss issues and 
exchange views. During the Iran-Iraq war the positions of member states 
varied. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia supported and funded Iraq while United Arab 
Emirates and Oman were criticised for maintaining high level visits between 
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them and Iran. '* Thus, even in terms of coordinating security matters the 
Council was facing difficulties in reaching a common foreign policy. 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait came in the wake of the end of the Iraqi-Iranian 
war to represent another major security challenge for the Gulf states. This was 
primarily due to the fact that GCC members do not have the military capability 
to defend themselves against a military machine as the one Iraq had at the 
time. The charter of the Council states that any attack on a member state 
would be considered an attack on the rest of the members. Despite that the 
first official reaction to the invasion came in a statement issued by the GCC, 
after its ministerial meeting in Cairo, on 3 August. In comparison states such as 
Algeria, Lebanon and Morocco declared their position in the first day of the 
attack. ^ The statement that came forth from the Council emphasised the 
necessity of an immediate unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait 
and the need for the Arab League to take a common Arab stand. ^  
The Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Sa'doun Hammadi, announced after the 
foreign ministers' meeting of the Arab League in Cairo that the situation in 
Kuwait after the invasion is not for negotiation. He reiterated Iraqi claims that 
Kuwait had been causing economic problems to Iraq due to its petroleum policy 
and that Iraq had borne the grunt of protecting Arab security from the adverse 
effects of the Iranian revolution. He also made it clear that the Iraqi delegation 
was not seeking a peaceful solution of the crisis. The UN Security Council by 
that time has already met and issued its resolution 660 which condemned Iraqi 
invasion, demanded immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces and the return of 
legitimacy of the Kuwaiti state. 
The GCC gradually began to view the crisis as too complicated to be solved 
within the framework of the Arab League, and asserted their intention to pursue 
an international framework for the resolution of the crisis if necessary. As one 
Kuwaiti academic puts it:-
The security of the Gulf is very complex. GCC members are small, 
except for Saudi Arabia, with very small populations in comparison 
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with Iran and Iraq, which makes it difficult to compete militarily with 
such giants. The 1990 crisis proved that Iraq can mobilise a million 
soldier in comparison to Saudi Arabia's eighty thousand. The same 
is true for Iran. It has huge human, military and economic resources. 
Thus the whole issue of the security of the Gulf must be 
reconsidered. ^ 
The statement made by the foreign ministers of the GCC indicated an 
understanding of the Arab League resolution which rejected foreign 
interference in Arab affairs. However, they claimed that the procedures and 
resolutions of the UN Security Council would not be included because the UN 
was an international body that was legally bound to maintain peace and 
security in the world and hence its resolutions and procedures would not be 
interpreted as foreign interference. ° 
The GCC succeeded, also, in amending the statement issued by the Arab 
League following an emergency meeting in Cairo on 30 August. A dispute had 
risen over the paragraph that stated "achieve a partial withdrawal of Iraqi forces 
and a partial retreat of US forces in the Gulf to prepare the atmosphere for a 
unified Arab stand". The GCC saw the paragraph as equating the presence of 
US forces with an occupational force which contradicts with their legitimate 
presence in the country as it was requested by Saudi Arabia. ^ 
The 11th session of the GCC was convened on 22 December 1990 in Qatar 
and was attended by Kuwait's Amir Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmad. The Gulf states 
reaffirmed their right to seek all means to guarantee the return of legitimate 
sovereignty to Kuwait and demanded the withdrawal of Iraqi forces. They also 
confirmed that the GCC will complete the security and defence arrangements to 
safeguard their security and increase coordination among themselves in all 
fields internal, Arab, regional and international. ^° The main conclusions of the 
meeting centred around the rejection of aggression as a means of solving 
disputes and conflicts among member states and emphasised the principle of 
negotiation to solve disputes among themselves. The Council saw the need, 
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due to Iraqi aggression, to focus on defence and on developing defence 
strategies with friendly countries that appreciate the strategic importance of the 
area. 
The Secretary-General of the GCC, Abdullah Bisharah, following a meeting with 
US Secretary of State, indicated that the US and Gulf position was identical on 
the following matters: 
1. The necessity to implement the resolution of Security Council in totality. 
There is no such thing as a partial or gradual solution. 
2. No negotiation over the unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait and 
the return to international legitimacy. 
3. The adoption of the necessary measures that guarantee economic and 
psychological pressure as well as international and regional isolation of 
12 
Iraq. 
The foreign ministers of the GCC intensified their political activities and held 
talks with their counterparts from Europe, Russia, Iran, Japan as well as South 
East Asia as part of their world wide campaign to guarantee the isolation of Iraq 
and to force it to implement international resolutions. 
The GCC performance during the crisis can be summarised as effective in 
gaining international support through the total convergence of interests with the 
US. It also "remained intact and it did formulate a military response; but it 
14 
singularly failed to deter aggression without outside assistance". Also, in the 
post-war period the issue of the security of the Gulf remained a point of 
contention, some member states wanted Egyptian and Syrian participation, 
others wanted Iran included, while others wanted to depend solely on the US 
and Britain. These issues will be discussed further in chapter five. 
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II. The Arab League and the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait 
The Arab League has 21 member states with a population of more than 260 
million people. On the eve of Saddam's invasion of Kuwait the Arab world 
would be described as fragmented as ever with a widening gap between the 
haves and have-nots, severe economic problems in most Arab countries, the 
unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict and lack of democracy. Unexpected new 
alignments emerged during the crisis: the anti-Saddam group which included 
the GCC, Syria, Egypt, Lebanon and Morocco and those outside that group 
which included Jordan, Yemen, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Mauritania and 
the PLO. 
The disarray of the Arab world, divisions and rivalry was at work from the first 
meeting of the League. Its inability to act on behalf of Arab interest is even 
further highlighted when the international response led by the US produced 
very swiftly Security Council Resolution 660, on 2 August, condemning the Iraqi 
invasion. The resolution was passed by 14 out of the 15 members (Yemen 
abstained). It was followed on 6 August by UN resolution 661 which imposed 
economic sanctions on Iraq that were to be enforced by an international naval 
blockade. 
The Arab League Charter defines its purposes as follows: 
1. To harness relations between member states and coordinate political 
action in order to achieve cooperation and protect sovereignty and 
independence, and 
2. To oversee in general Arab affairs and interests. 
Thus the Arab League is mainly concerned with coordination and cooperation 
among member states. The Arab League, after the failure of the bilateral talks 
between King Hussein and President Saddam and the failure of the discussion 
among the Arab foreign ministers, issued a resolution that:-
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1. Condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and rejected all its 
consequences. 
2. Deplored bloodshed and the destruction of buildings and facilities. 
3. Demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Iraqi 
forces to its positions prior to 1 August 1990. 
4. Referred the matter to the kings and presidents of the Arab countries to 
seek the convening of an emergency meeting to discuss a settlement 
acceptable to both sides based on the present Arab legal system, Arab 
heritage and the spirit of brethren and solidarity. 
5. Emptiasised the Arab League's adherence to the sovereignty and 
regional safety of its member states and renewed its adherence to the 
principles of the Arab League pact, which stipulated that force will not be 
used to settle disputes among member states, and respect to the 
internal regulations of the Arab League. 
6. The Council rejected utteriy any foreign interference in Arab affairs. 
This resolution passed with a majority vote of 14 out of 21 votes. It represented 
a modest attempt by the members to maintain the unity of the Arab League and 
its charter, despite the fact that the League had no power to force Iraq to accept 
the resolution. A second attempt for a peaceful negotiated solution to the crisis 
came from Mubarak, President of Egypt, who called for the convening of the 
Cairo Summit based on four major principles: 
1. Complete withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. 
2. The return of the legitimate government of Kuwait. 
3. The formation of an Arab peace keeping force between the two sides. 
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4. Immediate start of Iraqi-Kuwaiti negotiations to discuss the roots of the 
dispute represented in three main issues: 
a. A final delineation of borders between the two sides. 
b. Compensation to Iraq for the oil withdrawn from its oil field if that 
proved to be the case. 
c. Cancellation or reduction of the Iraqi debt to Kuwait due to the 
Iraq-Iran war. 
This appeared to be a sound and good starting point for a peaceful settlement 
but many factors were already at play that in the end pushed for a military 
solution without giving enough time for the peaceful solution to materialise. The 
summit was convened and from its resolution one can see how the ground was 
shifting slowly towards a military confrontation and further polarisation in the 
region. This polarisation led to the resignation of Arab League Secretary 
General, Chedii Klibi. The summit decided on 10 August upon a tough 
resolution voted by twelve of the twenty governments attending the summit. 
The resolution states the following : 
1. Condemns the aggression against Kuwait and declares the annexation 
of Kuwait by Iraq to be null and void and calls for the immediate 
withdrawal of Iraqi forces to their positions prior to the invasion of Kuwait. 
2. Reaffirms the sovereignty, independence and security of Kuwait and 
demands the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait. 
3. Deplores the numerous Iraqi threats against Gulf states and denounces 
the massing of Iraqi troops along the Saudi border and supports the 
Kingdom and Gulf states in their determination to defend their territories 
according to the provisions of the Arab League and the United Nations 
Charters. 
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Responding to the request by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states to send 
Arab military forces to join US and coalition forces for the defence of the 
Kingdom. ^® 
Subsequently a crucial difference emerged between the resolution of the Arab 
League passed on 3 August and the above mentioned one. Quite a shift from 
rejecting utteriy the interference of foreign forces in Arab affairs and the use of 
force in settling Arab disputes to allowing Arab troops to join the US and 
coalition forces in defending Saudi Arabia from what was thought to be an 
imminent Iraqi invasion. The differences in the perceived national interests of 
each country has always exerted immense limitations on the workings of the 
Arab League and that proved to be the case during the Gulf crisis. 
The role of the Arab League has traditionally been as a mediator between 
disputing sides. Militarily it has only interfered twice, to police the Kuwait-Iraq 
border in 1961 and during the Lebanese civil war. On both occasions it was 
unable to stop aggression and only aimed to maintain peace. The Arab League 
has passed many political, economic, legal and cultural resolutions, but very 
few were implemented. Cooperation among member states has been selective 
and member states do not abide except by those resolutions that they accept. 
Also the League does not have the mechanism to follow its resolutions and 
does not have the mechanism to punish those that do not adhere to its 
resolutions. Inter-Arab regime rivalry and ideological differences played a 
major role in side lining the Arab League, making it an ineffective organisation 
when it comes to major Arab disputes. 
During the 1980s and 1990s the role of the Arab League had become even 
more marginalised. It had no role in attempts to find a peaceful solution to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict and no role in solving the Lebanese civil war. In the 
meantime three distinct regional groupings were emerging: the GCC, ACC and 
the Arab Maghreb Union. These three groups appeared to be replacing the 
Arab regional system as represented by the Arab League and its charter. They 
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included among them fifteen Arab countries, two-thirds of the population of the 
Arab world and 90 percent of the sources of energy and 75 percent of 
agricultural resources and water. ^° Thus they represented quite a counter force 
to the Arab League. 
The Arab League tried during the Gulf crisis to use diplomacy, but positions 
crystallised within days that were difficult to change and the League appeared 
totally incompetent and ineffective. According to Clauvise Maqsoud, the Arab 
League Ambassador to the United Nations: 
An unprecedented schism occurred in the Arab situation as a result 
of the Gulf crisis. Arab nationalism was hit hard and it had become 
impossible to re-prioritise Arab cooperation concerning major 
national matters. The Arab League proved totally incapable of 
dealing with the Iraqi invasion and the crisis nearly destroyed it as a 
symbol of the Arab regional system. Its role was restricted to 
passing resolutions that condemned the Iraqi aggression, since from 
a practical point of view the Arab League does not have the military 
power to execute its resolutions. 
Thus the Iraqi invasion exposed the weakness of the Arab regional system 
furthermore and increased tensions in inter-Arab relations. The results of the 
crisis, on the political, economic and social fronts have made it very difficult to 
rearrange Arab priorities and control Arab disputes and disagreements. Arab 
relations, even at best, are full of contradictions and difficulties. One of the 
main reasons for that is the fact that Arab regimes are not built on institutions 
that carry stability and continuity but around a ruler who holds all the power. 
The Iraqi invasion epitomised the dysfunction of Arab relations and Arab 
regional system represented by the Arab League. 
Yet, despite the obvious shortcomings of the Arab League it has been 
important in terms of being a symbol of the Arab system, even if a nominal one. 
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Arab countries showed great concern to pass resolutions that were in 
accordance with the main elements of the Arab system. Also, despite its 
proven record of being unable to deal effectively with the challenges of the Arab 
region it has been an important constitutional institution that delineated the 
Arab regional system, provided an important channel to discuss, negotiate, 
pressure and balance the various issues and states, as well as being a meeting 
place to express opinions and a place to find compromises and avoid 
confrontation. The Gulf crisis has definitely changed all this and a serious 
reshaping of the Arab League is badly needed. But that requires agreement 
among member states, which at present seems to be most unlikely. 
IN. The Development of Saudi Political Stance During the Crisis 
The surprise that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait caused in the Arab region and the 
world at large was particularly felt in Saudi Arabia since a day eariier delegates 
from Iraq had started negotiating with the Kuwaitis in Jedda, and as Saddam 
had given his word to King Fahd as well as King Hussein and President 
Mubarak that he would not resort to aggression against Kuwait. Saudi Arabia's 
traditional and timid foreign policy showed itself in Riyadh's initial response. 
King Fahd gave a directive to all organs of the government to observe a strict 
atmosphere of silence regarding the aggression. This initial silence has been 
attributed to the Saudi fear of antagonising Saddam and encouraging him to 
move to the eastern region of the Kingdom with its oil wealth. Saudi silence 
was meant to leave Saddam with the false impression that Saudi Arabia 
accepted the fait accompli of Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and would do anything 
to avoid Saddam's antagonism. 
The House of Saud, besides their fears from Saddam, lacked at the start of the 
crisis the political consensus among the ruling family on whether to turn to the 
US for assistance. The conservative segment of the Saudi leadership led by 
Prince Abdullah was in favour of an Arab solution to the crisis and was 
opposed to having American troops on Saudi soil. The nationalists led by 
Prince Talal were against fighting a brotherly Arab country. It was the Sudayri 
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brothers who were convinced of the inevitability of requesting the assistance of 
the US in order to be able to act firmly against Saddam. Hence the first 
public reaction from Saudi Arabia came in the statement issued during the 
emergency meeting of the GCC in Cairo on 3 August. On the same day the 
Saudi cabinet met the Iraqi deputy prime minister, Izzat Ibrahim, who after a 
long session expressed his satisfaction with Saudi efforts to contain the crisis. 
But by the 6 of August, and after the arrival of the American Secretary of 
Defence, Richard Cheney, in Jedda, to discuss the crisis, events accelerated in 
favour of involving the Americans. Cheney's trip was initiated by the Americans 
to acquaint King Fahd with the threats that his country faced. Fahd was shown 
CIA satellite photographs documenting that Iraqi divisions were moving towards 
the Saudi border. After that Fahd invited the Americans to the Kingdom, and 
many concerns and details were hammered out between the two sides. 
President Bush, on 8 August, announced in a national address American goals 
as such: 
• The unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; 
• The restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government in place of the puppet 
regime put in place by Iraq; 
• The protection of the security and stability of the region, and 
The protection of the lives of Americans abroad. 27 
The protection of the security and stability of the region stemmed from US basic 
policy in the Gulf that is stated in National Security Directive 26 October 1989. 
The directive reaffirmed the 1980 Carter Doctrine by asserting that "access to 
the Persian Gulf and key friendly states in the area is vital to US national 
security" and the US is committed to defend these interests "against the Soviet 
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Union or any other regional power with interests inimical to our own". The 
Iraqi regime by invading Kuwait threatened directly American interests in the 
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Gulf through Saddam's bid for regional dominance. Subsequently it became 
imperative for the Americans to punish his aggression and to punish the regime 
too. 
The Americans succeeded in convincing the Saudis that an Iraqi invasion of the 
Kingdom was imminent, which coincided with the failure of Arab and diplomatic 
efforts to contain the crisis and produce a peaceful solution. The massing of 
Iraqi troops on the northern borders of the Kingdom, made Riyahd's decision to 
call upon Arabs and Western governments to send troops to support it in its 
struggle against a possible Iraqi attack much easier. King Fahd in his speech 
on the eve of requesting the American military assistance said: 
In the aftermath [ of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait], Iraq massed large 
forces on the borders of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In view of 
these bitter realities and out of the eagerness of the Kingdom to 
safeguard its vital and economic interests, and its wish to bolster its 
defensive capabilities and to rise the level of training of Saudi 
Arabian armed forces...the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia expressed its 
desire for the participation of fraternal Arab forces and other friendly 
forces...the governments of the United States, Britain, and other 
nations took the initiative to dispatch air and land forces to sustain 
the Saudi armed forces...Allied forces, which will participate in the 
joint training exercises with the Saudi armed forces are of a 
temporary nature. They will leave Saudi territory immediately at the 
request of the Kingdom. 
King Fahd also emphasised that the Saudi government had exhausted all 
possible avenues with the governments of Iraq and Kuwait to resolve the 
dispute. He made reference to the Jedda meeting that was held in Saudi 
Arabia by Iraqi and Kuwaiti delegations. He indicated that the meeting was 
convened in response to a desire by the two countries and it had been 
understood by the Saudis that the two sides had agreed to continue their 
meeting in Baghdad. ^° King Fahd emphasised that the role played by Saudi 
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Arabia during the meeting had been confined to bringing together officials of the 
two countries to the negotiating table for settlement of their dispute through 
cordial dialogue. Hence its role had been limited to the creation of a conducive 
atmosphere, since no one had asked the Saudis to do more than that because 
the two sides were capable of solving their problems, once good will prevails 
and the use of force is ruled out. Also, the Kingdom had not been mandated 
by the Arab League to solve outstanding issues between Kuwait and Iraq. 
The massing of troops on the Saudi border was interpreted by the Gulf Arab 
states as an extension of the Iraqi aggression on Kuwait to the rest of the Gulf 
states. A statement by the foreign ministers of the GCC in Jedda on 17 August 
portrayed such a sentiment by stating that "it had become clear to Saudi Arabia 
and the GCC that the occupation of Kuwait was a mere ploy to launch an 
aggression on all Arab Gulf countries". 
Following the historic decision to invite foreign troops onto its territory, Saudi 
Arabia intensified its efforts in the Arab world to increase Arab military 
cooperation and coordination, particularly with Syria and Egypt. The most 
important expression of this new cooperation was the joint memorandum that 
was agreed upon on 30 October 1990 in Jedda, which emphasised the 
importance of Gulf security. The new axis of Saudi Arabia-Egypt-Syria became 
the heart of Arab opposition to Iraq. The mutual interests of these three major 
players were crucial to the coalition against Saddam, as an Iraqi hegemony in 
the region would have threatened Saudi security and its dominant role in the 
Gulf, marginalised Egypt's role in the Arab world and destabilised the Syrian 
regime. ^ The Gulf crisis offered both Syria and Egypt an opportunity to write 
off their debt and gain access to fresh funds. Egypf s debt of $13 billion owed 
to the US and Gulf creditors was written-off, while Syria received $2 billion in 
direct aid from the Gulf states. The Gulf crisis gave Syria the opportunity to 
bring most of Lebanon under its control by removing General Michael Aoun, the 
last remnant of Maronite resistance - who was backed by Saddam. The 
historically fierce rivalry that exists between the two countries over political, 
military and ideological power in the Fertile Crescent was another motive for 
Syria to take a position against Saddam. Syria's special relations with Iran 
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placed her in a unique position to act as a broker between the Gulf states and 
Iran and its siding with the Gulf states added political legitimacy to the coalition 
against Iraq. 
Two weeks into the crisis, Saudi Arabia's initially cautious position shifted 
towards more public disapproval of Saddam, and under the guidance of Saud 
al-Faysal became more assertive and abandoned all pan-Arab motifs. Thus on 
14 August the Saudis closed the Iraqi oil pipeline that passes through Saudi 
territory to the Red sea. King Fahd announced that Saudi Arabia would not 
permit any aggression against its territory and the Saudi cabinet expressed 
displeasure from the stand of some Arab countries which opposed or had 
reservations concerning the Cairo summit resolution and increased its activities 
towards further collaboration with Syria and Egypt. It expurgated Jordan, the 
PLC, Yemen and to some extent Sudan, Algeria and Libya for their support or 
sympathy for Saddam's case. The Saudi policy became increasingly in line 
with Washington's uncompromising position concerning Iraq. 
The Saudi Ambassador to Washington, Bandar bin Sultan, in defence of the 
hardening of Saudi policy mentioned on 15 August that the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia was neither seeking confrontation nor approbating aggression. 
Moreover the measures undertaken by the Kingdom would not have come 
about if Iraq had not invaded Kuwait. He confirmed that Saudi Arabia had a 
treaty of non-aggression with Iraq but added that "when we see Iraq invades its 
closest brother neighbour and masses its forces on the Kingdom's border, will 
not this be time to question the true intentions of the Iraqi president ?". ®^ 
The interior minister of Saudi Arabia, Prince Naif said furthermore that: 
I would like to emphasise that the supporting forces whether from 
brotherly country or friendly country...have come only at the request 
of the Kingdom and not forced upon us. However, as long as the 
Kingdom is the requesting party it can decide on this issue on its sole 
discretion...Concerning the question offeree and weakness, if we are 
equal in force with Iraq we would not have asked support even from 
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our Arab brothers, but unfortunately the force of Iraq which was built 
by Arab money was put against an Arab...Saddam has turned this 
force against the Arabs and this is a crime which needs immediate 
correction. ®^ 
To gain international support and legitimacy Saudi Arabia restored its 
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union , which had been cut for more than 
half a century. The Saudi Ambassador to Washington visited Moscow on 24 
August at the request of Russia. During the visit Saudi Foreign Minister, Saud 
al-Faisal, declared that "it is the most appropriate time for an effective relation 
to develop between the two countries that encourages peace, security and 
justice as well as the vital interests of the two sides". '*° Within the same frame 
of widening international support Saudi Arabia activated its relations with China 
- diplomatic relations with China had been restored a month before Iraq invaded 
Kuwait. The aim was to maintain Chinese opposition to Iraq in the Security 
Council. 
With America, there was coordination to maintain the military pressure on Iraq 
and an agreement considering the command of military forces in the event of 
war breaking out. Saudi and American diplomacy was able to gather the 
utmost international support to pass Security Council resolution 678 which 
permitted the use of force against Iraq if it failed to comply with the resolution 
by the set deadline of 15 January 1991. Following the passing of the 
resolution President Bush announced his initiative to open a dialogue with Iraq 
and arrange for a meeting between the US Secretary of State and Iraqi Foreign 
Minister- a move supported by Saudi Arabia. 
In summary Saudi Arabia was the most important political-strategic player 
among the Gulf Arab states and the essential partner to the Americans in their 
effort to maintain the cover of international legitimacy to their actions in the Gulf 
area. The Saudi position hardened after the Americans provided guarantees 
that they would assist the government against any Iraqi aggression. 
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Nevertheless, its position during the crisis had been from the start based on 
three main principles: 
1. The necessity of the total withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and the 
return of the legitimate government and the condemnation of Iraqi 
aggression. 
2. To give peaceful solution a chance and to resort to military action only 
when all peaceful means had been exhausted. 
3. Withdrawal of the Iraqi troops massing on the borders of Saudi Arabia 
and guarantees that Iraqi aggression would not be repeated against any 
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other Gulf Arab state. 
This position was presented as consistent with the Charters of the Arab 
League and the GCC as well as the resolutions of the United Nations. By its 
reliance on international law as well as regional rules and regulations Riyadh 
hoped to help the region to avoid military confrontation and contain the crisis 
through regional and international coordination. But the intransigence of the 
Iraqi regime and the fear of being attacked moved Saudi policy quickly from 
political condemnation and active pursuit of a regional peaceful solution to 
requesting military help from Western and Arab countries, and from a defensive 
posture to an offensive one. 
IV. Saudi Arabia and the Shift from Desert Shield to Desert Storm 
The Iraqi invasion was the first major international chsis in the post Cold War 
era. The American deputy Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger stated 
that the US had to take firm action against Iraq in order to avoid setting "all the 
wrong standards" for the post Cold War world by implying that aggression by 
Third World dictators rewards. More importantly, the invasion directly 
threatened US interests in the Gulf and threatened the security of the Gulf for 
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three main reasons. Firstly, Iraq if not punished could use its power to threaten 
the region's oil producing states and could be a source of intimidation for these 
regimes. Secondly, the Iraqi threat made the prospect of higher oil prices 
significant. Thirdly, Iraq could possibly have invaded Saudi Arabia and 
occupied its strategic oil region. The Americans were convinced of this and 
convinced Saudi Arabia as well. Whether these were plausible or just a ploy 
on the part of the Americans to push Saudi Arabia towards taking a firmer stand 
against Iraq is a matter for speculation. 
Consequently, American objectives went beyond what was mandated by the 
UN and included the elimination of Iraq as a threatening player in regional 
politics. On 16 January, President Bush stated some objectives that were 
clearly not part of the UN mandate. He emphasised that "we are determined to 
destroy Saddam Hussein's nuclear bomb potential [and] we will also destroy his 
chemical weapons facilities". Secretary Cheney expressed similar views by 
saying "our objective is to get Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait and to destroy 
that military capability that he has used to invade Kuwait and to threaten the 
other nations in the Middle East". Congressman Les Aspin aptly summarised 
American objectives by stating tha t " Iraqi's military leverage in the region must 
be neutralised if security and stability are to be achieved in the Persian Gulf. 
These objectives opened a national debate in the US involving the Congress 
over the direction the crisis was heading. The House of Representatives voted 
250 to 183 against the Mitchel-Nunn antiwar resolution and in favour of the 
resolution authorising the President to use armed forces, subject to the UN 
Security Council Resolution 678, and so long as he exhausted all diplomatic 
means. The attempt by the US on 9 January 1991 to make one last final visible 
step towards a negotiated settlement by arranging a meeting between James 
Baker, and Tariq Aziz, as mentioned before, must be seen as a gesture to 
appease those in the US and abroad that were in favour of negotiating a 
peaceful settlement to the conflict and giving sanctions more time. 
To conduct the war for the liberation of Kuwait, the Americans needed the full 
cooperation of the Saudis. The importance of Saudi support was clear to the 
American administration from the start of the crisis. During the first meeting of 
the American National Security Council in the aftermath of the invasion, 
General Schawzkopf made it clear to the President that the deployment of 
American troops is possible only by Saudi participation and their permission to 
use a number of military bases in the Gulf states to accommodate American 
forces. 
The alternative to using Saudi territory was using Turkish territory. But that 
option had many constraints. The most important among them were Turkey's 
lack of the facilities to support air, land and naval forces especially in terms of 
supplies due to its difficult economic situation. Secondly was the shortness of 
the borders between Turkey and Iraq in comparison to the 808 km of border 
between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, which helped the coalition in their initial 
manoeuvres of land forces against Iraq and the subsequent conduct of the 
war.'*^ Consequently, the most important aspect of Saudi cooperation had been 
the permission to station coalition military forces on Saudi land and the conduct 
of war primarily from Saudi territory. The eastern and northern parts of the 
Kingdom were the centre for conducting the military operations. This gave the 
coalition air, sea and land supremacy vis a vis the Iraqi regime, but at the same 
time putting these sensitive and important areas of the Kingdom at risk as 
potential military targets for the Iraqi forces. 
In accordance with the agreement between Saudi Arabia and the US, the 
Kingdom was obliged to facilitate the task of the coalition forces by providing all 
that is within its means, including administrative matters concerning living 
quarters, food, medical services and transport. As for the matters that the 
Kingdom could not provide, it was obliged to provide the American treasury with 
the financial means to cover the costs of what the Americans provide 
themselves. ^° The Saudi government shouldered this heavy burden out of its 
commitment to Kuwait and to international law as indicated by Mufaid Shahab: 
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Saudi Arabia played a pivotal role in restoring the sovereignty of 
Kuwait out of total commitment to the principle of opposing 
aggression against a member of the Arab League and the UN. 
He went further to enumerate the many aspects of Saudi support for Kuwait as 
follows: 
Saudi Arabia provided the Kuwaiti government with support in 
international quarters, welcomed the Kuwaiti government and a large 
number of Kuwaiti citizens as guests in the Kingdom as well as 
defended Kuwaiti rights on regional and international levels. It 
provided also financial support and the participation of its military 
force and the use of its territory to launch the military operation for 
the liberation of Kuwait. 
It is worth mentioning that the humanitarian role played by Saudi Arabia 
extended also to welcoming at the start of the invasion Iraqi refugees and 
allowing them to stay until conditions were appropriate for their return to their 
country. According to international agencies the services provided by the Saudi 
government were considered among the best in the world. The government 
spent around $2 billion to accommodate these refugees. 
The preparations for the military action passed through two main stages. The 
first was dated from the start of the invasion until 29 November. The aim of this 
stage was to enhance the defences of Saudi Arabia and to deter Iraq from 
further aggression, in addition to implementing the economic sanctions 
imposed on Iraq by the Security Council. Elements of the US 82nd Airborne 
Division arrived in Saudi Arabia on 8 August and President Bush announced a 
purely defensive deployment called Operation Desert Shield which became one 
of the largest contemporary military deployments. ^ 
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Washington's alliance included 28 member nations which had grown to 37 by 
the war's end and included more than a million soldier with a ten thousand 
soldier brigade from the GCC, in addition to Kuwait soldiers and Syrian soldiers. 
By January half of all combat forces world-wide of the US had been deployed in 
the Gulf On 8 November, after consultation with King Fahd, the Bush 
administration announced plans for the further deployment of 200,000 
additional troops to ensure an adequate offensive option without congressional 
advice or approval. This decision marked the move from a defensive posture 
to an offensive one, from Desert Shield to Desert Storm. 
The second stage started with Security Council resolution 678 of 29 Nov 
authorising the use o f " all necessary means" to secure Iraq's departure from 
Kuwait by 15 January 1991. During that time preparations took place for Desert 
Storm which entailed the transport of massive numbers of soldiers and 
equipment. A plane every five to ten minutes landed in the Gulf area from 
American military bases and other friendly countries. 
To accommodate such a massive deployment of soldiers and weapons Saudi 
Arabia put at the service of the coalition all the necessary infrastructure 
available in the Kingdom, including Saudi ports, airports and military bases. In 
total the Kingdom and the Gulf states provided the coalition with 27 military 
bases and land areas for the landing of thousands of jet fighters. Of these 
bases 16 were provided by Saudi Arabia alone. ^ A\so considering the huge 
size of the military presence, the Kingdom carried out construction of areas for 
the landing of coalition forces. The strong infrastructure that the Kingdom 
possessed helped in its ability to cater for the American airlift that exceeded 
550 thousand tons of equipment. 
It also facilitated the air transport within the areas of military operations. That 
involved 9500 flights for the American air force alone to transport forces and 
ammunition from the main supply areas in Saudi Arabia. In addition, Saudi 
Arabia provided the fuel for this massive operation. The huge production 
capacity of Saudi Arabia made it relatively easy to respond to the needs of the 
military forces. Even concerning water; a resource that is scarce in Saudi 
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Arabia, the government was able to meet the challenge of providing the 
necessary and adequate amounts for the coalition forces. As expressed by 
Ahmad Al Baghdady-an academic at Kuwait University: 
There was one very serious obstacle to the deployment of American 
forces in Saudi Arabia, namely water. America would have been 
unable to provide directly the needed amounts. That was the 
weakest point in the plans that were set for a rapid deployment of 
American forces during the Carter Administration. Without the 
Saudis providing the necessary logistic support on land, including 
water, American forces would not have survived the desert for one 
day. This is a very important issue that must be taken into account 
when considering the role played by Saudi Arabia in support of the 
coalition forces. ®^ 
The military participation of Saudi forces involved the movement of forces from 
their various military areas in the country to the areas of deployment, setting up 
a comprehensive system of supplies for the coalition forces, and an extensive 
involvement of the Saudi air force in missions of defence, early warning and 
strategic reconnaissance. During Desert Shield the Saudi air force participated 
in more than 26000 flights. The modern network of Saudi command and 
control and Saudi air facilities contributed significantly to the success of the air 
campaign. As for the Saudi naval forces, they were involved in implementing 
the economic sanctions on Iraq within the Gulf area and securing the oil 
facilities and Saudi regional waters from any sea attack. Moreover Saudi 
infrastructure facilitated the efficient unloading of ships, storage and transport. 
The Saudi land forces were the first to enter Kuwait and regain control of some 
parts in the first day of the land attack. In the second day they liberated some 
ports and in the third day entered the city of Kuwait without facing any 
resistance from Iraqi forces. ^° The Kingdom participated also with the coalition 
forces in restoring civil life to Kuwait, transferring power to the Kuwaiti 
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government, helping the Kuwaiti government to control its international borders 
and maintain internal security, and removing weapons and dangerous 
materials. 
In sum, without the massive support provided by the Saudi government , the 
liberation of Kuwait would have been very hard to undertake. As indicated by 
William Gus Pagonis, the head of American Supplies, "we would have faced a 
very difficult situation if the guest country was poor, foe or both". This is 
further emphasised by Schwarkopf who indicated at the end of the war that: 
From the moment the first American soldier landed in the Kingdom 
we got 100 percent support from the Saudis. We were provided with 
food, water, fuel, means of transport and all our requirements. It 
must be known that what we achieved together is considered a great 
military victory that was not possible without total cooperation from 
Saudi Arabia. The ports that our equipment landed were Saudi 
ports, the airports that our first air raids started from were mostly 
Saudi. The support of the guest country was not possible to attain 
any where else. Without that support any military attack would have 
taken months if not years to prepare for...I believe it is the 
appropriate time to acknowledge the contribution of Saudi Arabia in 
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this victory. 
It is important to mention, also, the massive financial costs incurred by Saudi 
Arabia during the crisis. These costs were estimated at 60-70 billion dollars. 
They included grants to countries that sent forces to defend the Kingdom (the 
share of the US of that was 25 billion dollars), the cost of maintaining the 
coalition forces in the Kingdom and grants to friendly countries such as Egypt, 
Turkey and Syria. Of a lesser significance were the costs of mobilising Saudi 
Arabia's own defence forces - no estimate is available for that. 
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V. The Role of the Ulama in Supporting the Saudi Political and Military 
Stance 
The FKJiitical system of Saudi Arabia rests on a complex mix of religious power 
and political authority. The former is exercised by al ulama and the latter by al-
Saud. This has been in existence since 1744 following the alliance between 
Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahabb and Muhammad ibn Saud. It resulted in the 
creation of the system of issuing legal opinion on the Islamic sources of law, 
fatwa, which reinforces this relationship by interpreting the law and promoting 
the welfare of the Islamic state. Despite the tensions between the religious and 
established state authorities, al Saud continue to rely on the advice and support 
of ulama in times of peace as well as crisis. This relationship has survived and 
still functions to this date. ^ 
The ulama study the Quran and the Sunna as well as the life of the Prophet 
and draw their interpretations and resolutions of legal matters subsequently. In 
Sunni Islam the ulama and the fuqaha have traditionally supported the political 
institutions in power, and in Saudi Arabia this is given to al-Saud. This has 
been maintained despite the massive changes that took place in the country 
since the discovery of oil and the accumulation of huge wealth by al-Saud. The 
ulama accept the legitimacy of the government because al-Saud rule according 
to Shari'a and consult regularly with the recognised interpreters of the Shari'a, 
namely the ulama. It is this source of religion that gives the government 
legitimacy within the Kingdom and the Muslim world. 
The King is the head of the state and has absolute power, even the high 
standing of the Saudi ulama in the Muslim world, because of their responsibility 
for the Muslim holy places in the Hijaz, does not give them power equal to that 
of the King. He is the supreme ruler and the head of both legislative and 
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executive powers and has the full responsibility to administer state affairs. 
However, his power is restricted and tied to Shari'a laws and rules as well as 
the Quran and Sunna. 
Among the many responsibilities that he shoulders is the responsibility of the 
defence of the country in the face of external aggression and the maintenance 
of internal public security and public order. The King's decision to invite 
American and foreign forces into the kingdom was taken in accordance with this 
obligation with the aim of protecting the Kingdom from a possible Iraqi 
aggression. The decision, consequently, fulfilled two obligations: the first is the 
obligation of the King towards protecting the Kingdom and its citizens and the 
second is the obligation of the country to support a neighbouring state that is a 
member of the GCC, Arab League and the UN. The Deputy of the Egyptian 
Wafd party explains the motives of the Kingdom for calling upon foreign forces 
as follows: 
The main reason for the Kingdom to call upon friendly and 
neighbouring countries is to defend itself since the occupation of 
Kuwait threatened its the security. When we mention the military 
confrontation, one must remember that it was used only when all 
other peaceful means were exhausted by the Security Council and 
Arab League. It is the refusal of Iraq to abide by the requirements of 
the international community to withdraw from Kuwait which forced a 
military confrontation. That in turn necessitated the Kingdom's 
request for military support from international quarters. 
The Kingdom requested the help of foreign troops only out of necessity 
especially that the difference in the military strength between Saudi Arabia and 
Iraq was huge. As indicated by a Saudi academic: 
95 
The kingdom felt threatened and its existence and survival were 
endangered. It saw what took place in Kuwait as a first step towards 
more Iraqi aggression in the region. In my opinion when matters 
reach this level the choice is clear, and the Kingdom has the right to 
defend itself I do not believe there is anyone who can dispute the 
Kingdom's right. We must not, also, forget the strength of the Iraqi 
army and its combat experience, especially in relation to Saudi 
forces. The international community responded to the Kingdom's 
request and international efforts were successful under the auspices 
of the UN. Kuwait was liberated, and all foreign forces returned to 
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their respective countries. 
However, this decision created sensitivities and negative resonances in the 
Arab and Muslim worlds because Saudi Arabia has some of the most important 
Islamic holy places. Opinions split between those who were against the 
Kingdoms' decision to call upon foreign troops and those who supported the 
decision as an act of defence. As has been the case during the decisive crisis 
of the Mecca incident in 1979, the government turned to its ulama for 
consultation and advice. In their turn the ulama supported the government's 
decision. According to Sheikh Abd al Aziz bin Baz, the Grand Mufti and the 
head of the Committee of Senior Ulama: 
The decision by the government to call upon a variety of supporters, 
Muslims and others to ward off the aggression of the Iraqi regime 
and to defend the Kingdom is appropriate and is governed by 
necessity. The defence of Islam, Muslims and the honour of people 
and country is obligatory to the ruler. The government is excused in 
its initiative, since it is primarily concerned with the protection of the 
country and its people, and its defence against an expected 
offensive from Iraq. Necessity imposes on the government the need 
to take precautional measures and seek the assistance of others to 
safeguard the Kingdom and its people. 
96 
Thus, the ulama supported the government's decision based on their belief that 
it is the duty of the ruler as indicated by Shari'a to be vigilant and cautious when 
it comes to the defence and security of the people and the state. The 
Committee of Senior Ulama agreed unanimously on that and said in a 
statement: 
The council of senior ulama supports the ruler in his decision to invite 
forces fully equipped and capable to frighten those who are planning 
acts of aggression against the Kingdom. It is the duty of the ruler 
imposed on him by necessity and circumstances and the painful 
reality of the situation and rules of Shari'a, to seek help from those 
who are capable of giving it. ^° 
The council of the higher court made a statement explaining the necessity of 
the decision taken by the ruler as follows: 
Because the ruler has to do all that is in his powers to avoid the 
nation and country dangers, and must provide security and stability 
for the holy cities and the wealth and honour of the people, and that 
he has to resort to what he sees most effective to shun danger, 
hence we declare our support to everything done by the ruler to ward 
off aggression. 
Moreover, there is evidence from the Shari'a and the life of the Prophet in 
support of asking the assistance of non-believers. An example of that is Hanin 
battle, in the year 8 (H), where non-believers participated in the fight, such as 
Safwan bin Umayya and Suhail bin Amro. Safwan bin Umayya possessed 
arms and shields and the Prophet requested its usage in the battle. Many other 
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ulama assert that Musl im law allows the request of assistance from non-
believers and provide evidence from the life of the prophet. Thus seeking 
assistance from non-Musl ims falls within the Shari'a and the Saudi ulama 
based their fatwa on such evidence. They acted in support of the government 
and also as religious interpreters of Islamic law by permitting the presence of 
the coalit ion forces on Saudi soil. 
The support provided by the ulama and their public statements to that effect 
had greatly inf luenced people's acceptance of the presence of foreign troops on 
Saudi soil. This stance taken by the ulama was vital at a critical moment for the 
Kingdom and helped in maintaining internal unity. It showed how close are the 
ulama to regional events and their understanding of the significance and 
consequences of the Iraqi aggression and the occupation of Kuwait for Arab 
and Islamic issues. In some countries the ulama are often accused of being 
unaware of political events and that they are only experts on religious matters. 
But this is not the case with Saudi ulama. Saudi ulama showed an ability to 
understand the consequences and implications of the Iraqi aggression and lend 
support to the state's decision based both on its not contradicting Islamic rules 
and on political necessity. Sheikh Mohammed bin Otheimeen points to this 
understanding by stating that "this catastrophe will take the Arabs economically, 
politically and socially many years back because it destroyed and will destroy 
many of their achievements that they worked hard for." 
Al though the great majority of the ulama supported the government, significant 
opposit ion came f rom dissident Muslim preachers circulating and popularising 
their speeches and messages through cassette tapes and to a lesser degree by 
sermons in Mosques. The cassette tapes of two preachers, in particular. 
Sheikh Safar al-Hawali and Salman al- 'Auda "changed the Saudi political 
language [and] galvanised the public by harnessing Saudi anger over the war 
and disi l lusionment over Saudi Arabia's dependence on foreign protection". 
They focused the attention of Saudis on government weaknesses in the areas 
of defence, government spending and political participation. Al-Hawali in 
particular highlighted, also, the danger of foreign domination, especially 
Amer ican dominat ion of Saudi Arabia and the region in general. He saw 
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Western military and economic hegemony over the Islamic world and Saudi 
Arabia as extremely threatening and needs to be counteracted by building the 
military strength of the Muslim world and Saudi Arabia. Consequently he saw 
the Gulf crisis as instigated by the West in accordance with its strategic interest 
in the region: 
I'm of the opinion that what took place [in the Gulf] was not a random 
event, but part of the larger Western design, a position I stated 
publicly in front of many Sheikhs and ulama. 
Most notable about al-Hawali's opposit ion to the Saudi stance was the fact that 
it did not stem from support for the Iraqi regime but rather from opposition to 
Amer ican domination of both Saudi Arabia and the Muslim world. He was very 
critical of Saddam regime and the all iance that was built between him and 
Saudi Arabia during the Gulf war with Iran. Al-Hawali contends that it is 
unlslamic to allow foreign non-Musl im troops to occupy the holy land of Saudi 
Arabia, a presence that he considers harmful to Saudi Arabia's culture and 
value system. Yet, he sees the issue of the legality of the decision to invite 
foreign troops, which consumed Saudi sheikhs, as obscuring the gravity of the 
situation in terms of Saudi dependence on the West and Western superiority 
and dominat ion of the area. Thus he called f o r : 
1. "The creation of a panel of competent men to study the question of Saudi 
Arabia 's military capabilit ies, its strengths and its weaknesses; 
2. The creation of a panel to study how Saudi Arabia can and should defend 
itself and its independence ; 
3. The formulation of a defence strategy against Western troops in the event 
they should turn against Saudi Arabia; 
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4 . The creation of a panel to study the economic impact of the war on Saudi 
Arabia 's economy and society and 
5. The formulat ion of a peace initiative that would save Kuwait and allow 
Saddam a face-saving mechanism". 
Despite the popularity of these preachers and their messages their influence 
was insignificant in terms of changing state policy or instigating political activism 
on the part of those who supported them. Also the great majority of the ulama 
cont inued to support the Saudi government and its policy despite their concern 
about foreign influences on the Saudi society as indicated by Sheikh 
Muhammad bin Salih (second ranking 'alim in the Kingdom) who announced 
the presence of the Amer ican soldiers in the Kingdom "was the lesser of two 
evi ls" and thus was suff icient justification for the invitation extended by the 
government to the American forces. In the opinion of Fandy figures such as 
al-Auda and al-Hawali because of their extreme political and religious positions 
funct ion to maximise the interests of the establishment ulama and the 
conservat ive trend who appear more compromising on their positions and 
hence the government is more accommodating to them. ®° 
VI The Legal Basis of King Fahd's Historical Decision 
The dut ies of the ruler as the head of the state and the rules of international law 
played a role in justifying and encouraging King Fahd to take the 
unprecedented decision of inviting foreign troops to assist in the defence of the 
Kingdom. The King is the central figure in the Saudi government and his word 
is supreme. In his person the executive, legislative and judicial functions are 
combined and he is fully responsible for the maintenance of internal order and 
defence of the country and people against external danger. He executes his 
responsibil i t ies and power through a variety of royal mandates. These include 
the royal order, which is wri t ten and signed by the King without having to refer it 
to the cabinet; the royal decree which is written and signed by the King after it 
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has been referred to the cabinet, the royal directive which is issued by the King 
as head of state or head of the executive and can be written or verbal, and 
lastly is the high order that can be verbal or written and is issued by the King as 
head of the cabinet. 
King Fahd's decision to call upon Western forces was announced by a royal 
directive, i.e. what is undertaken in his capacity as the head of state. He also 
founded his decision on international law and regional resolutions. He took into 
account the resolutions of the Arab League, in particular the resolutions of the 
Cairo summit which emphasised the following legal aspects: 
1. The maintenance of the legitimacy of the state of Kuwait in international 
law and its right to independence and regional security. 
2. The emphasis on the principle of non-aggression in international 
relations especially among Arab countries. 
3. The support of all UN resolutions concerning the Kuwaiti crisis. 
4. The aff irmation of the right of nations to defend themselves against 
aggression. 
The resolutions of the Arab League were themselves based on international law 
in particular on the: 
1. Rules of international legitimacy that makes it obligatory to respect the 
independence and sovereignty of each state and prohibits the use of force 
to solve disputes and emphasises the use of peaceful means. 
2. UN charter especially article (2) paragraph (4) which prohibits the use of 
force in international relations. 
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3. Securi ty Counci l resolutions concerning the Kuwait-Iraq crisis, since 
member nations are obliged to respect these resolutions. Article (25) 
st ipulates that "members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry 
out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present 
Charter". 
4. Inherent right of individual or collective self-defence as affirmed by article 
(51) of the UN charter and article (2) of the Common Arab defence 
Agreement . ^ 
Thus the Kingdom's request for foreign assistance was based on its right that is 
guaranteed in international law to defend itself against any aggression. Article 
51 st ipulates clearly that "nothing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs 
against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security..." The 
response of the Arab League to the Kingdom's request for Arab troops to 
support its defence was also directly based on article 2 of the Arab Defence 
Treaty which aff i rms the right of states to seek military support if it is attacked or 
under the threat of an attack. 
The Kingdom's legal right to defend itself is further emphasised by Fuad 
Badrawi, Secretary-General of the Wafd party, as follows: 
The legit imate right of the Kingdom to defend itself and its use of that 
right in protecting its political system has been clearly based on rules 
of international law and the UN Charter, in particular article (51). 
Regionally its legal right has been founded on the Common Defence 
Treaty which stipulates that if any Arab country is attacked by 
another, Arab countries must come to the rescue. ®^  
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In sum the king based his decision on his legal responsibility as the head 
of the state to act in a manner that maintains the security of the country 
and the people as well as on the regional and international binding 
Charters of the Arab League and UN. These charters forbid the use of 
force among states and oblige states to uphold such a rule. In addition 
the decision took into account the right of states, stipulated in 
international law, to take appropriate action to defend themselves against 
aggression. 
VII Conclusion 
Saudi policy during the Gulf crisis stemmed primarily from fear of Iraqi 
aggression spilling over into its territory and from a need to reduce the regional 
power of the Iraqi regime. Hence Saudi and American objectives in the region 
were identical, namely to safeguard the security of Gulf states and to 
dramatically reduce the political and military power of Saddam's regime. For 
that reason the military option became increasingly more warranted especially 
in the face of Iraqi intransigence and uncompromising position. 
Although the Saudi government's call upon foreign troops to come to its 
assistance was initially aimed at the defence of the Kingdom, it quickly changed 
into an offensive posit ion. The readiness of the Saudis to lend all possible 
assistance to the deployment of the coalition troops and the presence of an 
excellent infrastructure in the Kingdom made that task possible and very 
efficient. The opposit ion to the presence of foreign troops on Saudi soil was 
quickly dealt with through the support of Saudi ulama. They declared that 
according to Islamic law it is actually obligatory for the ruler to take the 
necessary measures to maintain the safety of Muslims and the honour of the 
country and its people. This support was essential to legitimise the 
government's action and to maintain internal unity and security. 
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As for the rest of the region this drastic measure had its consequences in terms 
of further Arab division and disunity as well as the marginalisation of the Arab 
League and sett ing a precedent for Amer ican troops to be deployed by an Arab 
country against another. The Arab League found itself totally ineffective due to 
the crystall isation of posit ions and the division into an anti-Iraqi camp led by the 
GCC, Syria and Egypt, and the pro-Iraqi camp that was hoping for a peaceful 
and negotiated sett lement within an Arab framework. The international support 
gained by the Amer icans and the Saudis for the Kuwaiti case tipped the 
balance against Iraq and made the restoration of the legitimate government of 
Kuwait possible through waging a war against Saddam's military machine. 
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Chapter Five 
The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Crisis 
The analysis of the previous chapter showed the importance of the Saudi 
involvement in the management of the crisis. In order to complete the analysis 
concerning the major players that influenced and shaped the events following 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the role played by the UN must be explored. Its 
active involvement has had a direct impact on how the crisis was resolved and 
is important as a future reference to other international crises. 
For the first time since the inception of the UN, in 1945, its machinery operated 
swiftly and effectively. Within a very short span of t ime, it was able to bring 
about a total defeat of the Iraqi regime and restore the legitimacy of the state of 
Kuwait. There have been many instances of violation of international law by 
member states of the UN, but the Iraqi invasion stands out as the conflict where 
the UN was most active and effective. This poses the question of why this 
happened? Or what made it possible for the UN to act effectively? 
There are two main reasons for that. The first is the clarity of the aggression in 
violat ing international law. International law prohibits the use of force among 
states and stipulates the illegitimacy of occupation. Iraq's attack and 
occupat ion of a sovereign independent state, left no doubt that it was an act of 
aggression in breach of international rules. In addition, by annexing Kuwait it 
further breached international law and defied the UN and the international 
communi ty by such an action. More importantly, it represented an independent 
action by a regional power against the wishes of the major powers, hence 
chal lenging and restricting their ability to manage the global system.^ 
The second reason relates to the end of the Cold War. The Cold War years, 
1945-1990, inhibited the UN f rom applying the procedures of Chapter VII of the 
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Charter to violations of peace and acts of aggression especially in cases where 
the parties involved were affi l iated with one side or another of the Cold War. 
The UN became more reliant on using mediat ion, conciliation and peace 
making. ^ One of the instruments useful for such peaceful resolutions of 
disputes is the International Court of Justice. Al though it is a semi-independent 
entity headquartered at the Hague in the Netherlands, the Charter of the UN 
recognises it as one of the six principle organs of the UN. ^ However, its 
contribution to peaceful resolutions of conflicts has been limited primarily due to 
the unwill ingness of all affected parties to place a dispute before it. '* 
Iraqi aggression provided the international community with the first major 
challenge of the post Cold-War era. That explains the strong international 
response against the invasion, the imposition of economic, military and financial 
sanctions, and the format ion of an international coalition, which aimed at 
restoring peace and upholding international law. This international response 
represented a unique stance in international relations where international efforts 
were united in facing Iraq and restoring international legitimacy facilitated by the 
absence of the dynamics of Cold War politics. ^ 
In this chapter I shall examine this significant role of the UN and analyse the 
resolutions that helped end the crisis, in addition to a discussion of the 
international laws that Iraq violated by invading Kuwait. This is of a particular 
importance in this conflict since international law was used as the frame of 
reference from the start of the crisis, and the international response against Iraq 
was justified in the name of respecting and adhering to the rules of international 
law. I shall also touch upon the controversy surrounding some of the UN 
resolutions concerning their lawfulness, especially resolution 678 (1990); 
authorising the use o f f e ree against Iraq. 
I International Law and the Prohibition of the Use of Force 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was an attack on the independence and sovereignty 
of Kuwait and also a violat ion of the rules and laws of international law and 
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international relation. Thus, Iraq "struck at the cornerstone of the post-1945 
international legal order, the prohibition of the use of force against the territorial 
integrity of another state". ® 
International legitimacy is considered one of the key principles of international 
law that governs relations among states in peacetime and wartime. It attaches 
great importance to protecting and guaranteeing the internal and external 
independence of each state. Accordingly, military aggression and the use of 
force are illegitimate and are violations of international legitimacy. States are 
obliged to respect the independence and sovereignty of each other and not to 
interfere directly or indirectly in the internal affairs of each other. Just as law 
governs the relation between ruler and ruled, in democratic states, international 
legitimacy governs the relations among states, and these states are obliged to 
adhere to the rules of international law. Violating these rules is a breach of 
international legitimacy. 
The prohibit ion of the threat or use of force has become a given in international 
law and is explicitly adopted in the UN Charter. Article 2 (4) stipulates that: 
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat of or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the purposes of the United Nations. (See Annex 1) 
This posit ion is emphasised in the Vienna Convention (1969), which specified in 
Article 53 the presence of obligatory laws in international law that protect the 
common interests of the international community, such as the rules that prohibit 
the use of force in international relations. ® Furthermore, numerous UN 
resolutions have confirmed this prohibition. One example is General Assembly 
resolution 2625, known as the "Declaration of International Law Principles" 
pertaining to friendly relations between states under the UN Charter. This 
resolution, adopted on 24 October 1970, reaffirmed that any violation of the 
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principle prohibiting the use of force constitutes a violation of international law 
and the provisions of the Charter. The same resolution stressed that states are 
committed to refrain f rom any propaganda promoting wars of aggression and 
threats or use of feree, in order to encroach upon the international boundaries of 
any state, or as means of settl ing international disputes. ^ 
A further confimiation of this principle is adopted in resolution 2734 by the 
General Assembly, 16 December 1970, known as the "Declaration of the 
Reinforcement of International Security". It calls upon all states to show respect 
to the purposes and principles of the UN in their international relations, such as 
the principle of refraining f rom use of force and the settling of international 
disputes by peaceful means. 
In defining 'aggression" the UN General Assembly stated in resolution 3314 
adopted 18 December 1974, that aggression means "use of armed force by a 
state or use of any other means incompatible with the UN Charter against the 
sovereignty, integrity or political independence of another state". Accordingly, 
the use of force by a state is proof of committ ing an act of aggression, 
incompatible with the UN Charter. The same definition purports that if the 
armed forces of a given state invade the territory of another state or occupy a 
part by force, and, also, if the armed forces of a state shall target another state 
whether through bombs or any other means, this is considered an aggressive 
act. The Iraqi aggression against Kuwait was, therefore, clearly a violation of 
the provisions of international law and an infringement of the principles of the 
UN Charter. 
The UN in Article 5 of resolution 3314 of the General Assembly identified three 
major principles restricting aggression: 
1. No matter what the issue is, whether it is political, economic, or military 
it should not be used as a justif ication for war. 
2. War of aggression is a cr ime against peace and world security, thus it 
brings about international response. 
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3. Any gains of the war of aggression are not legitimate. 
It is clear that the international community has defined and restricted acts of 
aggression in order to maintain peace and stability in the world. Although the 
prohibition of the threat or use of force is universal and absolute, there are two 
instances where that use is permissible, namely, individual and collective self-
defence, and collective security, adopted by the Security Council, pursuant to 
chapter VII of the UN Charter. Apart from these two instances, no excuse may 
be given to justify aggression. In the next section I shall elaborate on these two 
instances and the powers and authority given to the Security Council in order to 
enable it to fight aggression and maintain international peace and security. 
II The UN Charter and the Legitimate Use of Force 
The maintenance of international peace and security is among the foremost 
purposes and principles of the UN, and that must be pursued through peaceful 
means and in accordance with international law. As stipulated in Article 1(1), 
the role of the UN is to; 
Maintain international peace and security, and to that end; to take 
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of 
threats to the peace, and for the suspension of acts of aggression 
and other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful, and 
in conformity wi th the principles of justice and international law, 
adjustment or sett lement of international disputes or situations which 
might lead to a breach of the peace. (See Annex 1) 
Member states of the UN delegate the Security Council to carry out this task in 
accordance with Art icle 24 (1); 
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In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the UN, its 
members confer on the Security Counci l primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in 
carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council 
acts on their behal f (See Annex 1) 
This paragraph confirms that the members rely on the Security Council for 
implementing that objective, and in accordance with Article 25 they agree to 
accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with 
the present Charter. The Charter of the UN, in line with its fundamental function 
as an international peace organisat ion, emphasises, first, the pacific settlement 
of disputes, in accordance with the provisions of chapter VI. Article 33 (1) 
specifies the peaceful measures for solving international disputes as follows: 
The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to 
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall 
first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional 
agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own 
choice. (See Annex 1) 
The initial position of the Charter is that the disputing parties must seek a 
solution through peaceful means. Only in the case of their failure, which might 
threaten international peace and security, the UN has the right to interfere. 
Article 37(1) stipulates that "should the parties to a dispute of the nature 
referred to in Article 33 fail to sett le it by the means indicated in that Article, they 
shall refer it to the Security Counci l" . These two duties are obligatory to the 
UN members. Bringing a dispute to the attention of the UN can be done by the 
Security Council, a UN member or a non-UN member, which is a party to a 
dispute. 
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Al though, the UN Charter emphasises, first, the pacific settlement of disputes, it 
has provided for a special system stipulated in chapter VII, permitting the use of 
force against those that violate Article 2 (4) for the purpose of maintaining 
international peace and security. The Charter in this manner affirms that 
international crimes have a special punishment and that states are obliged to 
comply by the prohibition rule. Moreover, the law makes no distinction among 
those that violate international law. The prohibition of the use of force is a 
principle applicable to all member states including the five permanent members 
of the Security Council, a l though these states have special privileges such as 
the right of veto. The only legitimate use of force is, therefore, the one that 
corresponds to the aims and functions of the UN and applies only in two specific 
instances; individual and collective self-defence and collective security. 
A. Individual and Collective Self-Defence 
The Legit imacy of individual and collective self-defence is present and 
acknowledged in all legal systems and represents a natural right for the state 
under attack in order to stop an act of aggression. Nevertheless, this right as 
granted in the UN Charter is of a temporary nature, until the Security Council 
takes necessary measures to maintain world peace and security and can not be 
pract ised when the Security Counci l is capable of stopping the aggression. It is 
only when the Security Counci l is unable to act that this right is applicable. 
Accord ing to Article 5 1 ; 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against 
a Member of the UN, until the Security Council has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures 
taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be 
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way 
affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under 
the present Charter to take at any time action as it deems necessary 
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in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. (See 
Annex 1) 
In addition, the Article specifies the terms under which states can resort to force 
for self-defence as follows: 
The right of self-defence can only be exercised when a state or 
states have actually been attacked by another state or states. The 
principle of self-defence differs f rom the principle of self-protection. 
There has to be a violation of a legal commitment towards the state 
that is exercising the right of self-defence. It is a way of protecting 
the basic rights of states against a harm that can not be fought 
except by force. 
This right by no means represents a punishment on the part of the state 
exercising it, but rather a means of stopping an aggression. The force used 
should equal the original aggression, not excessive, such as total occupation of 
the aggressor's territory or use of nuclear weapons to deter conventional 
weapons etc. At the same t ime the state engaged in self-defence can partially 
occupy and can destroy the aggressor's military force. Temporary occupation is 
permitted on the condition that withdrawal takes place the minute the threat is 
removed. Thus the action taken by the coalition forces in 1991 in following the 
Iraqi forces into southern Iraq, after fleeing Kuwait, can be said to be legal 
under international law, since the military force left the Iraqi territory within two 
weeks. Ultimately this defence remains temporary, until the Security Council 
fulfils its duties according to the Charter. 
Collective self-defence means that more than one state carries it out in order to 
respond to an attack that took place on one state. The same rules of individual 
self-defence applies to collective self-defence. An aggression must take place 
first and these states must prove that such an attack affects them too. In the 
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case that a mutual self-defence treaty exists among these states the matter is 
clear, s ince according to common defence treaties an aggression on one is an 
aggression on all the signatories of the treaty. However, if no common self-
defence treaty exists it falls on the state that wants to exercise the right of 
col lective self-defence to prove that the aggression affects her too. It can use 
arguments based on geographical proximity, common economic, political and 
cultural interests etc. 
B. Collective Security 
The second exception to the rule is allowing the Security Council to use force 
and mil i tary measures in order to punish aggression and to restore world peace 
and security. The Security Counci l has the authority to decide when an action, 
a si tuat ion, or a position threatens international peace and security. According 
to Art icle 39: 
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make 
recommendat ions, or decide what measures shall be taken in 
accordance with Articles 41 and 42 to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. (See Annex 1) 
Deciding the presence of a threat, the violation of peace, or the presence of an 
act of aggression accordingly is a pre-condition for the exercise of the rules of 
chapter VII of the Charter. The Security Council can not exercise its authority 
unless that condit ion is establ ished, which requires the unanimous agreement 
of the f ive permanent members of the Security Council. In the instance that no 
agreement can be reached the Counci l orders measures according to Article 
40 . There are also objective and political considerations that the Council must 
take into account before making such a decision. In specific tenns, the Council 
needs to consider three issues: 
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1. To what extent that decision will help in maintaining world peace and 
security; 
2. The ability of the Security Council to carry out coercive measures; and 
3. The agreement among the five permanent member states and their 
support for the decision. 
The Council, after deciding whether an event or action threatens world peace 
and security, has to decide between two choices. The first is to implement the 
rules of Article 40 of the Charter and call upon the disputed parties to comply 
with the provisional measures deemed suitable by the Council in order to stop 
the escalation of the conflict. The second is to implement Article 39 and take 
measures in accordance with Articles 41 and 42. ^° 
According to Articles 41 and 42 the Council has at its disposal two types of 
coercive collective measures in order to fulfil its role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security. These are non-military measures and military 
measures. The purpose of using coercive non-military measures is the exercise 
of pressure and the graduation in the action against states that violate 
international law and the UN Charter in order to force them to comply with 
international rules. As stipulated in Article 41 the non-military coercive 
measures are enumerated as follows: 
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the 
use of anned force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, 
and it may call upon the Members of the UN to apply such measures. 
These may include complete or partial interruption of economic 
relations and of rail, air, sea, postal, telegraphic, radio and other 
means of communication and severance of diplomatic relations. (See 
Annex 1) 
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Article 42 outlines coercive military measures as follows; 
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in 
Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it 
may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary 
to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action 
may Include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, 
sea or land forces of members of the UN. (See Annex 1) 
The coercive measures stated in these two articles give the Security Council 
great leverage in order to carry out its responsibilities according to the Charter. 
These measures are, thus, details of the collective measures mentioned in 
Article 1 of the Charter, which emphasise the right of the UN to take effective 
collective measures to maintain peace and security. The resolutions endorsed 
by the Security Council on the basis of Articles 41 and 42 are legally binding in 
accordance with Articles 25, 48 and 49. In addition, member states undertake 
to make available to the Council armed forces, assistance and facilities for the 
purpose of maintaining peace and security in accordance with Article 43. This 
article makes it clear that the Security Council is to have at its disposal troops 
supplied by prior agreement with members and awaiting the Council's call for 
action. The text of the article reads; 
All member states of the UN, in order to contribute to the 
maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make 
available to the Security Council on its call and in accordance with a 
special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and 
facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of 
maintaining international peace and security. (See Annex 1) 
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Thus, the capacity of the Security Council to take military action is dependent 
on negotiating special agreements with member states to make a UN security 
force available to the Council. These agreements need ratification by the states 
concerned according to their respective constitutional processes. Due to 
differences among the five permanent members, the Charter's commitment to 
collective security was never translated into a specific commitment to supply 
troops and material, and collective military action relied upon voluntary 
contributions of member states instead. Also, the Military Staff Committee 
that was established in accordance with Article 47, in order to advise and assist 
the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military 
requirements for the maintenance of peace and security, never operated as 
envisioned in the Charter. It became a token body with little influence. 
The Charter gave the Security Council the power to intervene in disputes or 
situations that have implications for international peace and security in 
accordance with Article 33 (2) and Article 34. Thus, the Council can on its own 
initiative investigate any dispute or any situation, which might lead to 
international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the 
continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of 
international peace and security. Also, the Council may intervene at any stage 
in a dispute that might threaten world peace in accordance with Article 36 (1), 
which stipulates that:-
The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature 
referred to in Article 33 or of a situation like nature, recommend 
appropriate procedures or methods of adjustments. (See Annex 1) 
In summary, the Charter has given the Council rights and responsibilities to act 
without any party requiring that from it, in order to maintain peace and stability 
in the world. Hence, when an act of aggression is committed, especially if it 
threatens international stability, it is the duty of the Security Council to find the 
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ways to secure world peace, in accordance with the UN Charter. The Charter 
on the other hand specified in chapter VI and VII the conditions, procedures and 
measures that the Security Council is legally bound to follow whether in pacific 
settlement of disputes or through the use offeree. 
Ill UN Resolutions during the Crisis 
The Security Council was heavily involved during the Gulf crisis. It adopted 
numerous resolutions concerning the crisis, which graduated in their 
forcefulness, severity and comprehensiveness in dealing with the Iraqi 
aggression. They began with a simple condemnation and affirmation of the 
illegitimacy of the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait and ended up authorising the 
use of force in order to reverse this aggression and restore the legitimacy of the 
Kuwaiti state. In the following section, I shall discuss some of the most 
important of these resolutions, namely resolutions 660, 661, 662, 678 and 687. 
Resolution 660 
Resolution 660, 2 August 1990, represented the first reaction of the UN towards 
the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, in accordance with Articles 39 and 40 of the UN 
Charter, which entitled the Council to take provisional measures to face the 
situation. The Council condemned the Iraqi invasion and demanded that "Iraq 
withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which 
they were located on 1 August 1990". The resolution also called upon Iraq and 
Kuwait "to begin immediately intensive negotiations for the resolution of their 
differences and supports all efforts in this regard, and especially those of the 
League of Arab States". 
The resolution was passed by fourteen out of fifteen member states voting in its 
favour. The Yemeni representative abstained because no instructions were 
received from his government. In its initial dealings with the crisis, the Security 
Council handled the matter fairly and there were expectations that the dispute 
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might be resolved peacefully. This quickly changed with the fonnation of an 
anti-Iraq coalition led by the US, determined to punish Iraq for its aggression. 
Resolution 661 
The failure of Iraq's immediate compliance with resolution 660, resulted in the 
passing of resolution 661 by the Security Council on 6 August 1990, in which it 
used its powers under article 41 of the Charter to impose comprehensive 
economic sanctions on Iraq in order to force it out of Kuwait. A majority of 
thirteen members voted in favour of the resolution with only Cuba and Yemen 
abstaining. 
It must be noted that the US, Japan, the EC, Canada and the Soviet Union had 
already, before the adoption of the resolution, announced measures such as the 
freezing of Iraqi bank accounts, a ban on oil supplies, the stoppage of exports of 
arms etc. In doing that these countries were "asserting either a right to take 
economic measures as first steps of collective self-defence with Kuwait or a 
right to take economic counter measures in response to an unlawful attack upon 
a friendly state". 
The resolution called upon all states, including non-member states of the UN to 
act strictly in accordance with its provisions. It required all states to prevent: 
1. "the import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in 
Iraq or Kuwait; 
2. any activities by their nationals or in their territories which would promote or 
are calculated to promote the export or trans-shipment of any commodities 
or products from Iraq or Kuwait and any dealings by their nationals or their 
flag vessels or in their territories in any commodities or products originating 
in Iraq or Kuwait, including in particular any transfer of funds to Iraq or 
Kuwait for the purpose of such activities or dealings; 
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3. the sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag 
vessels of any commodities or products, including weapons or any other 
military equipment, whether or not originating in their territories but not 
including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes and, in 
humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs, to any person or body in Iraq or 
Kuwait or to any person or body for the purpose of any business carried on 
in or operated from Iraq ore Kuwait, and any activities by their nationals or in 
their territories which promote or are calculated to promote such sale or 
supply of such commodities or products". 
In the same resolution, the Council established a special committee consisting 
of all the members of the Council to follow up the implementation of the 
resolution. As a response to some countries not enforcing the embargo, the US 
and the United Kingdom warned Iraq immediately after the adoption of the 
resolution, that they will use both naval and aerial interdiction to enforce the 
sanctions. In fact, a week after the adoption of the resolution both countries 
decided to institute a naval interdiction campaign, which was taken after the 
Emir of Kuwait made a request from his exile in Saudi Arabia to the US, Britain 
and other states as follows: 
Kuwait is grateful to all those Governments that have taken a 
principled stand in support of Kuwait's position against aggression 
and occupation by Iraq. It is considered essential that these efforts 
be strengthened so that the provisions of the relevant Security 
Council resolutions be fully and effectively implemented. In the 
exercise of its inherent right of individual and collective self-defence 
and pursuant of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, 
Kuwait would like to notify you that it has requested some nations to 
take such military or other steps as are necessary to ensure the 
effective and prompt implementation of Security Council resolution 
661.2® 
The response by the US and Britain to this request has been considered by 
some as a violation of the UN Charter, since there was no indication in the 
resolution that the Council had intended to confer upon states the power to use 
or threaten force against ships flying the flags of other states in order to enforce 
the sanctions. Both the US and Britain insisted that their naval interdiction 
was carried out in the exercise of the right of self-defence. Many delegates in 
the Council such as Canada made it clear that it was for the Council only to 
authorise the enforcement of its sanctions by military force and that the 
sanctions were imposed under Article 41 which relates to measurers not 
involving the use of armed force, while the blockade or interdiction is clearly 
within the limits of Article 42. °^ Because of the dubious legal basis of the 
interdiction, Douglas Hurd, the British Foreign Secretary announced that his 
government was "working very hard to get a fresh resolution in order to provide 
the legality of enforcing the blockade". 
In order to possess the authorisation of the Council a meeting was 
subsequently called for and resolution 665 was, adopted on 25 August 1990, 
after some ten days of intense negotiations by thirteen votes. Yemen and Cuba 
abstaining. The resolution called on: 
Those member states co-operating with the government of Kuwait 
which are deploying maritime forces to the area, to use such 
measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be 
necessary under the authority of the Security Council to halt all 
inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify 
their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of 
the provisions related to such shipping laid down in resolution 661. 
(See Annex 1) 
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The wording of the resolution is of some importance. The "use of minimum 
force" a formula preferred by the Americans and the British was abandoned for 
the milder one "the use of such measures commensurate to the specific 
circumstances". The use of force was consequently implied rather than 
directly referred to. This avoided at the time giving the US and Britain a direct 
UN mandate to use force. Although the resolution went beyond Article 41 of the 
Charter, it stopped short of Article 42. A most pertinent joke made by some 
observers was that the resolution was based on Article 41 and a half. 
This resolution was followed by another resolution, 670, adopted by the Council 
on 25 September 1990, by fourteen votes, with only Cuba objecting. It further 
tightened the sanctions on Iraq by imposing an air embargo, and requiring 
states to deny permission of aircraft destined to Iraq or Kuwait to over fly their 
territory except where the UN had given prior approval. ^ 
Despite this stiffening of the sanctions against Iraq, some UN members such as 
Jordan and Bulgaria found it difficult to comply fully with the sanctions in light of 
their strong economic ties to Iraq. They asked the Council to be allowed some 
exceptions and/or be compensated for the hardships confronting them as a 
result of the application of the economic sanctions, in accordance with Article 50 
of the Charter. The article provides that states confronted with special 
economic or social problems arising from enforcement measures taken by the 
Council, may consult with the Council to resolve these problems. Jordan was 
the first state to apply to the UN for relief under that Article. It was followed by 
another twenty countries, but Jordan remained the most vocal among them 
because of its close economic ties to Iraq, its virtual dependence on Iraqi oil and 
the influx of huge numbers of third state nationals fleeing Iraq and Kuwait. 
In response to that the Security Council decided to refer the case of Jordan to a 
committee in order to prepare a special report on the matter, that would function 
as a guide to other countries hurt by the embargo. The report was approved by 
the Council and its recommendations were referred to the Secretary-General to 
"develop methods for the purpose of receiving information from states about the 
contribution which they have or are preparing to make to alleviate the longer-
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term hardships confronting Jordan as a result of application of economic 
sanctions". Despite the efforts of the sanction committee, the assistance 
received by Jordan and other claimants fell far short of their expectations. 
It is useful to look at previous occasions upon which economic sanctions have 
been used as a coercive measure against a UN member state in order to 
compare them with the Iraqi case. In 1966, the first ever UN mandatory 
sanctions under chapter VII of the Charter were applied to the white minority 
regime in Rhodesia. It started with an embargo of oil, arms and motor vehicles 
and a boycott of Rhodesian exports, followed in subsequent years by far-
reaching economic sanctions. They were maintained until 1980 when power 
was transferred to the black majority, and Rhodesia was renamed Zimbabwe. 
The effectiveness of sanctions against Rhodesia was curtailed because through 
the use of friendly South Africa it was able to route its trade and ensure that its 
goods bypassed the British blockade at Beira in Mozambique. Hence, it was 
able to continue trading relatively normally throughout the period of sanctions 38 
In 1977, the arms embargo against South Africa (that was endorsed as a 
voluntary measure by the Security Council in 1963) was made mandatory. The 
UN sanctions were not well observed and had little effect on the country's racial 
and colonial policies. Nevertheless, the combination of internal troubles and 
increased economic pressures did eventually induce a change towards the 
dismantling of the apartheid regime. On both these occasions great patience 
was shown by the US and the international community in stark contrast to the 
little time given to sanctions in the case of Iraq. Also, neither country 
experienced the same level of severity and comprehensiveness of the sanctions 
regime. 
A more recent application of sanctions includes those applied against Libya and 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The Security Council in April 1992 
imposed mandatory sanctions on Libya, consisting of bans on airline traffic and 
arms sales and a reduction in the size of Libyan diplomatic missions abroad. 
This was taken due to Libya's refusal to surrender for trial the two Libyan 
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suspects in the bomb explosion of the pan American flight 103 over Lockerbie in 
Scotland. 
Sanctions on the FRY were imposed during 1992 because of its role in helping 
Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina following the outbreak of fighting in 
Croatia and Bosnia. The Security Council found it in violation of Article 2(4) of 
the UN charter, which says "all UN members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial or political 
independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of 
the UN". Subsequently it adopted a series of resolutions to impose sanctions 
against Serbia. Resolution 713 was adopted September 1991 and imposed a 
complete embargo on ail deliveries of weapons and military equipment to all 
parts of the former Yugoslavia. It was followed by resolution 757 of May 1993, 
which imposed a wide range of economic sanctions on Serbia; a ban on imports 
and exports except the sale of food and medical supplies, a ban on funds as 
well as a ban on scientific and technical co-operation and flights to or from 
Serbia. Resolution 787 of November 1992 prohibited the shipment of energy 
supplies and various commodities unless authorised by the Sanctions 
Committee. Further restrictions were imposed in resolution 820 of April 1993 
whereby the Security Council prohibited imports to, export from and 
transhipment of goods through the UN Protected Areas in Croatia, and those 
parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina under the control of Serb forces. Also assets of 
Yugoslav entities were frozen, and the provision of services both financial and 
non-financial for the purposes of business carried on Yugoslav was prohibited. 
The Security Council in resolution 942 aimed to prevent the economic activities 
and links with Bosnian-Serb entities in areas under the control of the Bosnian-
Serb military, in addition to freezing the assets of these entities and the supply 
of goods and services. 
It is apparent the sanctions on Serbia were wide ranging and had devastating 
effects on the economy. However, the sanctions were ineffectual at stopping 
Serbian expansionism and Slobadon Milosevic, the then leader of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslav, who used the sanctions as a glue for defiant nationalist 
sentiment and to strengthen his hold on power. In addition sanction busters 
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used to smuggle goods and oil and foreign currencies into country hence 
rendering the sanctions ineffective. 
These two recent occasions do not compare to the Iraqi case in terms of 
severity and strict adherence to the regime of sanctions. The past experience 
of the UN with sanctions reveals that their success depend to a large degree on 
the willingness of the international community to comply and the existence of 
opportunities to bypass them, in addition to time. '^ ^ Sanctions, therefore, in the 
case of Iraq had a good chance of working because firstly of the cooperation of 
the international community. Iraq's aggression was rejected by the whole 
international community even those who did not support the use of force. 
Secondly, no large, friendly states were willing to facilitate the evasion of 
sanctions; Syria and Turkey were part of the coalition against Iraq and Iran was 
interested in improving its relations with the Gulf Arab states as well as the 
West, and Jordan despite its political support of Iraq was in no position either to 
evade sanctions. Lastly, the US and Britain were more than willing to 
implement the sanctions, by force, if necessary and the UN gave them such an 
authority. ^ 
The problem was that the coalition against Iraq was not sure that the sanctions, 
even if they were working in isolating Iraq economically, commercially, 
diplomatically, politically, and morally, would bring about the objective of 
withdrawal from Kuwait. In addition, the time needed would threaten the unity 
and resolve of the coalition. '^^  However early signs showed that the embargo 
was effective, especially in stopping oil exports and imports of a technical and 
military nature. It cut down Iraqi exports by 97 percent and imports by 90 per 
cent. '^ ^ The devastating effects of the sanctions were seriously felt by the Iraqi 
population at large, but a much longer time would have been needed to 
influence the policies of the regime. 
Concerning the effectiveness of the economic sanctions Faleh al-Shatti (the 
Assistance Secretary of the GCC Military Council) commented: 
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No one can deny the effects of the economic sanctions on Iraq. 
However the destiny of Iraq is in the hands of one man, Saddam 
Hussein. He and his regime control resources and decisions and 
they have not been effected as the Iraqi people. One can say that 
the delaying tactics that Saddam has been using in implementing 
some of the resolutions of the Security Council, has lengthened the 
period of economic sanctions and hence the suffering of the Iraqi 
people. 
On 25 August 1995, the Security Council adopted resolution 665, which 
tightened the control over vessels that might be engaged in inward and outward 
shipping to Iraqi ports, in order to ensure effective implementation of resolution 
661. The sanctions imposed on Iraq were severe and comprehensive and the 
possibility of circumventing them was extremely limited. This was due to the 
strict adherence of most states and the willingness of the US and Britain to use 
force if necessary to ensure their implementation. The severity of the sanctions 
should have signalled to the Iraqi regime the serious intent of the coalition and 
their determination to restore the legitimacy of Kuwait. It should have, also, 
made the Iraqi government more appreciative of the possibility of a military 
confrontation. 
Resolution 662 
Instead, Iraq responded to the economic boycott by annexing Kuwait 8 August 
1990 and claiming it as the nineteenth province of Iraq. In return the Council 
issued resolution 662 on 9 August 1990, which reiterated the detennination of 
the Council to bring the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq to an end and to restore 
the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait. More 
importantly, the resolution 
1. Decides that annexation of Kuwait by Iraq under any form and whatever 
pretext has no legal validity, and is considered null and void; 
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2. Calls upon all States, international organisations and specialised agencies 
not to recognise that annexation, and to refrain from any action or dealing 
that might be interpreted as an indirect recognition of the annexation; 
3. Further demands that Iraq rescind its actions purporting to annex Kuwait. 
The resolution, henceforth, declared the invalidity of the Iraqi measure and its 
violation of international law. It called upon the entire international community 
with all its states and various international organisations not to recognise that 
illegitimate annexation. The Security Council needed to act swiftly and firmly 
concerning this action since it had sehous implications for the UN. ''^  The 
annexation carried with it the possibility of turning the conflict into an internal 
affair, thus, eliminating the role of the UN in settling a dispute between two 
member states. Also, accepting the annexation was contrary to the main 
principle of the sovereign independence of each member state of the UN. ''^  
From the start of the crisis, international law and its violation had been at the 
centre of concern of UN members and the international community. The 
annexation of Kuwait was yet another action by the Iraqi regime totally 
disregarding international law. Baghdad's politics increasingly isolated Iraq and 
consolidated the coalition against it and strengthened the determination of the 
US led coalition to force Iraq to comply by the rules that govern, restrict and 
constrain the behaviour of states. °^ Consequently, resolution 662 was passed 
unanimously. 
The build up of military presence in the Gulf area, and Saudi Arabia in 
particular, and the subsequent increased pressure on the Iraqi regime, pushed 
it further to take measures in violation of international law especially concerning 
foreign nationals in Iraq and Kuwait, and the immunities of diplomatic personnel. 
Incensed by such measures, the Council adopted resolution 664 on 18 August 
1990. The resolution demanded that the Iraqi regime allow third-state nationals 
to depart from Iraq and Kuwait and confirmed Iraq's obligation to protect the 
rights of civilians and the necessity to provide them with care and security as 
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well as food and medical supplies in compliance with the Fourth Geneva 
Convention. Also, the resolution demanded that Iraq rescind its closure of 
diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and the withdrawal of immunity of 
their personnel. 
This was followed by yet another resolution. The Council on 17 September 
passed resolution 667 which further condemned Iraq's violation of diplomatic 
premises and reiterated its demand for the release of all foreign nationals. The 
Iraqi regime was trying to use foreign and diplomatic nationals as a bargaining 
chip. Thus, Saddam offered to release all foreign detainees if President Bush 
would agree to give written guarantees that US forces will withdraw from Saudi 
Arabia and the economic sanctions revoked. But the US and its allies wanted 
to punish Saddam severely for his arrogance and obstinance in not complying 
with the UN resolutions and his continuous violation of international rules, and 
hence was not in a position to offer any deals or appear to be compromising on 
its strong stance against Iraq. 
The uncompromising stand-off between Iraq and the anti-Iraqi coalition led to 
further condemnation of Iraq's violation and defiance of international rules. 
Resolution 674 was adopted on 29 October 1990 which re-affinned the concern 
of the Council over the safety of nationals of third-states in Kuwait and Iraq, 
including personnel of the diplomatic and consular missions of such states. It 
also reminded Iraq of its responsibility under international law to damages 
relating to the invasion of Kuwait, including human rights violations. 
Iraq was aiming at changing the demographic structure of Kuwait by moving 
Kuwaitis out of Kuwait and bringing Iraqis into the territory, and was trying to 
destroy the civil records of the population of Kuwait. As a response to these 
activities the Council 28 December 1990 adopted resolution 677 which 
1. Condemns the attempts by Iraq to alter the demographic composition 
of the population of Kuwait and to destroy the civil records maintained 
by the legitimate government of Kuwait; 
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2. Mandates the Secretary-General to take custody of a copy of the 
population register of Kuwait, the authenticity of which has been 
certified by the legitimate Government of Kuwait and which covers the 
registration of population up to 1 August 1990. 
One finds it hard to see how despite this significant and constant pressure on 
Iraq to comply with international resolutions the regime opted to ignore these 
clear signals of the seriousness of the US and its allies to force Iraq to comply 
and to punish it for its aggression. It showed, also, an incredible resolute 
detennination on the part of the Western alliance not to falter in its will to restore 
the legitimacy of Kuwait and protect its strategic interests in the region. 
Resolution 678 
In the face of Iraq's challenge to international will and insistence on 
perpetuating the aggression against the state of Kuwait and the legitimacy of its 
government, the Security Council adopted, one of its most controversial 
resolutions, resolution 678 of 28 Nov 1990. The Council in operation of its 
powers vested under chapter VII of the Charter authorised the use of force to 
deter Iraqi aggression and force its withdrawal from Kuwait. The resolution 
henceforth 
1. Demands that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660 (1990) and all 
subsequent relevant resolutions, and decides, while maintaining all its 
decisions, to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of goodwill to 
do so; 
2. Authorises member states co-operating with the Government of 
Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements, as 
set forth in paragraph 1 above, the foregoing resolutions, to use all 
necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and 
all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace 
and security in the area. 
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The UN passed resolution 678 by noting that Iraq had refused to comply with its 
obligation to implement resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions 
of the Security Council. It also noted that the UN was determined to secure 
Iraq's full compliance with its decisions. Hence, acting under chapter VII of the 
Charter, it permitted the use of all necessary means to uphold and implement 
resolution 660 and all subsequent resolutions and to restore international peace 
and security in the area. Iraq was given an ultimatum to withdraw its troops 
from Kuwait by the 15 of January. Otherwise the allied forces were ready to use 
force to make Iraq comply with UN resolutions. 
By not heeding the ultimatum of the resolution, to withdraw willingly from 
Kuwait, Iraq missed a great chance to save its economy and people massive 
damage and suffering. It was obvious that the coalition would not let Iraq off the 
hook easily, especially when their interests had been so directly threatened by 
its action, and by its lack of responsiveness to UN resolutions in spite of the 
massive military build up in the region. The hostilities broke just as the deadline 
set by the resolution lapsed. The military coalition succeeded in ending the 
Iraqi occupation and restored the legitimate Kuwaiti government. However, the 
cost of the military action has been huge in human, financial and economic 
terms. 
A debate has ensued following resolution 687 concerning the legitimacy of the 
military action. Some saw the resolution as a straightfonward application of the 
UN Charter and international law, while others were very critical. Regardless of 
the position one takes concerning the legality of the resolution, the controversy 
over it has implications for the UN and its role in solving future conflicts and 
disputes. In addition, many developing countries became acutely aware of their 
lack of influence over the Security Council and its dominance by the US. This 
debate and the many questions it raised about the legality of the resolution shall 
be discussed in some detail in section IV. 
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Resolution 687 
Resolution 687 (1991) represents one of the most complex and far-reaching set 
of decisions ever taken by the Council, and the longest text ever adopted by the 
Council. It was dubbed the "mother of all resolutions". The resolution sets out 
in detail the terms of a formal cease-fire and the obligations of Iraq relating to a 
variety of issues such as its borders with Kuwait, its military capability and war 
reparations. These terms and obligations indicate that the intention was to 
severely punish Iraq not only as an aggressor and violator of international law, 
but as a criminal state, uniquely dangerous. These terms and obligations 
were primarily discussed among the five permanent members, and Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia; who were in agreement about imposing harsh conditions on Iraq. 
The severity and comprehensiveness of the obligations imposed on Iraq 
created differences among UN member states about the ultimate objective of 
the resolution, although its broad objective has been consistent with the 
previous resolutions relating to the restoration of international peace and 
security. ^ The US and Britain, for instance, saw the terms as maintaining 
pressure on Iraq in order to bring about the overthrow of Saddam's regime. 
Such an objective was incompatible with the purposes and principles of the UN. 
Regardless of what is the real objective behind the resolution, the fact remains 
that the obligations imposed on Iraq were extremely harsh and intrusive. The 
most important of these relate to the following; 
A. Boundary Settlement 
The resolution established a demilitarised zone along the boundary between 
Iraq and Kuwait and requested the Secretary -General to submit a plan for the 
deployment of a UN observer unit. Subsequently the United Nations Iraq-
Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) was established. The terms of 
reference of the mission were outlined as follows: 
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1. To monitor the Khawr Abdullah and a militarised zone extending 10 
kilometres into Iraq and 5 kilometres into Kuwait from the boundary 
referred to in the Agreed Minutes between Iraq and Kuwait of 4 October 
1963; 
2. To deter violations of the boundary through its presence in and 
surveillance of the demilitarised zone; 
3. To observe any hostile or potentially hostile action mounted from the 
territory of one State to the other. 
These terms of reference have limited the role of UNIKOM to monitor and 
observe and it was not authorised to take physical action to prevent the entry of 
military personnel or equipment into the demilitarised zone and that no military 
fortifications and installations were maintained in it. In addition it can only 
monitor the activities that can be observed in and from the Khawr Abdullah and 
the demilitarised zone. This zone is about 200 km long and the area of Khawr 
Abdullah about 40 km; it is barren and almost uninhibited, except for the oilfields 
and two towns, Umm Qasr and Safwan. ®^ The contingents of UNIKOM were 
fully deployed by 6 May 1991 and monitored the withdrawal of the armed forces 
still deployed in the demilitarised zone. On May 9 with the withdrawal complete 
the demilitarised zone established by the Security Council came into effect and 
UNIKOM assumed its observation responsibilities. The Mission's headquarters 
were located at Umm Qasr and it maintained liaison offices in Baghdad and 
Kuwait City. A logistic base first located in Doha, Qatar was later moved to 
Kuwait City. 
On the 5 February 1993, as a result of some Iraqi violations in the demilitarised 
zone the. Security Council in its resolution 806 gave UNIKOM a new extended 
mandate in order to allow for an adequate response to such violations. UNIKOM 
was permitted to use physical action to prevent or redress the following; 
1. Small-scale violations of the demilitarised zone; 
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2. Violations of the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait, for example by 
civilians or police; and 
3. Problems that might arise from the presence of Iraqi installations and 
Iraqi citizens and their assets in the demilitarised zone on the Kuwaiti 
side of the newly demarcated boundary. 
In order to perform these tasks UNIKOM's unarmed military observers were 
replaced by armed military observers with appropriate support elements. They 
would use weapons in self-defence, but were not authorised to initiate 
enforcement action. However the overall strength of UNIKOM remained 
relatively small and would not be able to prevent a significant military incursion. 
Its presence and vigilance have kept the DMZ relatively calm and it enjoyed the 
co-operation of the Iraqi and Kuwaiti authorities. ®°(See Map 3) 
In order for the UN to carry out the demarcation of the border as specified in the 
resolution a special commission was created on 13 May 1991: the United 
Nations Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission (UNIKBDC). The 
Commission had one representative each from Iraq and Kuwait and three 
independent experts appointed by the Secretary-General, one of whom served 
as the Chairman. The tenns of reference of the commission were specified as 
follows: 
1. To demarcate geographical coordinates of latitude and longitude the 
international boundary set out in the Agreed Minutes between Kuwait 
and Iraq of 4 October 1963; and 
2. To make arrangements for the physical representation of the boundary. 
The coordinates established by the commission will constitute the final 
demarcation of the international boundary between Iraq and Kuwait in 
accordance with the Agreed Minutes. The physical representation of the 
boundary will be carried out through the erection of an appropriate 
number and type of boundary pillars and monuments. The commission 
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will also provide for maintenance on a continuing basis and locational 
accuracy, including if necessary the repositioning of the surficial 
boundary representation. 
The Commission had eleven meetings between May 1991-May 1993. In the 
first five sessions, on which the land boundary and the Khawr Abdullah offshore 
section were considered, Iraq attended all the sessions, while it did not attend 
the subsequent six sessions. Iraq's decision to end its participation in the work 
of the commission was based on two considerations the first is its believe that 
the commission's work is of a political nature aimed at depriving Iraq of its rights 
and justifying the American bases and armed forces in the region. Secondly its 
believe that the Security Council lacked the legal competence to act on border 
questions. The Security Council in response reaffirmed its support to the 
commission's work and stressed "that through the demarcation process the 
Boundary Demarcation Commission is not reallocating territory between Kuwait 
and Iraq, but is simply carrying out the technical task necessary to demarcate 
the precise coordinates of the boundary between Kuwait and Iraq for the first 
time." It also stressed the inviolability of the international boundary being 
demarcated by the Commission and guaranteed by the Council, and the grave 
consequences that would ensue from any breach thereof. 
The final settlement of the boundary by the commission was affirmed in Security 
Council resolution 833 on 27 May 1993. The resolution; 
1. Reaffirmed that the decisions of the commission regarding the 
demarcation of the boundary are final; 
2. Called upon Iraq and Kuwait , in accordance with international law and 
relevant Security Council resolutions, to respect the inviolability of the 
international, as demarcated by the Commission, and the right to 
navigational access; 
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3. Reaffirmed its decision to guarantee the inviolability of the boundary as 
finally demarcated by the commission and to take as appropriate all 
necessary measures to that end in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations. 
Iraq in response to the resolution reiterated its position on the work of the 
commission being political and challenged the competence of the Council to 
work on border questions. It also opposed the Commission's decision to 
demarcate the Khawr Abdullah (offshore) boundary, which Iraq considered 
beyond the Commission's terms of reference or mandate. ^ Despite these 
reservations Iraq had no choice but to accept the commission's work. On 10 
November 1994 Iraq declared the following; 
1. The Republic of Iraq recognises the sovereignty of the State of Kuwait, 
its territorial integrity and political independence. 
2. The republic of Iraq in compliance with the United Nations Security 
Council resolution 833 (1993), recognises the international boundary 
between the Republic of Iraq and the State of Kuwait as demarcated by 
the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission and 
respects the inviolability of the said boundary. (See Map 4) 
B. Disarmament and Weapons Control 
The demands of the UN on Iraq concerning its present and future military 
capabilities are unprecedented in the history of the organisation and reveal the 
extent of the intention of the US and its allies to punish Iraq and to limit its future 
role in the region. The programme for the destruction of weapons and the 
permanent system of verifications were and are intended to be highly intrusive 
and a challenge to the sovereignty of Iraq. ®® To carry out this complex and 
unprecedented task the Council established a subsidiary body, the United 
Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), for the exclusive purpose of 
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implementing the resolution with the assistance of the Director of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
The mandate of UNSCOM has been extensive and elaborate. The details of 
which are as follows: 
• To "carry out immediate onsite inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical 
and missile capabilities"; 
• To take possession for their destruction, removal or rendering hamiless 
of" all chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and 
all related subsystems and components and all research, development, 
support and manufacturing facilities"; 
• To supervise the destruction by Iraq of all its "ballistic missiles with a 
range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometres and related major 
parts and repairs and production facilities"; 
• To assist and cooperate with the Director General of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency in the elimination of Iraq's nuclear-weapon 
capabilities and in the subsequent monitoring of non-proscribed 
nuclear activities; and 
• To designate for inspection "any additional locations" as deemed 
necessary by UNSCOM to ensure the elimination of all Iraq's banned 
capabilities-nuclear as well as non-nuclear. 
Similar comprehensiveness has been employed in relation to Iraq's nuclear 
disarmament. The Director General of IAEA was mandated to: 
• "To carry out immediate on-site inspections of Iraq's nuclear 
capabilities" and additional sites as designated by UNSCOM; 
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• To destroy, remove or render harmless Iraq's nuclear weapons, any 
subsystems or components or any research, development ,support or 
manufacturing facilities related to such items and nuclear-weapons-
usable materials; 
• To take exclusive control of all of Iraq's nuclear-weapons-usable 
materials for custody and removal, with the assistance and cooperation 
of the Special Commission; 
• To monitor and verify Iraq's compliance with its undertaking "not to use, 
develop, construct or acquire any of the items specified"; and 
• To inventory "all nuclear material in Iraq subject to the Agency's 
verification and inspections to confirm that Agency safeguards cover all 
relevant nuclear activities in Iraq". ®^  
The resolution also accorded many privileges to UNSCOM while carrying out its 
work in Iraq. These privileges are extensive and elaborate as follows: 
• "Unrestricted freedom of entry and exist without delay or hindrance of 
its personnel, property, supplies, equipment, spare parts and other 
items as well as of means of transport, including expeditious issuance 
of entry and exist visas"; 
• "Unrestricted freedom of movement without advance notice within Iraq 
of the personnel of the Special Commission and its equipment and 
means of transport"; 
• "The right to unimpeded access to any site or facility for the purpose of 
the on-site inspection whether a site be above or below ground. Any 
number of sites, facilities or locations may be subject to inspection 
simultaneously"; 
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• "The right to request, receive, examine and copy any record, data or 
information or examine, retain, move or photograph, including 
videotape, any item relevant to the Special Commission's activities and 
to conduct interviews"; 
• "The right to designate any site whatsoever for obsen/ation, inspection 
or other monitoring activity and for storage, destruction or rendering 
harmless" of items described above; 
• "The right to install equipment or construct facilities for observation, 
inspection, testing, or other monitoring activity and for storage, 
destruction or rendering harmless" of those items; 
• "The right to take photographs, whether from the ground or from the 
air, relevant to the Special Commission's activities" 
• "The right to take and analyse samples of any kind as well as to 
remove and export samples for off-site analysis"; and 
• "The right to unrestricted communication by radio satellite or other 
forms of communication". 
The work related to control of Iraq's military capability was further reinforced by 
three more resolutions. Resolution 669 (1991) determined that Iraq pay the full 
cost of the destruction of its weaponry while resolution 700 (1991) approved the 
guidelines for the full implementation of the arms embargo. Resolution 715 
(1991) required from Iraq to give UN and IAEA inspectors access to all its civil 
and military installations which are suspected of an arms capacity, all 
laboratories and research projects and the scientists and technicians working 
there. It also instituted controls over imports and exports. 
It is no wonder, therefore, that the relations between Iraq and UNSCOM and 
IAEA have been extremely difficult and Iraq's reaction to these extremely 
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intrusive measures was to deliberately obstruct the wori< of the Special 
Commission and to manoeuvre, intimidate and evade the UN inspectors. In 
addition, several serious stand-offs occurred, the latest ending up in a total 
collapse of the relationship between the Iraqi government and UNSCOM. ''° 
Resolution 687, coupled with the subsequent resolution 688 of 5 April 1991, has 
been perceived as a functional occupation of Iraq, meaning "that in certain 
domains and geographical areas Iraq was to be prevented from exercising its 
sovereignty under threat of fierce sanctions if it challenged UN resolutions". ''^  
Resolution 688 was prompted by the concern of the Security Council over the 
treatment of civilian population in many parts of Iraq and the flow of refugees. 
The resolution subsequently 
1. Condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts 
of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish-populated areas, the 
consequences of which threaten international peace and security in the 
region; 
2. Demands that Iraq, as a contribution to removing the threat to 
international peace and security in the region, immediately end this 
repression; 
2. Insists that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian 
organisations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and 
to make available all necessary facilities for their operations. ''^  
The breadth of the role given to the UN has been undoubtedly unique for the 
provision of humanitarian assistance and does infringe on the sovereignty of 
Iraq. However, the same resolution reaffirms the commitment of all member 
states to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence 
of Iraq and of all states in the region. In other words there appears to be a 
conflict in the UN role. This is a reflection of the tension that exists in the 
charter of the UN. On the one hand the charter in Article 1 (1) states that one of 
the main purposes of UN is the maintenance of peace and security while it goes 
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on and emphasises in article 2(4) the territorial integrity and the political 
independence of states. Thus the need to act for maintaining peace and 
security and for humanitarian reasons infringes on the sovereignty of states and 
has made the work of the UN highly complicated and in many instances very 
difficult to carry out. 
The UN humanitarian centre that was opened in Zakho and the other sub-
offices that were set up in Mosul, Basra, Erbil, Sulaimanaih and Dohuk were 
crucial in providing essential humanitarian relief measures, but were seen by 
the Iraqi government as an attack on its sovereignty. As stated in the letter 
from the permanent representative of Iraq to the Secretary-General dated 18 
April 1991 that the Iraqi government is opposed to the measure of creating the 
humanitarian centres and is especially opposed to the united states assuming 
responsibility for them. He added that the measures "constitute a flagrant 
violation of Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity" and requested the United 
Nations to assume responsibility for them. 
This tension between the need of the UN to interfere and the possible 
infringement on the sovereignty of states has also been manifested in the 
Memorandum of Understanding between Iraq and UN signed of April 1991 
points to it. The memorandum emphasises in paragraph 20 that the 
implementation of the programme of humanitarian assistance and the principles 
enclosed in the memorandum "shall be without prejudice to the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, political independence, security and non-interference in the 
internal affairs of the Republic of Iraq". 
Another striking example of the contradictory role of the UN is that in order to 
punish Iraq for its violation of UN charter and international law sever sanctions 
were imposed on the country. These sanctions are themselves causing severe 
distress to the civilian population and are a source of instability in the country 
and the region. In addition abuse of human rights and repression of civilian 
population is not exclusive to Iraq in the region. An example is Israeli practices 
in the West Bank and Gaza and its continuous violation of Palestinian civil and 
political rights. This has been a source of instability and threatens international 
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peace as much as the Iraqi practices. One could say that perhaps the only 
reason that Iraq is signalled out is because of the threat it has posed to Western 
interests in the region, more so than its treatment of its civilian population and 
its violation of international law. 
C. Compensation Fund 
The Security Council affirmed first in resolution 674, 29 October 1990, and 
repeated it in resolution 687, 2 April 1991 that Iraq "is liable, under international 
law, for any direct loss, damage including environmental damage and the 
depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign governments, nationals and 
corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation to Kuwait".''® 
It called upon states to "collect relevant information regarding their claims, and 
those of their nationals and corporations, for restitution or financial 
compensation by Iraq, with a view to such arrangements as may be established 
in accordance with international law" 
To carry out the compensation scheme the Council established the United 
Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC), for the processing, determination 
and payment of claims, and the United Nations Compensation Fund for the 
processing and payments of these claims as stipulated in resolution 692 (1991). 
The Compensation Commission will consider consolidated claims submitted by 
governments on their own or on behalf of their nationals. It established the 
categories of claims and guidelines regarding which claims are compensable 
while each government adopts its own procedures in respect to the 
consolidation of the claim. Priority is given to individual claims, then corporate 
and government claims, including compensation for environmental damages.®® 
The UNCC had become responsible for the largest compensation claims 
programme in history. By 1 October 1995, it had received 2.6 million claims 
with an asserted value exceeding $160 billion. These claims have been divided 
into six categories as follows; 
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• Category A : departure from Kuwait or Iraq 
• Category B: serious personal injury. 
• Category C: individual claims for personal damages up to $100,000. 
• Category D: individual claims for damages above $ 100,000. 
• Category E: claims of corporations and other legal entities. 
• Category F: claims of governments and international corporations. ''^  
Iraq is to pay for these claims from a percentage of its oil revenues. This 
percentage was determined by the Secretary-General in consultation with 
international financial institutions. Resolution 702 (1991) detennined this 
proportion at a maximum of 30 percent and gave the Compensation 
Commission the discretion to decide on the precise amount for any given 
year.^ ^ The 30 percent was a compromise between the 50 percent that the US 
was pushing for and the 28 percent that the British favoured. ^ ° 
Due to the continuation of sanctions, the funds available to the Commission 
have been limited. To overcome this the Council adopted Resolution 778 
(1992) which allows the Commission to finance its operation from 30 percent of 
Iraqi frozen oil assets overseas. These funds will be repaid once the sanctions 
are lifted or the food-for-oil scheme accepted. Comparing the total value of 
claims submitted till 1 October 1995 of $160 billion with the estimated $4-8 
billion available from frozen assets reveals the difficulty of finding the funds to 
pay the claims. It will take two to three decades to pay the full reparations 
based on a 30 percent of oil revenues. ®^  The Governing Council of the 
Compensation Commission decided upon two basic principles in order to 
prioritise these claims and balance between the available funding and the 
payment of claimants; 
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1. The commission should ensure that similarly situated claimants within 
each category of claims are treated equally, to the extent feasible 
regardless of the chronological order in which their claims are decided: 
2. Claimants with claims in the three categories of urgent claims (category 
A, B and C,) shall receive priority of treatment, including at both the 
processing and the payment stages, in accordance with the prior 
decisions and statements of the government Council. 
The principle of the liability of Iraq to pay for damage was accepted by Iraq 
and is not by itself objectionable. However some serious legal objections 
have risen about the work of the compensation fund. For instance it is 
unusual in international law that Iraq pays every penny of the costs of a 
procedure in which it has no say; it pays for the entire UNCC proceedings; 
it pays for the costs of entertaining the secretariat of the UNCC; it pays for 
the panels which investigate the claims; it pays for the consultants which 
assist the panels and pays for the investigations of the Secretariat and the 
experts that it commissions. And while Iraq pays for all this it does not 
even have access to the results produced by these experts. ^ The 
claimants some of whom are very wealthy such as the Kuwait oil 
Company, were under no restnctions with respect to the funds they spent 
on the preparation of their claims. ®^  
The work of the UNCC lacks also the scrutiny of the reasonableness of the 
costs claimed. A major part of an examination of any claim is looking at 
the aspect of reasonability of the claim. For instance in the case of 
awarding compensation for the damage of the Well Blow-Out Control 
Claim (WBC), no scrutiny has been made to ensure that Kuwait 
Government, the Kuwait Oil Company and all other involved in the process 
of extinguishing the fires proceeded with reasonable care. The claim was 
for 950 million US$. Out of this amount barely 3 million US $ have been 
dismissed. All the rest has either been admitted immediately or 
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transferred to another claim. There are few, if any international cases 
where a claimant has been so successful. ®® 
Another important comment on the substantive rules of the UNCC 
concerns the scope of the liability of Iraq provided for by international law 
in case of unlawful invasion. In other words which acts can be admitted 
for liability and what type of damage and/or which damage must be 
considered that caused by Iraq and other damage such as damage 
caused by the allies. No matter who caused the damage Iraq pays. 
Schneider claims that the resolutions and decisions of the UNCC 
Governing Council and the Security Council "have created a system of 
substantive rules and procedural mechanisms which have no basis in 
international law and have not been accepted by Iraq". ®^ Thus it appears 
that the need to punish and contain Iraq is permitting the UN with the 
blessing of the US to go beyond the accepted rules of international law 
and practice. 
D. The Sanctions Regime 
The maintenance of the three categories of sanctions; the oil embargo, the 
arms embargo and trade embargo, has been used in order to maintain the 
pressure on Iraq, and to force her to implement the required conditions of 
resolution 687. The criteria of lifting of these three categories of sanctions are 
complicated. According to paragraph 22 of the resolution, the lifting of the oil 
embargo is conditional upon Iraq's full compliance with its weapons-related 
obligations without specifying what constitutes full compliance. Also, some 
members of the Council believe that Iraq must also comply with other 
obligations such as those in resolution 688 before the oil embargo is lifted. ®^  
The second category of sanctions, the arms embargo, is subject to even less 
precise terms. According to the resolution, it will be reviewed regularly "taking 
into account Iraq's compliance with this resolution and general progress 
towards the control of armaments in the region". To include the objective of 
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controlling armaments in the region as one of the conditions for lifting sanctions 
on Iraq is a bit bewildering. First this is beyond Iraq's control and depends on 
agreement applicable to the region as a whole. °^ Secondly this is being 
emphasised at a time where the US and other Western powers have been very 
busy making huge arms deals with Gulf states. 
The third category of sanction, exports to Iraq, is subject to the most 
unqualified, unrestricted provisions. It leaves ample room for different 
interpretations as to when sanctions could be lifted and links the sanctions to 
the policies and practices of the Iraqi regime without specifying whether these 
are internal or external. According to paragraph 21 the Council shall review the 
trade sanctions every sixty days and shall 
in light of the policies and practices of the government of Iraq, 
including the implementation of all relevant resolutions of the Security 
Council for the purpose of detemiining whether to reduce or lift the 
prohibitions. (See Annex 1) 
The ambiguity surrounding the conditions for lifting the sanctions gives 
considerable discretion to the Security Council, in particular, the permanent five 
to decide when and if the sanctions can be lifted. At the same time the 
resolution provides for a tight implementation of the sanction regime by 
specifying that all states must continue to prevent the sale or supply, or 
promotion or facilitation of such sale or supply of a number of items, which were 
detailed in the resolution. It, also, requests in paragraph 26 the Secretary-
General to develop guidelines to facilitate the full implementation of the arms 
and related sanctions on Iraq and to make them available to all states. The 
guidelines were approved by the Council in Resolution 700 (1991). They 
provided for stringent controls and measures to prevent Iraq from circumventing 
the sanctions. 
One must point out that the objectives of the UN as indicated in the many 
relevant resolutions during the crisis were clear and unambiguous. They were 
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first, to bring the invasion and occupation of Kuwait to an end; second, to 
restore the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Kuwait; and 
third to restore the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait. But clearly 
Britain and the US had other objectives than those laid out in UN resolutions.^^ 
These objectives include the destruction of Iraq's military power and economic 
base, and with it destroying any possibility of her reappearing as a powerful 
regional actor The severity of the military action and the breadth of resolution 
687 was meant to achieve such undeclared objectives. So there was more at 
play than the act of aggression itself and Iraq's defiance of international rules 
and resolutions. The political strategic interests of the US in the region played a 
determining role in the severity of Iraq's punishment and in the pursuance of 
objectives not directly sanctioned by the UN. 
IV The Debate over the UN Resolutions 
As mentioned before, a debate h a s emerged among analysts and law experts 
about the lawfulness of some of the resolutions adopted by the UN, in particular 
resolution 678. According to Saraj al-Din (head of the Egyptian Wafad party) the 
manner in which the Security Council h a s acted during the crisis was a 
straightfonA/ard application of the UN Charter and international law. He 
comments that: 
There is no question about Iraq's violation of the UN Charter and 
international laws and customs in its occupation of Kuwait, its 
decision to force diplomatic and international missions to move to 
Baghdad and its unwillingness to comply with international 
resolutions. Hence, the international community saw the need to 
force Iraq to accept international will and to comply with the UN 
Charter to resolve its dispute with Kuwait. 
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This position of the lawfulness of UN resolutions and the legitimacy of the use of 
force to liberate Kuwait is further affirmed by Foud Badrawi, the Secretary of the 
Egyptian Wafd Party, who states that: 
From an international legitimacy point of view, all states that 
defended Kuwait did that according to the stipulations of international 
law. The measures adopted by the UN were to support international 
legitimacy and the rules of international law. 
Others, however, found serious flaws in these positions. To start with, the naval 
blockade of Iraq ordered by President Bush following resolution 661 was 
described by the UN Secretary-General, Javier Perez De Cuellar as "a breach 
of the UN Charter". ^ Under Article 41 of the Charter, any blockade has to be 
under Security Council approval. American ships had not been ordered to stop 
and search all ships carrying cargo to and from Iraq and Kuwait in the Gulf, the 
northern part of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Oman. Resolution 665 which 
was intended to provide legitimacy for the US action also departed from 
Chapter VII in asking states with maritime forces in the Persian Gulf area to 
monitor shipping. Articles 46 and 47 clearly state that enforcement measures 
would be under the control of the Security Council and its Military Staff 
Committee. In addition, the resolution stipulates that measures can be taken to 
ensure the embargo without specifically stating the body that is pemiitted to 
take action. 
As to resolution 678 it has been questioned on many grounds. First, some 
doubt that the resolution had in fact given the mandate to use force especially in 
light of previous UN resolutions. When the UN intended to allow the use of 
force, it made it clear in the text of the resolution. An example is resolution 83 
adopted on 27 June 1950 concerning the invasion by North Korea of South 
Korea. It determined the necessity of the use of force as follows 
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Having noted...the urgent military measures are required to restore 
international peace and security, the Security Council recommended 
that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to 
the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack 
and to restore international peace and security in the area. ®^ 
This was followed by resolution 84 on 7 July 1950, in which it nominated a 
commander of forces. Accordingly the Council 
Recommends that all members providing military force and other 
assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolution 
make such forces and other assistance available to a unified 
command under the United States of America...Authorises the 
unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations' flag in 
the course of operation against North Korean forces concurrently 
with the flags of the various nations participating. 
It is interesting to note that on the occasions that the Security Council has acted 
firmly, particular circumstances were present. Thus, in the Korean case the 
above mentioned resolutions were taken swiftly and effectively notably because 
of the absence of the Soviet delegate in protest against the Formosa (Taiwan) 
government occupying the seat for China at the UN. The return of the Soviet 
delegate ended the capacity of the Council to act and the matter was referred to 
the General Assembly, which was too large and divided to lead a military 
operation competently. It exposed, therefore, the limitation of the principle of 
collective security where action is possible only with consensus among the five 
permanent members. Also, the US provided more than half the ground troops, 
85 percent of the naval forces and nearly 95 percent of the air force 
contingents. Less than ten percent came from other contributors. 
During the Gulf crisis, the military weight of the US also dominated the military 
operation. Thus collective response whenever used has been heavily 
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dependent on a single great power and closely tied to its national interests. 
This makes collective response - that is so heavily dependent on a single great 
power, and so closely tied to its national interests - a questionable kind of 
collective security. Although over twenty countries participated in the war for 
the liberation of Kuwait, the US was the primary actor and its national interests 
were a crucial factor in determining the response of the coalition to Iraqi 
aggression. 
Another occasion where the UN was involved, in a military conflict, is the Congo 
(now Zaire) 1960. In the aftermath of its independence from Belgium 30 June 
1960, the Congo experienced widespread disorder and rioting as well as mutiny 
in the army. Subsequently the government appealed to the UN Secretary-
General, Dag Hammerskjold, for military assistance to thwart the breakdown in 
internal order and to prevent outside intervention and secession. The 
leadership and initiative of the Secretary-General played a crucial role in 
securing authority for action from the Security Council. The operation 
eventually reached a strength of twenty thousand troops from twenty-nine 
countries with a cost of $400 million in its four-year existence. 104 
The operation had its shortcomings in that it was seen as interfering in the 
internal affairs of a sovereign country and taking sides in an internal power 
struggle. The US-Soviet consensus that permitted the authorisation of the 
operation disappeared with the loss of political neutrality of the UN because the 
internal factions were not treated impartially. The Soviet Union and other 
members of the UN became unhappy and prominent critics of the role played by 
the Secretary-General. Consequently, the financial burden coupled with the 
political crisis of the UN brought an early withdrawal of the UN operation before 
internal stability had been fully achieved. Despite these shortcomings and the 
controversy over the leading role played by Hammerskjold, the UN operation 
succeeded in reducing the threat of foreign intervention, maintained essential 
public services in operation and supplied emergency relief throughout the 
country, and forestalled the secession of the Katanga region. 
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The history of the military involvement of the UN in international conflicts has 
been very limited and shows the difficulties of action under the provisions of 
collective security. In addition, controversy over the UN has been an inherent 
feature of its history because of the particular composition of the Security 
Council and the disproportionate power it gives to certain members in relation to 
the rest of the UN membership. 
Some might argue in reference to the Kuwaiti case that although resolution 678 
made no explicit reference to the use of force, it may be implied among "all 
necessary means". This omission helped to prevent a veto on the part of the 
Chinese and an acceptance of the resolution by the Soviet Union, while giving 
the Americans and the British the flexibility of interpreting it as meaning the use 
of force. Possibly the strict legality of the text does not matter, since the US 
and Britain were willing to go to war with or without Security Council 
authorisation as would later be the case over Kosovo. This determination is 
also manifested in their consistent reference to the right of collective self-
defence according to the UN Charter. 
The procedural validity of the resolution has also been questioned because 
China, a permanent member of the Council, abstained from the vote. A strict 
reading of the rules of the Charter support this position. However, in practice 
many resolutions have been adopted with at least one pennanent member 
abstaining and yet they have been accepted as valid. No resolution has ever 
been declared invalid merely based on one permanent member abstaining. 
Nevertheless, if the explanation of China for abstaining is considered, the 
validity of the resolution is definitely in question. China said it abstained 
because it interpreted the resolution as authorising the use of force, which it 
opposed, yet it supported the resolution's call on Iraq to comply with previous 
resolutions. """^  
Another legal question raised relates to the specific provision that the Council 
based its resolution upon. It is unsatisfactory to refer to chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, which includes Articles 39-51, without referring to any specific one. In 
contrast, resolution 660 on 2 August 1990 stated clearly that it was based on 
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Articles 29 and 40 of the UN Charter. It is also argued that the Council can only 
resort to force whence a determination has been made that measures taken 
under Article 41, namely, economic sanctions have failed. The failure to 
undertake such a determination is a violation of the procedures of chapter 
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Moreover, according to the provisions of Article 42 the Council is authorised to 
use force when necessary and not individual member states. This has been the 
main difference between the UN Charter and the Covenant of the League of 
Nations. The prerogative of using force is in the hands of the Council and not 
member states and breaching this "violates the Charter of the UN by authorising 
some States to use military force in total disregard of the procedures 
established by the Charter". Others, such as Schachter, Goodrich and 
Simons go as far as suggesting that Article 42 is in fact inoperative because the 
Council lacks the standing forces necessary to carry out Article 42-enforcement 
action. However, in the two occasions that the Council authorised the use of 
force it called upon member states to contribute for the particular operation. 
As already mentioned, the Cold War years prevented the creation of standby 
forces to implement the resolutions of the Security Council. The only means, 
subsequently, available to the Council became the indirect ones. Hence, the 
formula of authorising or mandating one or more states. Although the Gulf War 
has transformed the permanent members into actively running the Council on a 
consensual basis they were unable to activate the Military Staff Committee or 
more accurately unwilling to do so. The coalition did not even consider the 
possibility of the Security Council working out arrangements for the command 
forces in the Gulf area as suggested in Article 47(3) of the Charter. " ° 
Consequently the same method of mandating member states was applied 
during the Gulf operation as in the Korean and the Congo cases. The Gulf war 
became an operation authorised by the UN and conducted by a military 
coalition. The absence of the Council during the military action raised the 
question as to whether the use of force was to be exercised under the authority 
or control of the Security Council. Once hostilities began the UN was not 
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involved at all, and was barely referred it in the military briefings or US 
presidential press conferences. Taking into account the magnitude of the crisis 
and the massive attack waged on Iraq, one would have expected more 
intensive involvement of the Council during the war. The Security Council 
became involved again after the end of the military action, on the subject of the 
cease-fire, in order to consider the US draft for resolution 686. This made 
many sceptical about the way in which a superpower was able to manipulate 
the Council for its own political interests and about the role of the UN in future 
conflicts. 
The scope and ultimate purpose of the military campaign were also unclear and 
no member of the UN was able or willing to challenge the US-led coalition. This 
brought to the forefront the issue about the antiquated composition of the 
Security Council and the need to include more members from the Third World 
as well as to include the economically powerful Gemiany and Japan in order to 
lessen the leading role played by the US. In the end, the legitimacy of the 
Council's decisions depends on part on the participatory nature of the decision 
making, as indicated by the Charter of the UN. The Council acts on behalf of 
member states and its decisions are binding to all members. Hence soliciting 
the views of all members increase the effectiveness of the UN and the long-
term viability of the organisation. It is damaging to the UN if the national 
interests of the few powerful members are constantly seen to be dominating the 
Council's resolutions. 
Criticism is also levelled at resolution 687. This is the case partly because of 
the elaborate and intrusive obligations and requirements imposed on Iraq and 
also because the resolution left it to the Council to determine that peace and 
security have been restored to the region without specifying what constitutes a 
return to peace and security. Restoration of peace and security is a very broad 
objective giving the Council indefinite authorisation to pressure, control and 
punish Iraq. Another issue raised in connection with the resolution relates to 
whether the Council acted lawfully in ordering the demarcation of the border in 
accordance with the Agreed Minutes of 1963. The UN Charter provides that 
legal disputes should be referred to its own International Court of Justice, 
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without making a distinction between those disputes that threaten international 
peace and those that do not. Iraq challenged the competence of the Council to 
order the demarcation, but its opposition did not stop the Council from 
confirming the inviolability of the border as has been demarcated by the UN. ^^ "^  
The inevitable question is, then, what have been the real objectives of the 
resolution? Adherence to international law and the maintenance of world peace 
and security, or to drive Saddam out of power as some members of the Security 
Council hoped? Such an objective is incompatible with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter. 
The debate over the lawfulness of some of the UN resolutions reveals the 
difficulties attached to the functioning of an international organisation where five 
powerful members can run and dictate the way in which its Charter is 
interpreted and applied. The unwillingness and acquiescence of other 
members is a reminder of the danger inherent in such a system, where the 
interests of few can dominate. Demands for a change in the composition of the 
Council have increased since the Gulf crisis. 
V. Conclusion 
There is no doubt that the Iraqi invasion and annexation of Kuwait violated 
international rules and the UN Charter. This was not the first time that the UN 
faced a breach of international law and the UN Charter by a member state, but 
it was the first time that the UN proved to be so effective in resolving the crisis. 
This was due primarily to the end of the Cold War and the domination of the 
international system by one superpower; the clarity of Iraq's aggression and its 
breach of UN Charter and international rules, and the willingness of the US to 
take a leading role in managing the crisis. 
The Security Council was subsequently very effective in carrying out the will of 
the international community as interpreted and dictated by the US-led coalition. 
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One can argue that the success of the UN in this instance depended largely on 
the ability of the US to manipulate and dominate the discussion and the drafting 
of the various relevant resolutions as well as on its military strength. As a 
result of that some saw the war in the Gulf, and resolution 687 in particular, as 
exceeding the clearly identified objectives of the UN, namely, to end the 
occupation of Kuwait; to restore the sovereignty, independence, and territorial 
integrity of Kuwait; and to restore the authority of the legitimate Government of 
Kuwait. Other objectives, the destruction of Iraq as a regional power and the 
control over oil resources seem to have played a major role in determining the 
manner and extent of the punishment of Iraq by the Security Council. 
The involvement of the Security Council in solving international disputes and in 
stopping acts of aggression is extremely important for the security and stability 
of the international system. The danger is, as seen in the Iraqi case, is when 
one member state is capable of dominating the organisation and its national 
interests become synonymous with the interests of the international community. 
There is a need to reconsider the membership of the Council and to activate the 
Military Staff Committee of the UN as the executive arm of the Security Council. 
Also this was the first time in which the Security Council was directly involved in 
resolving an international boundary dispute. 
The actions of the Security Council succeeded on the one hand in restoring the 
legitimacy of Kuwait and ended its illegitimate occupation within a very short 
period of time. On the other hand, one can argue that the cost of UN action 
has been huge to Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the region in general as shall 
be discussed in the next chapter. In addition, the Gulf war left many very 
sceptical about the future role of the UN as a peacemaking and peacekeeping 
organisation. 
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Chapter Six 
The Aftermath of Desert Storm 
The escalation of the crisis by both parties; Saddam on the one hand by not 
abiding by the UN deadline, and the coalition on the other by their willingness 
and ability to execute their threat of using military power to force him to comply 
led to war in the Gulf. Desert Storm conducted between 15 January and 28 
February 1991 by the American led coalition succeeded in ending the Iraqi 
occupation of Kuwait and restoring the legitimate government of Kuwait. The 
massive military power that the coalition used achieved its crucial objective of 
preventing the breakdown of the balance of power in the Gulf region; or more 
accurately the strengthening of Iraq in the Gulf region and the Middle East in 
general. '' However, this resolution of the crisis came at a very heavy price for 
Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia as well as the whole region in terms of economic, 
financial, political and environmental repercussions. 
Not only Iraq's infrastructure and military power has been dealt a serious blow; 
the sanctions regime has had grave consequences on its economy and people. 
Kuwait's fragile security and sovereignty, on the other hand, has been 
highlighted, and is, at the present, bolstered by military dependence on Western 
powers, particularly the US. The whole issue of the security of the Gulf and the 
necessity to maintain a balance of power in favour of the West has become a 
main concern for the Gulf states and their Western allies. The financial burden 
of war and the military expenditures that followed has been enormous for Gulf 
states. In addition, the war has exacerbated the already existing problems in 
the Arab region of political disunity, growing US influence, regional economic 
disparities and ideological uncertainty.^ 
The chapter will focus on some of these repercussions of the war especially for 
Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. In addition a discussion of the environmental 
damage to the region as a result of both the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the 
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subsequent war is included. This has been one of the issues that have had the 
least attention despite the enormous devastation of the environment in these 
three countries. 
L Consequences for Iraq 
The focus of this section will be on three main aspects of the aftermath of the 
war for Iraq: the sanctions regime and economic instability, the political 
instability and disintegration of Iraq and the border demarcation between Iraq 
and Kuwait. 
A. Sanctions and Economic Instability 
The irony of the Iraqi situation is that the regime intended by invading Kuwait to 
solve its severe economic crisis as well as its access to the Gulf. Instead its 
action aggravated the economic situation; Iraq is facing a growing economic 
crisis that "threatens the social fabric of the country". ^ In addition, the UN 
succeeded in imposing a border demarcation with Kuwait which Iraq had to 
accept. 
More than a decade of UN sanctions is having disastrous effects on Iraq and its 
population, let alone the damage done to its infrastructure and economy duhng 
the war itself. The coalition forces considered the Iraqi infrastructure a justifiable 
strategic military target that must be destroyed in order to weaken Iraq, hence 
the massive attack that was conducted against vital Iraqi facilities and 
productive sectors. Estimates of Iraqi losses since it invaded Kuwait ranges 
between $200-$400 billion. ^ 
According to Iraqi sources, Iraq lost $85 billion in export revenues alone as a 
result of the imposition of the UN blockade which stopped most exports 
between August 1990 to Dec 1996.^ Before the sanctions, oil accounted for 60 
percent of the country's GDP and 95 percent of export earnings. In 1991 the 
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total value of trade was only 4 percent of its 1989 level of $22 billion. With the 
food for oil agreement the value had risen to 15 percent of the pre-war level and 
in 1998 rose to $5.9 billion.^ The financial situation is further aggravated by the 
freezing of Iraqi assets in Western banking institutions worth about $4 billion. 
Access to these funds may continue to be restricted even after an easing of 
sanctions. 
A look at some other socio-economic indicators for Iraq can give a clear picture 
of the deterioration of the economic situation and the effects that the war and 
sanctions have had on Iraq. Prior to the war, Iraq in accordance with the World 
Bank classification was placed among the upper middle income countries and 
the caloric intake of Iraqis was above average for an upper middle income 
country. This since the war has changed dramatically and its per capita income 
and calonc intake are approaching the ranks of countries such as Somalia, 
Rwanda and Zaire. Iraq's per capita income has dropped from $2,108 in 1989 
to $189.6 in 1991. In mid 1990's it fell further to $135.8. It increased to $192.7 
in 1999 but is way under the pre-invasion level. ® 
The country has suffered, also, from one of the highest inflation rates in the 
world. Annual inflation which was running at 45 percent before the invasion in 
1990 jumped to an average of 500 percent in 1991. According to the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO) from the time the sanctions were imposed to the 
end of 1995 food prices rose 4,000 fold. The food for oil agreement helped in 
reducing this inflationary spiral. Thus in 1998 inflation fell to 140 percent.^ The 
Iraqi Dinar, officially worth a little over three dollars before the Gulf war, was 
selling between ID 1500-2000 to $1 by the end of 1995. After Iraq began 
negotiating the oil for food deal, the Dinar recovered quickly. In the spring of 
1996, it fluctuated from around ID 300 to $1, but by the end of the year had 
dropped again to ID 1000 to $1. In 1999 the exchange rate was ID 1200 to $1. 
Consequently food and ordinary household goods has been put beyond the 
reach of all but the very wealthy and those favoured and protected by the 
regime.^° 
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Health services deserve special mention as the sector hardest hit by sanctions. 
While the import of medical supplies has been permitted under the sanctions 
regime, funds are scarce and are made scarcer for the general population by 
the disproportionate share of these imports going to regime supporters and 
other favoured elements of the population. Recent reports indicate acute 
shortages of medicine and deteriorating hospital equipment and services, as 
well as a serious rise in malnutrition among vulnerable elements of the 
population, resulting in increased infant mortality rates and stunted growth 
among children.^^ 
A 1995 report of the FAO indicates that Iraq's lack of essential food needs $2.7 
billion to cover it.^^ In 1999, FAO mentioned, also, the presence of a variety of 
the animal diseases that threatens the food security of Iraq because of the 
deterioration of the system of animals' disease control. A recent UNICEF report 
estimated that between 1991-1998 some 500,000 children under the age of five 
had died because of hunger and disease.^^ Thus, Iraq is suffering from the 
spread of diseases, malnutrition and deterioration of the health of its population. 
This is both the responsibility of the international community and Western 
policies and the policies of the Iraqi regime in its total disregard for the suffering 
of its people and its focus on maintaining power at any price. 
This health crisis was expected to improve after 1996. In May of that year Iraq 
accepted UN resolution 986 which pennits the sale of $2 billion in oil every 90 
days for food, medical and other life-sustaining imports. The oil for food deal 
was at first rejected by Baghdad on the basis that the strict tenns of the 
purchase and distribution of humanitarian goods is an infringement on Iraq's 
sovereignty. Secondly, it was perceived as a way to deflect humanitarian 
pressures to lift the embargo. By January 1996, the decline of the Dinar and 
pressure from France and Russia reversed the Iraqi position and it announced a 
willingness to negotiate implementation of the deal. The deal went into effect in 
December 1996 but the $1 billion (after deductions) the government received 
fell short of the amount international organisations estimated Iraq needed to 
meet its humanitarian requirements. The FAO puts the estimated costs of the 
imported food requirements at around $3 billion per year.^^ 
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Thus, by 1998, it had become obvious that an expanded formula was needed 
and the UN more than doubled the value of oil that Iraq could export and 
allowed for a wider range of humanitarian imports. Still the bureaucratic 
procedures for operating the scheme are very difficult and awkward, and the 
humanitarian situation has not improved.According to Denis Halliday (the 
former head of the UN's Humanitarian Programme) children are dying at a rate 
of five to six thousand a month due to lack of medicine. Around 25-30 percent 
of children, under the age of five, suffer malnutrition and the production of 
electricity is only 40 per cent of its level before the Gulf war. Iraq needs an 
instant injection of $50 to $60 billion for water and electricity supply and health 
services as well as to start rebuilding its industry and agriculture.^'' 
Halliday's successor, Hans Von Sponeck, expressed similar concerns and has 
argued that the system does not even come close to answering the desperate 
need for medicine and for spare parts for Iraq's crumbling infrastructure. He 
has said "this experience of sanctions with Iraq has not worked...why must we 
prolong the pretence that it does".^^ It is worth noting that both have resigned 
from the post because their outspokenness made the main advocates of 
sanctions extremely unhappy with them. 
Agriculture and industry have been damaged by the war, but more so by the 
sanctions regime. There is a severe shortage of spare parts, seeds and 
fertilisers, an absence of pest control and poor maintenance of irrigation 
system. Heavy industry (steel, iron, and aluminium) has been badly restricted 
by sanctions, while smaller light industries are producing consumer goods, 
although with considerable difficulty. According to the Iraqi government, 
industrial production in 1994 was about 60 percent of pre-Gulf war capacity.^^ 
More realistic estimates put it at 30 to 40 percent of previous output, with a 
significantly reduced quality of finished products due to the embargo and its 
influence on reducing the imports of foreign components. ^ ° 
The only industrial sectors that have received steady funding are the oil 
production industry, refineries and cement factories. The regime is 
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concentrating on rebuilding the most lucrative sector of the economy in the 
hope that its pre-war levels of production and export of oil will resume once 
sanctions are lifted. Iraq claims that within 14 months of a full lift of the 
sanctions it could pump 3.2 million barrels a day (b/d) and within five to eight 
years could reach a goal of 6 million b/d. Western oil analysts are less hopeful 
about this goal. Many facilities, such as gas-oil separator plants, storage 
facilities and the off shore oil terminals of Khawr al-Amaya and Mina al-Bakr 
need considerable rebuilding. Neither the Saudi nor Syrian pipelines are likely 
to be put back into service while Saddam is in power. Most important, the 6 
million b/d figure is based on $25 billion of foreign investment. This level of 
investment will not be realised without a complete removal of the oil embargo 
and a more open investment climate in Iraq; both of which are unlikely without a 
change of regime or of regime behaviour. 
In the meantime the Iraqi society is disintegrating due to "the impoverishment of 
Iraq's middle classes, the increasing inability of the state to provide basic 
nutrition and health, and the climate of political fear and repression". This 
disintegration process will continue until the sanctions are lifted. Even after 
that, the cost of rebuilding Iraq and reintegrating it into the regional and 
international system will be very costly. The reconstruction of Iraq is very 
difficult and needs billions while Iraq is obliged to give 30 percent of its oil 
revenues to the UN for its compensation fund. 
The success of the sanctions regime in terms of achieving its objectives has 
proved limited. First, sanctions have failed to force Iraq to cooperate as 
illustrated by the crises in relation with the Security Council since late 1997 over 
weapons inspection and UNSCOM. The broader objective hoped for by the US 
of bringing down Saddam seems at best unreachable even after a decade of 
sanctions. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright indicated, in 1997, that 
Washington's support for the embargo would be sustained while Saddam 
Hussein's regime remained in power. This insistence of the Americans is 
causing severe suffering to the Iraqi people and making Iraq's reintegration into 
the region increasingly more difficult. 
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The power of the Iraqi regime seems to be well entrenched. It has gradually 
extended its authority throughout much of the country since the low point of 
February 1991 during the simultaneous uprising in the north and south. In effect 
the assertion of the regime's authority in the south and central Iraq has been 
greatly assisted by the embargo, in three main ways: -
• The collapse of the economy has increased the dependence of the 
population on the rationing system. The system provides the government 
with a powerful tool to control people and their access to essential foods. 
• The economic distress of people means that they are all consumed by mere 
survival, which leaves no room for political debate and discussion. The 
economic situation has led to the destruction of the middle class, preventing 
further the possibility of a more stable and democratic political system. 
• Iraq's isolation has increased the government's control over information and 
confirmed to the population the regime's claim that it is fallen victim to 
foreign conspiracy. Challenges to the regime have been contained through 
elimination of opponents, or through repression or the threat of violence and 
elimination. 
Others share this view such as, Ismail al-Shatti, a member of the Kuwaiti 
National Assembly. He believes that the "economic sanctions have 
strengthened the Iraqi regime while the Iraqi population are suffering 
immensely, hence the Gulf states do not believe in the effectiveness of the 
sanctions regime anymore". His view is supported by the Secretary-General 
for Military Affairs of the GCC: "no doubt sanctions had its impact in forcing the 
Iraqi regime to accept international resolutions, but its effects are felt mostly by 
the population". 
The human and social impact has been devastating and there is an obvious 
imbalance between the political objectives and the human cost of the sanctions 
regime. This in many ways has put the Gulf states in general and the US in 
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particular under international scrutiny. Arab voices have become more 
sensitive about military strikes and the continued sanctions regime. The 
president of the UAE, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahayan, has publicly 
lamented the continued suffering of the Iraqi people and has signalled a 
growing willingness to accept Iraq's political and economic rehabilitation. Egypt 
had called on the UN Security Council to clarify the precise tenns which 
Baghdad is required to fulfil for sanctions to be lifted. ®^ 
France and Russia have been the most consistent of the coalition members to 
repeatedly express concern over the humanitarian effect of the sanctions 
regime and the rigid stance of the US. They also opposed the continued use of 
force against Iraq and were critical of US military strikes against targets in 
southern Iraq in September 1996. Neither was willing, also, to support a US led 
military action to resolve the weapons inspection crisis when it came to a head 
in February 1998. 
As the Muellers have aptly put it: "sanctions are causing great human damage 
in Iraq, and yet the prospects for the external or internal removal of Saddam are 
unpromising, another policy might be in order". They suggest that one way 
out of the impasse is to relax the current confrontational approach that has 
inflicted maximum damage on the people and to concentrate sanctions on 
strictly military issues while relaxing some of the economic sanctions to reduce 
the hardship of the Iraqi people. 
B. Political Instability and Disintegration of Iraq 
Iraq at the end of Desert Storm faced a spontaneous Kurdish uprising in the 
north and a Shi'ite uprising in the south, posing a serious threat to its political 
cohesion and unity. The Kurdish uprising received the most attention in the 
West although it was less bloody and threatening to the regime. The loss of the 
Shi'ite Arab south would have undennined the authority of the government and 
threatened its territorial integrity and independence. The rebels in the south 
raised slogans that were extremist such as "there is no authority except Ali" and 
161 
"no ruler except Ja'fari" (Shi'i). The violence and bloodshed associated with the 
uprising prompted Shi'ite religious leaders in Najaf to issue two fatwas calling 
for the protection of private property, public institutions and civilian life. 
The Iraqi regime brutally put down the rebellion by mobilising forces from the 
north and centre especially the Republican Guard and by using helicopter 
gunships. In less than three weeks every major rebel city and town was 
recaptured. The majority of Shi'ites in the south have no separatist 
aspirations like the Kurds in the north, they rather identify with the state, if not 
the system, and desire a change of regime and a more equal share of political 
power. However, for the moment, the brutality of the regime's suppression of 
the insurgency has alienated them, and the slums of Shi'ites in Baghdad and 
the two holy cities of Najaf and Karbala remain a potential source of opposition 
and potential target of Shi'i activists. 
As a result of this brutal treatment of the Shi'ites, the US, France and Britain 
imposed a no-fly zone on the Iraqi regime south of the 32nd parallel and 
restricted its military troops from moving south of this limit on the ground. This 
seriously limited Saddam's control over nearly a third of Iraq. Yet, the Iraqi 
army since 1991 has been able with tribal and party support to maintain a firm 
grip on the security situation. Also, the government's draining of the marshes 
by diverting the water to rivers and canals is forcing residents to relocate, hence 
denying the opposition viable bases of resistance and enhancing Baghdad's 
control of the security situation. ^ 
In the case of the Kurds, they have been struggling for years to achieve 
autonomous or semi-autonomous status in Iraq. The end of Desert Storm and 
the perception that Saddam's regime was finished, as well as the urging of the 
Americans, encouraged them to revolt. Bush on 15 February 1991 called upon 
the Iraqi people to overthrow Saddam by saying that they should take "matters 
into their own hands to force Saddam Hussein the dictator to step aside". 
The Kurdish uprising began at the town of Raniya and spread to other cities, 
including the important oil city of Kirkuk. The defection of the Kurdish auxiliary 
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forces known as the national defence brigades strengthened the rebels. These 
forces played a crucial role in suppressing Kurdish nationalism throughout the 
seventies and eighties and were recruited from among some of the Kurdish 
tribes loyal to Baghdad. The perception that Saddam's regime was finished 
prompted their defection. Within weeks most of northern Iraq was in the hands 
of Kurdish insurgents. 
However, in the face of Iraqi military forces, the Kurds could not hold onto their 
gains and panic and fear spread among the Kurdish population driving them to 
flee into neighbouring Iran and Turkey. Over a million and a half amassed on 
the borders of Iran and Turkey. Turkey refused to allow them entry for fear of 
exacerbating its own problem with the Kurdish separatist movement. The Kurds 
were pinning their hopes on the Americans to come to their rescue. Instead, 
the White House spokesperson, Marlin Fitzwater, said "we do not intend to 
involve ourselves in the internal affairs of Iraq". Saddam was left to capture 
town after town. By 6 April the Iraqi regime was able to announce that it "has 
totally crushed all acts of sedition and sabotage in all cities of Iraq". '^^  
The swelling of the number of Kurdish refugees and the repression of the 
uprising by the Iraqi military increased the pressure on the West to act. On 16 
April Bush announced that America, France and Britain were committed to 
providing relief aid to these refugees. This operation became known as 
"Operation Provide Comfort" of international relief and the creation of safe 
havens. A no-fly zone above the 36**^  parallel in northern Iraq was established 
barring Iraqi military aircraft from attacking the Kurds. 
Negotiations between the Iraqi government and the two main Kurdish political 
parties, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) of Masoud Barazani and Patriotic 
Kurdistan Union (PUK) of Jalal Talabani followed the regime's quelling of the 
uprising, but it ended in failure. Iraq withdrew its troops and officials from the 
area and imposed its own economic blockade. Barazani and Talabani 
organised their own election for a parliament under Western protection. Their 
parties received relatively equal share of votes and a power sharing 
arrangement was reached. The Kurds were able to establish an autonomous 
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entity and reduce significantly the power of central government. Yet, by 1996 
the differences between the two parties have reached a crisis point. 
The infighting between Talabani and Barazani gave Saddam in 1996 the pretext 
to re-enter the zone at the request of Barazani. This resulted in hundreds of 
thousands being driven from their homes and an "air bridge" evacuation of 
several thousand of Kurds and Arab collaborators with the CIA. ®^ Saddam, 
consequently, increased his influence in the north and checked Iran's influence, 
which had been supporting the PUK against the KDP. In addition, he 
decreased the power of his opponents who were co-operating with the Kurds 
undermined CIA efforts to oust him. Another consequence was that in 1996 
when "Operation Provide Comfort" expired, it was replaced by a new mission 
dictated by the Americans while the French refused to participate. 
The lack of unity between the two main Kurdish political groups and the fact that 
a third of Iraq's Kurdish population lives in Baghdad, and subsequently is under 
the control of the government, makes the emergence of a stable counter 
balance to central government limited. At the same time, the Kurdish 
reintegration into the Iraqi state is made more difficult with the continuous 
absence of central government control over the north. '*°The no fly zones in the 
north and south of the country and the safe havens for the Kurds are designed 
to curtail the power of Saddam's regime. Yet, it has been acknowledged, if not 
by words then by action, that the disintegration of Iraq into a Kurd, Sunni and 
Shi'ite separate entities is in no one's interest. 
As stated by Hamed al-Abdullah, of Kuwait University: "the division of Iraq does 
not serve the interests of the West nor the Gulf states, since a weakened Iraq 
will disturb the balance of power with Iran and Syria". He added that countries 
such as Syria, Turkey and Iran that have a Kurdish minority see the division of 
Iraq as threatening to their stability and creating internal pressures. Arab 
states see the necessity to maintain the unity of Iraq and support its 
sovereignty. According to Abdullah al-Shaiiji, of Kuwait University, all states 
reject the idea of a divided Iraq, especially the GCC states, which sees Iraq's 
unity as a counter balance to Iran in the region. Maintaining the unity of Iraq is 
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considered the main reason why the war ended so abruptly after the liberation 
of Kuwait, since its division would undermine the stability and security of the 
region. This to a certain extent explains the regime's short tenn objective of 
trying to remain in power and retain as much centralised control over the Iraqi 
territory as possible. The regime still believes that sanctions and international 
isolation will end due to the following specific factors: 
1. Local and Western fears of Iran. 
2. Concern about the ramifications of a break up of Iraq into Kurdish and 
Shi'ite national entities. 
3. The non-credibility of other alternatives, including the various opposition 
groups. 
4. The pressure of international trade and interest in the Iraqi market. 
5. Popular Arab pressure for normalisation. 
6. The role and influence of the Shi'ites in regional policies and 
alignments.'"*^ 
The lifting of the sanctions is essential, but that alone will not solve Iraq's 
problems. There is a paramount need for political restructuring of the Iraqi 
system of government. The war and sanctions have exacerbated all the 
weaknesses of the current regime and highlighted the fact that democracy is the 
only way fonward for a united Iraq. The grievances of the various ethnic and 
religious social groups must be addressed and Iraq must be able to reintegrate 
into the Gulf subregion as a partner rather than a hegemonic force. Under 
Saddam this is not a possibility, especially that his power rests on playing on 
these differences to his advantage and depends heavily on Sunni elements for 
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the security of the regime. This issue is of a great importance to succeeding 
governments in Iraq and to the whole issue of the security of the Gulf. 
C. Border Demarcation 
As mentioned in the previous chapter the work of the Iraq-Kuwait demarcation 
commission has been accepted by the Security Council as final. The Council in 
resolution 833 (1993) affirmed this and announced the inviolability of the 
international borders which the committee had demarcated between the two 
states. The commission held eleven meeting over a two-year period. Iraq 
attended only the first five sessions and ceased to participate on the grounds 
that the work of the commission has been political and objected to the fact that 
the UN lacked the legal competence to act on border issues. This 
involvement of the UN in demarcating border issue has been unique in the 
history of the UN and objectionable voices has been raised not only from Iraq 
but from the European Commission, some UN member states and Arab 
countries. 
Moreover, the commission in carrying out its work dependent on some historical 
and geographical factors but ignored some crucial ones such as the political 
and economic including access to the Gulf and oil fields. In other words, it 
ignored the roots of the dispute between the two states. The final decisions on 
the delimitation and demarcation of the three sections of the boundary, the 
western, northern and khawrs sections are as follows: -
Western section: The delimitation of this section was based on the delimitation 
set in the 1932 agreement and in the Edmonds memorandum of 1940. Wadi al 
Batin is well defined as a natural feature, except in its most northern part where 
its thalweg divides into two. The commission decided that the eastern thalweg 
would form the boundary- a decision favouring Iraq. 
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Northern section: the commission divided this section into three subsections: 
from the Wadi al Batin to the point south of Safwan, from the Safwan to the 
intersection of the khawrs and lastly khawr Abdullah. For the first subsection, 
the commission found all maps agree that the boundary line follows latitude to a 
point south of Safwan. However, the noticeboard that indicates that point had 
been removed and its location has been disputed by the Iraqis since 1940, 
when the British attempted to re-establish the noticeboard. The commission 
subsequently decided that the point should be on the basis of a mean figure 
and the location was determined to be the line of demarcation between the end 
of the boundary in the Batin and the beginning of the northern boundary. 
(See Maps 5& 6) 
In the second subsection the commission first identified the thalweg of the 
channel in order to determine the location of the junction of the two khawrs. It 
decided that the thalweg had not changed its location and the junction 
accordingly demarcated. By adopting the principle of the mean position, the 
commission demarcated the line south of the Safwan in a way that left only 
Umm Qasr port complex and Umm Qasr village to Iraq. Thus, eleven oil fields 
at the southern tip of Rumaila oil field and an agricultural area south of Safwan 
lay within Kuwait. The commercial port of Umm Qasr remains within Iraq but it 
lost effective control over naval jetties just south of Umm Qasr. (See map 7) 
Naturally, Kuwait accepted the demarcation with great satisfaction since it 
confirmed its claim to the rich south Rumaila oil field and the two islands of 
Warbah and Bubiyan. It also divided Umm Qasr, the only maritime area that 
Iraq has used other than Basra between the two countries. The land boundary 
had been demarcated by 106 pillars and twenty-eight intermediate boundary 
markers. ^° 
The third subsection consists of the maritime boundary from the junction of 
Khawr Zubayr and Khawr Abdullah to the eastern end of the Khawr. The 
commission demarcated the border based on the principle of the median line. 
However, the UN stressed that Iraq has navigational access through the 
Khawrs; a right upheld by the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
1 6 ' ' 
Regarding the offshore islands, the commission reaffirmed Kuwait's sovereignty 
over Warbah and Bubiyan, although a future deal whereby Kuwait can lease the 
islands to Iraq is not precluded. Moreover, Iraq must have the permission of 
Kuwait to maintain the deep-water channel it had dredged in 1989-90, which 
enables vessels of up to 11.5m, in draught, to use the ports of Umm Qasr and 
Zubayr. Maritime boundaries are usually not demarcated physically, but 
plaques were installed on jetties and on some other marks indicating 
demarcating lines. ^^(See map 8) 
Some has seen this demarcation as unfair to Iraq and in favour of Kuwait as 
expressed in these words; 
The new border offered Kuwait considerable advantages at the 
expense of Iraq. It gave Kuwait greater control over the Ratga and 
Rumalia oil fields in its northern border area, and reduced Iraqi 
access to the port facilities at Umm Qasr. 
There is a necessity of allowing some Iraqi presence on Warbah Island in the 
interest of being able to defend its access to the Gulf if Iraq is to resume a 
legitimate role in the Gulf security structure. ^ This becomes imperative if one 
is to consider the position of the Iraqi opposition, especially in light of the US 
efforts to persuade them to accept the commission verdict on the boundary, 
which they strongly resisted. The following summarises their position; 
1. The Iraqi opposition leaders, aware that Saddam has committed many 
unforgiving wrongs, were opposed to the invasion of Kuwait because it is 
contrary to Arab and Islamic traditions as well as to the nonns of 
international law. 
2. The Iraqi opposition leaders were just as much concerned about the 
maintenance of peace and security in the Gulf as Kuwait. For this reason, 
they were anxious to settle the border question directly between Iraq and 
Kuwait. 
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3. The Iraqi opposition leaders were not opposed to the demarcation of frontier 
in principle. In fact they "welcome a permanent demarcated boundary 
capable of survival in order to avoid falling in the same tragic situation as 
that of the Algiers Agreement which Saddam had concluded and later 
denounced, leading to war resulting in the loss of over a million men". 
4. Because the present regime in Iraq has denied the people a voice in the 
governance of the country, the Iraqi opposition leaders maintain that the 
postponement of demarcation to more auspicious circumstances would be in 
the interests of both countries until the people could elect their own rulers to 
maintain peace and security. 
The Iraqi opposition insists that the best guarantee for Kuwait is an agreement 
reached with a government elected by the people of Iraq rather by dependence 
on a foreign power. Thus, a fundamental procedural difference with political 
implication underiined the positions of the Kuwaitis and Iraqi opposition; should 
the agreement on the boundary between the two countries be dependent on the 
support of foreign powers or on an agreement reached between regimes 
elected by the people? To some the support of foreign powers is no guarantee, 
especially that Iraq recognised the demarcated boundaries under pressure and 
future government might be reluctant to accept it as enduring and valid. ^ 
The issue of the border will continue to linger as exemplified by the continued 
escalation of tension between the two countries through war of words. Iraq 
continues to question the legitimacy of the border as Tariq Aziz describes 
Kuwaiti borders as a "bombshell that may explode in the future". He points to 
the fact that Iraq accepted the border in 1994 as part of a UN resolution, but 
added that the resolution was tailored "to expand Kuwait's coasts at the 
expense of Iraq". In other words, it is a forced acceptance, Iraq really had no 
choice in the matter. Kuwait complained to the Arab League about Aziz's 
comments saying, "they are full of lies and deliberate fabrications of history". 
It is obvious that this long-standing dispute reflecting the disadvantageous 
position of Iraq in the Gulf can not be foreclosed by a UN resolution and the 
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Security Council guaranteeing the inviolability of the border. ®^ In addition, in 
light of the above-mentioned stance of the Iraqi opposition a change of the 
regime in Iraq is not a guarantee for abiding to the UN resolution concerning the 
borders. 
II Consequences for Kuwait 
The invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent war waged to liberate the country 
from Iraqi aggression have had far reaching consequences for Kuwait. 
Although the most obvious one is the exposure of the fragility of its security and 
sovereignty, other domestic issues also surfaced. These include increasing 
pressure on the ruling family for political change and political liberalisation of the 
system of governance. Substantial economic pressure emerged due to the 
massive cost of the war and the subsequent military purchases, hence, putting 
pressure on the government for economic restructuring and for curtailing public 
expenditure. In addition, the environmental costs of the invasion and the war 
were substantial. This issue will be dealt with in Section V. 
A. Security and Sovereignty 
The ruling family has been most concerned about the security and viability of 
Kuwait as an independent state. The war restored Kuwaiti sovereignty, but it 
did nothing to alter its viability as a state; indeed, it drew attention to its fragility. 
Its territory and population are so small that it can not be self-reliant in defence 
terms. This need for external support to maintain its independence will 
constitute a constant source of worry and tension in Kuwait especially that its 
dependence on Western powers has increased significantly. 
The GCC proved to be not a very viable and effective vehicle for maintaining 
and enhancing Kuwaiti security. In fact its security is undermined by the 
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ineffectiveness of the GCC to emerge as a capable military alliance and the 
slow progress in developing integrated defence capabilities with Saudi Arabia. 
Kuwait has, thus, chosen to rely heavily on the West especially the US. 
However, this choice represents serious problems, that must be dealt with. 
These include the following: 
1. Such ties create the risk that Kuwait will become so dependent on states 
outside the region that it will not properly develop its own defense 
capabilities, will become over-reliant on outside support for low-level 
security contingencies that require a constant Kuwaiti effort and 
immediate reaction, and will fail to assert its own sovereignty. 
2. Dependence on the West will lead Kuwait to under-emphasise the 
importance of collective security with Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, and the 
need to at least try to expand the capabilities of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council. 
3. Ties to so many countries will encourage buying arms from every 
possible source and politicising arms purchases at the expense of 
standardisation, interoperability, effectiveness, and waste. 
4. Kuwaiti's growing dependence on the US will lead the US to abuse its 
burden-sharing negotiations with Kuwait, and to seek more support than 
is really merited." ®° 
These issues can not be put on the backburner if Kuwait's security is to be 
enhanced. Kuwait on the other hand is attempting to enhance its own military 
strength by expanding its military purchases and forces, and to correct many of 
the military weaknesses that existed at the time of the Iraqi invasion. During 
1990-1993 Kuwait ranked third in world arms agreements, while it did not 
number in the top ten nations during 1986-1989. In 1992, the government's 
plan of spending $11.8 billion on arms over a period of twelve years met with 
objections from the National Assembly. Kuwait did not wait for the approval of 
the assembly because it had already spent billions by the time the assembly 
approved a $11.7 billion expenditure. However, this raises the question of its 
continued ability to fund its ambitious plans for expanding its military force. 
Kuwait's military forces had a paper strength of around 20,000 men at the time 
of the Iraqi invasion, with large numbers of Bedouins who were not full citizens 
and large numbers of foreign personnel for technical, service and logistic 
support, and maintenance and training. They included Jordanians, Egyptians 
and Pakistanis. For the more advanced Western-supplied military equipment, 
there were British, American and French technical teams. The officer corps and 
NCOS were recruited from the royal family and loyal tribes. However, most of 
the Kuwaitis in the military forces in 1990 were from tribal groups that were not 
really citizens. 
Manpower, subsequently, is the most serious challenge facing Kuwait in its 
effort to rebuild its military. The limited manpower pool that Kuwait can draw 
from has been further constraint by the government's policy of not recruiting the 
members of the Kuwaiti resistance into the armed forces after liberation, by 
purging the army of its 10,000 Bedouins and by not making any attempt to enlist 
its Shi'ite citizen. ^ In 1996, Kuwait had a total force of only 16,000. It is still 
heavily dependent on foreign personnel for its technical services, logistic 
support, and maintenance and training, and on American, British and French 
military for contractor support missions. This puts considerable limitations on its 
plans to expand and enhance its military capabilities. 
Another limitation is the lack of substantive progress in co-ordinating and 
standardising the forces of the GCC, which means there is no overall 
standardisation of Kuwait's forces and those of other Gulf states. Kuwait buys 
from too many countries and buys too many specialised items of military 
equipment that are not fully standardised and interoperable with other forces. 
Thus Kuwaiti purchases are not part of any major mission system whether air 
defence, mine warfare, maritime sun/eillance or air attack. There is only partial 
standardisation with the US land and air forces, the only major Western country 
that would support Kuwait militarily. Kuwait is making political purchases from 
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every important trading partner and supplier state. This is the kind of amis' sale 
policy that is costly and ineffective in terms of defending the sovereignty of 
Kuwait. The defence of Kuwait is a very serious issue that will test the ability 
of the ruling family to manage the military effectively and to control corruption. 
The Iraqi-Kuwaiti border is still a source of worry to the Kuwaiti government 
despite the fact that the UN has pledged to guarantee its inviolability and 
despite the presence of UNIKOM. Kuwait has established a new security with a 
three-meter deep trench and a five-meter sand berm along the entire length of 
the boundary. Kuwait is also thinking of building a defence system that includes 
three fences along the border, one of which is to be electrified or equipped with 
electronic sensors, and mines and machine gun nests. 
B. Political Liberalisation 
Kuwaif s ruling family has faced increasing demands from its citizens to share 
political power. These demands reflect a desire for political liberalisation and 
criticism of al-Sabah for their failure to thwart the Iraqi invasion. The resumption 
of oil production to pre-war levels has helped in increasing stability and 
lessening the pressure for change. Nevertheless, the wealth and richness that 
have been enjoyed by Kuwaiti citizens and the generous benefits that the state 
provides are under pressure due to the fluctuation of oil revenues and the 
massive cost of the war and military purchases. In addition, the difficult 
economic and political situation has focused the attention of the citizens and 
opposition groups on the widespread problems in the society of corruption, 
waste and inefficiency as well as the weakness of the traditional system of 
governing and the absolute power of the ruler and the ruling family. 
Many of the promises of the Kuwaiti ruling family during their exile period were 
not kept or were fulfilled half-heartedly. Kuwait has held three elections for the 
National Assembly since the war, in 1992, in 1996 and in 1999. Opposition 
groups felt the date that was set by the ruling family for the 1992 election took 
key decisions about the future of the country out of the jurisdiction of the 
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assembly - such as the signing in September 1991 of a ten-year defence 
agreement with the United States, followed by similar agreements with Britain 
and France. Other grievances included the continued exclusion of women 
voters and the inclusion of only males above 21 from families living in Kuwait 
since 1920. That is roughly 81,000 of the 600,000 citizens. ®^  
However, despite these limitations and the ruling family's resort to the old 
methods of boosting the government support through cash handouts (bad debts 
worth $20 billion were bought from banks by the government) and raising civil 
servants salaries by a quarter, the 1992 election proved to be a victory for 
factions considered to be in opposition and for independents. They gained 35 
of the assembly's 50 seats. The candidates of the Islamic movement won 19 
seats, more than doubling their representation since the last national assembly, 
elected in 1985. ^° 
This assembly succeeded in broadening the base of the electorate by passing 
in 1994 a legislation that extends voting rights to the sons of naturalised 
Kuwaitis citizens - about 110,000 males. Extending the vote for women, though 
favoured by the assembly, did not materialise. ''^  Subsequently, this became an 
issue during the 1996 election and women showed opposition during and before 
election day against their exclusion, and vocalised their right to be full 
participants in the political system. Kuwaiti women hold many senior positions 
in the public sector, universities, commerce and industry, so there is no reason 
for them to be excluded from political life. 
Eventually Kuwaiti women were given the right to vote and nominate by a royal 
decree from Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmad al-Sabah 16 May 1999. A statement by 
the cabinet, following a meeting with the Emir, confirmed that his highness has 
decreed giving women the right to nominate and vote as an appreciation of their 
vital role in building and developing the Kuwaiti society, their sacrifices and their 
capabilities in facing the many challenges that confronted the country over the 
years. ''^  The news was greeted with great enthusiasm and appreciation in 
Kuwait and internationally. It elicited positive responses from President Clinton, 
The European Union, Iran, Egypt, and Russia as an important step towards 
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augmenting democracy in Kuwait by giving women equality and full political 
rights. Some Islamist voices in Kuwait saw the decision as violating Islamic 
Shari'a and as part of a Western agenda that is invading the Gulf with its 
Western ideas and ideals in an attempt to replace Muslim culture with a foreign 
Western culture. 
The legal battle appeared for a while as if it has been won and that women have 
won at least access to a channel in which to voice their agenda especially 
concerning changes in civil laws affecting marriage and family. As pointed out 
by Khaldoun Al Naqueep -: "the decree giving women its rights opens the way 
for women and their supporters to struggle for a wider social reforms focusing 
on the antiquated and backward civil rights laws". 
However, this euphoria was short-lived and the legal battle for Kuwaiti women 
continues. The assembly, elected in 1999, rejected the Emir's decree and 
voted 32 to 30 against giving women their political rights. It must be noted that 
that came within the wider frame of opposing all the Emir's decrees on a variety 
of matters that had been announced since he dissolved the 1996 elected 
assembly. According to the constitution royal decrees are issued when the 
national assembly is not in session and only if it is absolutely necessary. To 
many in the assembly, the sixty decrees that the Emir issued were of no 
pressing nature, thus issuing them undermines the legislative function of the 
Kuwaiti parliament. 
Despite these shortcomings, Kuwait has been the only GCC state that has a 
parliamentary tradition, organised opposition groups and a relatively free press. 
However, the weakness and division of opposition groups make real democratic 
changes seem to be implausible in the short term. In addition, political parties 
are still officially banned and public gatherings need to receive prior approval by 
the government. The assembly seems to be more than able to debate many 
sensitive issues such as power sharing, the fiscal accountability of al-Sabah 
family and corruption and waste, yet it has failed to take decisive decisions on 
any of these vital issues. Political liberalisation is fraught with tensions, also, 
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among the ruling family itself where some elements oppose the level of freedom 
and call for its curtailment. 
C. Economic Recovery 
Contrary to expectations, Kuwait's post war recovery has been relatively rapid. 
It restored most of its urban services by mid 1991 and extinguished all the 
oilwell fires set by Iraq by the end of October 1991. Kuwait was able to resume 
its oil exports and was exporting around 1.4 million b/d by 1993. Current oil 
production capacity is around 3m b/d although production agreements restrict 
output to around 2m b/d. Income from oil exports remains the major source of 
revenue of the state and that fluctuates depending on the price of oil. This 
makes state revenue difficult to predict and budgetary planning harder to 
achieve at a time when its expenditures are huge and its budget deficit is 
persisting. 
During the Gulf War Kuwait drew heavily from its Fund for Future Generation, 
estimated at $100 billion before the war. In the three years following the 
invasion Kuwait's deficit totalled $48 billion. Kuwait spent $20 billion for repairs 
and modernisation of oil facilities and made massive arms purchases, in 
addition to $20 billion to repay bad loans. Much of Kuwait deficit spending 
goes into subsidies and welfare. Kuwait has no taxation, and has utility 
subsidies and free health care and free housing. These subsidies do not make 
economic sense in a wealthy country, especially considering the new economic 
situation. Austerity measures were being considered by the government such 
as cuts in government subsidies and welfare benefits, raising taxes, privatising 
of state owned enterprises and selling electricity, water and telecommunication 
etc. Due to serious political problems and severe opposition to such cuts 
most austerity measures in recent years have targeted items less politically 
sensitive such as equipment procurement and development projects. ®° 
Kuwait continues to use the capital it obtains from selling foreign investments 
and borrowing to pay for recovery from war and support social benefits. Its debt 
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ceiling was raised in 1991 from $10 billion to $34 billion. The government only 
drew $5.5 billion. Instead, it used the liquidation of its global assets to meet its 
financing needs. Kuwait's cautious external borrowing meant that by 1994 its 
debt was only $9.9 billion and down to $9.3 billion in 1998. Its oil revenues 
and global assets have helped Kuwait in meeting its needs but economic 
reforms are paramount. The development plan 1995-2000 calls for a revision of 
tax polices, for a reduction in budget deficit by cutting state spending, the 
elimination of subsidies and the imposition of higher custom duties. Yet very 
little of that has been achieved mainly due to the political difficulty of such a 
programme. 
Another area that needs serious attention is the country's high dependence on 
foreign workers which, contrary to the discussion during the Gulf crisis, has 
increased. The difference has been a de-Arabisation of foreign workers and an 
increase in importing more Asian workers. Foreign workers make up 83 
percent of the total work force and 99 percent of the work force in the private 
sector, while most Kuwaitis are employed in the public sector. This 
dependence needs to be addressed in Kuwait just as in the rest of the GCC 
countries. The plan to "Kuwaitise" the private sector by replacing 10 percent of 
expatriate workers with Kuwaitis each year is difficult because foreigners hold 
jobs that Kuwaitis do not want or do not have the skills and the expertise to fill 
them. ^ 
III Consequences for Saudi Arabia 
The pivotal role played by Riyadh during the crisis have had major 
consequences for the country. Saudi Arabia took centre stage by playing host 
to the thousands of coalition forces and incurred huge financial and political 
costs. In the aftermath of the war, the threat of Iraq to Saudi Arabia and other 
states in the region has been diminished, but other sources of insecurities have 
emerged. These include domestic pressures for political change from both 
sides of the ideological spectrum, the liberals and the fundamentalists, 
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pressures to enhance its military position, and economic pressures due to the 
declining revenues of oil while expenditure remains very high 
Being the leading economic and military power among the Gulf states, Saudi 
Arabia's stability Is essential for promoting stability throughout the Gulf. This 
stability can only be achieved if the pressures that have mounted since the war 
are dealt with, in addition to the crucial issue of creating a viable structure for 
the security of the Gulf. That needs the reintegration of Iraq into the system and 
cooperation with Iran. The security concern of the Gulf shall be dealt with in 
section VI. The attention here will focus on internal pressures within Saudi 
Arabia. 
A. Military Expenditure 
Military development and the creation of an indigenous armed force has been 
among the top priorities of Saudi Arabia, hence it devoted a large portion of 
state expenditure to the military. As shown in the Saudi budget military outlays, 
rose from $1 billion in 1974 to $11 billion in 1978 to $17 billion by 1979. They 
peaked at $20 billion in 1984. In 1988 outlays were set at $14 billion. The 
Iraq-Iran war and the insecurity felt in the Gulf as a result helped to maintain 
such high levels of expenditure in the eighties. The nineties has seen a 
substantial increase in the procurement policy as a result of the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait, involving tens of billions of US dollars worth of equipment. ®^  Saudi 
Arabia is the world's largest single arms importer acquiring equipment worth 
$10,400 million in 1998 and its defence spending is the largest in the region at 
around 16 per cent of GDP, while the share of defence outlays of public 
expenditure stands at 40 percent. ®^  
It is clear that Saudi Arabia has been spending massively on its military. Thus, 
it came as a surprise to many in Saudi Arabia of how unprepared was the 
Kingdom to defend itself against Iraq and its need for Western help, particularly 
the Americans. In terms of Gulf standards, Saudi Arabia is a major military 
power and its forces make up a great deal of the total military strength of the 
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GCC. Yet, it does not match to either Iraq or Iran. As a result of that weakness 
the government has committed itself in the wake of Desert Storm to boost its 
military purchases and double the size of its armed forces and provide them 
with the latest technology. Before, there was an apprehension on the part of 
the ruling family of a large strong army that might become a base for military 
take-over. In the wake of the Gulf War, this perception has changed. In 1991 
King Fahd announced "his firm decision...to expand and re-equip all sectors of 
our armed forces...with the world's most powerful and modern equipment and 
technology". ®® 
The Saudi armed forces consist of the armed forces reporting to the Defence 
Minister and the National Guard reporting to Crown Pnnce Abdullah. Although 
the armed forces have grown from the pre-war level of 40,000 to 60,000 it still 
would require around 100,000 to be fully manned. Reaching that desired level 
is proving hard to achieve since the government is finding it difficult to recruit 
the necessary personnel, especially in technical roles. The National Guard 
totals 77,000 men of which 57,000 are active regulars and 20,000 part-time. ^° It 
is a tribal force made of those tribal elements loyal to the Saudi family in order 
to offset any threat from the army, and to counter balance within the royal family 
the Sudairi control over the regular armed forces. Crown Prince Abdullah 
descends from another wife of Abdull Aziz. The National Guard is also 
extremely useful in balancing tribal frictions to reduce the risk of feuding and 
provide means through which the royal family can allocate funds to tribal and 
Bedouin leaders. In addition, it secures key facilities in the Kingdom against an 
army coup. The effectiveness of the National Guard had been demonstrated 
when they were used during the siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979, 
in the Shi'ite uprising in the Eastern province and in putting down the Iranian 
riots in Mecca in 1987. During Desert storm, they helped in securing the 
Eastern Province. 
The US since the 1950s has been the main arms supplier to the Saudi 
government. However, the fear of the impact of some arms transfers on 
Washington's strategic relationship with Israel and the maintenance of Israel's 
superior military position in the region has blocked some arms deals from going 
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through. This encouraged Saudi Arabia to diversity its arms supply and procure 
arms from other Western powers such as Britain and France. But since the 
Gulf crisis the military dependence of Saudi Arabia on the US has been 
reinforced as well as its position as the major arms supplier. It is estimated 
that Saudi Arabia has made orders of weapons from the US for $50 billion for F-
15 planes, Awacs planes, Apache anti-tank missiles, patriot missiles, M1-A1 
tanks, Bradley armoured fighting vehicles and others. This at a time of 
fluctuating oil revenues and a very difficult financial situation. The dependence 
on the West and the US extends also to many service support, maintenance, 
and logistics functions. 
The development of an indigenous military force capable of defending Saudi 
Arabia against external attack remains a long term objective. Problems of 
recruitment, training and maintenance of weapons, efficient logistics, and 
reluctance to address deficiencies and make reforms remain major hindrances 
towards achieving such a goal. Consequently, the dependence on the West will 
remain the major source of security for Saudi Arabia. 
B. Economic Pressures 
The UN oil embargo on Iraq removed 4.4 million b/d of supply from the 
international oil market. The Saudis and others were more than happy to fill the 
void. Saudi output rose from 5.6 million b/d in the first half of 1990 to 8.2 million 
b/d in the third quarter of 1990. It compensated for 60 percent of the gap 
created by the embargo. Price of oil reached a level of $30-40 a barrel and 
descended after the panic period but remained higher than pre-invasion levels. 
On average the price hovered around $22 per barrel, almost $5 dollars above 
1989 prices, while the average price in 1991 was $18. ^ This raised the 
Kingdom's revenues substantially from $24 billion in 1989 to $40.1 billion in 
1990 and $43.7 billion in 1991, to $44.7 in 1992. However in 1993 it declined to 
$38.6 billion and in 1994 remained around $38.1 billion. Between 1995-1996 it 
increased substantially to reach $43.5 in 1995, $54.2 in 1996 and $52.1 in 
1997. But by 1998 it had dropped to $33.4 billion. The beginning of the year 
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2000 showed an impressive improvement with the price of oil reaching $30 per 
barrel, which will be reflected in the revenues generated during the year. 
Despite the windfall in oil revenues at the beginning of the Gulf crisis, the 
fluctuation in oil revenues, the high military expenditures and the cost of the war 
have aggravated financial difficulties for Saudi Arabia. Its budget deficit and 
debt increased massively. In the early years of deficit, the government covered 
itself by drawing on foreign assets in the central bank, but in 1988 these assets 
fell so sharply that the treasury began to borrow internally. Internal debt had 
risen from $ 4 billion in 1989 to $20 billion in 1993 while foreign borrowing also 
has increased. In 1991, the government was forced to borrow from Western 
commercial banks $4.5 billion, and $1.8 billion in 1992 from a British bank to 
cover part of a payment to an arms supplier. In total the public debt of Saudi 
Arabia is estimated for the year 2000 between $150-$170 billion, which 
amounts to 115 per cent of the GDP. ^ 
A major burden on the Saudi budget is government subsidies, which are 
pervasive and embedded in the society. These come in a variety of forms and 
ways. Some are direct cash subsidies such as payments to farmers, who also 
get subsidised irrigation, machinery, equipment, fertilisers, seeds and feed, and 
other inputs at 30-50 per cent below their cost. Other cash payments include 
those to utilities (water, gas, and electricity) to cover their operational losses 
because they sell at a fraction of production cost. Adding to this health care, 
education and other services are provided free to all nationals. Generous 
grants are provided for those who pursue higher education abroad or require 
health treatment. Telecommunication, national airline, and other consumer 
services are subsidised too. 
The Saudi government has been aware of the need for economic reforms and 
by 1995 it was forced to make a major departure from its past policy. It took 
measures to generate more domestic revenues by raising the domestic price of 
gasoline, the rates for electricity and water, the fares of domestic travel on the 
national airline, limiting the free local calls, the installation chargers for 
telephone lines, fees for visas, and work and residence permits. These 
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measures are meant to boost revenues and to discourage wasteful 
consumption of water, electricity and fuels. The government also axed capital 
expenditure both to encourage the private sector to take a leading role and to 
reduce its budget deficit. 
Moreover the privatisation process has been given a boost by the formation in 
1997 of a Ministerial Committee on privatisation under the Council of Ministers. 
The task of the committee is to co-ordinate and follow up implementation of the 
privatisation programme. Already the Saudi telecommunications sector was 
transferred to private sector management in 1997 and its sale is expected in the 
year 2000 while the restructuring and the regulation of the administrative and 
financial status of the electricity sector has been approved by the Council of 
Ministers in 1998. Before the end of the year 2000 the General Port Authority 
will complete the first stage of privatisation programme, while preliminary steps 
has been taken for the gradual privatisation of the postal sen/ices. 
Another major outlay is the extensive hiring in the public sector, which can be 
considered also a kind of subsidy. The importance of government hiring is 
evident in light of the fact that only 10 percent of nationals are employed in the 
private sector. However, budgetary constraints have started to reflect a 
reduction of the numbers hired by the state. Consequently, unemployment 
increased in the 1990s. According to a senior figure in the Saudi Chamber of 
Commerce and industry "nobody has accurate figures" about the level of 
unemployment, although a figure ranging between 10 -25 have been widely 
floated. ^°°The government has taken steps to upgrade the quality of education 
and training to ensure that Saudis can take jobs held at present by foreign 
workers combined with an effort to increase the participation of the private 
sector in the economy. 
The success of Saudi Arabia in reforming its expenditure policy and its financial 
situation depends on the persistence of the government in reducing its debt and 
in encouraging a bigger role for the private sector as well as reducing the 
burden of the welfare state by transferring some of the costs of services to the 
citizens. 
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C. Political Pressures 
The Gulf crisis and the presence of coalition forces on Saudi soil created a 
polarised and heated debate between Islamic conservatives and modernising 
liberals. This was clearly manifested in the two petitions circulated by the two 
groups. The Liberals circulated a petition, at the end of 1990 and in early 1991, 
which was signed by 43 public figures, among them businessmen, academics, 
writers and technocrats. The petition listed ten demands: -
1. A flexible approach to the interpretation of the Shari'a. 
2. The issuing of a "basic law" of government. 
3. The formation of a consultative council "representing all regions of the 
Kingdom". 
4. The revival of municipal councils. 
5. Steps to modernise the judicial system and ensure its independence. 
6. Equality of all citizens " without distinction based on ethnic, tribal, 
sectarian, or social origins". 
7. Greater freedom for the media. 
8. Reform of the mutawa (religious police). 
9. A greater role for women in public life. 
10. "Comprehensive and fundamental reform" of the education system. 
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This petition was followed by a rival petition from a group of religious figures 
and was presented to the King, few months after the war. It listed 12 demands: 
1. The formation of a consultative council comprising "honest" and "totally 
independent" individuals. 
2. The conformity of all laws and regulations with the Shari'a. 
3. The need for government officials to be " unswervingly moral". 
4. "Full equality among citizens, not favouring the nobles or begrudging the 
weak". 
5. A purge of government officials of proven "corruption or dereliction". 
6. Fair distribution of public wealth, and the need for banks to be "cleansed of 
usury". 
7. The creation of a strong and fully integrated army. 
8. The reform of the media so that they "serve Islam". 
9. The need for foreign alliances to be "sanctioned by the Shari'a". 
10. The development and strengthening of religious institutions. 
11. The "full and effective independence" of the judicial institutions. 
12. Guarantees - "within acceptable religious safeguards" - of the rights of 
individuals and of society. 
As can be seen there was an overlap between the demands of the two petitions 
but from a different ideological orientation. The liberals wanted to have a more 
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flexible modern system of government while the Islamists want to increase the 
grip of Islam on society. The debate throughout 1991 intensified and by the end 
of the year the ruling family was pressurised into action. King Fahd announced 
the introduction of three laws on 1 March 1992. 
The basic law of government contains 83 articles emphasising the Islamic 
character of the state, the sanctity of family values, the powers of the King and 
the Council of Ministers, the rights and duties of the citizens, the economic 
principles of the Kingdom and the mechanisms of government accountability. 
The second law created a 60-member majlis al-shura (consultative council). As 
the name suggests this council has an advisory/consultative function. It can 
propose laws but does not pass them and advises on domestic and 
international issues. The King chooses all its members. 
As for the third law, it attempts to give the various regions of the country some 
sort of autonomy. It makes each region the responsibility of an Emir who is 
accountable to the Minister of Interior and an advisory council chaired by the 
same Emir. The council must have at least ten members suitably qualified from 
the public. 
These three laws have been acknowledged by the opposition in Saudi Arabia 
and by the King himself as formalising the status quo rather than introducing 
new changes. In the words of King Fahd, these laws "are to strengthen 
something that exists and formulate something, which is already in 
o p e r a t i o n " . T h e King emphasised in an interview with the Associated Press 
published on 28 March 1992 that: -
The prevailing democratic system in the world is not suitable for us in 
this region; our people's composition and traits are different from the 
traits in the world. We can not import the way other peoples deal 
[with their own affairs] in order to apply it to our people; we have our 
own Muslim faith which is a complete system and a complete 
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religion. Elections do not fall within the sphere of the Muslim religion, 
which believes in the consultative system and the openness between 
the ruler and his subjects and makes whoever is in charge fully 
answerable to his people...Free elections are not suitable for our 
country. 
Despite the modesty and limited content of the reforms, they signified the extent 
of internal pressures on the ruling family and the necessity of making 
adjustments to the new realities of Saudi society. The use of al-ulema and 
Islamic institutions as the basis of the legitimacy of Saudi rule is coming under 
pressure from a new generation of Islamic militants, some of whom are 
extremely critical of the ruling family. On the other hand, liberal voices are 
becoming more vocal in demanding a more modern style of government. This 
makes the balancing act that the ruling family needs to play between these two 
opposing groups harder and the consequences less predictable. For the 
meantime "domestic discontent may be containable; coupled with wider regional 
problems, it could pose a more formidable challenge". 
As pointed out by Hardy, "it is more realistic to argue for greater accountability, 
participation and respect for the law. These things are not synonymous with 
democracy, but they are steps towards it". There is a need to broaden the 
decision-making process and hence participation is the key for political change. 
The creation of the majlis is very important for that purpose, despite the fact that 
the circle of consultation is limited and is determined by the King. 
IV Security of the Gulf 
Desert Storm led to two major security developments in the region. The first 
was the strengthening of the US as the dominant power in the region with its 
policy of "dual containment" of both Iraq and Iran. This policy is based on 
achieving security and stability in the region by the military containment of these 
two major players in the region through two means. Firstly by strengthening the 
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American presence in the region, by way of military bases and military facilities, 
defence and security agreements with the Gulf states and the increase of the 
sale of American weaponry to the region. Secondly, the containment of Iraq is 
carried out principally through the severe sanctions regime and efforts to oust 
Saddam from power, while the Americans continue by ostracising Iran 
diplomatically and internationally and by imposing further economic restrictions. 
A new law imposed punishments on companies that invested more than $40 
million in the Iranian oil and gas sector. 
This American policy is short sighted, and tensions and conflicts will continue to 
rise to the surface because without Iran and Iraq any discussion of security or 
security pacts is of limited value. Even some Saudi establishment figures are 
unhappy about the policy, as indicated by Prince Sultan bin Khaled, "American 
policy in the Gulf is based on the dual containment of Iraq and Iran as well as 
maintaining the Iraqi regime as a symbol of threat to Gulf states to keep the 
need for protection under the American umbrella". 
The policy of "dual containment" did manage to limit the flow of conventional 
arms and technology and of dual use equipment to both Iraq and Iran. Iraq has 
enjoyed no arms imports since its invasion of Kuwait and it faces massive 
problems in terms of modernisation and capitalisation of its military. It is 
estimated that Iraq needs $26 billion in arms imports to deal with the impact of 
the Gulf war, while Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have imported some $32 billion 
worth of arms since 1991. Iranian amis purchases have been limited too. 
During 1991-1994 it totalled $4.8 billion and in the period 1993-1996 its amis 
agreements were worth only $1.3 billion. Yet, Iran managed to buy enough 
arms to rebuild its army to the point of being effective in combating a weakened 
Iraq. It is also making real progress in military production and is using its limited 
military imports more effectively than the Gulf states use their massive amis' 
purchases. 
The second development pertaining to the aftemiath of Desert Storm is that the 
war highlighted the inept attempts to establish an effective and inclusive 
regional security system in its wake. Two main ideas were being considered 
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after the liberation of Kuwait. The first was the idea of developing a serious 
GCC military force. However, GCC members regarded it as overly ambitious 
and allowed discussions of the proposal to lapse. As indicated by Abdullah al-
Shaiiji, "Gulf states failed to create a regional security arrangement that reduces 
its dependence on imported security from the West especially the US. The 
1990 experience provided little room for optimism about the ability of these 
states to form a strategic military defence force". 
The second idea came in the form of the Damascus Declaration signed by 
Egypt, Syria, and the GCC members in March 1991. Egypt and Syria were to 
provide the bulk of a 100,000-man defence force in exchange for financial aid 
from the Gulf states. That too seems to be no longer considered after the Gulf 
states changed their minds for fear of an enhanced role for these two Arab 
countries in the region. Instead, several Gulf states opted to sign bilateral 
defence agreements with Western nations and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
preferred American protection arrangements. 
As mentioned before, Kuwait signed defence accords with Britain, France and 
Russia in order to deter further aggression through defence co-operation, 
training and exercises and arms sales. In addition, total military expenditures 
escalated rapidly. The Gulf states have signed contracts for $36 billion of US 
arms since Desert Storm, almost a third of US arms exports world wide during 
the same period. According to the 1994 report of US Arms Control and 
Disarmament, the Middle East spent more on arms than any other region: 20.1 
percent of the GDP and 54.8 percent of overall expenditures. Most of the 
money was paid to the US, which has become the principal supplier of the Gulf 
marginalizing its competitors, France and Britain. Moreover, American 
protection is paid for in full by local governments. For instance, each joint 
military exercise with Kuwait costs $10 million, entirely covered by the Kuwaiti 
government. 
These very high expenditures, especially at a time of fluctuating oil revenues 
and problems of rising debt and budget deficits, do not help in enhancing the 
defence of the Gulf states. The lack of manpower in most of the Gulf states and 
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dependence on foreign personnel puts a great constraint on building a viable 
military and defence capability, leaving the real leverage for the protection of 
GCC members in the hands of the West. Moreover the GCC needs to take 
action on several fronts if these military purchases are to make any difference. 
These include the need 
1. To develop collective or integrated defence capabilities . 
2. To procure interoperable or standardised equipment. 
3. To develop co-ordinated procurement plans to eliminate the waste of 
defence. 
4. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia need to co-ordinate tightly on land defence, 
while Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain need to co-ordinate their air and 
missile defences, air strike-attack capabilities, maritime surveillance, and 
surface defence capabilities. The co-operation between these three 
states will shape the most important elements of their deterrent and 
defence capabilities and ability to support enforcement from the West. 
The security and stability of the Gulf is seen by some as achievable not by a 
Western presence, increased military purchases and military defence treaties 
but "in regional cooperation that prevents the exacerbation of crises among 
states and such a cooperation must be based foremost on respecting states' 
borders, non-interference in each others' internal affairs, respect of minority 
rights as well as achieving social justice to the people of the region". "® The 
continued American presence in the region is a rallying point for opposition 
movements. The attack on the US base at Dhahran on 25 June 1996 confirms 
that opposition is becoming more radical and strongly anti American. This 
resentment of the population of the Gulf states of the US is forcing the GCC 
states to try sometimes to distance themselves sometimes from American 
policy. For instance, the September 1996 bombing of Iraq was not endorsed by 
these states and Saudi Arabia banned the use of its airfields. 
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Thus, long-term stability in the region cannot be achieved except with a lower 
presence of the US, more cooperation with Iran and the reintegration of Iraq into 
the regional and international system. The establishment of a workable 
relationship between the three major powers, Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia is 
essential for any such long-term stability and security. Last, but not least 
political liberalisation in the Gulf region is a key issue. Although at present 
internal pressures for political change are evident in most of the GCC states, 
the possibility of democratic restructuring is slight. However, that is exactly 
what the Gulf states need. Their traditional domestic and foreign policies for 
political stability and security must be reassessed with a view to focus on 
building more democratic systems of government and lessening dependence on 
external support. 
V. Environmental Coste of the War 
It is a well-established fact that "militaries are the most destructive institutions to 
the environment in the modern world; they have the technology and the global 
reach to destroy and to poison entire regions and vast ecosystems". This 
has been seen repeatedly in militarised conflicts, the most striking among them 
has been Vietnam. Some of the damage that occurred has been permanent 
affecting forest cover, soil quality and human health. Large regions of 
Afghanistan are uninhabitable because of Soviet military operations there. The 
same story repeated itself in the Gulf and damage to the environment occurred 
on a large scale. Yet the effects of the war on the environment have received 
little public attention when compared with the oil spills and the burning of oil 
wells. The oil spills are disastrous to marine life and the entire coastal ecology 
of the Gulf, and the oil fires have had massive impact on air pollution, but that 
does not represent the whole picture of the environmental degradation of the 
region. The preparations for the Gulf War and the subsequent military action 
have had massive impact on the environment of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq. 
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The presence of a half million strong army, setting base in the fragile arid land 
environment of Saudi Arabia resulted in a serious disturbance to the desert 
surface as well as generating in the few months that its stay lasted huge 
amounts of waste, sewage, and solid. A conservative estimate calculates that a 
minimum of 15-20 million gallons of sewage a day was produced, in addition to 
the huge garbage that piled up of heavy-duty packaging materials, plastics etc. 
According to the Pentagon "disposal of solid and sewage waste is, by 
agreement, the responsibility of the host country". ''^ ^ Saudi Arabia does not 
possess the facilities to dispose of this waste in the most environmentally safe 
manner since the desert region lacks such facilities. Garbage and human 
waste takes a long time to degrade in a desert because of lack of moisture, and 
liquid sewage migrates through sandy soil with the possibility of contaminating 
underground aquifers. In addition, the water system and ecology in Saudi 
Arabia has been exposed to incredible amounts of toxic substances that 
accompany all military manoeuvres. The Saudis have been trying to assess the 
levels of chemical pollution, but their efforts have been hampered by a lack of 
information. The US military did not release the needed infonnation to assist 
them in their effort since it is considered classified information. 
Another source of degradation of the environment has been the infrastructure 
that was built during the military build-up of roads, runways, semi-permanent 
housing and support buildings well as the cutting of holes in the desert surface 
and the presence of thousands of tanks, heavy equipment and track vehicles. 
This breached the desert shield cover, destroyed vegetation, damaged wild life 
and disturbed surface water patterns. 
Iraq on the other hand has suffered most damage due to the intensive coalition 
bombing over a short period. The bombing destroyed water supplies, fuel 
supplies, food stocks, sewage systems, transportation systems, garbage 
disposal systems and public health systems in every major settlements in the 
country. All this happened under the famous American slogan that "America 
has no argument with the Iraqi people, only with Saddam Hussein". As it has 
been pointed out by many it is the Iraqi people that have paid a high price for 
what America believes is inflicted on Saddam regime. 
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The coalition dropped an explosive tonnage equivalent to seven Horishima-size 
bombs on Iraq. This bombardment included Depleted Uranium (DU); a heavy 
metal two and a half times heavier than metal. The problem is that DU is 
radioactive and chemically toxic. The Iraqi regime and environmentalists claim 
that Iraq's environment is contaminated by it and its population exposed to 
catastrophic health risks. They believe the increase in congenial defonnities 
and cancers is due to DU. This claim might be bolstered by similar incidents 
appearing in other Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Yet, 
neither the Saudis nor the Kuwaitis have reported any such increases. In an 
official report by the Atomic Energy Authority it estimates that 300 tons of DU, in 
the form of shell fragments, litter wide areas of Iraq and Kuwait. The authorities 
in the US and Britain, however, downplay the risks of DU and claim it does not 
present a hazard to people. 
The coalition also bombed Iraqi nuclear facilities and chemical weapons' 
production facilities. Chemical, radioactive and biological releases are 
immediately life-threatening, in addition to threatening riverine and underground 
water supplies, agricultural lands and food stocks with long tenn consequences. 
It is not known if radiation was released from these facilities and the exact 
damage to these facilities is unknown and consequently their environmental 
impact. Information that can help in realistically assessing the damage of 
military related activities is withheld on the basis that it is a military secret and 
classified. Without the cooperation of the military, the true extent can not be 
assessed. ^^ '^  
In Kuwait, the Iraqi military and the coalition have inflicted enormous damage to 
the desert topography and ecology. The breaching of the desert surface in 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iraq has destabilised the desert topography, leading 
to increase in sand and dust storms, increased soil erosion and instability in 
sand suri'aces that might engulf agricultural land, settlements, roads and water 
systems. The war left large areas of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iraq littered with 
such military related wastes. 
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It is estimated that 11 million barrels of oil were intentionally released into the 
waters of the Gulf. Most of the oil was released at or near Mina al-Ahmadi in 
southern Kuwait on the north-western coast of the Gulf. Oil was released from 
three export terminals and a number of tankers. Two other Kuwaiti facilities at 
Mina al-Bakr and Mina Abdullah released minor amounts of oil. Oil flowed 
unchecked over land and sea, producing an oilspill estimated to be thirty times 
greater in extent than that of the Exxon Valdez in Alaska. It damaged the 
marine environment, ecology and wildlife habitats along the Gulf coast. 
Despite this major environmental disaster, no major clean up effort has been 
implemented. Only a few sites have received the necessary approval for 
cleanup from the Saudi government, funded by the International Maritime 
Organisation. Only about 500 workers were devoted to the cleanup of the oilspill 
which was financed at about $60 million. In comparison the Alaska spill utilised 
11,000 workers to cleanup the Exxon Valdez spill, a spill that is very small in 
comparison to the Gulf spill with a cost of $2 billion. Apparently the delay in 
the clean up of the shoreline was due to lack of funding. The cost for Saudi 
Arabia is $450 million, an insignificant amount in comparison to the size of the 
military purchases that followed Desert Storm and the overall cost of the war.^ ^^ 
The Saudi government concentrated its efforts on the protection of its 
desalination plants, which were carried out promptly by mid 1991 with 
international cooperation, while the rest of the clean up is obviously being left to 
natural cleaning processes. The recovery time for the marine communities 
(mangroves, seagrasses, algae, coral reefs, seagrass infauna) will be slow and 
will take decades. 
According to the Kuwaiti Oil Company a total of 788 Kuwaiti wells sustained 
damage as a result of Iraqi sabotage, of which 613 oil wells had been set alight. 
The oilwell fires emitted tons of pollutants into the atmosphere and polluted air 
for hundreds of miles. The Kuwait Oil Company claims that 3 percent of its pre-
war oil reserves of 100 billion barrels were lost in the fires. Thus, large 
quantities of air pollutants were produced. These pollutants (sulphur dioxide, 
inhalable particles, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, ozone, hydrogen 
sulphide) are known to have acute health complications if humans are exposed 
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to high concentrations for prolonged periods. For example, sulphur dioxide 
causes airway resistance and impairment of the lung functions, while carbon 
dioxide (a major component of smoke) is a main contributor to global 
w a r m i n g . T h e management of this massive pollution incidence showed 
several weaknesses in national and international co-ordination. Local 
organisations were not prepared for the task and international teams came on 
their own initiatives such as Green Peace, Harvard University or on instructions 
from their governments. The UN failed to co-ordinate international activities and 
its Environmental Programme failed to provide funds and expertise to deal with 
the incidence. 
The ground military operation was also a major contributor to air pollution. It is 
estimated that 7 billion gallons of fuel were consumed during the Gulf crisis 
while air operations used more than 600 million gallons. Major pollutants were 
emitted in the Gulf, subsequently, the majority of which emitted in Feb 1991 
within a short period of 2-3 weeks. The amounts of carbon dioxide, carbon 
monoxide, and nitrogen oxide produced were 53 percent, 5 percent and 133 
percent of that emitted by the Kuwaiti oil fires, respectively. The emission from 
Kuwait was produced over a much longer period of eight months. Thus, the 
effect on air pollution from the war is more adverse than the pollution from the 
oil fires. 
The marine environment in the Gulf, which is already stressed due to the oil 
industry, was also influenced by the sizeable naval force that gathered in the 
Gulf. It created a range of hazardous wastes, including sewage and solid waste 
while landing exercises influenced coastal ecology, and ordnance and mines 
littered the beaches and coastal waters. 
It is clear that the damage to the environment of the Gulf is very serious and 
extends to encompass more than the damage caused by the oil spills and oil 
fires. Several international teams in collaboration with local agencies and 
scientists conducted studies of the environmental aftermath of the war. An 
example is the mission in 1991 of the Third World Academy of Sciences in 
Trieste, Italy. Its work was followed by a "Workshop on the Environmental 
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Dimension of the Gulf Policy and Institutional Perspectives" hosted in the United 
Arab Emirates in 1992. Also oceanography has been conducted in the Gulf 
through various voyages including the Mount Mitchell voyage in 1992, which 
was followed by a workshop to discuss its findings in Kuwait in 1993. The 
Japanese government followed up that work with several other voyages by the 
Yomataka-Maro ship. There is a pressing need to continue studying the 
effects of the war on the Gulf environment, as well as efforts must concentrate 
on limiting or reversing some of the adverse impact on the Gulf environment. 
Vi Conclusion 
The previous discussion has shown the variety of problems that emerged and 
the intensification of existing ones in the wake of Desert Storm. A serious 
reassessment of the policies of Gulf states is needed on domestic, regional and 
international levels. On the domestic level, the issue of democracy and a wider 
share in political power by the various social groups in these states is 
imperative. While the economic situation can not be left without serious 
consideration of economic restructuring and liberalisation. 
Regionally, the isolation and containment of Iraq is proving to be very costly to 
the Iraqi people and making its reintegration into the region the more difficult. 
Hence, a more accommodating policy is needed. Such a policy might be more 
successful in producing a change in the regime in Baghdad, giving people the 
chance to think of their political plight rather than just mere survival. 
Cooperation with Iran is also essential for the long terni stability and security of 
the region. The overtures by the Iranian reformist government towards the Gulf 
states, especially Saudi Arabia is encouraging. Gulf states need to offset the 
increased cooperation between Turkey and Israel by helping to reintegrate Iraq 
into the region and enhance cooperation with Iran. 
Last but not least, the increased dependence of the Gulf states on Western 
military protection and strengthening the US as the dominant power in the 
region is not in the long term interests of the region. A reduction in the level of 
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the presence and power of the US in the region is necessary for enhancing 
Arab cooperation and cooperation among the states of the region. In that lies 
the real security and stability of the region. 
196 
Conclusion 
The management of the Iraq - Kuwait crisis raises two interesting issues for 
those studying international relations and crisis management. The first 
concerns the dangers inherent in a unipolar international system dominated 
by the US. The US from the onset of the crisis led and organised the manner 
in which the international community as well as key regional states responded 
to Iraqi aggression. Iraq by its military action against Kuwait directly 
threatened American strategic interests in the area and challenged the 
existing balance of power. Securing a flow of oil at reasonable prices as well 
as maintaining the stability and security of the existing pro-Western regimes 
primarily motivates American policy in the region. Saddam's military strength 
and capability was built through reliance on Western technology and facilities, 
and was supported by the American administration and Western 
governments. Yet, the moment that power was used in a manner that 
challenged the status quo, the West was more than willing to take decisive 
action to destroy Iraq as a regional power. 
Iraqi aggression in effect gave the US the opportunity to flaunt its domination 
and leadership of the international order in the wake of the end of the Cold 
War. President Bush used terminology such as establishing a New Worid 
Order, but what in effect he was promoting was the dominance of the US in 
conducting international affairs in the absence of any rivalry from its previous 
adversary, the Soviet Union. Much was made about this New Worid Order 
during the crisis, but the minute the war was over, the West was competing 
for the sale of weapons to the region, and talk about limiting the arms build up 
disappeared totally. A new surge in military expenditure dominated the 1990s 
and plans for the expansion of the military of most of the Gulf states dictated 
the political agenda of these countries. The region appears to be building its 
security on a belief in armament rather than concentrating on building security 
through promoting better political and economic conditions, and reducing 
income gaps and poverty. 
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The clarity of Iraqi aggression and its outright violation of international law and 
the Charters of the UN and Arab League made it much easier for the US and 
its allies to rally international support for the anti-Saddam coalition, and to 
present the international response and the fight for the liberation of Kuwait in 
the name of principles such as peace and stability and upholding international 
law and punishing aggression and criminality. These principles are morally 
superior to the principle of protecting American strategic interests and made 
the UN the ideal channel for mobilising international response and action. 
They also validate the escalation/confrontation approach adopted by the US 
especially that Saddam continued to be defiant of UN resolutions. There was 
no sign on the part of the US that it will negotiate or accept any sort of 
compromise with the Iraqi regime, hence denying Saddam the much needed 
face saving formula. Saddam's action in retrospect was a golden opportunity 
for the US to enhance its influence and presence in the region especially in 
Saudi Arabia. The involvement of a third party in this crisis instead of acting 
as a neutral mediator between the two disputing sides became part and 
parcel of the crisis itself and inflicted huge damages on one side in order to 
uphold the rights of the other. The US could not divest itself from its national 
and strategic interests and acted in a manner consistent with its interests. 
The second issue concerns the role of the UN in conflict resolution and the 
use of military force to keep the peace. The Cold War and the bipolar 
international order prevented the use of collective security as envisioned in 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, while the different political circumstances of 
the Gulf crisis allowed for consensus among the permanent five members and 
better cooperation making military action possible. The Security Council 
responded to the Iraqi aggression with a series of resolutions that graduated 
in their severity. Resolution 660 demanding Iraqi withdrawal was approved by 
a vote of 14-0, (Yemen not participating). Resolution 661, imposing 
comprehensive economic sanctions, was approved 13-0 (Cuba and Yemen 
abstaining). Resolution 662, declaring the annexation of Kuwait null and void, 
was approved by 15-0, while resolution 665, which permitted the use of naval 
force to uphold the economic sanctions, was approved 13-0 with Yemen and 
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Cuba abstaining. This clear consensus has been elusive in the history of the 
UN during other conflicts and explains the initial optimism that greeted such a 
change in the functioning of the UN and hope of an enhanced effectiveness in 
dealing with international disputes and problems. 
But the obvious domination of the US of the Security Council and the dubious 
legal grounds of some of the resolutions made the UN appear more as a tool 
and ally to the US and dashed hopes about the emergence of a more 
effective UN. Strong criticism has been levelled, particularly, on resolution 
687 as exceeding the cleariy identified objectives of the UN of ending the 
occupation of Kuwait, restoring the sovereignty, independence and territorial 
integrity of Kuwait and restoring the authority of the legitimate government of 
Kuwait. Also, the decision to launch war, supposedly under the auspices of 
the Council was taken outside the Council. This was compounded with the 
inactivity of the Council during the conduct of the war. It showed that the UN 
gave its approval to a war, which it had no control over. 
In addition, the functioning of the UN during the crisis exposed the imbalance 
in power between the General Assembly and the Security Council. The 
General Assembly's participation in the crisis was limited to the adoption on 
the 18 December of resolution 45/170 on the Situation of Human Rights in 
Kuwait. The concentration of deliberations in the Security Council gave the 
US the clout and control over the course of events and sanctioned its actions 
through the UN. The US was willing to go to war with or without the 
authorisation of the UN, since it claimed that no Security Council resolution 
was needed to legitimise the use of force to liberate Kuwait, by referring to the 
right of individual and collective self defence to defend a member state of the 
UN. However, the waging of the war under the banner of the UN made it 
harder for the voices of those opposing the war and opposing US intervention 
in the region to be heard. The auspices of the UN was also necessary to 
maintain the cohesion of the coalition and the support of public opinion in the 
US and the West. 
199 
The extent of the influence of the US on the Security Council during the crisis 
generated many concerns about the future role of the UN and voices in 
support of reform of the organisation have increased. As aptly and accurately 
enumerated, the UN needs to improve its performance in the following broad 
areas: 
1. a constitutional framework of the UN where enforcement actions are kept 
within the scope of Chapter VII; 
2. the UN must not seek recourse to military action unless all peaceful means 
have been exhausted; 
3. the necessity to conduct military operations under UN auspices in strict 
conformity with the laws of war; 
4. the overriding duty to take diplomatic initiatives to moderate war 
threatening situations; 
5. the autonomous negotiating and diplomatic role for the secretary-general 
inline with the primary objective of the office to resolve all disputes by 
peaceful methods.^ 
In addition, a more democratic decision making process must be adopted 
where a balance is struck between the General Assembly and the Security 
Council either by expanding the participation in the Security Council to include 
other countries or through wider involvement and consultation with the 
General Assembly especially in times of crisis. Such improvements will 
prevent the emergence of scepticism and doubt about who controls the UN 
and who is able to manipulate the Council to promote their own national 
interests and agendas, especially in times of crises. 
One wonders what would have been the response if Iraq - as was expected 
by the Americans and the Saudis - limited its aggression to the disputed 
islands of Warbah and Bubiyan. However, the scale of the aggression 
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followed by the annexation of Kuwait made their position stringent and firm 
stance, and increased the anxiety and fear of Saudi Arabia of the regional 
ambition of the Iraqi regime. 
The outright Iraqi takeover of Kuwait showed the extent of the regime's 
desperation and frustration with the situation in the aftermath of the end of the 
war with Iran. Its quest for the leadership of the region - which Iraq believes it 
deserves and has earned after its war with Iran in defence of the Gulf states -
had been undermined by its economic situation, reconstruction bill and 
military costs. The creation of the ACC came both as a counter balance to 
GCC and also as a mechanism for promoting and establishing Iraqi 
leadership. But it lacked the resources of the GCC, and Saddam was in need 
of a massive injection of aid. He used the platform of the ACC summit in 
Amman in Feb 1990 to ask for a moratorium on all wartime loan repayment 
plans to the Gulf states as well as an urgent grant of $30 billion. Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait, since the end of the Iraq-Iran war had supplied limited aid to Iraq, 
while Saddam wanted previous aid levels to continue in view of Iraqi financial 
needs. He reiterated his demands during the Arab summit in Baghdad at the 
end of May 1990 for the Gulf states to waive Iraq's war debts and to provide 
more aid. In addition he began a campaign against Kuwait and the Emirates 
blaming them for the fall in the price of oil, due to their over pumping. 
In response to the escalation in the campaign against Kuwait and the 
Emirates, Saudi Arabia exerted pressure on each to abide by their OPEC 
quotas of 1.5 million b/d, and prepared the grounds for the Jedda summit of 
the 31 July 1990 between Iraqi and Kuwaiti officials. Expectations were high 
that the meeting would be successful, but when the Kuwaitis did not respond 
to the three basic demands of the Iraqis (waiving of Iraqi debts incurred during 
the Iran-Iraq war, $10 billion in compensation for the use of the Rumaila oil 
field, and the possession of the disputed islands) Iraq opted to take military 
action and invaded Kuwait. The objective was not only to solve the territorial 
dispute by force but also to put Iraq in a better economic position to pursue its 
reconstruction plans and quest for regional power and leadership. 
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The traditional stance of Saudi Arabia in maintaining a certain level of Arab 
unity explains the initially mild response of the Kingdom to the news of the 
invasion. But that quickly changed into a more aggressive and firm position 
reflecting the anxiety of Riyadh over its own security and stability and 
prompted by assurances of the US that it will provide it with protection. This 
shift was also helped by the US convincing the Saudis of the presence of a 
threat from Saddam and presenting satellite photographs of Iraqi troops 
amassing on the borders of Saudi Arabia. Whether the Iraqis intended to 
invade Saudi Arabia or not is open to question. Critics believe that the US 
either overstated or even faked the evidence to convince Saudi Arabia that 
there was an imminent and real threat from Iraq. US military involvement was 
not possible without the use of Saudi territory, thus, the support and 
cooperation of Al-Saud was essential for the deployment of the US military 
and for implementing US objective of containing the Iraqi regime and 
undermining its power. On the other hand, the prospect of a military defeat of 
Saddam would achieve three benefits for Saudi Arabia: the liberation of 
Kuwait, the elimination of Iraqi military power and a change in the military 
imbalance between Saudi Arabia and Iraq as well as increasing the regional 
influence of Saudi Arabia. King Fahd made his historic decision of inviting 
foreign forces onto the country, which indicated an intensification and further 
escalation of the crisis. 
The risks Saudi Arabia and the Western coalition took in escalating the crisis 
and opting for confrontation were incomparable to the risks that Saddam took. 
Saddam from the start seemed to build his strategy of managing the situation 
on erroneous assumptions and /or misperceptions. First he depended on the 
non - aggression pact signed by King Fahd with Iraq at the end of March 1989 
to act to his benefit. The pact spelled out the principles of non-interference in 
the domestic affairs of the two countries and the non-use of force between 
them. Second he did not expect the Saudis to allow the US to use Saudi 
bases as they had always rejected an American military presence in the 
country. These initial miscalculations were further aggravated by his 
intransigence in the face of the massive build up of American military in the 
region and the clear intent of the Western coalition and Saudi Arabia to 
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liberate Kuwait and restore its sovereignty. He gave the West the chance to 
destroy the Iraqi military and civilian infrastructure and Iraqi lives, and to 
increase their influence and presence in the region. By not abiding to the UN 
deadline of the 15 January he played into the hands of the Americans and 
over estimated his military power vis a vis the US and its allies. The belief 
which he held till the very end - that the US will not execute its threat of using 
force and will back off - stands in total contrast to all the evidence around 
him. The price the Iraqi regime paid for its mismanagement of the crisis was 
extremely high. The total win of the coalition is contrasted with its total loss. 
From a regional point of view the crisis has had devastating consequences, 
also. First there are the political costs of the crisis in terms of the further 
marginalisation of the Arab League. The League was never effective in 
meeting the challenges of the region or solving its problems. But, it was a 
symbol of an Arab order that has been struggling to maintain a minimum level 
of unity and cooperation as well as a semblance of pan Arabism. Regional 
sub groupings such as the GCC, ACC and the Maghreb Union were already 
bypassing the League by setting their own agendas of cooperation and 
economic and political strategies. The need for Arab cooperation is so acute, 
considering the economic and political problems facing the region and the 
challenges of increasing economic globalisation, yet the Arab League has 
been made more than ever less capable of creating new approaches to 
cooperation and conciliation in the region. 
As for the GCC, it proved to be totally ineffective in dealing with the crisis and 
was unable to defend a member state. Desert Storm thus left the region with 
no other alternative for establishing an Arab order except by relying on the 
West. The Gulf states, after the initial approach to create an Arab order 
based on the Damascus Declaration, changed their minds and resorted to 
bilateral agreements with the West for maintaining their security and defence. 
The decline of the Arab League and Arab order is being faced, on the one 
hand, by an increase in the domination and presence of the US in the region 
and the loss of Arab autonomy and ability to create its own viable regional 
order, on the other. 
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The economic costs of the crisis have been massive, whether in tenns of the 
costs of Desert Stomn, the military purchases that followed the war, or the 
reconstruction bill of Iraq and Kuwait. The continuation of the sanctions 
regime has debilitated Iraq and is making its rehabilitation and reconstruction 
much harder. Many voices internationally and regionally have been calling 
for a reassessment of the sanctions regime, in light of its effect on the Iraqi 
people and the future of Iraq. However, the US appears to be intent on 
continuing with this policy although it had failed to produce the anticipated 
objective of ousting Saddam from power. What it is actually doing is 
destroying the Iraqi people and their livelihood, increasing the spread of 
diseases, increasing malnutrition and mortality rate among children, and 
increasing substantially the costs of reintegrating Iraq into the region. 
The other major consequence of the crisis has been to highlight of the need 
for a better security arrangement for the Gulf, especially in light of the total 
failure of the GCC in either preventing Iraqi aggression or reversing it without 
foreign assistance. Despite the seriousness and the urgency of this matter, 
the GCC member states have been unable to agree on how to remedy the 
situation. The GCC is undermined by widespread personal conflicts among 
the different ruling families, border disputes and the cautious attitude of the 
smaller members towards designs of Saudi domination. Thus, despite their 
sharing similar vested interests in the stability and security of the region their 
cooperation is constrained and that is shown clearly in the security 
arrangements that they adopted post Desert Stomi. Kuwait, Bahrain, and 
Qatar opted to sign bilateral defence accords with the US, while the Saudis 
opted to continue their informal understanding with the Americans. Riyadh is 
still pressurised to downplay its close military relation with the US in order not 
to antagonise Iran, fundamentalist forces in the country and anti-American 
forces in the region. 
In sum, there is no doubt that Iraq violated the Charters of the UN and Arab 
League and violated international law. The international coalition against 
Saddam with the cooperation of Saudi Arabia and the UN helped reverse this 
aggression within a short span of time and restored the sovereignty of Kuwait. 
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However, the costs to the region have been massive in terms of further 
divisions, increased presence of the US in the region, intensification of 
domestic economic and political pressures in the Gulf states, while the 
continuation of the sanctions regime is crippling Iraq and its people and is 
making its reintegration of Iraq into the region extremely difficult and its 
reconstruction bill massive. Thus, in terms of creating security and stability in 
the region the coalition has been less successful. The long tenn security of 
the Gulf states necessitates the lifting of sanctions on Iraq and the 
consideration of including both Iran and Iraq in any regional security 
arrangement. Also less emphasis should be put on defence and annaments 
and more attention paid to the underlying factors of tension in the region; 
unequal distribution of wealth, lack of democracy and absence of strategies 
for better coordiantion and cooperation in the region. In addition the recent 
trend of solving border disputes - such as the Saudi- Qatari dispute, the 
Omani-Emirates dispute, the Omani-Saudi dispute, the Saudi-Emirates 
dispute, the Saudi-Yemeni dispute and the Yemeni-Omani dispute- through 
negotiation and diplomacy must be emphasised. 
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Appendices 
Appendices 
Appendix 1: Charter of the United Nations. 
Chapter I: Purposes and Principles. 
Article 1 
The Purposes of the United Nations are: 
1 .To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective 
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of 
acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and 
in confomriity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of 
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace; 
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal 
rights and self-detennination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to 
strengthen universal peace; 
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, 
social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion; 
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common 
ends. 
Article 2 
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in 
accordance with the following Principles: 
1 The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members. 
2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from 
membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the 
present Charter. 
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner 
that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. 
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with Purposes of the United Nations. 
5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in 
accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any State 
against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action. 
251 
e.The Organization shall ensure that States which are not Members of the United Nations act 
in accofxjance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. 
7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the 
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle 
shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII. 
Chapter V: The Security Council. 
Article 24 
1 .In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on 
the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council 
acts on their behalf. 
2.In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes 
and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for 
the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters V1,VII,VIII, and XII. 
3. The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the 
General Assembly for its consideration. 
Article 25 
The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and cany out the decisions of the 
Security Council in accordance with the present Charter. 
Chapter VI; Pacific Settlement of Disputes. 
Article 33 
1 .The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance 
of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, 
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or 
arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. 
2.The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their 
dispute by such means. 
Artical34 
The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to 
international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of 
the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of intemational peace and 
security. 
Article 36 
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1 .The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or 
of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment. 
2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the 
dispute which have already been adopted by the parties. 
3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into 
consideration that legal disputes should as a general mie be refenred by the parties to the 
Intemational Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court. 
Article37 
1 .Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the 
means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council. 
2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to 
endanger the maintenance of intemational peace and security, it shall decide whether to take 
action under Article 36 or to recommend such tenns of settlement as It may consider 
appropriate. 
Chapter VII: Action with Respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the 
peace, and acts of aggression. 
Article 40 
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making 
the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the 
parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or 
desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or 
position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to 
comply with such provisional measures. 
Article 41 
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to 
be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United 
Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or parties inten-uption of 
economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of 
communication and the severance of diplomatic relations. 
Article 42 
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be 
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land 
forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore intemational peace and security. Such 
action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces 
of Members of the United Nations. 
Article 43 
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1 - All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of 
intemational peace and security, undertake to make available to Security Council, on its call 
and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, anned forces, assistance, and 
facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining intemational 
peace and security. 
2 - Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types offerees, their 
degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be 
provided. 
3 - The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiatfve of 
the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or 
between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by 
the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. 
Article 47 
1 - There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security 
Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the 
maintenance of intemational peace and security, the employment and command of forces 
placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disamriament. 
2 - The Military Staff Committee shall consist of chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of 
the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not 
permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be 
associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the 
participation of that Member in its work . 
3 - The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the 
strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. 
Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently. 
4 - The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after 
consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional subcommittees. 
Article 48 
1 - The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance 
of intemational peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or 
by some of them, as the Security Council may determine. 
2 - Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and 
through their action in the appropriate intemational agencies of which they are members. 
Article 49 
The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out 
the measures decided upon by the Security Council. 
Article 51 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense if an amned attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security 
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Council has taken measures necessary to maintain intemational peace and security. 
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility 
of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such actions as it deems 
necessary in order to maintain or restore intemational peace and security. 
Appendix 2: 
Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council Regarding the 
Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait. August 1990. 
On August 2,1990 Iraqi forces invaded and occupied sovereign Kuwait. Starting with Its 
condemnation of the invasion in Resolution 660,the United Nations Security Council adopted 
of 30 resolutions directly relating to the situation between the two countries. Fifteen 
resolutions were adopted prior to or during the crisis, with a further 15 adopted in direct 
relation to the implementation of the cease-fire accords (Resolution 687). 
Resolution 660 
S/RES/660(1990). 2 AuQust1990 
Security Council resolution condemning Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, demanding the immediate 
and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces and calling for negotiations for a peaceful 
resolution of their differences. 
The Security Council, 
Alarmed by the invasion of Kuwait on August 1990 by the military forces of Iraq, 
Determining that there exists a breach of intemational peace and security as regards the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait, 
Acting under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter of the United Nations, 
1- Condemns the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; 
2- Demands that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions 
in which they were located on 1 August 1990; 
3- Calls upon Iraq and Kuwait to begin immediately intensive negotiations for the resolution of 
their differences and supports all efforts in this regard, and especially those of the League of 
Arab States; 
4- Decides to meet again as necessary to consider further steps to ensure 
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compliance with the present resolution. 
Resolution 662 
S/RES/662(1990). 9 August 1990 
Security Council resolution deciding that the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq under any from is 
considered null and void. 
The Security Council, 
Recalling its resolutions 660(1990) and 661(1990), 
Gravely alamned by the declaration by Iraq of a " comprehensive and eternal merger" with 
Kuwait, 
Demanding, once again, that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to 
the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990, 
Determined to bring the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq to an end and to restore the sovereignty, 
independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait, 
Detennined also to restore the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait, 
1- Decides that annexation of Kuwait by Iraq under and fomn and whatever pretext has no 
legal validity, and is considered null and void; 
2- Calls upon all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize 
that annexation, and to refrain from any action or dealing that might be interpreted as an 
indirect recognition of the annexation; 
3- Further demands that Iraq rescind its actions purporting to annex Kuwait; 
4- Decides to keep this item on its agenda and to continue its efforts to put an 
eariy end to the occupation. 
Resolution 664 
S/RES/664(1990). 18 Auoust 1990 
Security Council resolution demanding that pemnit the departure of third-state nationals from 
Kuwait and Iraq. 
The Security Council, 
Recalling the Iraqi invasion and purported annexation of Kuwait and resolutions 
660,661 ,and662. 
Deeply concerned for the safety and well being of third State nationals in Iraq and Kuwait, 
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Recalling the obligations of Iraq in this regard under intemational law. 
Welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-General to pursue urgent consultations with the 
Govemment of Iraq following the concern and anxiety expressed by the members of the 
Council on 17 August 1990, 
Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, 
1 - Demands that Iraq pennit and facilitate the immediate departure from Kuwait and Iraq of 
the nationals of third countries and grant immediate and continuing access of consular 
officials to such nationals; 
2 -Further demands that Iraq take no action to jeopardize the safety, security or health of 
such nationals; 
3 - Reaffinns its decision in resolution 662 (1990) that annexation of Kuwait by Iraq is null 
and void, and therefore demands that the govemment of Iraq rescind its orders for the closure 
of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and the withdrawal of the immunity of their 
personnel, and refrain from any such actions in the future; 
4- Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on compliance 
with this resolution at the eariiest possible time. 
Resolution665 
S/RES/665(1990). 25 AuQUSt 1990 
Security Council resolution expanding the sanctions against Iraq and authorizing maritime 
forces to take "commensurate" measures to ensure strict compliance. 
The Security Council, 
Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), and 664 (1990) and demanding 
their full and immediate implementation, 
Having decided in resolution 661 (1990) to impose economic sanctions under Chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations, 
Determined to bring an end to the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq which imperils the existence 
of a Member State and to restore the legitimate authority, and the sovereignty, independence 
and territorial integrity of Kuwait which requires the speedy implementation of the above 
resolutions. 
Deploring the loss of innocent life stemming from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and determined 
to prevent further such losses. 
Gravely alanned that Iraq continues to refuse to comply with resolutions 660(1990), 661 
(1990), 662 (1990) and 664 (1990) and in particular at the 
conduct of the Govemment of Iraq in using Iraqi flag vessels to export oil, 
1 - Calls upon those Member States cooperating with the Govemment of Kuwait which are 
deploying maritime forces to the area to use such measures commensurate to the specific 
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circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council to halt all 
inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and to verify their cargoes and 
destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the provisions related to such shipping laid 
down in resolution 661(1990); 
2- Invites Member States accordingly to cooperate as may be necessary to ensure 
compliance with the provisions of resolution 661(1990) with maximum use of political and 
diplomatic measures, in accordance with paragraph 1 
above; 
3- Requests all States to provide in accordance with the Charter such assistance as may be 
required by the States referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution ; 
4 - Further requests the States concemed to coordinate their actions in pursuit of the above 
paragraphs of this resolution using as appropriate mechanisms of the Military Staff Committee 
and after consultation with the Secretary-General to submit reports to the Security Council 
and its committee established under resolution 661(1990) to facilitate the monitoring of the 
implementation of this resolution; 
5 - Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. 
Resolution 667 
S/RES/667(1990). 16 September 1990 
Security Council resolution demanding that Iraq immediately release foreign nationals 
atxJucted from diplomatic premises in Kuwait or Iraq. 
The Security Council, 
Reaffinming its resolutions 660(1990), 661(1990), 662(1990), 664(1990), 665(1990) and 
666(1990). 
Recalling the Vienna Conventions of 18 April 1961 on diplomatic relations and 
24 April 1963 on consular relation, to both of which Iraq is a party. 
Considering that the decision of Iraq to order the closure of diplomatic and consular missions 
in Kuwait and to withdraw the immunity and privileges of these missions and their personnel 
is contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, the intemational Conventions mentioned 
above and intemational law. 
Deeply concemed that Iraq, notwithstanding the decisions of the Security Council and the 
provisions of the conventions mentioned above, has committed acts of violence against 
diplomatic missions and their personnel in 
Kuwait. 
Outraged at recent violations by Iraq of diplomatic premises in Kuwait and at the abduction of 
personnel enjoying diplomatic immunity and foreign nationals who were present in these 
premises. 
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Considering that the above actions by Iraq constitute aggressive acts and a flagrant violation 
of its international obligations which strike at the root of the conduct of intemational relations 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. 
Recalling that Iraq is fully responsible for any use of violence against any diplomatic or 
consular mission in Kuwait or its personnel. 
Determined to ensure respect for its decisions and for Article 25 of the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
Further considering that the grave nature of Iraq's actions, which constitute a new escalation 
of its violations of intemational law, obliges the Council not only to express its immediate 
reaction but also to consult urgently to take further concrete measures to ensure Iraq's 
compliance with the councils resolutions. 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. 
1- strongly condemns aggressive acts perpetrated by Iraq against diplomatic premises and 
personnel in Kuwait, including taking hostage foreign nationals in these places. 
2- Demands the immediate release of those foreign nationals as well as all nationals 
mentioned in resolutions 664(1990). 
3- Further demands that Iraq immediately and fully comply with its intemational obligations 
under resolutions 660(1990), 662(1990) and 664(1990) of the Security Council, the Vienna 
Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations and Intemational Law. 
4- Further demands that Iraq immediately protect the safety and well-being of diplomatic and 
consular personnel and premises in Kuwait and in Iraq and take on action to hinder the 
diplomatic and consular missions in the performance of their functions, including access to 
their functions, including access to their nationals and the protection of their person and 
interests. 
5- Remands all States that they are obliged to observe strictly resolutions 661(1990), 
662(1990), 664(1990), 665(1990), 666(1990). 
6- Decides to consult urgently to take further concrete measures as soon as possible, under 
Chapter VII of the Charter, in response to Iraq's continued violation of the Charter, of 
resolutions of the Security Council and intemational 
law. 
1/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol.500, No.7310. 
2/lbid.,vol.596,No.8638. 
Resolution 669 
S/RES/669(1990). 24 September 1990 
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Security Council resolution asking the Sanctions Committee to recommend a response to 
States requesting assistance with economic problems arising from the implementation of 
those sanctions. 
The Security Council, 
Recalling its resolutions 661(1990) of 6 August 1990, 
Recalling also Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations, 
Conscious of the fact that an increasing number of requests for assistance have t>een 
received under the provisions of Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations, 
Entrusts the Committee established under resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation 
between Iraq and Kuwait with the task of examining requests for assistance under the 
provisions of Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations and making recommendations to 
the president of the Security Council 
for appropriate action. 
Resolution 670 
S/RES/670(1990). 25 September 1990 
Security Council resolution calling for strict compliance with the sanctions against Iraq and 
confimning that these sanctions apply to all means of transport, including aircraft. 
The Security Council, 
Reaffimiing its resolutions 660(1990), 661(1990), 662(1990), 664(1990), 665(1990), 
666(1990), and 667(1990), 
Condemning Iraq's continued occupation of Kuwait, its failure to rescind its actions and end 
its purported annexation and its holding of third State nationals against their will, in flagrant 
violation of resolutions 661(1990), 662(1990), 664(1990), and 667(1990) and of intemational 
humanitarian law. 
Condemning further the treatment by Iraqi forces of Kuwaiti nationals, including measures to 
fore;e them to leave their own country and mistreatment of persons and property in Kuwait in 
violation of intemational law. 
Noting with grave concem the persistent attempts to evade the measures laid down in 
resolution 661 (1990), 
Further noting that a number of States have limited the number of Iraqi diplomatic and 
consular officials in their countries and that others are planning to do so. 
Determined to ensure by all necessary means the strict and complete application of the 
measures laid down in resolution 661(1990), 
Determined to ensure respect for its decisions and the provisions of Articles 25 and 48 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, 
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Affinning that any acts of the Govemment of Iraq which are contrary to the above-mentioned 
resolutions or to Articles 25 or 48 of the Charter of the United Nations, such as Decree 
No.377 of the Revolution Command Council 
of Iraq of 16 September 1990, are null and void, 
Reaffinming its detemiination to ensure compliance with Security Council resolutions by 
maximum use of political and diplomatic means. 
Welcoming the Secretary-Generals use of his good offices to advance a peaceful solution 
based on the relevant Security Council resolutions and noting with appreciation his continuing 
efforts to this end, 
Underiining to the government of Iraq that its continued failure to comply with the tenns of 
resolutions 661(1990), 661(1990), 662(1990), 664(1990), 666(1990) and 667(1990) could 
lead to further serious action by the Council under the Charter of the United Nations, including 
under Chapter VII, 
Recalling the provisions of Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, 
Acting under Chapter Vll of the Charter of the United Nations, 
1 - Calls upon all States to carry out their obligations to ensure strict and complete 
compliance with resolutions 661 (1990) and in particular paragraphs 3, 5 and 5 thereof; 
2 - Confirms that resolution 661 (1990) applies to all means of transport, including aircraft; 
3 - Decides that all States, notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations confen-ed 
or imposed by any intemational agreement or any contract entered into or any licence or 
permit granted before the date of the present resolution, shall deny pemrtission to any aircraft 
to take off from their territory if the aircraft would carry any cargo to or from Iraq or Kuwait 
other than food in humanitarian circumstances, subject to authorization by the Council or the 
Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) and in accordance with resolution 666 
(1990), or supplies intended strictly for medical purposes or solely for UNIIMOG; 
4- Decides further that all States shall deny permission to any aircraft destined to land in Iraq 
or Kuwait, whatever its State of registration, to over fly its territory unless: 
a ) The aircraft lands at an airfield designated by that State outside Iraq or Kuwait in order to 
permit its inspection to ensure this there is no cargo on board in violation of resolution 
661 (1990) or the present resolution, and for this purpose the aircraft may be detained for as 
long as necessary; or 
b) The particular flight has been approved by the Committee established by resolution 
661(1990); or 
c) The flight is certified by the United Nations as solely for the purposes or UNIIMOG; 
5 - Decides that each States shall take all necessary measures to ensure that any aircraft 
registered in its tenitory or operated by an operator who has his principal place of business or 
permanent residence in its territory complies with the provisions of resolution 661(1990) and 
the present resolution; 
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6 - Decides further that all States shall notify in a timely fashion the Committee established by 
resolution 661(1990) of any flight between its territory and Iraq or Kuwait to which the 
requirement to land in paragraph 4 above does not apply, and the purpose for such a flight; 
7 - Calls upon all States to co-operate in taking such measures as may be necessary, 
consistent with intemational law, including the Chicago Convention, to ensure the effective 
implementation of the provisions of resolution 661(1990) or the present resolution; 
8 - Calls upon all States to detain any ships of Iraqi registry which enter their ports and which 
are being or have been used in violation of resolution 661 (1990), or to deny such ships 
entrance to their ports except in circumstances recognized under intemational law as 
necessary to safeguard human life; 
9 - Reminds all States of their obligations under resolution 661(1990) with regard to the 
freezing of Iraqi assets, and the protection of the assets of the legitimate Govemment of 
Kuwait and its agencies, located within their territory and to report to the Committee 
established under resolution 661(1990) regarding those assets; 
10 - Call upon all States to provide to the Committee established by resolution 661(1990) 
infonnation regarding the action taken by them to implement the provisions laid down in the 
present resolution; 
11- A f f ims that the United Nations Organization, the specialized agencies and other 
intemational organizations in the United Nations system are required to take such measures 
as may be necessary to give effect to the temis of resolution 661(1990) and this resolution; 
12 - Decides to consider, in the event evasion of the provisions of resolution 661 (1990) or of 
the present resolution by a State or its nationals or through its territory, measures directed at 
the State in question to prevent such evasion; 
13 - Reaffirms that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to Kuwait and that as a High 
Contracting Party to the Convention Iraq is bound to comply fully with all "its temis and in 
particular is liable under the Convention in respect of the grave breaches committed by it, as 
are individuals who commit or order 
the commission of grave breaches. 
1/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 15, No. 102. 
2/ Ibid. , vol. 75, No.973. 
Resolution 674 
S/RES/674(1990). 29 October 1990 
Security Council resolution demanding that Iraq release third-State nationals being held in 
Iraq or Kuwait. 
The Security Council, 
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Recalling its resolutions 660(1990), 661(1990), 662(1990),664(1990), 665(1990), 666(1990), 
667(1990) and 670(1990), 
Stressing the urgent need for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from 
Kuwait, for the resolution of Kuwaitis sovereignty, independence and temtorial integrity and of 
the authority of its legitimate govemment, 
Condemning the actions by the Iraqi authorities and occupying forces to taking third-State 
nationals hostage, mistreating and oppressing Kuwaiti and third-State nationals, and the other 
actions reported to thee Security Council, such as the destmction of Kuwaiti demographic 
records, the forced departure of Kuwaitis, the relocation of population in Kuwait and the 
unlawful destruction and seizure of public and private property in Kuwait, including hospital 
supplies and equipment, in violation of the decisions of the Council, the Charter of the United 
Nations, the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular 
Relations and Intemational Law , 
Expressing grave alarm over the situation of nationals of third States in Kuwait and Iraq, 
including the personnel of the diplomatic and consular missions of 
such States, 
Reaffirming that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to Kuwait and that as a High 
Contracting Party to Convention Iraq is bound to comply fully with all its tenms and in 
particular is liable under the Convention in respect of the grave breaches committed by it, as 
are individuals who commit or order the commission of grave breaches. 
Recalling the efforts of the Secretary-General concerning the safety and well-being of third-
State nationals in Iraq and Kuwait, 
Deeply concemed about the economic cost and about the loss and suffering caused to 
individuals in Kuwait and Iraq as a result of the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq, 
Acting under Chapter Vll of the Charter of the United Nations, 
Reaffirming the goal of the intemational community, of maintaining intemational peace and 
security by seeking to resolve intemational disputes and conflicts through peaceful means, 
Recalling the important role that the United Nations and its Secretary-General have played in 
the peaceful solution of disputes and conflicts in confomnity with the provisions of the Charter, 
Alarmed by the dangers of the present crisis caused by the Iraqi invasion and occupation of 
Kuwait, which directly threaten intemational peace and security, and seeking to avoid any 
further worsening of the situation, 
Calling upon Iraq to comply with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, in particular 
its resolutions 660(1990), 662(1990), and 664(1990), 
Reaffirming its detemiination to ensure compliance by Iraq with the Security Council 
resolutions by maximum use of political and diplomatic means, 
1 - Demands that the Iraqi authorities and occupying forces immediately cease and desist 
from taking third-State nationals hostage, mistreating and oppressing Kuwaiti and third-State 
nationals and any other actions, such as those reported to the Security Council and described 
263 
above, that violate the decisions of this Council, the Charter of the United Nations, the Fourth 
Geneva Convention, the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular 
Relations and Intemational Law; 
2 - Invites states to collate substantiated infonmation in their possession or submitted to them 
on the grave breaches by Iraq as per paragraph 1 above and to make this infomiation 
available to the Security Council: 
3 - Reaffinms its demand that Iraq immediately fulfil its obligations to third-State nationals in 
Kuwait and Iraq, including the personnel of diplomatic and personal missions, under the 
Charter, the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and consular 
Relations, general principles of intemational law and the relevant resolutions of the Council; 
4 - Also reaffirms its demand that Iraq permits and facilitates the immediate departure from 
Kuwait and Iraq of those third-State subjects, including diplomatic and consular personnel, 
who wish to leave. 
5 - Demands that Iraq ensure the immediate access to food, water and basic services 
necessary for the protection and well-being of Kuwaiti nationals and of nationals of third-
States in Kuwait and Iraq, including the personnel of diplomatic and consular missions in 
Kuwait ; 
6 - Reaffimis its demand that Iraq immediately protect the safety and well-being of diplomatic 
and consular personnel and premises in Kuwait and Iraq, take no action to hinder these 
diplomatic and consular missions in the perfomance of their functions, including access to 
their nationals and the protection of their person and interests and rescind its orders, for the 
closure of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and the withdrawal of the immunity of 
their personnel; 
7 - Request the Secretary-General, in the context of the continued exercise of his good 
offices conceming the safety and well-being of third-State nationals in Iraq and Kuwait to seek 
to achieve the objectives of paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 above and in particular the provision of 
food, water and basic services to Kuwaiti nationals and to the diplomatic and consular 
missions in Kuwait and the evacuation of third-State nationals; 
8- Reminds Iraq that under intemational law it is liable for any loss, damage or injury arising in 
regard to Kuwait and third states and their nationals and corporations, as a result of the 
invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq; 
9 - Invites states to collect relevant infonnation regarding their claims and those of their 
nationals and corporations, for restitution's or financial compensation by Iraq with a view to 
such anrangement as may be established in accordance with intemational law; 
10 - Requires that Iraq comply with the provisions of the present resolution and its previous 
resolutions. And in case of non-compliance the Security Council will need to take further 
measures under the Charter; 
11- Decides to remain actively and pemnanently seized of the matter until Kuwait has 
regained its independence and peace has been restored in confomiity with the relevant 
resolutions of the Security Council; 
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12 - Reposes its tmst in the Secretary-General to make available his good offices and, as he 
considers appropriate, to pursue them and to exert diplomatic efforts in order to reach a 
peaceful solution to the crisis caused by the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait on the 
bases of the Security Council resolutions 660(1990), 662(1990), and 664(1990), and call 
upon all states, both those in the region and others, to pursue on this basis their efforts to this 
end, in conformity with the Charter, in order to improve the situation and restore peace, 
security and stability; 
13 - Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the results of this 
good offices and diplomatic efforts. 
1/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, No. 973. 
2/lbid.,vol. 500, No. 7310. 
3/ Ibid., vol.596. No. 8638. 
Resolution 677 
S/RES/677(1990). 28 November 1990 
Security Council resolution condemning Iraqi attempts to alter the demographic composition 
of the population of Kuwait. 
The Security Council, 
Recalling its resolutions 660(1990) of August 1990, 662(1990) of 9 August 1990 and 674 
(1990) of 29 October 1990, 
Reiterating its concem for suffering caused to individuals in Kuwait as a result of the invasion 
and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq, 
Gravely concemed at the ongoing attempt by Iraq to alter the demographic composition of the 
population of Kuwait and to destroy the civil records maintained by the legitimate govemment 
of Kuwait, 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
1 - Condemns the attempts by Iraq to alter the demographic composition of the population of 
Kuwait and to destroy the civil records maintained by the 
legitimate government of Kuwait; 
2 - Mandates the Secretary-General to take custody of a copy of the population register of 
Kuwait, the authenticity of which has been certified by the legitimate govemment of Kuwait 
and which covers the registration of the population up to 1 August 1990; 
3 - Requests the Secretary-General to establish, in co-operation with the legitimate 
govemment of Kuwait, an order of mies and regulations goveming access to and use of the 
said copy of the population register. 
Resolution 678 
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S/RES/678(1990), 29 November 1990 
Security Council resolution authorizing member States cooperating with the Govemment of 
Kuwait to use "all necessary means to uphold and implement" the Council's resolutions on the 
situation unless Iraq fully complies with those resolutions on or before 15 January 1991. 
The Security Council, 
Recalling and reaff iming its resolutions 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990, 661 (1990) of 6 August 
1990, 662 (1990) of 9 August 1990, 664 (1990) of 18 August 1990, 666 (1990) of 13 
September 1990, 667 (1990) of 16 September 1990, 669 (1990) of 24 September 1990, 670 
(1990) of 25 September 1990, 674 (1990) of 29 October 1990, and 677 (1990) of 28 
November 1990, 
Noting that, despite all efforts by the United Nations, Iraq refuses to comply with its obligation 
to implement resolution 660 (1990) and the above-mentioned subsequent relevant 
resolutions, in flagrant contempt of the Security Council, 
Mindful of its duties and responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations for the 
maintenance and preservation of intemational peace and 
Security, 
Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions. 
Acting under Chapter Vll of Charter, 
1 - Demands that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant 
resolutions, and decides, while maintaining all its decisions, to allow Iraq one final opportunity, 
as a pause of goodwill, to do so; 
2 - Authorizes Member States co-operating with the govemment of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or 
before 15 January 1991 fully implements, as set forth in paragraph 1 above, the foregoing 
resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and 
all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore intemational peace and security in the area; 
3 - Requests all States to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken in pursuance 
of paragraph 2 of the present resolution; 
4 - Requests the States concemed to keep the Security Council regulariy infonned on the 
progress of actions undertaken pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the present resolution; 
5 - Decides to remain seized of the matter. 
Resolution 687 
S/RES/687(1991V 3 April 1991 
Security Council resolution establishing detailed measures for a cease-fire, including 
deployment of a United Nations observer unit; an-angements for demarcating the Iraq-Kuwait 
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border; the removal or destmction of Iraq weapons of mass destmction measures to prevent 
their reconstitution, under the supervision of a special commission and the Director General of 
the IAEA; and creation of a compensation fund to cover direct loss and damage resulting from 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. 
The Security Council, 
Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990), 666 
(1990) , 667 (1990), 669 (1990), 670 (1990), 674 (1990), 677 (1990), 678 (1990), and 686 
(1991) , 
Welcoming the resolution to Kuwait of its sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity 
and the retum of its legitimate government, 
Affimiing the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, temtorial integrity and 
political independence of Kuwait and Iraq, and noting the intention expressed by the Member 
States cooperating with Kuwait under paragraph 2 of resolution 678 (1990) to bring their 
military presence in Iraq to an end as soon as possible consistent with paragraph 8 of 
resolution 686 (1991), 
Reaffirming the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions in light of its unlawful invasion 
and occupation of Kuwait, 
Taking note of the letter sent by the Foreign Minister of Iraq on 27 Febmary 1990 (S/22275) 
and those sent pursuant to resolution 686 (1991) (S/22273, S/22276, S/22320, S/22321 and 
S/22330), 
Baghdad on 4 Noting that Iraq and Kuwait, as independent sovereign States, singed at 
October 1963 " Agreed Minutes Regarding the Resolution of Friendly Relations, Recognition 
and Related Matters", thereby recognizing, fonnally the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait 
and the allocation of islands, which were registered with the United Nations in accordance 
with Article 102 of the Charter and in which Iraq recognized the independence and complete 
sovereignty of the State of Kuwait within "its borders as specified and accepted in the letter of 
the Prime Minister of Iraq dated 21 July 1932, and as accepted by the mier of Kuwait in his 
letter dated 10 August 1932, 
Conscious of the need for demarcation of the said boundary, 
violation of its Conscious also of the statements by Iraq threatening to use weapons in 
obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, 
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 
17 June 1925, and of its prior use of chemical weapons and affimiing that grave 
consequences would follow any further use by Iraq of such weapons. 
Recalling that Iraq has subscribed to the Declaration adopted by all States participating in the 
Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States, held 
at Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, establishing the objective of universal elimination of 
chemical and biological weapons. 
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Recalling further that Iraq has signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, of 10 April 1972, 
Noting the importance of Iraq ratifying this Convention, 
Noting moreover the importance of all States adhering to this Convention and encouraging its 
forthcoming Review Conference to reinforce the authority, efficiency and universal scope of 
the Convention, 
Stressing the importance of an eariy conclusion by the Convention on Disarmament of its 
work on a Convention on the Universal ProhibKion of Chemical Weapons and of universal 
adherence thereto. 
Aware of the use by Iraq of ballistic missiles in unprovoked attacks and therefore of the need 
to take specific measures in regard to such missiles located in Iraq, 
Concemed by the reports in the hands of Member States that Iraq has attempted to acquire 
materials for a nuclear-weapons program contrary to its obligations under the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968, 
Recalling the objective of the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the region of 
the Middle East, 
Conscious of the threat which all weapons of mass destmction pose to peace and security in 
the area and of the need to v/ork towards the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free 
of such weapons, 
Conscious also of the objective of achieving balanced and comprehensive control of 
amriaments in the region. 
Conscious further of the importance of achieving the objectives noted above using all 
available means, including a dialogue among the States of the region, 
Noting that resolution 686 (1990) mart<ed the lifting of the measures imposed by resolution 
661 (1990) in so far they applied to Kuwait, 
Noting that despite the progress being made in fulfilling the obligations of resolution 686 
(1990), many Kuwaiti and third country nationals are still not accounted for and property 
remains unretumed. 
Recalling the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, opened for signature 
at New York on 18 December 1979, which categorizes all acts of taking hostages as 
manifestations of intemational terrorism. 
Deploring threats made by Iraq during the recent conflict to make use of ten-orism against 
targets outside Iraq and the taking of hostages by Iraq, 
Taking note with grave concem of the reports of the Secretary-General of 20 March 1991 
(S/22366) and 28 March 1991 (S/22409), and conscious of the necessity to meet urgently the 
humanitarian needs in Kuwait and Iraq, 
Bearing in mind its objective of restoring intemational peace and security in the area as set 
out in recent Council resolutions. 
Conscious of the need to take the following measures acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, 
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1- Affimns all thirteen resolutions noted above, except as expressly changed below to achieve 
the goals of this resolution, including a formal cease-fire; 
A 
2 - Demands that Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability of the intemational boundary and 
the allocation of islands set out in the "Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the 
Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related 
Matters", signed by them in the exercise of their sovereignty at Baghdad on 4 October 1963 
and registered with the United Nations and published by the United Nations in document 
7063, United Nations Treaty Series, 1964; 
3 - Calls on the Secretary-General to lend his assistance to make arrangements with Iraq and 
Kuwait to demarcate the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait, drawing on appropriate material 
including the map transmitted by Security Council document S/22412 and to report back to 
the Security Council within one month ; 
4 - Decides to guarantee the inviolability of the above-mentioned international boundary and 
to take as appropriate all necessary measures to that end in accordance with the Charter; 
B 
5 - Requests the Secretary-General, after consulting with Iraq and Kuwait, to submit within 
three days to the Security Council for its approval a plan for the immediate deployment of a 
United Nations observer unit to monitor the Khor Abdullah and a demilitarized zone, which is 
hereby established, extending 10 Kilometers into Iraq and 5 Kilometers into Kuwait from the 
boundary refen-ed to in the " Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and Republic of 
Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters" of 4 
October 1963; to deter violations of the boundary through its presence in and surveillance of 
the demilitarized zone; to observe any hostile or potentially hostile action mounted from the 
territory of one State to the other; and for the Secretary-General to report regulariy to the 
Council on the operations of ttie unit, and immediately if there are serious violations of the 
zone or potential threats to peace; 
6 - Notes that as soon as the Secretary-General notifies the Council of the completion of the 
deployment of the United Nations observer unit, the conditions will be established for the 
Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678 (1990) to bring 
their military presence in Iraq to an consistent with resolution 686 (1991); 
c 
7 - Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the 
Prohibition of use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological 
Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and to ratify the Convention on 
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Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and 
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destmction, of 10 April 1972; 
8 - Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destmction, removal, or rendering 
harmless, under intemational supervision, o f 
a) all chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems 
and components and al research, development, support and manufacturing facilities; 
b) all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 Kilometers and related major parts, and 
repair and production facilities; 
9- decides, for the implementation of paragraph 8 above, the following: 
a) Iraq shall submit to the Secretary-General, within fifteen days of the adoption of this 
resolution, a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of all items specified in 
paragraph 8 and agree to urgent, on-site inspection as specified below; 
b) the Secretary-General, in consultation with the appropriate Govemment and, where 
appropriate, with the Director-General of the Wortd Health Organization (WHO), within 45 
days of the passage of this resolution, shall develop, and submit to the Council for approval, a 
plan calling for the completion of the following acts within 45 days of such approval: 
I) the forming of a Special Commission, which shall carry out immediate on-site inspection of 
Iraq's biological, chemical and missile capabilities, based on Iraq s declarations and the 
designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission itself; 
II) the yielding by Iraq of possession to the Special Commission for destmction, removal or 
rendering harmless, taking into account the requirements of public safety, of all items 
specified under paragraph 8 (a) above including items at the additional locations designated 
by the Special Commission under paragraph 9 (b) (I) above and the destmction by Iraq, under 
supervision of the Special Commission, of all its missile capabilities including launchers as 
specified under paragraph 8 (b) above; 
III) the provision by the Special Commission of the assistance and cooperation to the 
Director-General of the intemational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) required in paragraphs 12 
and 13 below; 
10 - Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally undertake not to use, develop, constmct or 
acquire any of the items specified in paragraphs 8 and 9 above and requests the Secretary-
General, in consultation with Special Commission, to develop a plan for the further ongoing 
monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with this paragraph, to be submitted to the 
Council for approval within 120 days of the passage of this resolution; 
11 - Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, of 1 July 1968; 
12 - Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons 
or nuclear-weapons usable material or any subsystems or components or any research, 
development, support or manufacturing facifities related to the above; to submit to the 
Secretary-General and the Director-General of the Intemational Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) within 15 days of the adoption of this resolution a declaration of the locations, 
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amounts, and types of all items specified above; to place all of its nuclear-weapons-usable 
material under the exclusive control, for custody and removal, of the IAEA, with the 
assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission as provided for in the plan of the 
Secretary-General discussed in paragraph 9 (b) above; to accept, in accordance with the 
arrangements provided for in paragraph 13 below, urgent on-site inspection and the 
destruction, removal, or rendering hanmless as appropriate of all items specified ab»ove; and 
to accept the plan discussed in paragraph 13 below for the further ongoing monitoring and 
verification of its compliance with these under takings; 
13 - Requests the Director-General of the Intemational Atomic Energy (IAEA) through the 
Secretary-General, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission as 
provided for in the plan of the Secretary-General in paragraph 9 (b) above, to carry out 
immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's nuclear capabilities based on Iraq's declarations and 
the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission; to develop a plan for 
submission to the Security Council within 45 days calling for the destruction, removal, or 
rendering harmless as appropriate of all items listed in paragraph 12 above; to carry out the 
plan within 45 days following approval by the Security Council; and to develop a plan, taking 
into account the rights and obligations of Iraq under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, of 1 July 1968, for the further ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's 
compliance with paragraph 12 above, including an inventory of all nuclear material in Iraq 
subject to the Agency s verification and inspections to confimi that IAEA safeguards cover all 
relevant nuclear activities in Iraq, to be submitted to the Council for approval within 120 days 
of the passage of this resolution; 
14 - Takes note that the actions to be taken by Iraq in paragraphs 8 , 9,10, 11,12, and 13 of 
this resolution represent steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free 
from weapons of mass destmction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a 
global ban on chemical weapons; 
D 
15 - Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the steps taken to 
facilitate the retum of all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, including a list of property which 
Kuwait claims has not been returned or which has not been returned intact; 
E 
16 - Reaffinms that Iraq, without prejudice to the debts and obligations of Iraq arising prior to 
2 August 1990, which will be addressed through the normal mechanisms, is liable under 
international law for any direct loss, damage depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign 
Govemments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and 
occupation of Kuwait; 
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17- Decide that all Iraqi statements made since 2 August 1990, repudiating its foreign debt, 
are null and void, and demands that Iraq scrupulously adhere to all of its obligations 
concerning servicing and repayment of its foreign debt; 
18- Decides to create a Fund to pay compensation for claims that fall within paragraph 16 
above and to establish a Commission that will administer the Fund; 
19 - Directs the Secretary-General to develop and present to the Council for decision, on 
later than 30 days following the adoption of this resolution, recommendations for the Fund to 
meet the requirement for the payment of claims established in accordance with paragraph 18 
above and for a program to implement the decisions in paragraph 16,17 and 18 above, 
including: administration of the Fund: mechanisms for detemiining the appropriate level of 
Iraq's contribution to the Fund based on a percentage of the value of the exports of petroleum 
and petroleum products from Iraq not to exceed a figure to be suggested to the Council by the 
Secretary-General, taking into account the requirements of the people of Iraq's payment 
capacity as assessed in conjunction with the international financial institutions taking into 
consideration external debt service, and the needs of the Iraqi economy; an"angements for 
ensuring that payments are made to the Fund; the process by which funds will be allocated 
and claims paid; appropriate procedures for evaluating losses, listing claims and verifying 
their validity and resolving disputed claims in respect of Iraq's liability as specified in 
paragraph16 above; and the composition of the Commission designated above; 
20 - Decides, effective immediately, that the prohibitions against the sale or supply to Iraq of 
commodities or products other that medicine and health supplies, and prohibitions against 
financial transactions related thereto, contained in resolution 661 (1990) shall not apply to 
foodstuffs notified to the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) or, with the approval 
of the Committee, under the simplified and accelerated "no-objection " procedure, to materials 
and supplies for essential civilian needs as identified in the report of the Secretary-General 
dated 20 March 1991 (S/22366), and in any further findings of humanitarian need by the 
Committee; 
21 - Decides that the Council shall review the provisions of paragraph 20 above every sixty 
days in light of the policies and practices of the Govemment of Iraq, including the 
implementation of all relevant resolutions of the Security Council, for the purpose of 
determining whether to reduce or lift the prohibitions refen-ed to therein; 
22 - Decides that upon the approval by the Council of the program called for in paragraph 19 
above and upon Council agreement that Iraq has completed all actions contemplated in 
paragraphs 8, 9 ,10 ,11 ,12 , and 13 above, the prohibitions against the import of commodities 
and products originating in Iraq and the prohibitions against financial transactions related 
thereto contained in resolution 661 (1990) shall have no further force or effect; 23- Decides 
that, pending action by the Council under paragraph 22 above, the Committee established 
under resolution 661 (1990) shall be empowered to approve, when required to assure 
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adequate financial resources on the part of Iraq to carry out the activities under paragraph 20 
above, exceptions to the prohibition against the import of commodities and products 
originating in Iraq; 
24 - Decides that, in accordance with resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent related 
resolutions and until a further decision in taken by the Council, all States shall continue to 
prevent the sale or supply, or promotion or facilitation of such sale or supply, to Iraq by their 
nationals, or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of: 
a) amis and related materiel of all types, specifically including the sale or transfer through 
other means of all fomis of conventional military equipment, including for paramilitary forces, 
and spare parts and components and their means of production, for such equipment; 
b) Items specified and defined in paragraph 8 and paragraph 12 above not otherwise covered 
above; 
G) technology under licensing other transfer an-angement used in the production, utilization or 
stockpiling of items specified in subparagraph (a) and (b) above; 
d) personnel or materials for training or technical support services relating to the design, 
development, manufacture, use, maintenance or support of items specified in subparagraphs 
(a) and (b) above; 
25 - Calls upon all States and intemational organizations to act strictly in accordance with 
paragraph 24 above, notwithstanding the existence of any contracts, agreements, licences, or 
any other arrangements; 
26 - Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with appropriate Govemments, to 
develop within 60 days, for approval the Council, guidelines to facilitate full intemational 
implementation of paragraph 24 and 25 above and paragraph 27 below, and to make them 
available to all States and to establish a procedure for updating these guidelines periodically ; 
27- Calls upon all States to maintain such national controls and procedures and to take such 
other actions consistent with the guidelines to be established by the Security Council under 
paragraph 26 above as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the terms of paragraph 
24 above, and calls upon intemational organizations to take all appropriate steps to assist in 
ensuring such full compliance; 
28 - Agrees to review its decisions in paragraph 22, 23, 24, and 25 above, except for the 
items specified and defined in paragraphs 8 and 12 above, on a regular basis and in any case 
120 days following passage of this resolution, taking into account Iraq's compliance with this 
resolution and general progress towards the control of annaments in the region; 
29 - Decides that all States, including Iraq, shall take the necessary measures to ensure that 
no claim shall lie at the instance of the Govemment of Iraq, or of any person claiming through 
or for the benefit of any such person or body, in connection with any contract or other 
transaction where its perfomiance was affected by reason of the measures taken by the 
Security Council in resolution 661 (1990) and related resolution; 
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30 - Decides that, in furtherance of its commitment to facilitate the repatriation of all Kuwaiti 
and third country nationals, Iraq shall extend all necessary cooperation to the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, providing lists of such persons, facilitating the access of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross to all such persons wherever located or detained 
and facilitating the search by the International Committee of the Red Cross for those Kuwaiti 
and third country nationals still unaccounted for; 
3 1 - Invites the International Committee of the Red Cross to keep the Secretary-General 
apprised as appropriate of all activities undertaken in connection with facilitating the 
repatriation or return of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals or their remains present in Iraq 
on or after 2 August 1990; 
H 
32 - Requires Iraq to inform the Council that it will not commit or support any act of 
intemational terrorism or allow any organization directed towards commission of such acts to 
operate within its territory and to condemn unequivocally and renounce all acts, methods, and 
practices of terrorism; 
\ 
33 - Declares that, upon official notification by Iraq to the Secretary-General and to the 
Security Council of its acceptance of the provisions above, a fonmal cease-fire is effective 
between Iraq and Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with 
resolution 678 (1990); 
34 - Decides to remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as may be required 
for the implementation of this resolution and to secure peace and security in the area. 
1 / omcial Records of the Security Council, Forty-sixth year, Supplement for January, 
February and March t997,document S/22273. 
2 / Ibid., documents S/22275 and S/ 22276. 
3 / Ibid., documents S/22320 and S/22321. 
4 / Ibid., document S/ 22330. 
5 / United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 485, No.7063. 
6 / League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138. 
7 / A/44/88, annex. 
8 / General Assembly resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex. 
9 / United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 729, No. 10485. 
10 / General Assembly resolution 34/146, annex. 
11 / Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-sixth year. Supplement for April, May and 
June 1991, document S/22366, annex. 
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12 / Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-sixth year. Supplement for January, 
February and hAarch 1991, document S/22409, annex. 
13 / Ibid., document S/22412. 
Resolution 688 
S/RES/688(1991). 5 April 1991 
Security Council resolution demanding that Iraq end repression of the civilian population in 
many parts of Iraq and insisting that it allow immediate access by intemational humanitarian 
organizations to all those in need of assistance. 
The Security Council, 
Mindful of its duties and its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations for the 
maintenance of intemational peace and security. 
Recalling Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter of the United Nations, 
Gravely concerned by the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, 
including most recently in Kurdish populated areas which led to a massive flow of refugees 
towards and to cross border incursions, which threaten intemational peace and security in the 
region. 
Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering involved. 
Taking note also of the letters sent by the peimanent Representative of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran to the United Nations dated 3 and 4 April 1991, respectively (S/22436 and S/22447), 
Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, tenitorial 
integrity and political independence of Iraq and of all States in the area, 
Bearing in mind the Secretary-Generals report of 20 March 1991 (S/22366), 
1- Condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including 
most recently in Kurdish populated areas, the consequences of which threaten intemational 
peace and security in the region; 
2 - Demands that Iraq, as a contribution to removing the threat to intemational peace and 
security in the region, immediately end this repression and expresses the hope in the same 
context that an open dialogue will take place take place to ensure that the human and political 
rights of all Iraqi citizens are respected; 
3 - Insists that Iraq allow immediate access by intemational organizations to all those in need 
of assistance in all parts of Iraq and to make available all necessary facilities for their 
operations; 
4 - Requests the Secretary General to pursue his humanitarian efforts in Iraq and to report 
forthwith, if appropriate on the basis of a further mission to the region, on the plight of the Iraqi 
civilian population, and particular the Kurdish population, suffering from the repression in all 
its from inflicted by the Iraqi authorities; 
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5 - Requests further the Secretary-General to use all the resources at his disposal, including 
those of the relevant United Nations agencies, to address urgently the critical needs of the 
refugees and displaced Iraqi population; 
6 - Appeals to all Member States and to all humanitarian organizations to contribute to these 
humanitarian relief efforts; 
7 - Demands that Iraq cooperate with the Secretary-General to these ends; 
8 - Decides to remain seized of the matter. 
1 / Official Records ofttie Security Council, Forty-sixth year, Supplement for April, May and 
June 1991, document S/23300. 
2 / Ibid., documents S/22436 and S/22447. 
3 / Ibid., document S/22366, annex. 
Resolution 692 
S/RES/692(1991), 20 May 1991 
Security Council resolution establishing the United Nations Compensation Fund and the 
United Nations Compensation Commission. 
The Security Council, 
Recalling its resolutions 674 (1990) of 29 October 1990, 686 (1991) of March 1991 and 687 
(1991) of 3 April 1991, concerning the liability of Iraq, without prejudice to its debts and 
obligations arising prior to 2 August 1990, for any direct loss, damage, including 
environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign 
Governments, nationals and corporations as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and 
occupation of Kuwait, 
Taking note of the Secretary-Generals report of 2 May 1991 (S/22559), submitted in 
accordance with paragraph 19 of resolution 687 (1991), 
Acting under Chapter Vll of the Charter of the United Nations, 
1 - Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for his report of2 May 1991 (S/22559); 
2 - Welcomes the fact that the Secretary-General will now undertake the appropriate 
consultations requested by paragraph 19 of resolution 687 (1991) so that he will be in a 
position to recommend to the Security Council for decision as soon as possible the figure 
which the level of Iraq's contribution to the Fund will not exceed; 
3 - Decides to establish the Fund and the Commission referred to in paragraph 18 of 
resolution 687 (1991) in accordance with section I of the Secretary-Generals report, and that 
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the Goveming Council will be located at the United Nations Office at Geneva and that the 
Goveming Council may decide whether some of the activities of the Commission should be 
carried out elsewhere; 
4 - Requests the Secretary-General to take the actions necessary to implement paragraphs 2 
and above in consultation with the members of the Goveming Council; 
5 - Directs the Goveming Council to proceed in an expeditions manner to implement the 
provisions of section E of resolution 687 (1991), taking into account the recommendations in 
section 11 of the Secretary-Generals report; 
6 - Declares that the requirement for Iraqi contributions will apply in the manner to be 
prescribed by the Goveming Council with respect to all Iraqi petroleum and petroleum 
products exported from Iraq after 8 April 1991 as well as such petroleum products exported 
eariier are not delivered or not paid for as a specific result of the prohibition contained in 
resolution 661 (1990); 
7 - Requests the Goveming Council to report as soon as possible on the actions it has taken 
with regard to the mechanisms for detemriining the appropriate level of Iraq's contribution to 
the Fund and the arrangements for ensuring that payments are made to the Fund, so that the 
Security Council can give its approval in accordance with paragraph 22 of resolution 687 
(1991); 
8 - Requests that all States and Intemational organizations cooperate with the decisions of 
the Goveming Council taken pursuant to paragraph 5 of this resolution and further requests 
that the Goveming Council keep the Security Council informed on this matter; 
9 - Decides that if the Governing Council notifies the Security Council that Iraq has failed to 
can^ out decisions of the Goveming Council taken-pursuant to paragraph 5 of this resolution, 
the Security Council intends to retain or to take action to reimpose the prohibition against the 
import of petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq and financial transactions 
related hereto; 
10 - Decides to remain seized of this matter and that the Goveming Council will submit 
periodic reports to the Secretary-General and the Security Council. 
1 / Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-sixth year, Supplement for April, May and 
June 1991, document S/22559. 
Resolution 700 
S/RES/700(1991). 17 June 1991 
Security Council resolution approving guidelines for monitoring the amis embargo against 
Iraq. 
The Security Council, 
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Recalling its resolutions 661 (1990), of 6 August 1990, 665 (1990) of 25 August 1990, 
670(1990) of September 1990and 687 (1991) of 3April 1991, 
Taking note of the Secretary-General's report of 2 June 1991 (S/22660) submitted pursuant to 
paragraph 26 of resolution 687 (1991), 
Acting under Chapter Vll of the Charter of the United Nations, 
1 - Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for his report 2 June 1991 (S/22660), 
2 - Approves its Guidelines to Facilitate Full Intemational Implementation of paragraphs 24, 
25 and 27 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), annexed to the report of the Secretary-
General (S/22660), 
3 - Reiterates its call upon all States and international organizations to act in a manner 
consistent with the Guidelines; 
4 - Requests all States, in accordance with paragraph 8 of the Guidelines, to report to the 
Secretary-General within 45 days on the measures they have instituted for meeting the 
obligations set out in paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991); 
5 - Entmsts the Committee established under resolution 661 (1990) conceming the situation 
between Iraq and Kuwait with the responsibility, under the Guidelines, for monitoring the 
prohibitions against the sale or supply of Iraq and related sanctions established in paragraph 
24 of resolution 687 
(1991); 
6 - Decides to remain seized of the matter and to review the Guidelines at the same time as it 
reviews paragraphs 22, 23, 24 and 25 of resolution 687 (1991) as set out in paragraph 28 
thereof 
1 / Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-sixth year. Supplement for April, May and 
June 1991, document S/22660. 
2 / Ibid., document S/22660, annex. 
Resolution 705 
S/RES/705(1991). 15 August 1991 
Security Council resolution endorsing the Secretary-General's suggestion that compensation 
to be paid by Iraq should not exceed 30 per cent of the annual value of its oil exports. 
The Security Council, 
Having considered the note of 30 May 1991 of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to 
paragraph 13 of his report of 2 May 1991 (S/22559) which was also annexed to his letter 
(S/22661), of 30 May 1991 addressed to the President of the Security Council, 
Acting under Chapter Vll of the Charter, 
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1 - Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for his note of 30 May 1991 which 
was annexed to his letter to the President of the Security Council of the same date (S/22661); 
2 - Decides that in accordance with the suggestion made by the Secretary-General in 
paragraph 7 of his note of 30 May 1991, compensation to be paid by Iraq (as in arising from 
section E of resolution 687) shall exceed 30 percent of the annual value of the exports of 
petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq; 
3 - Decides further, in accordance with paragraph 8 of the Secretary-General's note of 30 
May 1991, to review the figure established in paragraph 2 above from time to time in light of 
data and assumptions contained in the letter of the Secretary-General (S/22661) and other 
relevant developments. 
1 / Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-sixth Year, Supplement for April, May and 
June f99t ,document S/22559. 
2 / Ibid, document S/22661. 
Resolution 712 
S/RES/712(1991). 19 September 1991 
Security Council resolution confinning the $1.6 billion ceiling for Iraqi oil sales and authorizing 
the release of funds to meet Iraq's essential civilian needs. 
The Security Council, 
Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, and in particular resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 
1990, 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991, 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 688 (1991) of 5 April 1991,692 
(1991) of 20 May 1991, 699 (1991) of 17 June 1991, and 705 (1991) and 706 (1991) of 15 
August 1991, 
Expressing its appreciation for the report submitted by the Seaetary-General on 4 September 
1991 pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution 706 (1991), 1/ 
Reaffimning its concem about the nutritional and health situation of the Iraqi civilian population 
and the risk of a further deterioration of this situation, and underiining the need in this context 
for fully up-to-date assessments of the situation in all parts of Iraq as a basis for the equitable 
distribution of humanitarian relief to all segments of the Iraqi civilian population. 
Recalling that the activities to be carried out by or on behalf of the Secretary-General to meet 
the purposes referred to in resolution 706 (1991) and the present resolution enjoy the 
privileges and immunities of the United Nations, 
Acting under the Chapter Vll of the Charter of the United Nations, 
1 - Confimns the figure mentioned in paragraph 1 of resolution 706 (1991) as the sum 
authorized for the purpose of that paragraph, and reaffirms its intention to review this sum on 
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the basis of its ongoing assessment of the needs and requirements, in accordance with 
paragraph 1 (d) of that resolution; 
2 - Invites the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) conceming 
the situation between Iraq and Kuwait to authorize immediately, pursuant to paragraph 1 (d) 
of resolution 706 (1991), the release by the Secretary- General from the escrow account of 
the first one-third portion of the sum refen-ed to in paragraph 1 above, such release to take 
place as required subject to the availability of funds in the account and, in the case of 
payments to finance the purchase of foodstuffs, medicines and materials and supplies for 
essential civilian needs that have been notified or approved in accordance with existing 
procedures, subject to compliance with the procedures laid down in the report of the 
Secretary-General 1/ as approved in paragraph 3 below; 
3 - Approves the recommendations contained in paragraphs 57 (d) and 58 of the Secretary-
General's report; 
4 - Encourages the Secretary-General and the Committee to cooperate, in close consultation 
with the Govemment of Iraq, on a continuing basis to ensure the most effective 
implementation of the scheme approved in the present resolution; 
5 - Decides that petroleum and petroleum products subject to resolution 706 (1991) shall, 
while under Iraqi title, be immune from legal proceedings and not be subject to any from of 
attachment, gamishment or execution, and that all States shall take any steps that may be 
necessary under their respective domestic legal systems to assure this protection and to 
ensure laid down in resolution 706 (1991); 
6 - Reaffimis that the escrow account to be established by the United Nations and 
administered by the Secretary-General to meet the purposes of resolution 706 (1991) and the 
present resolution, like the United Nations Compensation Fund established by resolution 692 
(1991), enjoys the privileges and immunities of the United Nations; 
7 - Reaffinns also that the inspectors and other experts on mission for the United Nations, 
appointed for the present resolution, enjoy privileges and immunities in accordance with the 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 21 and demands that Iraq 
allow them full freedom of movement and all necessary facilities; 
8 - Confimns that funds contributed from other sources may, if desired, in accordance with 
paragraph 1 ( c ) of resolution 706 (1991), be deposited into the escrow account as a %ub-
account and be immediately available to meet Iraq's humanitarian needs as refen-ed to in 
paragraph 20 of resolution 687 (1991) without any of the obligatory deductions and 
administrative costs specified in paragraph 2 and 3 of resolution 706 (1991); 
9 - Urges that any provision to Iraq of foodstuffs, medicines or other items of a humanitarian 
character, in addition to those purchased with the funds referred to in paragraph 1 above, be 
undertaken through arrangements that assure their equitable distribution to meet 
humanitarian needs; 
280 
10 - Requests the Secretary-General to take the actions necessary to implement the above 
decisions, and authorizes him to enter into any an-angements or agreements necessary to 
accomplish this; 
11 - Calls upon States to cooperate fully in the implementation of resolution 706 (1991) and 
the present resolution, in particular with respect to any measures regarding the import of 
petroleum and petroleum products and the export of foodstuffs, medicines and materials and 
supplies for essential civilian needs as referred to in paragraph 20 of resolution 687 (1991), 
and also with respect to the privileges and immunities of the United Nations and its personnel 
implementing the present resolution, and to ensure that there are no diversions from the 
purposes laid down in these resolution; 
12 - Decides to remain seized of the matter. 
1/ Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-sixth Year, Supplement for July, August and 
September 1991, S/23006 and Corr.2. 
Resolution 715 
S/RES/715 (1991). 11 October 1991 
Security Council resolution approving the plans submitted by the Secretary-General (S/ 22871 
Rev.1, 2 October 1991) and the Director General of IAEA 
(S/22872 Rev.1, 20 September 1991) 
The Security Council, 
Recalling its resolutions 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991 and 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991, and its 
other resolution on this matter. 
Recalling in particular that under resolution 687 (1991) the Secretary-General and the 
Director General of the Intemational Atomic Energy Agency were requested to develop plans 
future ongoing monitoring and verification, and top submit them to the Security Council for 
approval. 
Taking note of the report and note of the Secretary-General, 1/transmitting the plans 
submitted by the Secretary-General and Director General of the Intemational Atomic Energy 
Agency, 
Acting under Chapter Vll of the Charter of the United Nations, 
1 - Approves, in accordance with the provisions of resolution 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and the 
present resolution, the plans submitted by the Secretary-General and the Director General of 
Intemational Atomic Energy Agency; 1/ 
2 - Decides that the Special Commission shall carry out the plan submitted by the Secretary-
General, 2/ as well as continuing to discharge its other responsibilities under resolutions 687 
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(1991), 699 (1991), and 707 (1991) and perfonning such other functions as are conferred 
upon it under the present resolution; 
3 - Requests the Director General of the Intemational Atomic Energy Agency to cany out, 
with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission, the plan submitted by him 3/ 
and to continue to discharge his other responsibilities under resolution 687 (1991), 699 (1991) 
and 707 (1991); 
4 - Decides that the Special Commission, in the exercise of its responsibilities as a subsidiary 
organ of the Security Council, shall: 
a) Continue to have the responsibility for designating additional locations for inspection and 
over flights; 
b) Continue to render assistance and cooperation to the Director General of the Intemational 
Atomic Energy Agency, by providing him by mutual agreement with the necessary special 
expertise and logistical, infonnational and other operational support for the carrying out of the 
plan submitted by him; 
c) Perfonn such other functions, in cooperation in the nuclear field with the Director General 
of the Intemational Atomic Energy Agency, as may be necessary to coordinate activities 
under the plans approved by the present resolution, including making use of commonly 
available services and information to the fullest extent possible, in order to achieve maximum 
efficiency and optimum use of resources; 
5 - Demands that Iraq meet unconditionally all its obligations under the plans approved by the 
present resolution and cooperate fully with the Special Commission and the Director General 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency in canying out the plans; 
6 - Decides to encourage the maximum assistance, in cash and in kind, from all Member 
States to support the Special Commission and the Director General of the Intemational 
Atomic Energy Agency in carrying out their activities under the plans approved by the present 
resolution, without prejudice to Iraq's liability for the full costs of such activities; 
7 - Requests the Committee established under resolution 661 (1990), the Special 
Commission and the Director General of the Intemational Atomic Energy Agency to develop 
in cooperation a mechanism for monitoring any future sales or supplies by other countries to 
Iraq of items relevant to the implementation of section C of resolution 687 (1991) and other 
relevant resolution, including the present resolution and the plans approved hereunder; 8 -
Requests the Secretary-General and the Director General of the Intemational Atomic Energy 
Agency to submit to the Security Council reports on the implementation of the plans approved 
by the present resolution, when requested by the Security Council and in any event at least 
every six months after the adoption of this resolution ; 
9 - Decides to remain seized of the matter. 
1/ Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-sixth year. Supplement for October, 
November and December 1991, document S/2871/Rev. 1. 
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^/lbid., document S/22872/Rev. 1 and Corr. 1. 
Resolution 778 
S/RES/778 (1992). 2 October 1992 
Security Council resolution concerning Iraq's assets frozen outside Iraq. 
The Security Council, 
Recalling its previous relevant resolution and in particular resolutions 706 (1991) of 15 August 
1991 and 712 (1991) of 19 September 1991, 
Taking note of the Letter of 15 July 1992 from the Secretary-General to the President of the 
Security Council on Iraq's compliance with the obligations placed on it by resolution 687 
(1991) of 3 April subsequent resolution. 
Condemning Iraq's continued failure to comply with its obligations under relevant resolution. 
Reaffirming its concem about the nutritional and health situation of the Iraqi civilian 
population, and the risk of a further deterioration of this situation, and recalling in this regard 
that resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991) provide a mechanism for providing humanitarian 
relief to the Iraq population, and that resolution 688 (1991) of 5 April 1991 provides a basis for 
humanitarian relief efforts in Iraq, 
Having regard to the fact that period of six months referred to in resolutions 706 (1991) and 
712 (1991) expired on 18 March 1992, 
Deploring Iraq's refusal to cooperate in the implementation of resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 
(1991), which puts its civilian population at risk and which results in the failure by Iraq to meet 
its obligations under relevant Council resolutions. 
Recalling that the escrow account provided for in resolution 706 (1991) and 712 (1991) will 
consist of Iraqi funds administered by the Secretary-General which will be used to bay 
contributions to the United Nations Compensation Fund, the full costs of canying out the 
tasks authorized in section C of resolution 687 (1991), the full costs incured by the United 
Nations in facilitating the return of all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, half the costs of the 
United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission and the cost to the United 
Nations of implementing resolution 706 (1991) and of other necessary humanitarian activities 
in Iraq, 
Recalling that Iraq, as stated in paragraph 16 of the resolution 687 (1991), is liable for all 
direct damages resulting from its invasion and occupation of Kuwait, without prejudice to its 
debts and obligations arising prior to 2 August 1990, which will de addressed through the 
normal mechanisms. 
Recalling its decision in resolution 692 (1991) of 20 May 1991 that the requirement for Iraqi 
contributions to the Compensation Fund applies certain Iraqi petroleum and petroleum 
products exported from Iraq before 3 April 1991, 
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Acting under Chapter Vll of the Charter of the United Nations, 
1 - Decides that all States in which there are funds of the government of Iraq, or its Stare 
bodies, corporations, or agencies, that represent the proceeds of sale of Iraqi petroleum or 
petroleum products, paid for, by or on behalf of the purchaser on or after 6 August 1990, shall 
cause the transfer of those funds (or equivalent amounts) as soon as possible to the escrow 
account provided for in resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991) provided that this paragraph 
shall not require any State to cause the transfer of such funds in excess of 200 million United 
States dollars or to cause the transfer of more than 50 per cent of the total funds transferred 
or contributed pursuant to paragraphs 1 to 3 of the present resolution and further provided 
that States may exclude from the operation of this paragraph any funds which have already 
been released to a claimant or supplier prior to the adoption of the present resolution, or any 
other funds subject to or required to satisfy the rights of third parties, at the time of the 
adoption of the present resolution; 
2 - Also decides that all States in which there are petroleum or petroleum products owned by 
the govemment of Iraq, or its State bodies, corporations, or agencies, shall take all feasible 
steps to purchase or arrange for the sale of such petroleum or petroleum products at fair 
market value, and thereupon to transfer the proceeds as soon as possible to the escrow 
account provided for in resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991); 
3 - Urges all States to contribute funds from other sources to the escrow account as soon as 
possible; 
4 - Decides further that all States shall provide the Secretary-General with any infomnation 
needed for the effective implementation of the present resolution and that they shall take the 
necessary measures to ensure that banks and other bodies and persons provide all relevant 
infomnation necessary to identify the funds referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above and 
details of any transactions relating thereto, or the said petroleum or petroleum products, with 
a view to such information being utilized by all States and by the Secretary-General in the 
effective implementation of the present 
resolution; 
5 - Requests the Secretary-General; 
a) To ascertain the whereabouts and amounts of the said petroleum and petroleum products 
and the proceeds of sale referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above, drawing on the work 
already done under the auspices of the United Nations Compensation Commission, and 
report the results to the Council as soon as possible; 
b) To ascertain the of United Nations activities conceming the elimination of weapons of mass 
destmction, the provision of humanitarian relief in Iraq, and the other United Nations 
operations specified in paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 706 (1991); 
c) To take the following actions: 
I) To transfer to the United Nations Compensation Fund, from the funds refen-ed to in 
paragraphs 1 and 2 above, the percentage referred to in paragraph 10 below; and 
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ii) To use the remainder of funds refen-ed to in paragraphs 1 to 3 for the costs of United 
Nations activities conceming the elimination of weapons of destmction, the provision of 
humanitarian relief in Iraq, and the other United Nations operations specified in paragraphs 2 
and 3 of resolution 706 (1991), taking into account any preference expressed by States 
transferring or contributing funds as to the allocation of such funds among these purposes; 
6 - Decides that for so long as oil exports take place pursuant to the system provide in 
resolution 706 (1991) and 712 (1991) or to the eventual lifting of sanctions pursuant to 
paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991)implementation of paragraphs 1 to 5 above shall be 
suspended and all proceeds of those oil exports shall immediately be transferred by the 
Secretary-General in the currency in which the transfer to the escrow account was made, to 
the accounts or States from which funds had been provided under paragraphs 1 to 3 above, 
to the extent required to replace in full the amounts so provided (together with applicable 
interest), and that, if necessary for this purpose, any other funds remaining in the escrow 
account shall similariy be transferred to those accounts or States, provided, however, that the 
Secretary-General may retain and use any funds urgently needed for the purposes specified 
in paragraph 5 ( c ) (ii) above; 
7 - Deddes that the operation of the present resolution shall have no effect on rights, debts 
and claims existing with respect to funds prior to their transfer to the escrow account; and that 
the accounts from which such funds were transferred shall be kept open for retransfer of the 
funds in question; 
8 - Reaffinns that the escrow account referred to in the present resolution, like the 
Compensation Fund, enjoys the privileges and immunity from legal proceedings, or any forms 
of attachment, garnishment or execution; and that no claim shall lie at the instance of any 
person or body in connection with any action taken in compliance with or implementation of 
the present resolution; 
9 - Requests the Secretary-General to repay, from any available funds in the escrow 
account, any sum transferred under the present resolution to the account or State from which 
it was transferred, it the transfer is found at any time by him not to have b>een of funds subject 
to the present resolution; a request for such a finding could be made by State from which the 
funds were transferred; 
10 - Confimis that the percentage of the value of exports of petroleum and petroleum 
products from Iraq for payment to the Compensation Fund shall, for the purpose of the 
present resolution and exports of petroleum or petroleum products subject to paragraph 6 of 
resolution 692 (1991), be the same as the percentage decided by the Security Council in 
paragraph 2 of resolution 705 (1991) of 15 August 1991, until such time as the Goveming 
Council of the Compensation Fund may decide otherwise; 
11 - Decides that no further Iraqi assets shall be released for purposes set forth in paragraph 
20 of resolution 687 (1991) except to the sub-account of the escrow account established 
pursuant to paragraph 8 of resolution 712 (1991), or directly to the United Nations for 
humanitarian activities in Iraq; 
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12 - Decides that, for the purposes of the present resolution and other relevant resolution, 
the tenm "petroleum products" does not include petrochemical derivatives; 
13 - Calls upon all States to cooperate fully in the implementation of the present resolution; 
14 - Decides to remain seized of this matter. 
Resolution 806 
S/RES/806(1993). 5 February 1993 
Security Council resolution conceming UNIKOM. 
The Security Council, 
Reaffirming its resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, in particular paragraphs 2 to 5 thereof, 
and its resolution 689 (1991) of 9 April 1991 and 773 (1992) of 26 August 1992, and its other 
resolutions on this matter. 
Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 18 and 19 January 1993, 1/ 
Noting with approval that work is being completed on the realignment of the demilitarized 
zone referred to in paragraph 5 of resolution 687 (1991) to correspond to the intemational 
boundary demarcated by the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission, 
Deeply concerned at recent actions by Iraq in violation of relevant Security Council resolution, 
including the series of border incidents involving the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation 
Mission, 
Recalling the statements made by the President on behalf of the Council on 812 and 11 
January 3/1993, 
Acting under Chapter Vll of the Charter of the United Nations, 
1 - underiines once again its guarantee of the inviolability of the intemational boundary 
between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq and its decision to take as appropriate 
all necessary measures to that end in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as 
provided for in paragraph 4 of resolution 687 (1991); 
2 - Approves the report of the Secretary-General, and decides to extend the tenms of 
reference of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission to include the functions 
contained in paragraph 5 of the report; 
3 - Requests the Secretary-General to plan and execute a phased deployment of the 
strengthening of the Mission, taking into account the need for economy and other relevant 
factors and to report to the Council on any 
step he intends to take following an initial deployment; 
4 - Reaffinms that the question of termination or continuation of the Mission and the 
modalities of the Mission will continue to be reviewed every six months pursuant to 
paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 689 (1991), the next review to take place in April 1993; 
5 - Decides to remain seized of the matter. 
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1 / Official Records of the Security Council, Fortti-eighth Year, Supplement for January, 
February and t^arch f993,documnts S/25123 and Add.1. 
2 / S/25081. 
3/S/25091. 
Resolution 833 
S/RES/833(1993).27 May 1993 
Security Council resolution concerning the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission. 
The Security Council, 
Reaffiming its resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, in particular paragraphs 2 to 4 thereof, 
and its resolutions 689 (1991) of 9 April 1991,773 (1992) of 26 August 1992, and 806 (1993) 
of February 1993, 
Recalling the report of the Secretary-General of 2 May 1991 concerning the establishment of 
the United Nations Iraq- Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission, 1/the subsequent 
exchange of Letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council 
dated 6 and 13 May 1991, 2/ and the acceptance of the report by Iraq and Kuwait, 
Having considered the Letter dated 21 May 1993 from the Secretary-General 
to the President of the Security Council 3/ transmitting the final report of the Commission, 
Recalling in this connection that through demarcation process the Commission was not 
reallocating territory between Kuwait and Iraq, but was simply canying out the technical task 
necessary to demarcate for the first time the precise coordinates of the boundary set out in 
the "Agreed Minutes between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq regarding the 
resolution of friendly relations, recognition and related matters" 4/ signed by them on 4 
October 1963, and that this task was carried out in the special circumstances following Iraq's 
invasion of Kuwait and pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) and the report of the Secretary-
General regarding implementation of paragraph 3 of that resolution, 1/ 
Reminding Iraq of its obligations under resolution 687(1991). In particular paragraph 2 
thereof, and under other relevant resolutions of the Council, and of its acceptance of the 
Council resolutions adopted pursuant to Chapter VII of the United Nations, which acceptance 
fonns the basis for the cease-fire. 
Noting with approval the Secretary-General's instruction to the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait 
Observation Mission to finalize the realignment of the demilitarized zone with the entire 
international boundary between Iraq and Kuwait demarcated by the Commission, 
Welcoming the Secretary-General's decision to make the necessary arrangements for the 
maintenance of the physical representation of the boundary, as recommended by the 
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Commission in section X.C of its report, until other technical arrangements are established 
between Iraq and Kuwait for this purpose, 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, 
1 - Welcomes the Letter dated 21 May 1993 from the Secretary-General to the President of 
the Security Council 3/ and the 20 May 1993 report of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait 
Boundary Demarcation Commission transmitted therewith; 
2 - Welcomes also the successful conclusion of the work of the Commission; 3 - Expresses 
its appreciation to the Commission for its work on the land part of the boundary as well as the 
Khawr'AbdAllah or offshore section of the boundary, and welcomes its demarcation decisions; 
4 - Reaffirms that the decisions of the Commission regarding the demarcation of the 
boundary are final; 
5 - Demands that Iraq and Kuwait, in accordance with international law and relevant Security 
Council resolutions, respect the inviolability of the international boundary, as demarcated by 
the Commission, and the right to navigational access; 
6 - Underlines and reaffirms its decision to guarantee the inviolability of the above-mentioned 
international boundary which has been finally demarcated by the Commission and to take as 
appropriate all necessary measures to that end in accorclance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, as provided for in paragraph 4 of resolution 687 (1991) and paragraph 4 of resolution 
773 (1992); 
7 - Decides to remain seized of the matter. 
1/See Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-sixtfi Year, Supplement for April, May 
and June 799y,document S/22558. 
2/ S/22592 and S/22593 respectively. See Official Records ofttie Security Council, Forty-
sixtti Year, Resolutions and Decisions ofttie Secuiity Council, 1991,p. 17. 
3/ Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-eighth Year, Supplement for April, May and 
June 7993,documents S/25811 and Add.1. 
4/ United Nations, Treaty Senes,vol.485, No. 7063. 
Appendix 3: Correspondence of State Officials Pain to the Crisis 
A 
The Letter of Tarek Aziz, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, dated 15 April, 1990 to the 
Arab League Secretary General 
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Brother Al Chadhli Al Quiaibi, Secretary General of the Arab League. 
At the beginning I have the bring up the principles in which Iraq believes and which it has 
honestly and painstakingly applied in its Arab relations. Iraq believes that the Arabs 
throughout their respective countries are one nation. The well being of one country must 
extend and be accessible to them all, and the infliction or grief that befalls any one country 
must also be suffered by them all. Iraq sees the wealth's of the nation in the light of these 
principles and has been using its own wealth accordingly. 
Iraq also believes that despite the various sorts of partition. Humiliation, persecution and 
attempts to metamorphose the national character of the Arab Nation at the hands of the 
Ottoman rulers and later under westem colonization, the mainstays of Arab Unity are still 
viable and strong. Iraq believes that the Arab Homeland, though divided into countries, is one 
homeland and that any inch of it here or there in this or that country must be seen first of all in 
the light of national considerations, particulariy the common Arab national security; 
The pitfalls of narrow perspective and selfishness must be avoided in dealing with the 
interests and rights of this or that country. Moreover, the higher interests of the Arab Nation 
and the higher strategic calculations of Arab National Security must always be bome in mind 
as the first criterion in dealing with such matters between the Arab countries. Basing itself on 
these national, brotheriy, sincere and honest principles, Iraq has been dealing with Kuwait 
despite the well known facts of the past and present of both countries. 
We were prompted to write this letter by the fact that most regrettably, we came to be faced 
by a Kuwaiti attitude that deviates from the framewori^ of the stated national concepts; it even 
contradicts and threatens these very concepts and mns against the simplest constituents of 
Arab relations. Officials in the Kuwaiti government, despite our sincere brotheriy positions 
towards them in all issues and our keenness to maintain a brotheriy dialogue with them at all 
times, have constantly, premeditated and deliberately sought to scourge and encroach on 
Iraq. They even made a point of enfeebling Iraq after the intemecine 8 - year war in which 
Iraq was defending the Arab Nation, especially the Gulf states and even more particulariy 
Kuwait, as affimned by all honest Arab leaders, thinkers and citizens including Gulf States' 
leaders. The government of Kuwait also adopted this emasculating policy at a time when Iraq 
was confronting a frantic Zionist imperialist campaign because of its national attitudes in 
defending the Arab right; sadly, the Kuwaiti policy was invoked by selfish motives, a narrow 
perspective and ends that can no longer be regarded as anything but suspicious and 
alarming. There are two major points in this respect; 
First: It is well known that since the days of colonization and partitions imposed on the Arab 
Nation there has been a pending issue between Iraq and Kuwait conceming the borders. 
Contacts in the sixties and seventies failed to carve out a solution to this issue until the 
outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war. During the long war years in particular while the valiant sons of 
Iraq were sacrificing their precious blood on the fronts in defense of the Arab lands including 
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the land of Kuwait - and Arab sovereignty and dignity - incorporating the dignity of Kuwait-
the Kuwaiti government took advantage of Iraq's entanglement as well as Iraq's genuine 
national principles and noble Approach in dealing with the brothers and national issues to 
carry out a plot with the aim of raising the note of piecemeal calculated advance on the 
territory of Iraq. It embari^ed on establishing military and oil installations, police stations and 
farms on the Iraqi territories. We actually closed our eyes and only dropped a few hints and 
passing remarks that we considered sufficient within the framewori^ of brotheriy concepts 
which we believed to be adopted by all. However, procedures continued so schemingly and 
persistently asserting deliberateness and stratagem. 
After the liberation of Al Faw we were quick to infonn the Kuwaiti side at the 1988 Algeria 
summit of our true desire to solve this issue within brotheriy relations and the higher national 
interests, but found ourselves before a most surprising case. Although logic dictates that 
Kuwaiti officials should be delighted at this kind of brotheriy initiative on our part and should 
endeavor to bring the issue to a speedy conclusion, we noted that they were intentionally 
hesitant and reluctant to hold further negotiations and contacts, and even aroused affected 
complications while proceeding with their encroachments establishing more oil and military 
installations, police stations and famis on Iraqi temtories. Out of wisdom and forbearance, we 
reconciled ourselves to patience at such outrageous acts . 
We were markedly ready for more forbearance, but matters worsened to a perilous stage that 
silence could no longer be feasible, as will be shown in the second point which is the most 
serious. 
In fact, Iraq keeps a complete record of the issue pointing out with documents and details all 
deviations by the Kuwaiti government. 
Second : A few months ago, more specifically since Iraq has clamored forcefully for restoring 
the Arab rights to Palestine and alerted the Arabs to the hazards of the American presence in 
the Gulf, the Kuwaiti government began to adopt an unfair policy aimed at undermining the 
Arab Nation, particularly Iraq. 
In this respect the U.A.E government cooperated with Kuwait. They both carried out a 
planned dumping of the oil market with more production than their OPEC quota under flimsy 
excuses supported by neither logic nor justice or equity and pretexts advocated by none of 
the sisterty producing countries. This carefully designed policy caused a serious steep slump 
in oil prices. After the fall years before from highs of $ 34,29 and 28 per banrel, the acts of 
Kuwait and the Emirates conduced to a collapse in the modest minimum price finally 
approved by OPEC as $ 18 per ban-el to $ 11-13. With a simple calculafion we can figure out 
the huge losses inflicted on the Arab oil producing countries. 
( A ) The Arab oil production rate is 14 million barrel/ day and the price slump in the period 
between 1981-1991 caused losses to the Arab countries of about $500 billion, $89 billion of 
which suffered by Iraq. If all the Arabs had not lost these huge sums and saved half of them 
for national development and assistance for poorer Arab countries we would have achieved 
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significant progress in national development, gratified the poor of our nafion and secured for 
the nation a more powerful, affluent and advanced situation. 
According to the minimum price set by OPEC in 1987-$ 18/barrel -the losses of the Arab 
countries from 1987 to 1990 due to this price slump are estimated at $25 billion 
approximately. 
( B) Any dollar less in the price of oil leads to an annual loss of $1 billion for Iraq. Noticeably, 
the oil price fell this year to several dollars below 18 because of the policy adopted by the 
governments of Kuwait and the Emirates, which means a loss for Iraq estimated at several 
billions of its income this year at a time when Iraq is suffering from a finandal plight caused by 
the costs of legifimate defense of Iraqi territory, security and sanctities as well as the 
territories, security and sanctities of the Arabs all along the 8-year fierce fight. The grave 
losses caused by the slump in oil prices did not only plague the Arab producing countries but 
also other sisterty countries that received assistance from oil producers. Assistance 
potentialities diminished and even vanished in some cases, and institution of common Arab 
action faced deteriorating conditions and went through the hardest of times either for this 
reason or for taking it as a pretext to reduce or stop the assistance and support extended to 
such institutions. 
Moreover, the government of Kuwait added another deliberate offence aimed at injuring Iraq 
in particular when it started to establish since 1980 under the hard conditions of war-oil 
installations on the southern part of Iraqi Rumeila oil field and drew oil from it, making clear 
that part of the oil with which it dumped the worid market was the oil stolen from the Iraqi 
Rumeila oil field. This way Kuwait inflicted heavy damage twice on Iraq: first by impairing its 
economy at a time of dire need and second by stealing its wealth. 
The value of the oil drawn by the government of Kuwait from Al Rumeila oil field in this 
unbrotheriy manner is estimated at $2400 million according to the prices of 1980 - 1990. And 
we are recording before the Arab League and all the Arab countries the right of Iraq to restore 
the amounts stolen from "its wealth, as well as the right of Iraq to demand from the concemed 
party to redress the aggression and injury inflicted on the country. 
We have frequentiy explained the dangers involved in the policy of the U.A.E and Kuwait 
governments on our brothers in the Arab oil - producing countries, including Kuwait and 
U.A.E. We have complained and wamed. And at the Baghdad Summit President Saddam 
Hussein spoke about the issue before Kings, Presidents and Princes in the presence of the 
parties concemed frankly and in a spirit of fratemity (the text of his Excellency's at the summit 
is enclosed). We though that the governments of U.A.E. and Kuwait would rectify their 
approach, especially after the positive fraternal atmosphere of the Baghdad Summit. The 
painful truth, however, is that despite all our endeavors and contacts with sisteriy countries in 
order to urge for a positive role in dissuading the U.A.E. and Kuwaiti govemments, as well as 
the address of President Saddam Hussein at the Baghdad Summit, both govemments 
deliberately and persistently proceeded with their policy; some of tbeir officials even made 
brazen statements when we hinted at these facts and complained . Therefore, there is no way 
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now to exclude the conclusion that all the acts of the governments of Kuwait and the U.A.E. in 
this regard are merely a planned policy with cloudy objectives. And though we realize that this 
policy which caused a collapse in oil prices would ulfimately impair the economy of Kuwait 
and U.A.E. themselves, we can only conclude that whoever adopted, supported or urged to 
this policy purposefully, directly and overtly is merely carrying out part of the imperialist Zionist 
plot against Iraq and ttie Arab Nation, particulariy at such critical time when the Nation in 
general and Iraq in particular are alanningly threatened by Israel and imperialism, for how 
would we face this dangerous threat and keep the balance of power achieved by Iraq at a 
dear cost: heavy losses during the war with the collapse of the main resource of Iraq and the 
other Arab oil exporting countries - Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Yemen, Egypt, Syria, Algeria 
and Labia This suspicious policy would also undermine the capability of these Arab countries 
to face their thorny fate-detemiining economic and social problems. So, where are the 
governments of the U.A.E. and Kuwait dragging the Arab Nation at this critical, delicate 
juncture whose policies and objectives do they wish to fulfil. We have explained the whole 
matter to all the brothers. We also asked both governments directly to desist from this 
oppressive devastating policy and put forth the precarious detriments involved before, during 
and after the Baghdad Summit. We sent envoys and dispatched letters. All this done to no 
avail, we can only condemn the acts of the governments of the Emirates and Kuwait for their 
aggression on Iraq as well as the Arab Nation. 
As for the government of Kuwait, it has made a two-fold aggression. It has transgressed the 
rights of Iraq by encroaching on our territories and oil fields and looted our nafional wealth, 
acts which represent military aggression; by the same token, the govemment of Kuwait is 
intenfionally seeking a collapse in Iraqi economy at a fime when Iraq is subject to a bmtal 
Zionist imperialist threat, an act equally disruptive as milrtary aggression. 
We are exposing these painful facts before the Arab brothers hoping that they will raise their 
voices to put an end to this premeditated deliberate aggression and advise the deviants to go 
back to the right conduct that takes into consideration the common national interest and the 
requirements of common national security. 
( c ) Talking about the higher national interests and how the Arab wealth is liked to the destiny 
of the Arab Nation, we would like to present the following proposal: 
If all oil producing and non-producing Arab countries establish strong political collaboration 
and agree to raise the oil price to over $25, then set up an Arab fund for assistance and 
development- agreed on at Amman Summit- to be financed by a dollar sold by producer 
countries for more than $25, the total accmed to the fund will de $5 billion annually in addition 
to simultaneous increase in the incomes of oil exporting countries. The Arab solidarity created 
by this fair price would definitely increase their incomes and protect them from any hostile 
attempt aimed at debilitating the Arab power through oil wealth resources. 
We can envisage how such a fixed amount could enhance Arab national security and provide 
growth potentialities for all countries that would help them face the suffocating economic 
straits from which most of our countries suffer. 
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Iraq is putting forth this proposal for serious consideration, and pemaps the next Arab Summit 
in Cairo will be a good opportunity to discuss and adopt it. 
( d ) Talking about these painful facts, we find it necessary to clear the muddle that might be 
felt by some brothers about the (assistance) given by Kuwait and the Emirates to Iraq during 
the war. 
1 - All the honest Arabs in the Arab homeland unanimously agreed that the war to which Iraq 
was driven was not only to defend Iraqi sovereignty but also to protect the eastern gate to the 
Arab homeland as well as the Arab homeland itself, especially the Gulf region, as 
emphasized by the Gulf leaders themselves in very expressive ternis. The war, therefore, a 
"national battle" in which Iraq undertook the task of defending national security and the 
security of the Gulf region in particular 
2 - During the war, Iraq received diverse assistance from the brothers in some Gulf States, 
prominently interest- free (loans). Such (assistance) characterized the eariy stages of the war 
and has been withdrawn since 1982. At that time Iraq did not discuss the fomnula of the 
assistance with its Arab brothers because it hoped that war would not drag on as it actually 
did and that after the war it would restore its full economic power. 
However, war dragged on and costs tremendously increased. To mention only an example, 
the value of the military installations bought by Iraq in hard currency was as high as $102 
billion, apart from the other exorbitant military and civilian costs of an 8-year war on a 1200 
Kilometer long front. 
And although all the (assistance) received by Iraq from "its brothers only represented a modest 
percentage as compared to the huge costs borne by the Iraqi economy and the Iraqi people 
who sacrificed rivers of blood in defense of national sovereignty and dignity, the leadership of 
Iraq has expressed deep gratitude to all the brothers who extended assistance. President 
Saddam Hussein has publicly voiced his thankfulness during the visits of a number of Gulf 
Heads of State to Iraq. However, the bitter truth that must be leamed by every Arab is that the 
larger part of this assistance, including the assistance of Kuwait and the Emirates, is still 
recorded as a "debt" on Iraq. More than a year ago, we talked in a spirit of brothemood with 
the creditors about writing off the "debt", but they just dodged the issue. 
Also recorded as a debt on Iraq are the amounts of oil sold by Kuwait for Iraq from the Khafji 
area after dosing the Iraqi pipeline passing across Syria though these amounts were sold 
outside its OPEC quota. For full details about this subject, an important point should be 
clarified concerning the happenings in the oil mari<et during the war. Iraq had been a major 
producer before the war with a production of about 3.6 million barrels daily. When war broke 
out production came to a halt for several months and was later resumed with meager 
quantities exported aaoss Turi^ey then Syria until the pipeline was put out of commission in 
1982. In September 1980, Iraqi oil exports were suspended in the south until the pipeline 
passing across Saudi Arabia was operated in September 1985. This large decrease in 
exports cost Iraq huge sums amounting to $106 billion which were practically transferred to 
the treasuries of the other producer countries in the region whose exports increased to make 
293 
up for the fall in Iraq oil exports for a period of eight years. By a simple calculation we can 
figure out that the (debts) due to the Emirates and Kuwait were not totally from the aggregate 
increases in their earnings caused by low Iraqi exports in wartime. 
We are wondering : in the light of the fact that Iraq has shouldered the responsibility of 
defending Arab nafional security, sovereignty and dignity as well as the wealth of the Gulf 
states which would have come to nothing had Iraq lost the war, can the assistance given to 
Iraq be considered a (debt) 
The Unfied States presented huge sums derived from the taxes paid by American citizens as 
assistance to the Soviet Union and its westem allies during Wortd War II, though they are not 
sons of the same nafion. Even after the war it spent other huge sums on the Marshal Plan to 
rebuild Europe and acted with a comprehensive strategic view taking into account its own 
security as well as that of intemafional groups to which it belonged and with which it 
participated in a war against a mutual enemy then, how can these sums still be considered a 
(debt) on Iraq to its brothers in the Arab Nafion though Iraq has sacrificed many times as 
much as this (debt) throughout the years of the fierce war, as well as rivers of blood shed by 
the flower of its youth while defending the land, dignity, honor and wealth of the nafion given 
the American precedent, do not nafionalist logic of regional security dictate on these countries 
not only cancel the Iraqi (debt) but also to draw an Arab plan along the lines of the (Marshal 
Plan) to compensate Iraq for some of its war losses this is how the nationalist logic would be if 
there is a sense of Arabism and Arab belonging as well as a serious attitude towards national 
security. Regrettably, however, instead of this logical responsible approach, the two Gulf 
governments whose wealth's, have been preserved through the blood sacrificed by the sons 
of Iraq, and even increased because of the fall in Iraqi oil production, are both attempfing to 
min the economy of Iraq and reduce Iraqi resources. One of them- the govemment of Kuwait-
is deliberately encroaching on the territory and wealth of those who have protected the 
territory, honor and wealth of Kuwait. 
We are putting these painful facts before the conscience of every honest Arab, prominently 
the brotheriy people of Kuwait, to realize the agony, detriment and injury that have been and 
still are inflicted on us. 
For this purpose, I am requesting of the Secretary General to distribute this letter to the Arab 
countries. 
Best wishes and reganjs. 
Tarek Aziz 
Foreign Minister of Iraq 
Baghdad on Thoulhejja 23, 1410 H 
July 15*, 1990. 
B 
294 
The Letter of Sheikh Sabah Al Ahmad, Deputy Prinne Minister and Foreign 
Minister, dated 18 July, 1990 to Al Chadhli Al Quiaibi, Secretary General of 
the Arab League, in reply to the Iraqi letter: 
Your Excellency, Mr. Al Chadhli Al Quiaibi, Secretary General of the Arab League, 
We received with much surprise and amazement the memorandum directed to your 
Excellency by the Iraqi govemment dated Thoulhejja 23 rd, 1410 H - July 15'^ 1990- which 
was distributed to the sisteriy Arab countries in the Arab League. It included groundless 
claims and accusations against Kuwait as well as words that disagree with the spirit of 
brotherhood exisfing between Kuwait and Iraq and contradict the simplest mies that we are all 
keen to base our Arab relafions upon. More surprisingly still, the memo comes at an important 
and delicate juncture for the Arab Nafion which calls for concentrafing all Arab efforts on fate-
determining issues after a bloody atrocious war in the region. 
It really is painful that the Arab League held an emergency meefing to consider the Zionist 
and imperialist threats to the Arab worid only to wind up with such a memo that involves 
threats to member states. 
Expressing dissatisfaction at this memo, Kuwait would like to assure that it has dealt with the 
sisteriy Arab countries and still does on the basis of a commitment to the principles and 
values stipulated in the Arab League Pact, particulariy those calling for enchanting bonds of 
fraternal relations, good neighborhood, non-interference in internal affairs and respect for the 
sovereignty of all countries, not to menfion the Arab values and ethics that govern relafions 
between brothers. Moreover, Kuwait has always been and still is the first to provide every 
opportunity for coherence in Arab relafions and exclusion of any impurity that might disturta 
their clearness. 
Kuwait is even more surprised that this memo by the sisteriy Iraq is sent at a fime when 
bilateral coordinafion is in process on all fronts of mutual interest to maintain the normal ever-
developing relafions between both countries. 
Kuwait had no intenfion to raise pending issues for discussion, in an atmosphere of fevered 
propaganda. So, it left the task of following up these issues to bilateral specialized 
committees to concentrate on developing the present fields of cooperation and aeating new 
more advanced domains with the aim of giving more prominence to cooperation over points of 
disagreement. 
On the other hand, the memo comes at a time when Kuwait is exerting well-meant efforts on 
all levels to promote security and stability in a region thirsty for a just peace. 
Your Excellency, 
It is striking that the memo which includes disparaging remari^ s against our relations with the 
sisteriy Iraq would come from Iraq itself that was the first caller for entente in Arab relations 
away from any disturbing taints to create a balance that would serve collective Arab action. 
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Out of faith in the importance of collective Arab action, Kuwait has made every endeavor to 
boost it and provide the favorable opportunity to support the process of development in the 
Arab homeland. The effective and impressive role played by Kuwaiti finance institutions ever 
since the independence of Kuwait is, perhaps, the best evidence of Kuwait's keenness to 
push the development process towards horizons that would meet the legitimate aspirations 
and interests of the sons of the Arab Nation. It is also widely known in this respect that Kuwait 
is the vanguard of worid countries income is for the most part devoted to assistance given 
mainly to the sisteriy Arab countries. 
Your Excellency, 
It is really painful that the memo involves the daim that Kuwait has sought to weaken Iraq, 
though it is publicly known that Kuwait has maintained a pro-Iraq attitude since the very start 
in fulfillment of her national principles and adherence to the didates of her national duties 
within the Arab League frameworic. Also publidy known is massive suffering borne by Kuwait 
because of this national attitude, culminating in dired aggressions against her temtories, oil 
installations, oil tankers and commerdal interests. But Kuwait kept her commitment to her 
principles and goals with her head up high amid the flames of intemedne war. Kuwait would 
not make public her support for sisteriy Iraq, believing that it is all up to Iraq itself whether to 
declare it or not. The shed Arab blood can by no means be equated with any material benefit, 
however large in figures and multifarious in sources. 
It is truly shameful that twisted ends find a way to obliterate tmths, thrusting lies upon a living 
history whose events are still vivid in minds. 
Surpassingly enough, such accusation against Kuwait is concomitant with revertaerating 
praise for the Kuwaiti attitude to Iraq through the statements of Iraqi offidals or the various 
Iraqi mass media. 
Your Excellency, 
The allegations included in the memo concerning the boundary line issue and the daim that 
Kuwait has escalated a piecemeal calculated advance on the territories of Iraq by establishing 
military and oil installations, police stations and famns on the Iraqi tenitories are all considered 
a falsification of reality and a presentation of reversed fads- Iraq having a long record of 
encroachments on the Kuwaiti territories supported by concrete evidences and kept by the 
parties concemed. 
Kuwait has constantly sought to demarcate the boundary between the two states and resolve 
the relevant pending problems. But Iraq used rejed any attempt to put an end to the issue, 
though during the war it attempted to settle finally the question of boundary demarcation with 
other neighboring sisteriy Arab countries. Affinning her keenness to settle this vital issue with 
Iraq and expressing convidion of her sound position and dictates of her national belonging, 
Kuwait leaves it to the discretion of the Nation to choose an Arab commission whose 
members are to be agreed upon in order to pass a judgement on the issue of tx)undary 
demarcation in accordance with the documents and treaties concluded between Kuwait and 
Iraq. 
296 
But would the sisteriy Iraq accept the Arab judgement in compliance with her principles and 
the spirit of the nafional pact proposed by His Excellency President Saddam Hussion. 
Your Excellency, 
A follow-up of the oil prices would obviously reveal that the fall of prices was the effect of a 
worid-wide problem involving several parties- producers and consumers- in and outside the 
OPEC. The govemment of Kuwait suffered just like Iraq from the production cut-back of the 
eighties, although it could produce at large capacity in view of the huge oil reserve it has. 
However, Kuwait committed itself to low production, despite the sacrifice involved, to preserve 
natural wealth and get to a better price level. 
As for the claim that Kuwait has been constructing oil installations since 1980 on the southern 
part of the Iraqi AIRumeila oil filed, the simple truth is that Kuwait started explorafion and 
prospection within its territories in 1963, but operafions were discontinued for reasons that 
Iraq knows very well. Drilling operafions were later resumed in 1976 and were completed to 
start production in the late sevenfies. 
Conceming the claim that Kuwait used to draw oil from the southem part of AIRumeila oil 
field, it has to be pointed out that this part of the field is within the Kuwaiti temtories. 
Therefore, Kuwait drew oil from wells within its tenitories south of the Arab League line and at 
a sufficient distance from international boundaries and according to intemafional 
measurements. 
Contrary to the Iraqi claims, producfion operafions are conducted within the Kuwaiti territories 
and Iraq has repeatedly attempted and still is to dig wells in Kuwaiti territories, causing 
massive detriment to the reserve of the Kuwaiti part of the oil field despite repeated Kuwaifi 
objections. And in spite of the Iraqi encroachments inside the Kuwaifi temtories, Kuwait did 
not wish to raise the question in the Arab arena, confining itself to bilateral contacts which it 
deemed sufficient. 
Your Excellency, 
Kuwait, expressing her readiness to study the proposal put fonward in the Iraqi memorandum 
conceming a fund for Arab assistance and development, believes in all sincerity that this 
proposal can be raised for discussion and consideration within the Arab League. But what 
Kuwait understands and does not accept is that the proposal be accompanied with 
defamafion of Kuwait, one of the leading callers for bases and mIes that would further 
collective Arab acfion in a way that meets the higher nafional interests of the Arab Nation. 
To conclude with, Kuwait, while relying only on facts to answer the Iraqi memo that represents 
a negative development in bilateral brotheriy relations, would like to warn against the hazards 
involved in such ways of dealing between brothers which would roll back our nafion to the 
circle of diversion away from the Arab fate-detenmining issues. To clarify the situafion, we are 
requesting of Your Excellency to distribute this memorandum to the sisteriy Arab countries. 
Best regards and wishes. 
Sabah Al Ahmad Al Jaber 
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Deputy Prime Minister and 
Foreign Minister. 
The Letter of Tarek Aziz, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, dated 21 July, 1990 to Mr. 
Al Chadhli Al Quiaibi, the Arab League Secretary General, in reply to the 
Kuwaiti answer: 
Your Excellency, Brother Al Shazli Al Quiaibi, the Arab League Secretary General. 
We have read the memo of the Kuwaiti government dated Thoulheijja 26,1410 H-July 18*^ 
1990 - and I would like first to comment on the opening expressions of surprise and 
amazement at my letter dated July 15*, 1990, a matter that refleds painful fads that were 
behind writing this letter of ours. 
The Kuwaiti govemment offidals who have deliberately injured Iraq and earned out a planned 
plot for years to make a gradual advance on the territories of Iraq and plunder the wealth of its 
people while Iraq was engrossed in war defending the sovereignty and dignity of the Arab 
Nation as well as the wealth of the Gulf States, these offidals are now surprised because we 
are exposing their ads before the Arab Nation after the failure of all brotheriy attempts on our 
part to dissuade them. They are surprised because they got used to taking advantage of our 
silence and patience for years and years. We threw a veil over our wound out of keenness to 
maintain our brotherty relations which they disregarded and safeguard the higher national 
interests which they intentionally made of 
In fad, the letter of the Kuwaiti govemment is full of fallades that can be easily uncovered in 
their falsification of the self- evident truths contained in our letter and attempt to divert 
attention from them using general tenns aimed at evading the injury and injustice inflided by 
the Kuwaiti govemment on Iraq. Following are some remari^s on the letter of the Kuwaiti 
govemment: 
1 - According to the letter of the Kuwaiti govemment "Kuwait is even more surprised that this 
memo by the sisteriy Iraq is sent a time when bilateral coordination is in process on all fronts". 
And we are asking the Kuwaiti govemment: what are the steps of coordination it has taken 
towards Iraq the truth that should be leamed by all Arabs is that the Kuwaiti offidals have 
been deliberately procrastinating and shunning any step towards serious coordination 
between the two countries. A case in point is the delay and procrastination shown in 
responding to the Iraqi offer to supply Kuwait with water from Shaft Al Arab out of a fratemal 
feeling for the brotherty people of Kuwait. 
There is also the question of the dired air passage between Iraq and Kuwait. During the war 
Iraq had to stop using the passage. And in November 1989, Iraq approached the Kuwaiti 
govemment through a letter from the Iraqi Minister of Transport and Communication to his 
Kuwaiti counterpart about reopening the passage, but the Kuwaiti govemment ignored the 
298 
request. Again in January 1990 the Iraqi Minister sent another letter to his Kuwaiti counterpart 
but received no reply. In Febmary, 1990 I personally approached the Kuwaifi Foreign Minister 
and appealed to him to resolve the matter, but no reply was received, which meant that Al 
Basra International Airport could operate as an intemafional airport after the war while Kuwait 
resumed operating air passage between her and Iran. Can this act be considered show of 
keenness to coordinate with the brothers as claimed by the Kuwaiti govemment. Events affirm 
that during the period from September 1980 to date Iraq was the first to take the initiative 
through visits to Kuwait aimed at effecting coordination in all mutual questions, including the 
questions mentioned in our letter of July 15^ ,^1990. If we count the visits paid by Iraqi officials 
to Kuwait, we would find them more then those paid by Kuwaifi officials to Iraq, another fact 
which points to the party that is truly keen on coordination. 
2 - The Kuwaifi memo was right in saying that "Iraq (was) the first caller for entente in Arab 
relafions away from any disturbing taints to create a balance that would serve collective Arab 
action". Iraq was, still is and will always be this way. However, it was the Kuwaiti govemment 
officials who violated these principles when they deliberately and premeditatedly inflicted 
injury on Iraq and encroached on its tenritories and right throughout the war years. Had they 
respected and observed these principles in their relations with Iraq who has always cherished 
affinity for Kuwait and endured injuries from if for several years, we would not have been 
forced to do what we did unwillingly President Saddam Hussein expressed in his address of 
July 17 th, 1990 considerable distress for having to react to the injury inflicted on us when he 
said," Having to say this, we feel tom deep inside and heavy hearted to the full. We have 
never wished to talk about rights usurped by some Arabs. We only wished to concentrate as 
ever on the rights usurped by aliens. But it is the evildoers who will bear alone before God 
and the Nation the consequences of their monstrous evils of which they have shown some 
that we did not know or rather wished not to be tme". 
3 - The Kuwaifi govemment refers to the encroachments on its territories, oil installafions and 
tankers and commercial interests inflicted on it during the war, ignoring the polifical and 
geographical facts of the conflict that took place somefime before 1980 to 1988. As stated in 
our memo, all heads of Gulf states together with the whole Arab Nation have reiterated that 
the battle was not exclusively Iraqi, but was in defense of the Gulf and its security and 
sovereignty. Kuwait, being the nearest to the battlefield and having been exposed to direct 
threat from outside and inside, as proved by some facts the Kuwaiti memo, adopted positions 
for which we have expressed appreciation as menfioned in our memo of July 15*^ , mainly in 
self-defense. 
It is tme that Kuwait suffered material losses, but we shed precious blood in addifion to heavy 
losses. Nevertheless, we have always made a point of attending to nafional issues and we 
sttll do. As for the Kuwaifi memo, it did not provide answers to our questions neither did it 
touch upon production increases made by certain Gulf countries when Iraqi exports were 
suspended and the wealth's they accumulated in war days, though we presented definite 
figures and proofs in this regard. 
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4 - Conceming the claim that Iraq has" a long record of encroachments on the Kuwaiti 
territories", it is all a lie and a turning of truths upside down; Iraq was engrossed in war for 
eight years and there was no single Iraqi soldier, policeman or border guard in the positions 
mentioned, as they were all in the battlefield fighting in defense of the honor and sovereignty 
of the Nation while Kuwaiti govemment offidals were preoccupied plotting for the gradual 
advance on Iraqi territories, by establishing police stations, fanns and military and oil 
installations. Iraq took no notice of such measures as it was in special well-known view on 
Arab territories and relations. 
5 - According to the memo Iraq used to rejed Iraq-Kuwait (boundary demarcation), a 
sophism refuted by fads, documents and events. 
First: as stated in the enclosed letter of Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Sa'adoun Hammadi to the 
Kuwaiti Foreign Minister dated April 30th, 1990 the question between Iraq and Kuwait is not 
(boundary demarcation) as daimed in the Kuwaiti memo. The border situation as stated in the 
letter" is in fad a situation of two neighboring countries sharing strong bonds of kinship who 
have not yet reached an agreement about" demarcating their land water borders". Obviously, 
the Kuwaiti memo ignored the initiative proposed in our letter of July 15*, 1990. In May, 1988 
during the Algeria Summit I personally infonned the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister of President 
Saddam Hussein's desire to resolve the border question between the two countries. After 
several relevant contads, however, the Kuwaiti side evaded the subjed saying that his 
circumstances were not convenient and asked to put it off. Moreover, Kuwaiti offidals 
contaded us expressing their desire to hand over the borders file to another Kuwaiti officials, 
and it was President Saddam Hussein who proposed for the second time during the visit of 
HRH the Emir of Kuwait to Iraq in September 1989 that the subjed be reconsidered and 
solved in a brotheriy way. As for the Kuwaiti memo's reference to resolution of pending bonjer 
problems with Saudi Arabia and Jordan, it is true. But in fad were no serious "border 
problems" between us and Saudi Arabia and Jordan as is the case with Kuwait. They were no 
more than limited problems that we have dealt with in the light of a national perspedive which 
would raise no disputes between sisterty countries over entailed eventualities. It would have 
been much appredated if the Kuwaiti govemment aded towards this issue the same way as 
we and the brothers in Jordan and Saudi Arabia did. 
6 - As for the Kuwaiti reference to the National pact proposed by President Saddam Hussein 
in February 1980 and the affeded link it has established between the Pad and a proposal 
included in the memo, we would like to point out that the National Pad is an indivisible whole 
and no one can just accept what he likes and impugn the very core of the other principles and 
bases, the Arab relations proposed by the Pad being coherent and all-embracing. And if the 
govemment of Kuwait really believes in the National Pad announced ten years ago, why did it 
not say so before? Why did it evade signing the agreements we put forwanj and even signed 
with the Saudi Arabia Kingdom and other countries of the region? Why was it aroused at our 
proposal- as indicated in the letter of Dr. Sa'adoun Hammadi dated 30 April, 1990- that fall 
under the prindples of the National Pad and the Arab League Pad. The seledive approach 
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cannot be valid in Arab relations. The matter needs a comprehensive approach based on fimn 
national principles and the exigencies and requirements of Arab nafional security. 
7 - The memo of the Kuwaiti govemment made only a brief mention of its oil policy which 
made a point of injuring Iraq and ignored the facts known by all the brothers in the region to 
whom we have complained. On their part, they upheld our complaint and made their own 
stressing that they were equally injured by this deliberate policy aimed at destabilizing the oil 
market and inflicting losses on the eight exporting countries, except for Kuwait and the 
Emirates. All this proves the tmth of the facts stated in our letter 
8 - Conceming the allegations of the Kuwaifi govemment on the Iraqi Remeila oil field, we 
affirni that it is Iraqi in name and land and that the oil drawn by the govemment of Kuwait 
intentionally while Iraq was engrossed in war- one example of the encroachments made by 
the Kuwaiti govemment on our oil which is not only confined to Al Remeila- is stolen and must 
be returned to the struggling Iraqi people. 
9 - Strikingly enough, the Kuwaifi govemment not only replied to our letter in a memorandum 
to the League Arab States, but also conveyed a relevant message to Security Council 
President and United Nafions Secretary General on Thursday July 19*^ . Does the Kuwait 
government mean to internafional the issue though it swelled its memorandum with high 
sounding words about the Arab League, its pact and the Arab relafions actual conduct reveals 
facts; and perhaps the issue would come to more light and parts we have quoted from 
President Saddam Hussein's address on July 16**^ , and our letter of July 15*^ , to effect that the 
policy by the Kuwaiti govemment is American, would be proved if we consider recent 
American declarations that the govemment of Kuwait could resort to the umbrella of American 
force, quite an encouragement of the Kuwaiti govemment to proceed with the policy of 
deliberate aggression on Iraq and the Arab Nafion. So, what is the posifion of Arabs, Arabism 
and the League amid all this, govemment of Kuwait. 
In this regard we say to the Kuwaifi govemment that foreigners would not be able protect 
whoever conspires against the Arab Nafion and threatens its very essential interests for the 
Arab people have previously dealt with similar cases and the consequences are known to all. 
We are requesting of the Secretary General to distribute this letter to the Arab countries. 
Best regards and wishes. 
Tarek Aziz, 
Deputy Prime Minister & Foreign 
Ministerof the Republic of Iraq 
Baghdad on Thoulheija 29,1410 H 
July 21,1990 
D 
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The Letter of Sheikh Sabah Al Ahmed, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister, dated 21 July, 1990 to Al chadhli Al Quiaibi, Secretary General of the 
Arab League, commenting on the Iraqi reply dated 21, July, 1990: 
Your Excellency, brother Al Chadhli AIQulabi, Secretary General of the Arab League, 1 would 
like to refer to the Iraqi govemment memorandum dated Thoultejja 29* , 141 OH.-July 21 
st,1990AD- in reply to our memorandum to your Excellency dated Thoultjja 26* ,-Jule18 
th,1990 Ad, I affinm here that the reply fomriualted in our memorandum highlights our 
keenness to rely only on fads about the statements in the Iraqi memorandum away from any 
accusations or terms that would disturt) the atmosphere of brotherty relations between the two 
countries. 
Your Excellency 
Despite the fads in our previous memorandum that were to us a clear categorical reply to the 
claims and accusations of the Iraqi memo. We find ourselves most regrettably once again 
faced with new claims and accusations before which we can only bring in some fads in the 
hope of putting an end to the spate of claims and accusations by the Iraqi govemment as well 
as such way of dealing experienced by Kuwait for the first time and with extreme bittemess. 
Your Excellency, 
It is sorrowful that the Iraqi memo has pointed out once again that Kuwait deliberately injured 
Iraq, although Kuwait has emphasized in the previous memo that this represents a 
falsification of reality and disregard for the well-known fads about the pro-Iraq Kuwaiti attitude 
based on a sense of belonging to the Arab Nation and keenness to full fill Kuwait's obligations 
within the framewori-: of the Arab League. Obviously, there is no need to add more fads than 
those recorded in the annals of history about the honorable and genuine attitude of Kuwait 
towards a war that drawn out for over eight years. 
Kuwait, realizing the political and geographical fads related to this dispute, would like to re-
emphasize the attitude it has repeatedly dedared. Kuwait regards the dispute from a national 
perspedive and has never acted just in self-defense. As affinned in the previous memo and 
again here, the shed Arab blood can by no means be equated with any material benefit, 
however large in figures and multifarious in sources. 
Your Excellency, 
We prefen-ed in our previous memo to be brief and predse replying to the accusations 
included in the Iraqi memo about our oil policy. But this fumed out to be unconvindng to our 
Iraqi brothers, driving us to dwell here upon more details supported by figures and inddents. 
The objedives of Kuwaiti oil policy are dear and dedared. They call for a balance price and 
produdion policy with a far-sighted realistic perspedive aiming at the highest income possible 
under the circumstances of worid oil market and taking into account the interests of all -
producing countries. They also take as a guide the experiences and lessons of the past in 
relation to high prices and the damage that befell all OPEC members, particulariy such Arab 
Gulf States with huge reserves as Iraq, as a result of intransigence and crack down price 
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policies, causing consumer countries to close ranks and follow energy policies at odds with 
the interests of the OPEC. 
Kuwait has always supported forcefully and sincerely OPEC policies and decisions since its 
establishment, especially conceming price and production issues. It has always been intent 
on having these decisions taken within the countries without discrimination between countries 
or groups and regardless of political differences. 
To this end, Kuwait has given much more sacrifices than any of the OPEC memt>er states to 
boost and back up OPEC decisions. Kuwait's production fell from 2.5 million ban'els in 1979 
to less than 800 thousand barrels/ day in 1982. Production sustained a mach lower level than 
before the Iraq-Iran war and Kuwait has not yet been able to restore its quota, while Iraq 
managed through a strong Kuwaiti support in the OPEC to get a much higher quota than 
before the war. Moreover, relations between Kuwait and the other countries were heavily 
damaged for its support of Iraqi demands, a fact very well known to the Iraqi brothers. 
Accordingly, if we calculate the losses of Kuwait- which are proved in both scientific and 
accounting temns- we would find them more than tens of billions of dollars. Kuwait's 
commitment to the principle of supporting OPEC decisions, maintaining the OPEC official 
price level and ensuring price stability at reasonable levels, have all led to a loss of 55% of 
Kuwait's production rate before the Iraq-Iran war. 
Therefore, it is erroneous to say that Kuwait took advantage of war at the expense of Iraq as 
evidenced by published figures and events. Kuwait's oil eamings fell from 6 billion dinars in 
1986. And despite recent increases, oil eamings are still below the pre-war level. 
Kuwait was not responsible for the deterioration of crude oil prices since 1982. On the 
contrary, Kuwait has been making efforts and has sacrificed much of its production and 
income to stop price deterioration. It has even lost its maricet share, including its customers 
and traditional markets, while other known countries won a large part of the share lost by 
Kuwait in defense of prices and in preservation of the interests of producing countries. The 
quota of certain countries increased through price knockdown and direct and indirect 
discounts by way of back-to-back credits and other means known to oil traders. 
It is also a matter of fact to those infomned of oil martlet that oil price deterioration in the mid 
eighties was linked to the policies adopted by consumer countries with a view to minimizing 
reliance on oil, especially the oil exported from Arab Gulf countries. Furthermore, high-price 
policies contributed whether intentionally or unintentionally, to the success of these policies, 
causing a weakened worid oil demand and doubled production of OPEC competitors which 
lost the OPEC about 50% of worid oil maricet. However, some producing countries suffered 
heavier loss, some maintained their martlet quota, while others increased theirs. The claim 
Kuwait was behind the oil price deterioration is fallacious, particulariy as all reports by OPEC 
itself indicate that the number of countries which exceeded their quotas before the last 
meeting held in May is not one or two but nine countries having the technical capacity to do 
so. Moreover, Kuwait committed itself at the last meeting held in Jeddah to its approved quota 
and we have always full filled our commitments. But we must not look upon the issue of 
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quotas and commitment through a narrow perspective or just to put all the blame for non-
commitment on one or two countries-non-commitment being shown by several countries 
much more obviously than Kuwait. Violation of production agreements since date of 
enforcement has been a common practice. Therefore, agreements collapsed a short while 
after their conclusion because several countries were not convinced of their value and even 
took them as a pretext for political pressure on other countries or bear alone the burden of 
defending prices. 
However, in spite of its commitment to the quota, Kuwait has always been forthright in its 
attitude; it has voiced dissatisfaction at its unfair quota, spelt out its position on all production 
agreements, and declared just demands at every OPEC meeting held to discuss production 
quotas. But despite repeated promises to Kuwait that its quota would be increased with 
increasing demand on OPEC oil, Kuwait has not yet got a fair quota. 
Kuwait finds it more feasible for the OPEC and its members to discuss the quota's question 
on scientific bases using the method of convincing dialogue to lay down a system on the fimi 
foundations of justice and balance between interests of all members states. 
Your Excellency, 
It is quite far from the tmth that Kuwait, as claimed in the Iraqi memo, was one of the Gulf 
countries which increased oil production and accumulated wealths in absence of Iraqi exports 
during the war. Iraq's absent production quota was distributed to other producing countries in 
the world, including Kuwait which was not technically capable of increasing its production at 
that time. About the Iraqi allegation and accusation that Kuwait has stolen oil from Al Rumeila 
oilfield, it is important to clarify that the geological strata of this oilfield are extended across 
the Iraqi and Kuwaiti territories, known as Al Rumeila in Iraq and Al Ratka in Kuwait. From this 
field Kuwait draws oil according to international standards and norms which stipulate a 
reasonable distance from the boundary line between the tow countries. 
Your Excellency, Kuwait does by no means deny the sustained efforts it has been exerting 
with the brothers, including Iraq, for coordination and development of relations on all fronts as 
evidenced by events and figures and as the sisteriy Iraq knows very well. However, the 
circumstances of war have prevented the fulfillment of this objective for the past decade and 
drifted coordinafion to other fields according to the requirements of that stage. 
Our keenness to constantly develop the economic relations was shown in bilateral ambitions 
aspirations to lay down the foundations of cooperation in this filed. Our objective has never 
been focussed on polifics or propaganda; it has reflected determinafion to create a strong 
basis with economic payoff to the benefit of the sons of both countries. 
It is worth mentioning here that the giant projects between the two countries include 
liquefaction of gases, electric connection and others. At any rate, we would not have refen-ed 
to such matters had they not been menfioned in the Iraqi memo. Moreover, such great 
important projects on they on the way to coordinafion between the two countries were 
approved less than a year ago, i.e. since the last visit of HRH the crown Prince and Prime 
Minister- may God preserve him- when these projects were documented. 
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Certainly, the memo comprehensive dealing between the official private institutions of both 
countries requires conditions that are very well known to economists. The Iraqi brothers 
promised on several occasions to revise many of the regulations and laws which might be 
hampering the desired cooperation. Naturally, these regulations and laws are only for Iraq to 
consider and we have nothing to do in this respect. But it is also important to note that private 
capital is always after the best atmosphere and easiest way of dealing. 
Conceming coordination, the Iraqi memo brought up the issue of the Baghdad- Basra- Kuwait 
air passage saying that Kuwait was behind suspension of civilian flights through this passage. 
To make things clear, we have to point out that there are several considerations related to 
interiined issue between technical authorities on both sides which are woridng for a settlement 
out of a true desire to re-operate the passage. 
It might be useful in this regard to refer to the existence of a Kuwaiti - Iraqi committee for 
commercial, customs and transit activities comprising members from the ministry of trade and 
industry on both side who meet regulariy and periodically to coordinate as far as these 
activities are concemed, matters that cannot be explained in detail in this limited space. 
Your Excellency, 
Boundary demarcation is not a complicated issue and dose not call for such a long time to go 
back to the starting point which is quite clear to us. The issue is actually govemed by 
agreements and pacts signed by the two countries. What remains is well-intentioned 
confrontation and courageous resolution. 
We would like to seize this opportunity to affinm our keenness and unfailing deteimination to 
close with the brothers this file whose suspension would always threaten our relations with 
such shakes as experienced in the present. And pemaps our continuous follow-up of the 
subject is the best proof of our keen interest. 
Your Excellency, 
The Iraqi memo dealt with that it called evasion of signing draft agreements proposed by Iraq. 
The sisteriy Iraq also mentioned that it has signed similar agreements with a number of 
sisteriy countries in the region. 
Regrettably, we are forced to say that the so-called agreements proposed by the brothers in 
Iraq were not- we believe-similar to or identical with the agreements signed with the brothers 
in the region, not to mention the fact that their content was void of the principle of equal 
footing cooperation. We would make the drafts public at this stage out of our commitment to 
the ethics of political wori^. 
Your Excellency, 
We have noted that the Iraqi reply ignored the solution proposed in our previous memo within 
the Arab framework. However, Kuwait was and will always be obviously detemnined to have 
Arab solutions to its problems with the Arab brothers, the Arab League being the home that 
shelters us all. Hence, we were unquestionably clear in considering the Arab League, the 
natural channel for our issue. While refemng to this solution, we are welcoming any 
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supporting ideas or proposals from the brothers that would ensure a final irrevocable solution 
to the questions that still cast a shadow on relations between the two sisteriy countries. 
Presenting this memo, Kuwait hopes to receive a favorable response from the brothers in the 
sisteriy Iraq to the well-meant efforts aimed at containing this passing difference to make it 
possible for us all to achieve the positive, advanced stages of our relafions we aspire to in a 
way that would boost and enhance our Arab role and fulfil our aspirations as well as the 
hopes and higher interests of our Arab Nafion. 
In the end, I am requesting of your Excellency to kindly distribute this memo to the member 
states in the Arab League. 
May God be our guide to success. 
Sabah Al Ahmad 
Deputy Prime Minister & Foreign Minister 
The Letter of Sheikh Sabah Al Ahmad, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister, to the Secretary General of the United Nations: 
Your Excellency, Mr. Javier Perez De Cuellar, the UN Secretary General, 
I would like to inform Your Excellency that Kuwait received a memo from the Iraqi government 
dated July 17 th, 1990 with a number of groundless claims and accusations that can be 
summed up as follows: 
First: Kuwait stands behind oil price deteriorafion by dumping the worid maricet with 
higher rates of production. 
Second: Kuwait has stolen Iraqi oil from the Iraqi oilfield of Al Rumeila. 
Third: By so doing, Kuwait has substantially damaged Iraqi economy, an act tantamount to 
military aggression. 
Fourth: All acts by Kuwait are premeditated and agreed upon with foreign entities. 
Fifth: Kuwait shows slackness in responding to the good offices made to solve the border 
question and has deliberately made a gradual calculated advance on the temtories of Iraq by 
establishing installafions thereon. 
Regarding the first accusation, it contradicts both tmth and reality. A follow-up of oil prices 
would make it quite clear that price deteriorafion was the result of a worid-wide problem 
involving several parties in and outside the OPEC. As for the claim that Kuwait steals Iraqi oil, 
we would like to affinm that Kuwait draws oil only from wells within the Kuwait territories south 
of the Arab League line at a sufficient distance from intemafional borders and according to 
intemafional measurements. 
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Concerning the alleged Kuwaifi slackness in responding to the good offices made to solve the 
border question and the gradual advance on the temtories of Iraq by establishing installafions 
thereon, this is all a falsification of reality and a presentation of reversed facts. Kuwait has 
constantly sought to demarcate the boundary between the two states and resolve the relevant 
pending problems. But Iraq used to reject any attempt to put an end to the issue, though 
during the war it attempted to settle finally the question of boundary demarcafion with other 
neighboring sisterly Arab countries. 
Wishing to draw your excellency's attenfion to the seriousness of the claims and accusations 
included in the Iraqi memo, Kuwait would also like to refer to the threat implied in the 
statement that Iraq preserves its right to demand the concerned parties to redress the 
deviafion- a deviafion that Kuwait affirms to be fictitious. 
Kuwait would also like to emphasize that while the worid is witnessing a noticeable entente 
and focuses of tension are diminishing, and though Kuwait has exerted strenuous efforts to 
put an end to a tragic war that lasted for over eight years during which security and stability 
were swept away in the region and direcfiy threatened at the intemafional level, the Iraqi 
memo shows up to brandish tension again in the region, a matter that involves serious 
dimensions. Regrettably, this memo has been brought fonward at an important delicate 
juncture when lights as well as Arab and worid attention are centered on the confinuing 
tragedy of the Palesfinian people and attempts find negofiated solution. 
Your Excellency, 
Although Iraq intends to keep stepping up propaganda campaigns, Kuwait would like to 
accentuate it's latitudinal commitment in dealing with the neighboring countries based on 
good neighborhood, peaceful coexistence and dialogue to solve the pending problems. 
Kuwait would also like to stress in this regard its full commitment to the United Nafions 
Charter, its purposes and its objectives. 
Your Excellency, 
We have submitted this memo to familiarize you with the claims and accusations leveled at 
Kuwait, a member in your distinguished Organization. We will also keep Your Excellency 
infomed of any new developments in this respect. 
Please accept my special appreciation and respect. 
Sabah Al Ahmad Al Jaber Al Sabah, 
Deputy Prime Minister & Foreign Minister 
Appendix 4: Resolutions by Arab and islamic States following the 
Invasion of Kuwait 
A 
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The Communique by the Council of Arab Foreign Ministers dated 3 August 
1990 
The council of the League of Arab States opening "its extraordinary session in Cairo on 11, 
Moharram 1410H., corresponding to 2 August 1990 A.D., 
According to a request from the State of Kuwait that the league Council hold an extraordinary 
session to consider the Iraqi aggression on Kuwait; Acting under articles 5, 6 and 7 of the 
Pact of the League of Arab States; Acting under article 2 of the treaty of Joint defense and 
Economic Cooperation among the League Member States; Actin under article 2 of the Arab 
Solidarity Pact approved by the third Arab Summit held in Casablanca; 
Decides: 
1 - To condemn the Iraqi aggression on the State of Kuwait, reject any consequences 
entailed by it and not to recognize its sequels; 
2 - To deprecate bloodshed and destruction of buildings; 
3 - To demand from Iraq to withdraw immediately all its forces to the positions in which they 
were located before 10 Moharram, 1411 H. 1 August, 1990; 
4 - To refer the matter to kings. Emirs and presidents of the Arab countries to consider an 
extraordinary meeting to discuss the aggression and examine the means to reach a lasting 
negotiated solution to be accepted by the two parties concemed and guided by the heritage of 
the Arab Nation, the spirit of fraternity and solidarity, as well as the applicable Arab legal 
system. 
5 - To affinn "its full commitment to safeguarding the tenritorial sovereignty and integrity of the 
member states and reiterate its adherence to the principles of the Pact of the League of Arab 
States which stipulate non-resort to force to settle disputes that might arise between the 
member states, respect for their mling regimes and abstention from any act to change them. 
6 - To reject absolutely any foreign interference or attempt of interference in Arab affairs. 
7 - To entrust the Secretary General with following-up implementation of this resolution and 
reporting to the Council any new developments. 
B 
The Communique by the 19"^ Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the 
Islamic States held in Cairo on 5 August, 1990 
The conference received with much regret the news of the tragic incidents that have broken 
out between two member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference- namely, Iraq 
and Kuwait- which coincided with the convening of this conference at a time when hopes 
have been pinned on a forth-coming success for direct contacts arranged through sincere 
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brotheriy Arab efforts to contain the crisis which has erupted between two sisteriy countries 
and reach a peaceful satisfactory settlement for their dispute. 
The conference expresses its support to the communique issued by the OIC Secretary 
General in this respect dated 11 Moharram 1411H. -August2, 1990 A.D. 
The conference further condemns the Iraqi aggression on Kuwait, rejects any consequences 
entailed by it, does not recognize its sequels and demands Iraq to withdraw its forces 
immediately from the Kuwaifi territories to their posifions in which they were located before 10 
Moharram, 1410H.-1 August,1990- and abide by the Pact of the League of Arab States, 
particulariy in as far as it sfipulates the necessity of settling disputes between the member 
states by peaceful and non-interference in the domestic affairs of any state. The conference 
further demands the two countries to observe the requirements of good neighbomood; not to 
attempt to change the mling regime in any of them by force; and to respect the sovereignty 
demands the member states to desist from the use or threat of use of force against the unity, 
territorial integrity and polifical independence of any of the two states. 
Having taken note that the Iraqi government has declared its intention to withdraw its anmed 
forces from Kuwait, the conference will follow up compliance with this declaration without 
condifions on the part of Iraq, while supporting the legifimate regime in Kuwait under the 
leadership of his highness the Emir of Kuwait and the Chairman of the Fifth Islamic Summit 
and affimning full solidarity with the Emir, government and people of Kuwait. 
Resolution of the Arab Summit held in Cairo on 10 August, 1990 
The extraordinary Arab Summit held in Cairo on 19 Moharram, 1411 H., conresponding to 10 
August,1990. Having examined the resolufion of the Council of the League of Arab States 
convening in Cairo in an extraordinary session on 2 and 3 August 1990, 
Having reviewed the communique issued in Cairo on August 2, 3 1990, by the 19*" 
Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Islamic States, Relying on the provisions of the 
Pact of the League of Arab States and the Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic 
Cooperation among member-states. Realizing the grave historic responsibility dictated by the 
crifical circumstances in consequence of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and its disastrous 
repercussions on the Arab homeland, the Arab nafional security and the higher interests of 
the Arab Nafion. 
1 - Confirms the resolution issued by the League of Arab States on 3 August, 1990 and the 
communique of the Organizafion of the Islamic Conference on 4 August, 1990; 
2 - Further confirms abidance by Security Council Resolufions 660 issued on 2 August1990, 
661 on 6 August, 1990 and 662 on 9 August, 1990, being expressive of international 
legitimacy; 
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3 - Condemns the Iraqi aggression on the sisteriy Kuwait, declares non-recognition of the 
Iraqi decision to annex Kuwait as well as any results consequent upon the invasion by Iraqi 
forces of Kuwaiti temtories, and demands Iraq to immediately withdraw its forces to the 
positions in which they were located before 1 August, 1990. 
4 - Also affims the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait as a member-
states in the League of Arab States and the United Nations; expresses insistence on 
resolution of the legitimate regime; and supports this regime in all measures taken towards 
liberation of its territories and realization of its sovereignty; 
5 - Condemns the Iraqi threats to the Arab Gulf States, denounces Iraq's massing of military 
forces on the Saudi borders, upholds the measures taken by Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf 
States in enforcement of their right to legitimate defense in accordance with Article II of the 
Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation among member states in the League of 
Arab States, Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and Security Council Resolution 661 of 6 
August 1990, with particular emphasis on bringing implementation of these measures to a halt 
immediately after the total withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and restoration of legitimacy 
to Kuwait. 
6 - Decides to make a positive response to the request by Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf 
States to send Arab forces to support their military forces in defense of their temtories and 
tenltorial integrity any external aggression. 
7 - Authorizes the Secretary General of the League of Arab States to follow up and report on 
implementation of this resolution within fifteen days to the League Council to take in its 
discretion the necessary action. 
Appendix 5: Historical Agreement concerning the Kuwait Border. 
Agreement with the Sheikh of Koweit 23 January 1899 
Translation from Arabic Bond 
Praise be to God alone (lit. in the name of God Almighty) ('Bissim lllah Ta'alah Shanuho') 
The object of writtng this lawful and honorable bond is it is hereby covenanted and agreed 
between Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm John Meade, I.S.C., Her Britannic Majesty's Political 
Resident, on behalf of the British Government on the one part, and Sheikh Mubarak-bin-
Sheikh Subah, Sheikh of Koweit, on the other part, that the said Sheikh Mubarak-bin-Sheikh 
Subah of his own free will and desire does hereby pledge and bind himself, his heirs and 
successors not to receive the Agent or Representative of any Power Govemment at Koweit, 
or at any other place within the limits of his temtory, without the previous sanction of the 
British Govemment; and he further binds himself, his heirs and successors not to cede, sell, 
lease, mortgage, to give for occupation or for any other purpose any portion of his territory to 
the Govemment or subjects of any other Power without the previous consent of Her Majesty's 
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Govemment for these purposes. This engagement also to extend to any portion of the 
territory of the said Sheikh Mubarak, which may now be in the possession of the subjects of 
any other Govemment. 
In token of the conclusion of this lawful and honorable bond, Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm 
John Meade, l.S.C, Her Britannic Majesty's Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and Sheikh 
Mubarak-bin-Sheikh Subah, the fonmer on behalf of the British Govemment and the latter on 
behaff of himself, his heirs and successors do each, in the presence of witnesses, affix their 
signatures on this, the tenth day of Ramazan 1316, corresponding with the twenty-third day of 
January, 1899. 
M.J.Meade Mubarak-AI-Subah 
Polifical Resident in the Persian Gulf. 
Witnesses: 
E. Wickham Hore, Capt., l.M.S. Muhammad Rahim bin 
T. Calcott Gaskin Abdul Nebi Saffer 
Iraq-Kuwait Border Agreement of 1963:Minutes approved by the Republic of 
Iraq and the State of Kuwait, Baghdad,4 October 1963. 
In response to the desire of the two parties to eliminate all that mars relafions between the 
two countries, the official Kuwaifi delegation now in a visit to the Republic of Iraq according to 
an invitafion from the Iraqi Prime Minister met with the Iraqi delegafion in Baghdad on 4 
October, 1963. The Iraqi delegafion comprised the following members: 
1 - Major General Ahmed Hassan Al Bakr, Prime Minister. 
2 - General Saleh Mahdy Ammash, Defense Ministerand Acting Foreign Minister. 
3 - Dr. Mohamoud Mohammed Al Hajji, Minister of Commerce. 
4 - Mr.Mohamed Kayara, Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
The Kuwaiti delegafion comprised thee following members: 
1 - HRH, Sheikh Sabah Al Salem Al Sabah, Crown Prince and Prime Minister. 
2 - His Excellency Sheikh Saad Al Abdallah Al Salem Al Sabah, Minister of Interior and Actin 
Foreign Minister. 
3 - His Excellency, Mr. Khalifa Khaled Al Ghauneim, Minister of Commerce. 
Talks were held between the two delegations in an atmosphere of fratemal affinity and 
commitment to the bonds of Arabism, neighborhood and common interests. In affinmafion of 
the strong desire of the two delegations to strengthen bilateral relafions for the good of the 
two countries in the light of the higher Arab goals, believing in the need to redress the Iraqi-
Kuwaiti relafions which have suffered some inconveniences as a result of the attitude adopted 
by the past mthless regime towards Kuwait before the down of the blessed Revolutions of 14 
Ramadan. 
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Having faith in the national duty which dictates tuming over a new leaf of relations between 
the two countries with the original bonds and relations that t>ear no shade of the gap 
deliberately created by the previous regime in Iraq. 
Out of faith in the identity and inevitable unity of the Arab Nation, the two delegations, after 
the side had reviewed the Statement of the govemment of Kuwait read out at the Kuwaiti 
Ummah Council on 9 April, 1963, to the effect that Kuwait wishes to abrogate in due course 
the agreement concluded with Britain, have agreed as follows: 
First: The Republic of Iraq shall recognize the independence of the State of Kuwait and its full 
sovereignty on the borders referred to in the letter of the Iraqi Prime Minister dated 21.7.1932 
and approved by the mier of Kuwait in his letter dated 10.8.1932. 
Second: The two governments shall woric on strengthening brotheriy relations between the 
two sisteriy countries motivated by the national duty, common interests and aspirations to a 
comprehensive Arab Unity. 
Third: The two governments shall establish bilateral cultural, commercial and economic 
cooperation and exchange technical information. 
In compliance with these provisions, diplomatic representation at the level of Ambassadors 
shall be immediately establish. In witness whereof the heads of the two delegations have 
subscribed hereto. 
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Maps 
Maps 
The development of the Iraq-Kuwait border dispute in maps, 
1- Map no.1 
Shows the diminishing Kuwait territorial authority as defined by the 1913 
Anglo-Ottoman Convention. 
2- Map no.2 
Demonstrates area including Warbah Island and a four-Kilometre strip of 
Kuwaiti territory which Iraq wished to secure under long-term lease terms in 
1955. 
3- Map no.3 
The United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) Deployment 
as of January1996. 
4- Map no.4 
Shows the land territory boundary as demarcated by the UN Boundary 
Commission in 1992. 
5- Map no.5 
Shows boundary turning points: positions of the notice board south of 
Safwan(1992). 
6- Map no.6 
Shows a sketch of the northern sector of the UN land boundary in relation to 
previous British Mapping (1992). 
7- Map no.7 
Shows Khawr ( Khor) Az Zubayer: demarcated by the United Nations Iraq-
Kuwait boundary Demarcation Commission, (1993). 
8- Map no.8 
Demonstrates a chart showing the UN delimitation of the Iraq-Kuwait 
maritime boundary (1993). 
Maps no. 1,2,4,5,6,7, 8. 
Source: Brown, Harry, "The Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Dispute: f-Hstorical Background 
and the UN decisions of 1992 and 1993" in Schofield, Olive (ed.). Boundary and 
Security Bulletin. International Boundaries Research Unit (IBRU), Department of 
Geography, University of Dumam, Volume2, Numbers, October 1994, pp.68-80. 
Map no. 3. 
Source: The United Nations Bule Books Series, Volume IX, The United Nations and 
the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990 -1996, Department of Public Infonnation, United 
Nations, New York, 1996, pp46053. 
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Map 1 
Map *howing the Red (inner) end Green (outer) tines of diminishing Kuweiti 
territorial authority as defined by the 1913 Anglo - Ottoman Convention. 
Sourcs : M a p produc«»d by the Foreign Off ice Research Department m Mey 1954 
P E R S I A 
ICHOR 
JOU81E« 
L>mnn 
•haran 
« j - 0 « w i » h 
• H l i < « r 
K U W A I T 
0 KILOMETRES 100 
I I 1 
Map 2 
Map 3 
/ 
li 
Map 4 
XT" 
Map 5 
Z 
UN M A P S H O W I N G B O U N D A R Y TURNING POINTS: 
P O S I T I O N S OF THE N O T I C E B O A R D SOUTH OF S A F W A N 
J -
Turning Points-
As indicalad by historical documents: 
• A - 1351 Clarification 
• B - 19*0 Iraqi protest not* * 
• C - 1rTulei1609nn) from the cuAoms post 
As dentsrcated by ttte United Nations Iraq/Kuwait 
Boundary Demarcation Commisaion: 
N 30= 06' 13.3181- E 479 42' 27.6429' 
IRAQ 
A - I O O O m 
B - 1 2 B 0 m 
K U W A T 
Boundary pillar 
IKBCX; boundary 
Floads as shown on 194 
Contomporary roads 
Map 6 
o 
t N ~ 
£ 
o -
Map 7 
Map 8 
Bibliography 
Bibliography 
Primary Sources 
" Agreed Minutes Between the States of Kuwait and Republic of Iraq Restoration of 
Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters", Singed at Baghdad on October 
1963. 
" Unofficial" Text of Rafsanjani's 8* August Letter to Saddam Husayn, Summary of 
World Broadcasts, ME/0846.A/2,3, 18 August 1990 
A Press Conference of Ambassador of Saudi Arabia in Washington Prince Bander Ibn 
Sultan, Washington, August 15,1990, Saudi Arabia; Documents of the Saudi Press 
Agency, June 1991. 
A Statement of the Supreme Judicial Council, Saudi Arabia; Documents of the Saudi 
Press Agency, June 1991. 
An address of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Fahd Ibn Abdulaziz Al-
Saud for the Saudi People and the World at Large, Saudi Arabia; Documents of the 
Saudi Press Agency, June 1991. 
An intellectual Meeting; Between H.R.H. Prince Naif Ibn Abdulaziz The Interior Minister 
and Chairman of the Supreme Information Council and Luminaries, Saudi Arabia; 
Documents of the Saudi Press Agency, June 1991. 
Astatement of H.E. Sheikh Abdulaziz Ibn Baz, The General President of Islamic 
Scientific Research, Ifta, call and Guidance departments, Saudi Arabia; Documents of 
the Saudi Press Agency, June 1991. 
Convention on Law of Treaties (Adopted May 22, 1969; Opened for Signature May 23, 
1969), United Nations, General Assembly, A/Conf.39/27, 23 May 1969. 
Decision 17 taken by the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation 
Commission; Priority of payment and payment mechanisms A/AC. 26/Dec. 17 (1994), 
24 March 1994. 
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), League of Arab States, 
General Secretarial, Unified Arab Statistical Abstract 1980-1988, Third Issue, United 
Nations April 1990. 
Economic and Social Commission for Westem Asia, National Accounts Studies of the 
ESCWA Region, Bulletin No. 19, United Nations, NewYori< 1999. 
Economic and Social Commission for Westem Asia, Unified Statistical Abstract of the 
ESCWA Region, Seventeenth Issue , United Nations, New Yori<,1997. 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Annual Report 1411/1412 
(1991) Research and Statistics Department, Febmary 1993. 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Annual Report 1412/1413 
(1992) Research and Statistics Department, March 1994. 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Thirty-Fifth Annual Report 
1420 H (1999G) Research and Statistics Department, October, 1999. 
314 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Thirty-Fourth Annual 
Report 1419 H (1998G) Research and Statistics Department, October 1998. 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Thirty-Second Annual 
Report 1417 H (1996G) Research and Statistics Department, July1996. 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Thirty-Third Annual Report 
1418 ti (1997G) Research and Statistics Department, October, 1997. 
Letter dated 13 November 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq 
transmitting the declaration of the National Assembly (10November1994) and decree of 
the Revolution Command Council No,200(10 November 1994) affirming Iraq's 
recognition of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Kuwait 
and of its International boundaries as endorsed by the Security Council in its 
Resolution 833 (1993), S/1994/1288, 14 November 1994. 
Letter the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the Secretary-General transmitting the 
Memorandum of Understanding dated 18 April 1991 between Iraq and the United 
Nations concerning humanitarian assistance, S/22513, 22 April 1991. 
Memorandum, London: Public Record Office, Foreign Office,21 March 1902, L/P&S/19. 
Report of Secretary-General proposing terms of reference for an observer unit to be 
Known (UNIKOM), S/22454, 5 April 1991,Adaddenda: S/22454/Add. 1, SApril 1991, 
S/22454/Add. 2, SApril 1991, and S/22454/Add.3, 9 April 1991. 
Report of the Secretary-General regarding creation of a United Nations Compensation 
Fund and United Nation Compensation Commission as envisaged in Security Council 
resolution 687 (1991). S/22559, 2 May 1991. 
Report of the Secretary-General, S/22558, 2 May, 1991. 
Resolution 3314 (XXIX), Definition of Aggression, in Resolutions adopted by the 
General Assembly, Vol. 1, 17-18 December 1974, General Assembly Official Records: 
Twenty-Ninth Session Supplement No. 31(A/9631),New Yori<: United Nations, 1975 
Resolution No. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of Intemational Law conceming 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-Fifth Session, 
Supplement No. 18(A/8082), 24 October 1970. 
Saddam Husayn's initiative on withdrawal of troops from Iran, Exchange of Rows, 
Summary of World Brodcasts, ME/0844 A/1,16 August 1990. 
Security Council resolution, S/RES/687 (1991), 3 April 1991. 
Security Council resolution, S/RES/688 (1991), 5 April 1991. 
Security Council Resolution/660(1990), 2 August 1990. 
Special Report of Secretary-General on UNIKOM, S/25123, 18 January 1993, And 
addendum, S/25123/Add.1, January 1993. 
Statement by the President of the Secretary-General, S/24113,17 June 1992. 
315 
statement of the Board of the Senior Ulama in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Saudi 
Arabia; Documents of the Saudi Press Agency, June 1991. 
Telegram dated 22 March 1940 from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to the 
Secretary of State for India, London; Public Record Office, FO 371/24559. 
Texts of Lease Agreement dated 15 October 1907, in India Office Library and Records, 
London; L^&S/10/606. 
The Agreement dates in 15/10/1907, in Indian Office Library and Records, London; 
L/P&S/1-/606. 
The Annual Report of the Central Bank of Kuwait for the Fiscal Year 1998-99, Central 
Bank of Kuwait, The Twenty Seventh Annual Reporti998-99. 
The Central Bank of Kuwait, Economic Report 1990 -1992. 
The Central Bank of Kuwait, Economic Report 1994. 
The Central Bank of Kuwait, Economic Report 1996. 
The Central Bank of Kuwait, Economic Report 1998. 
The Extraordinary Arab Summit Conference, Cairo, 10 August 1990, Saudi Arabia; 
Documents of the Saudi Press Agency, June 1991. 
The Message of Custodian of the two Holy Mosques King Fahd Ibn Abdulaziz in Reply 
to a Massage of Saddam Hussein, Saudi Arabia; Ministry of Information, Documents of 
Saudi Press Agency, June 14,1991. 
The National Bank of Kuwait, Economic and Financial Quarteriy, I /1999. 
The Sixth Report of the Secretary-General, S/1994/1138, 7 October 1994. 
United Nations Treaty Series, Vol.485, New York; United Nations, 1965. 
United Nations, Security Council Official Records, (New Yori<; 957* meeting, 2"" of July 
1961). 
Secondary Sources 
I.English Books: 
Abir.Mordechai (1993). Saudi Arabia Govemment, Society and the Gulf Crisis, London 
and New Yori< ;Routledge. 
Al-Alkim, Hassan Hamdan (1994), The GCC States in An Unstable World Foreign-
Policy Dilemmas of Small States .London; Al-Saqi Books. 
Al-Farsy, Fouad (1986). Saudi Arabia A case Study in Development Completely 
revised and Updated Edition, London; Kegan Paul Intemational Limited. 
Al-Ghunaim, Abdulla (1992). Kuwait: Statehood and Boundaries, Kuwait; Center for 
Research and Studies on Kuwait. 
316 
Al-Ghunaim, Abdulla (1994). Demarcation of the Intemational Boundary between the 
State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq by the United Nations, Kuwait: Printed by the 
Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait as a contribution to the work of the United 
Nations. 
Al-Ghunaim, Abdulla (1994). Kuwait-Iraq Boundary Demarcation Historical Rights and 
Intemational Will, Kuwait: The Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait. 
Al-Hassan, Omar (1992). The Gulf in the 1990s Seminar, London: The Gulf Center for 
Strategic Studies. 
Al-Hassan, Omar(1992). The GCC Border Disputes Seminar with Special Reference to 
Iraq and Kuwait, London: The Gulf Center for Strategic Studies. 
Al-Kadiri, Raad (1998), Iraq Under Sanctions: Diminishing Retums,. In Oil and 
Regional Developments in the Gulf, ed. Rosemary Mollis, The Royal Institute of 
Intemational Affairs, Middle East Programme, In association with Division of Research 
and Studies Crown Prince Court of Abu Dhabi,UK. 
Al-Mazidi, Feisal (1993). The Future of the Gulf the Legacy the War and the 
Challenges of the 1990s, London: I.B.Tauris. 
Al-Rumaihi, Muhammd. The Dynamic of Kuwait Foreign Policy, 
Alsdirawi, Fozia (1994). The Impact of the Gulf War on the Desert Ecosystem. InThe 
Gulf War and the Environment, ed Farouk El-Baz and R. M. Makharita, USA: Gordon 
and Breach Science Publishers. 
Anderson, Ewan W. and Khalil H. Rashidian. Iraq and the Continuing Middle East 
Cnsis, London: Pinter Publishers Limited, 1991. 
Aub-Hakima, Ahmad Mustafa(1985). The Modem History of Kuwait 1750-1965 , 
London: Luzac and Company Limited. 
Barzilai, Gad (1993), Aharon Klieman and Gil Shidlo. The Gulf Crisis and Its Global 
Aftermath, London: Routledge. 
Bedjaoui, Mohammed(1994). The New World Order and the Security Council Testing 
the Legality of its Acts, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
Bloom, Saul et al (eds.) (1994). Hidden Casualties Environmental, Health and Political 
Consequences of the Persian Gulf War, USA: ARC/Arms Control Research Center. 
Boume, Kenneth .and D.C. Watt.(eds.)(1986), British Documents on Foreign Affairs: 
Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, from the First to 
the Second Worid War series, USA: University Publications of America. 
Choueiri, Youssef (1991). Syria and Egypt and the Spoils of War, In Beyond the Gulf 
War the Middle East and the New World Order, ed. John Gittings, CNR and the Gulf 
Conference Committee, London. 
Cordesman, Anthony H (1997). Kuwait Recovery and Security After the Gulf War, 
Oxford: Westview Press A Division of Harper Collins Publishers. 
Cordesman, Anthony H (1997). Saudi Arabia Guarding the Desert Kingdom, Oxford: 
Westview Press. 
317 
Cordesman, Anthony H and Ahmed S. Hashim (1997). Iraq Sanctions and Beyond, 
Oxford; Westview Press A Division of Harper Collins Publishers. 
Danchev, Alex and Dan Keohane(1994). Intemational Perspectives on the Gulf 
Conflict,1990-91, London; The Macmillan Press Ltd. 
Dann, Uriel(1969). Iraq Under Qassem: A Political History 1958-1963, lsrael;Reuven 
Shiloah Research Centre, Tel Aviv University, Israel University Press. 
Ehteshami, Anoushiravan (1993). The Arab Statea and the Middle East Balance of 
Power. In Iraq, The Gulf Conflict and the World Community, ed. James Gow.Center for 
Defence Studies, London; Brassey's Ltd. 
Ehteshami, Anoushiravan and Gerd Nonneman with Charies Tripp (1991). War and 
Peace in the Gulf Domestic Politics and Regional Relations into the 1990s, 
Reding; Ithaca Press. 
Fandy,Mamoun(1999). Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent, London; Macmillan 
Press Ltd. 
Finnie, David H(1992). Shifting Lines in the Sand: Kuwait 's Elusive Frontier with Iraq, 
London; I B. Tauris and Co Ltd. 
Fox, Hazel H (1993). Reparations and State Responsibility; Claims Against Iraq Arising 
out of the Invasion and Occupation of Kuwait, In The Gulf War 1990-1991 in 
Intemational and English Law, ed. Peter Rowe, London; Routledge. 
Freedman, Lawrence and Efraim Karsh (1993). The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991 Diplomacy 
and War in the New World Order, London; Faber and Faber Limited. 
Freudenschuss, Helmut (1996). The Impact of the Kuwait Conflict on the United 
Nations and the Security Council; Developments and perspectives. In The Iraqi 
Aggression Against Kuwait Strategic: Lessons and Implications for Europe, ed. Charies 
R. H. Tripp and Danspeckgmber, Wolfgang F, Oxford; Weatview Press A Division of 
Harper Collins Publishers. 
GCSS Staff Report (1994), Iraq and a New Gulf Crisis, London; Gulf Centre for 
Strategic Studies. 
George, Alexander L. Avoiding war. Problem of Crisis Management, Westview Press, 
1991. 
Goodrich, Leiand M. and Anne P. Simons (1955). The United Nations and the 
Maintenance of Intemational Peace and Security, Washington, D. C ; The Brookings 
Institution. 
Groom, A.J and Margot Light, (1994). Intemational Relations A Guide to Theory, 
London; Pinter Publishers. 
Groom, A.J.R. and C.R. Mitchell, Intemational Relations Theory: Abibliorgraphy, 
London; F. Pinters, 1978. 
Hardy, Roger (1992). Arabian after the Storm; Intemal Stability of the Gulf Arab States, 
London; Royal Institute of Intemational Affairs. 
318 
Harris, D. J. Cases And Materials on Intemational, London: Sweet and Maxwell, Fourth 
Edition, 1991. 
Hassouna, Hussein A (1975). The League of Arab States and Regional Disputes: A 
study of Middle East Conflicts, New Yori<: Oceana Publication, Inc. 
Hay, Rupert (1959). The Persian Gulf States, Washington : Middle East Institute. 
Heikal, Mohamed (1992). Illusions of triumph an Arab View of the Gulf War, London: 
Harper Collins Publishers. 
Helms II, Robert F. and Robert H. Dorif (1993). The Persian Gulf Crisis Power in the 
Post-Cold War Worid, London: Praeger,Westport,Connecticut. 
Indyk, Martin (1992). The Postwar Balance of Rower in the Middle East, In After the 
Storm Lessons from the Gulf War, ed. Joseph S. Nye, Je and Roger K.Smith. Aspen 
Institute for Humanistic Studies. 
Ismael, Tareq Y. and Jacqueline S. Ismael (1994). The Gulf War and New Worid Order 
Intemational Relations of the Middle East, United States: University Rress of Florida. 
J, Lorimer (1970). Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia, England: 
Gregg Intemational Publishers Limited Westmead.VoH Historical Part B. 
Jawad, Haifaa A (1994), The Middle East in the New Worid Order, London :The 
Macmillan Rress Ltd. 
Johnstone, Ian (1994). Aftenvath of the Gulf War An Assessment of UN Action, 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers,Inc. 
Jrichow, Anders (1998). 7 /7© Saudi File People, Power, Politics. ,UK: Curzon Rress. 
Kanovsky, Eliyahu (1994). The Economy of Saudi Arabia: Troubled Present, Grim 
Future, Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 
Kechichain, the Gulf Cooperation Council: Search for Security in the Persian Gulf, 
Khadduri, Majid and Edmund Ghareeb (1997). War in the Gulf,1990-1 The Iraq-Kuwait 
Conflict and Implications, Oxford : Oxford University. 
Khalidi, Walid (1991). The Iraq vs. Kuwait; Claims and Counter Claims,/n The Gulf War 
Reader, History, Documents, Opinions, ed. Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf,New 
Yori<: Times Books Rundom House. 
Lauterpaccht,E. et al., (eds.) (1991), The Kuwait Crisis: Basic Documents, UK: 
Cobridge, Grotius Publications Limited. 
Macdonald, Robert. The League of Arab States: A Study in the Dynamic of Regional 
Organisaton, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
Man-, Phebe (1997), Iraq Faces the Twenty-First Century: Potential Challenges for Gulf 
States, In Gulf Security in the Twenty-First Century, ed David Long and Christian Koch, 
United Arab Emirates: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. 
Matthews, Ken (1993). The Gulf Conflict and Intemational Relations, London: 
Routledge. 
Maull, Hanns W. and Otto Pick (1989). The Gulf War Regional and Intemational 
Dimensions, New York: St Martin's Press. 
319 
Mclaurin, R. (eds.) (1977). Foreign Policy Making in the Middle East: Domestic 
influences on Policy in Egypt, Iraq, Israel and Syria, New Yori<; Praeger Publishers. 
Msalam, Musallam All (1996). The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Saddam Hussein, His 
State and Intemational Power Politics, London; British Academic Press. 
Mueller, John (1994). Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War, London; The University of 
Chicago Press, Ltd. 
Murden, Simon (1995). Emergent Regional Powers and Intemational Relation in the 
Gulf: 1988- 1991, Intemational Politics of the Middle East Series, UK; Ithaca Press, 
Reding. 
Niblock, Tim (1991). Arab Losses, First Worid gains, In Beyond The Gulf War The 
Middle East And the New World Order, ed. John Gittings, London; Catholic Institute for 
Intemational Relations. 
Niblock,Tim (1982). Iraq: The Contemporary State, London and Canberra and Center 
for Arab Gulf Studies; Croom Helm, Exeter. 
Nonneman, Gerd {^^93).lraq, the Gulf States and the War A Changing Relationship 
and Beyond, London; Routedge. 
Nyuop, Richard. F. Persian Gulf States Country Studies Foreign Area Studies, USA; 
Washington DC, 1984. 
Pimlott, John. And Stephen Badsey (1992). The Gulf War Assessed, London; Arms 
and Armour Press. 
Rashid, Nasser Ibrahim. And Esber Ibrahim Shaheen ( 1992). Saudi Arabia and the 
Gulf War, USA;Intemational Institute of Technology,Inc. 
Riggs.Robert, and Jack Piano (1994), The United Nations: Intemational Organization 
and World Politics, New York; Hartcourt Brace College Publishers. 
Roberts, Jonthan M. Decision-Making during Intemational Crises, London; The 
Macmillan Press, 1988. 
Rosenne, Shabtai (1995). The Worid Court what it is and how it worfcs,London; 
Martinus Nijhaff Publishers. 
Sadiq, Muhammad and John C. McCain (1993). The Gulf War Aftenvath an 
Environmental Tragedy, London; Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Salinger, Pierre. With Eric Laurent (1991). Secret Dossier. The hidden Agenda behind 
the Gulf War, London; Penguin Books. 
Schofield, R and G Blake, (eds.) (1988), Arabian Boundaries: Primary Documents 
1853-1957, Vol.8, Kuwait-Iraq II, England; Archive Editions. 
Schofield, Richard (1993). Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Temtorial Disputes, 
London; The Royal Institute of Intemational Affairs. 
Schofield, Richard (1994). Territorial Foundations of the Gulf States, London; University 
College London. 
320 
Seager,Joni (1991). Operation Desert Disaster: Environmental Costs of the War, In the 
Gulf War and the New Worid Order, eds., Haim Bresheeth and Nira Yuval-Davis, 
London: Zed Books. 
Simons, Geoff (1999). Imposing Economic Sanctions Legal Remedy or Genocidal Tool, 
London: Pluto Press. 
Sindelar III, H. Richard and J.E. Peterson (1988). CnDSScurrents in the Gulf Arab, 
Regional and Global Interests, for Middle East Institute, Washington, London: 
Routledge, 1988. 
Sultan, H. G. Khaled (1995). Desert Warrior A Personal View of the Gulf War by the 
Joint Forces Commander, London: HarperCollins Publishers. 
Taylor, Paul, and A. J.R.Groom (1992). The United Nations and the Gulf War 1990-91: 
Back to the Future, London: The Royal Institute of Intemational Affairs. 
Trevelyan, Humphrey (1970). The Middle East in Revolution, London: Macmillan and 
Co Ltd. 
Treverton, G. Regory (1981). Crisis Management and the Super-Powers in the Middle 
East, London: The Intemational Institute for Strategic Studies. 
United Nations (1996), The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict 1990-1996, 
Blue Books Series, Volume IX, Department Of Public Infonnation United Nations, New 
York. 
Urquhart, Brian (1991). The Role of United Nations in the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict in the 
1990, SIPRI Year Book: Worid Amnaments and Disannament. 
Watson, Baice W. eta l (1993). Military Lessons of the Gulf War London: Greenhill 
Books. 
Weller, Marc (1993), The United Nations and the jus ad bellum. In the Gulf War 1990-
1991 in Intemational and English Law, ed. Peter Rowe, London and New Yori<: 
Routledge. 
Weston, Bums (eds.,) (1990). Intemational Law and Worid OnderA Problem-Oriented 
Course book, USA: West Publishing CO. 
Wilson.Rodney (1990). The Economic Prospects for Kuwait in the Post-War Period.In 
After the War Iran Iraq and the Arab Gulf, ed Davies Charies, Centre for Arab Gulf 
Studies University of Exeter, UK: Garden Publications Limited. 
Wlison, Peter W. and Douglas F. Graham (1994). Saudi Arabia the Coming Stonv, 
New York: M.E. Sharpe. 
Yetiv, Steve A (1997),. The Persian Gulf Crisis, London: Greenwood Rress Westport, 
Connecticut. 
321 
II. Arabic Books: 
Abaid, Nayif Ali (1996). majlis alt'aawn Idwl alkhaliij al arabiih mn a/fa aawan 7y 
altakaami, (The Gulf Cooperation Council from Integration to Cooperation), Lebanon; 
Beirut, Center for Arab Unity Studies. 
Abdulrahim, Mohammad(1994). al'umam almutahdh wa alsim wa al'amn aldawlii (The 
United Nations and Intemational Peace and Security), Lebanon; Al-'asriih Library. 
Abdulrahman, Mustafa S (1992). qrarat majlas ai 'mn fii muuajhah al'aduan al- araqii 
'la al-kuuiit, ( United Nations Resolution conceming the Iraq-Kuwait Crisis), Cairo; Dar 
Al-Nahdah Al-'arabiih. 
Al-'atibi, Saad (1999). alwathiga qrar 16 maiiuu 99 wa ahdath mutsar'ah muiih 
shamlah Ihquuq almrah alsyasiih (The Document, Resolution 16 May 99, Inclusive 
View for the Political Rights for Women). 
Al-Bazzaz, Sa'ad (1992). War And The oneAfterthe Secret History of the Gulf War, 
Jordan; Al-Ahliah Publisher. 
Al-Far, Abdulwahad M (1994). alqanuun aldawlii al aam, (The Public Intemational Law) 
Cairo; DarAI-Nahdh Al-'arabih. 
Al-hartJi, 'abid A.A (1993). dwral'alma' w ald'aah fii amliih rd'a alghzah, Saudi Arabia; 
Obikan Library. 
Al-Jihani, Aid (1984). majis alwazra fii almamlakh al arabiih als 'auudiih biin alshurah 
al'slamiih wa al'tajahat aldastuuriih almu'asarii (The Council of Ministers in Saudi 
Arabia Between The Islamic Shamiah and Modem Constitutional Trends), Saudi 
Arabia; Riyadh, Al-Majd Published. 
Al-Qaba'a, Abdulallh S (1986). alsiiassh alkharijiih als 'auudiih (The Saudi Foreign 
Policy), Saudi Arabia, Riyadh; Al-farazdaq Published. 
Al-Qhazaly, Mohammed.and Asmail Al-Shatii and others (1991), albari<an 2August 
1990 wa madha ba ad tahriir alKuuiit nazrah mustaqbliih (The Volcano what after 
Kuwait liberation Futurity Slant) Saudi Arabia; The Saudi Company for Published and 
Research. 
Al-Ramaihi, Muhammad (1983). alkhaliij laysa nafta (The Gulf It does not Oi l) Kuwait; 
Dar Qadmah. 
Al-Sadun, Khalid M (1983). alalaqat bayna nap wa alKuuiit: 1902-1922, (The 
Relations between Najed and Kuwait), Saudi Arabia, Reyadh; King Abdulaziz 
Research Center. 
Al-sayd, Muhammad W (1995). zmh htlaal al'araq llkauuiit -almuhddat - altfa alat-
alnata 'j, ( A Crisis of Iraqi Occupation of Kuwait- Certains - Interactions- Fallouts ) 
Cairo; Dar Al-Nahdh Al-'arabiih. 
Al-Zhranii, Ahmad (1992). alsiiassh als auudiih fii aldirah al'arabiih fii alfatrah man 
1979-1990, (The Saudi Policy and Arab Framewori< From 1979-1990), Saudi Arabia. 
Amer, Ahmad(1991). zmh fqh al'zma, (The Crisis in Undeerstanding the Iraq-Kuwait 
Crisis), Riyadh; Arab League. 
322 
Asasah, Samii (1994). hi nthatharb alkhaliij ,draash Jadliih fii tanaaqdat al zmh, 
Lebanon: Beirut. 
Assiri, Abdul-Reda (1993). alkuuiit fii alsyasah aldwiiih almu 'aasrh, 
njazat.akhfaqat.wa tahdiiat (The Kuwait and the Comteoprary Intematioal Policy) 
Kuwait 
Aumlil, Ali (1996). alghzw aLaraaqii llkuuiit: alkhbraat almustakhlsh wa khurj mn 
arzmh, bhuuth wa munaaqashaat alnadwh al^kriih (The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, the 
Arguments and Experience from the Crisis), Amman: Muntada Alfkr Al-'arabii,16-17 
January. 
Balqaziz, 'abdiilah (1993). rtarb alkhaliij wa ainzam aldawlii, (The Gulf Crisis and New 
worid Order) Beirut: Dar Altalii'ah. 
Dahlan, Ahmad R (1984). drash fii alsiiassh aldakhliih llmmlakh al arabiih als 'auudiih 
(The Internal Policy of Saudi Arabia - Case Study), Saudi Arabia. 
Hasan, Ibrahim Muhammd (1996). alsira a aldawlii fii alkhaliij al'arabii alghazw 
al araaqii llkauuiit alab aad wa aintaa 'ij al'arabiih wa aldwiiih (The Intemational Conflict 
in the Arabian Gulf, The Iraqi Aggression on Kuwait: Intemational, Arabian, Fallout and 
proscription), Cairo: 'aiin For Humanities and Socail Research and Studies. 
Ibn Kather,Alhafz 'amad Aldiin Abu Al-fda' Asma'aiil. Tafsiir al-Quran Al- aziim, ( 
Interpretation of the Meanings of the Holy Book), Cairo: Dar-Tarath Al-'arabii 
Rublshers, Part Two, 
Ibrahim, Ali (1997). ainzriih al aamh llhdwd aldwiiih m a drash khash Imshklh alhadwd 
biin al'araq wa alkuuiit wa tkhtiitha wfqa Iqrarmajis al'mn raqm 6871 'aam 1991 (The 
Public Theory for Intemational Boundary, with Special Study for Iraq -Kuwait Boundary 
Dispute And Demarcation According to Security Council Resolution 687 in1991) Cairo: 
Dar Al-Nahzah Al-'arabiih. 
Ibrahim, Ali(1997). alhuquuq wa aluuajbat aldawHih fii alam mutaghiirwa almabada' 
alkubra wa ainzam aldwiii aljadiid, Cairo: Dar Al-Nahdh Al-'arabih. 
Martion, AbdulJalial (1997), mn alkhaliij b d alharii albaradh, (The Security of the Gulf 
After The ColdWortd), Lebanon: Beiojt, DarAI-Nahar. 
Mkhemar, Abdulaziz (1996). " muhawlh qanuuniih Itafsiiralt 'iid al'almii Idawlh alkuuiit 
ban mahnh alghazw." (The Effects of the Iraqi Aggression on the State of Kuwait),The 
Intemational Conference On The Effects Of The Iraqi Aggression On The State Of 
Kuwait April 2-6-1994, Political and Economical Implications, The Center of The Gulf 
and Arabian Peninsula Studies, Kuwait, Volume I. 
Murphy, Emma .et al (1998). Arabian Gulf Security under the New Intemational Order 
Jordan: Middle East Studies Center. 
Saa'ti.Amin (1990). The Iraq 's Ambitions in Kuwait: from the t>eginning and until the 
Military Invasion, (in Arabic), Jedda: Okaz Organisation for Press and Publication. 
Sawfii, Waheb and Adnan Sawfii (1993). almamlakh wa zmat alkhaliij namuudhj 
ladrasah 'darii al zamat aldawliih, ( Saudi Arabia and The Gulf Crisis), London and 
Lebanon: DarAI-Saqi. 
Sh'at, Ahmad K (1991). a/'araqr almghbuun... wa tada aiiat haris alkhaliij (The Iraq 
Wronged.. And the Gulf War Collapse), Cairo: Madboli Library. 
323 
Slaamh, Ghsaan (1980), al-siiaash al-khaarjiih als 'auudiih mundh aam 1945 drassh fii 
al-'alaaqat al-dwiiih, ( Saudi Arabia Foreign Policy since 1945; A Study in Intemational 
Relations). 
III.Ph.D.Thises and Research: 
Al-Mayyal, A. "The Political Boundaries of the State of Kuwait", PhD thesis submitted 
to the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1986. 
Kelly, Anne M. The Soviet Naval presence during the Iraq-Kuwaiti Border Dispute: 
Mach-April 1973, Professional Paper 122, Virginia; Centre for Naval Analyses, June 
1974. 
Journals and Periodicals 
English 
"Iraq and the West; When Sanctions do not Wori<." The Economist, April 8-14, 2000. 
Abdullh, Diana, Qatar and Suadi Arabia Agree to end Border Dispute, Reuterll, 7 
April 1996. 
Ahmad, Hisham H. " Iraq's Conduct of the Gulf Crisis; A Critical Assessment." Arab 
Studies Quarteriy, Vol.13,no.1 and 2, Winter/ Spring 1991. 
Al-Roubaie, Amer and Wajeeh Elali. "The Financial Implications of Economic 
Sanctions against Iraq." Arab Studies Quarteriy, Vol.17, no.3 Summer 1995. 
Al-Shayeji, Abdullah. " Dangerous Perceptions; Gulf Views of the U.S. Role in the 
Region." Middle East Policy, Vol.V, no.3, September 1997. 
Anand, R.P. "Role of the UN Security Council in the Gulf Crisis." Indian Joumal of 
Intemational Law, Vol. 31,1991. 
Anderson, Ewan and Jasem Karam." The Kuwait-Iraq Boundary; A Geopolitical 
Prespective." IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, Intemational Boundaries Research 
Unit, Department of Geography, University of Durtiam, Vol.1, no.4, January 1994. 
Bahgat, Gawdat. " Military Security and Political Stability in the Gulf." Arab Studies 
Quarteriy,yo\.17 no.4, 1995. 
Bengio, Ofra. " Iraq" Middle East Contemporary Sun/ey, Vol. XVIII; 1994. 
Bligh, Alexander. " The Saudi Religious Elite (Ulama) as Participant in the Political 
System of the Kingdom." Intemational Joumal Middle East Studies no.17, (1985). 
Border Agreement Signed by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia 2 July 2000, Demarcating their 
Offshore Neutral Zone Border, IBRU, Boundary and Security Bulletin, Autumn 2000. 
Brown, Harry. " The Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Dispute; Historical Background and the UN 
Decisions of 1992 and 1993." IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, Intemational 
Boundaries Research Unit, Department of Geography, University of Durtiam, Vol. 2, 
no.3, October1994. 
324 
Brynen, Rex and Paul Noble. " The Gulf Conflict and Arab State System: A New 
Regional Order." Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, no. 1-2 Winter/Spring 1991. 
Caron, David D. " The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council." 
American Journal of International Law, Vol.87, no.4, October 1993. 
Carver, Jeremy P. " Iraq-Kuwait the end of Line." IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, 
International Boundary Research Unit, Department of Geography, University of 
Durham, no2, July 1991. 
Carver, Jeremy P. " Iraq-Kuwait the end of Line", IBRU, Boundary Bulletin, No.2, July 
1991. 
Chubin,Shahram. " Iran and Regional Security in the Persian Gulf." Surv/Va/The lISS 
Quarteriy, Vol,34 ,no.3,1992. 
Cooley, John K. "Pre-WarGulf Diplomacy." Sun/ival, No.2, March-April 1991. 
Dekmejian, R.Hrair. " Saudi Arabia's Consultative Council." The Middle East 
Jouma/,Vol.52, no.2. Spring 1998. 
Greenwood, Christopher. " Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait: Some Legal Issues." The Worid 
Today, Vol.,47. January-December 1991. 
Greenwood, Christopher. " New Worid Order or Old? The Invasion of Kuwait and the 
Rule of Law." The Modem Law Review, Vol. 55, no2, March 1992. 
Greig, D.W. " Self-defence and the Security Council: What Does Article 51 Require." 
Intemational and comparative Law Quarteriy, Vol. 40 part 2, April 1991. 
Gresh, Alain. " The Legacy of Desert Storm." Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. XXVI, 
no. 4, Summer 1997. 
Iraq, Country Profile, The Economist Intelligence Unit, London, UK, 1998-1999. 
Iraq, Country Profile, The Economist Intelligence Unit, London, UK,1999. 
Iraq, Country Profile, The Economist Intelligence Unit, London, UK, 2000. 
Kaur, K. "United Nations and Gulf Crisis." India Quarteriy Vol. Part 48 (1-2), 1992. 
Kechichian, Joseph A. " The Role of the Ulama in the Politics of an Islamic State: The 
Case of Saudi Arabia." Intemational Journal of Middle East Studies, no.18,(1986). 
Khadduri, Walid. " Iraq's Fmstration Boils over." The Worid Today,Vol.53, no. 12. 
December1997. 
Kuttab, Daoud. " in the Aftemiath of the War." Journal of Palestine Studies XX,Ho.A 
(Summer1991). 
Kuwait, Country Profile, The Economist Intelligence Unit, London,UK, 1998-1999. 
Kuwait, Country Profile, The Economist Intelligence Unit, London, UK,1999-2000. 
Lesch, Ann Mosely. " Contrasting Reactions to the Persian Gulf Crisis: Egypt, Jordan 
and the Palestinians." Middle East Joumal, Vol., XLV, 1991. 
325 
Mueller, John and Karl Mueller. " Sanctions of Mass Destnjction." Foreign 
Affairs,\/o\.78, no.3,May-June 1999. 
Munro, Alan. " Gulf Security-The War and Its Aftermath." The RUSI Jouma/,Vol.138, 
no.4, August 1993. 
Normand, Roger and Chris af Jochnick. " The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical 
Analysis of the Gulf War." Harvard Inteivational Law Journal, Vol.35, no.2, Spring 
1994. 
Nufal, Ahmad. "The Gulf States and The Crisis over Kuwait." Arab Studies Quarterly, 
Vol.13, no. land 2, Winter/Spring 1991. 
Rajan, M.S. " The UN Security Council and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict (1990): An 
Exercise in Hypocrisy by Member Nations." Indian Journal of International Law, 
Vol.31,1991. 
Rathmell, Andrew. " Mind Waniors at the Ready." Trte World Today,Vol.54, no.11, 
November 1998. 
Said, Edward . "Iraq and the Middle East Crisis." The Iraqi File, Vol.72, December 
1997. 
Saudi Arabia, Country Profile, The Economist Intelligence Unit, London, UK, 1998-
1999. 
Schachter, Oscar. " United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict." American Journal of 
International Law, Vol.85,no.3, July 1991. 
Schneider, Michael E. How fair and Efficient is the UNCC System? A Model to 
Emulate?. Journal of International Arbitration, Kluwer Law international, 15 (1), 1998. 
Schofield, Richard. "The United Nations' Settlement of The Iraq-Kuwait Border, 1991-
1993." IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, International Boundaries Research Unit, 
Department of Geography, University of Durham, Vol.1, no.2, July 1993. 
Shwadran, Benjamin. "The Kuwait Incident." Middle Eastern Affairs, no.13,1962. 
Simpson, John. " The Aftennath of the Gulf War." Asian Affairs, Vol./part 23(2), 1992. 
Special Report Saudi Arabia, Slow Steps Forward, Middle East Economic Digest 
(MEED), Vol. 44,no. 12,24 March 2000. 
Teitelbaum, Joshua. " Saudi Arabia." Middle East Contemporary Survey Vol. XVII: 
1993. 
The Middle East, " Depleted Uranium: the War of Words Rages on." Issue 293, 
September 1999. 
Tripp, Charies. " The Gulf States and Iraq." Sun/ivallhe lISS Quarteriy, Vol,34, no. 
3,1992. 
Twinam, Joseph Wright. " The Gulf Cooperation Council since the Gulf War The State 
of the States." Middle East Policy, Vol./Part 1(4) 1990. 
326 
Urquhart, Brian. " The Role of the United Nations in the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict in 
1990,S/Pf?/ Year Book: Worid Amiaments and Disamiament, 1991. 
Warbrick, Colin. "The Invasion of Kuwait by Iraq." International Comparative Law 
Quarterly, Vol.40, April 1991. 
Whelan, John. Muscat Agrees Border with Riyadh, IBRU, International Boundaries 
Research Unit Boundary Bulletin, No. 2, July 1991. 
Whelan, John. Muscat Agrees Border with Riyadh, IBRU, International Boundaries 
Research Unit Boundary Bulletin, No. 2, July 1991. 
Arabic 
Abdulhadi, Abdulaziz M. " a l 'adwan al 'araqii 'aly albi i 'h bdwih alkuuiit fii duu ' 
'hkam alqanuun aldwiii." (The Iraqi Aggression on Kuwait Environment and the 
Intemational Law Rules) The Joumal of Law, Published by Academic Publication 
Council Kuwait University,Vol.15,no.1, March 1991. 
Abouamoud, Mohammad S. " Inter-Arab Relations in the Second Half of the Twentieth 
Century." A/-s/yassa Al-dawliya, Vol, no.139 January 2000. 
Al-Amri, Abdullah. " Intemational Organizations and the Use of Force." Joumal of 
Diplomatic Studies: Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol, no 12, 1996. 
Al-Anezi, Abdullah. " 'amn alkhaliij: drash fii al'asbad wa almu'tiiat." (Arabian Gulf 
Security... Reasons and Results) Joumal of Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies: Vol. 
XXI, na83,1996. 
Al-Anezi, Rashid H. " Iraqi Allegationa against the State of Kuwait under Intemational 
Law." Joumal of the Guff and Arabian Peninsula Studies: Vol.Xllll.no,72.1994. 
Al-Aqqad, Salah. " Stability and the Counter Factors in Kuwait." Al-siyassa Al-dawliya, 
no. 12, January 1972. 
Al-Awadi, Abdulrahman. " Environmental Pollution and the Role of the Regional 
Organization for Protecting Maritime Environment to Rehabilitate the Environment." 
Joumal of Guff and Arabian Peninsula Studies: Special Issue Vol, XIX, no. 74.1994, 
Al-Baiiatii, Adal M. "jam'ah aldwl al'arabiih biin hatr al'aml al'arabii almushtri< wa 
mustgbalh." Joumal of Drasat arabiih. Vol. 5/6 March 1998. 
Al-Balah, Abdulaziz and Abdulrahman Al-Marshad. "dawar almmlakh al'arabiih fii hartD 
tahriir alkuuiit (The Role of Saudi Arabia During the Kuwait Liberation) TheFourth of 
Scientism Symposium, the GCC History Unity, Intestine and Action Common 
Intransitive, Joumal of the Guff and Arabian Peninsula Studies, University of Kuwait, 
15-17, Vol.1, November 1993. 
Al-Haj, Abdullah J. " The Gulf Cooperation Council to the 1990s." Joumal of the Guff 
and Arabian Peninsula Studies: Vol.XXII, no.87,1997. 
Al-Hamad, Turki. " ftna alkhaliij: nazrh shamlh." Joumal of the Guff and Arabian 
Peninsula Studies, The Fourth of Scientism Symposium, The GCC History Unity, 
Instestine and action Common Intransitive, University of Kuwait, Vol., 2 November 15-
17,1993. 
327 
Al-Hawari, Abdulrahman. " alta'awn al'askarii alkhaliijii Itahriir alkuuiit."(The Gulf 
Military Cooperation for Kuwait Liberation) The Fourth of Scientism Symposium, the 
GCC History Unity, Intestine and Action Common Intransitive, Joumal of the Gulf and 
Arabian Peninsula Studies, University of Kuwait, 15-17,Vol.1, November 1993. 
Al-Hudithy, Many A. " 'thar al'aquubat wa alhsar 'aly hquuq al'nsan fii aluutan 
al'arabii: drash haltii al'araq wa liibiia."(The Effects of Economic Sanction on the 
Human Rights in Arab Lands: A Cause of Study Iraq and Libya) Joumal of Arab Affairs, 
The League of Arab States, June 1999. 
Al-Serjany, Khalid. " the Origins of the Crisis Between Kuwait and Iraq.", Alsiyassa Al-
daiv//ya,no.102, October 1990. 
Al-Shayeji, Abdullah. " The Seventh Kuwaiti National Assembly Elections: Analysis and 
Results." Joumal of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies: Vol.XVIIII. no,72,1994. 
AI-Tarrah,Ali. " Preliminary study of Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Motivations and 
Consequences." Joumal of Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies: Special Issue Vol. 
XIX, no.74, 1994. 
Ghoneimi, Zein Eddin A. " The Environmental Repercussion the Iraqi Invasion of 
Kuwait" Joumal of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies: Special Issue, Vol. XVII, 
May 1992. 
Goad, Saad Nagy and Monem Sahi El-Amar, " The Arab Gulf a Changing Worid." A/-
s/yassa A/-daw//ya,Vol,no. 125, July 1996. 
Iraq - UNSCOM Crisis (Special Section), A/-s/yassa Al-dawliya, Vol, no. 132, April 
1998. 
Jabr, Jabr Ali. " altahdilr al'askaty ll'adwan 'ly alkuuiit." Joumat of the Gulf and 
Arabian Peninsula Studies, University of Kuwait, Vol. 1, November 15-17, 1993. 
Karam, Jassim. " Political Boundary Demarcation of the State of Kuwait an Output of 
the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait." Joumal of Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies: Special 
Issue Vol.XlX,no.74 ,1994. 
Mahmmod, Hanfi. " al'adwan al'araqii 'aly alkuuiit; majlas alt'aawn that alkhtbar." 
(The Iraqi Aggression on Kuwait: GCC under the Test) The Fourth of Scientism 
Symposium, the GCC History Unity, Intestine and Action Common Intransitive, Joumal 
of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies, University of Kuwait,15-17, Vol.1, 
November 1993. 
Naggar, Ahmad Mounir. " Economic Notes on the Consequences of the Iraqi 
Aggression on the State of Kuwait." Joumal of Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies: 
Special Issue Vol. XIX, no.74,1994. 
Obaid, Majdi Ali. "al-muqadimat al-siyasiiah lil- ghazw.", Al-siassa 
A/dwa/ya,Vol,no.102, October 1990. 
Shahab, Mufed. " 'azma alkhaliij wa aldabluumasiih althan'iih wa mut'addh alatraf." 
(The Gulf Crisis and Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomacy) Seminar on Diplomacy in the 
Contemporary Intemational Community, Saudi Arabia: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Institute of Diplomatic Studies15-18 Feb 1992. 
328 
Sultan, Qanm. " alba'd aljghraafii llghazw al'araaqii Idwlh alkuuiit: draash tahliiliih,( The 
Geographic Distance for the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Analytical Study) Joumal of the 
Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies, Vol., 83, Autumn,1996. 
The concluding declaration of Baghdad Summit, May, '\990,Sh 'oun Arabiya Joumal of 
Arab Affairs, Published: The League of Arab States, September, 1990. 
IV.Newspapers: 
Newspapers and Weeklies 
English 
International Joumal of Middle East Studies (IJMES). 
Middle East Economic Survey, Vol.XLIII,no.7, 14 Febmary 2000 (MEES). 
Arabic 
Al-Aharm,31 March1973 (Egypt). 
Al-Bilad, no.43 (Beirut). 
Al-Hayat,12 Novembe 1999 (London). 
Al-Riyadh, 29 March 1992 (Saudi Arabia). 
The Financial Times, 22 December1972 (United Kingdom). 
Umm Al-Qura Newspaper, 29July 1961 (Saudi Arabia). 
Electronic Sources: 
Barkho, Leon. " Iraq Questions Kuwait's Borders." The Associated Press, 
http://www.can-widecirculation.conv'cNews Iraq/990114- Kuwaithtml, 
Cordesman, Anthony. " US policy, the Southern Gulf States, and Challenging Strategic 
Balance in the Gulf." CSIS Middle East Studies Program 
http://www.csis.org/mideast/gulfspch.html 17 December, 1998. 
Hull, Richard E. " Economic Sanctions against Iraq." Institute for National Strategic 
Studies, http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/mss/book/sanctions/chapterl html 
Serbia Sanctions (SERBSANC), http://w\vw.aniericanedu/ted/scrt)sanc.hun. 
Interviews: 
Interview with .Ismail Al-Shatti, MP of The Kuwaiti Pariiament(National 
Assembly),Kuwait,23 May 1998. 
329 
Interview with Brigada Falh Al-Shatii, Assistant Secretariat General for Military Affairs 
of Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, Saudi Arabia, Riyadh, 4 March 
1997. 
Interview with Dr, Hasan A. Johar, MP of the Kuwaiti Pariiament (National Assembly), 
Kuwait,25 May 1998. 
Interview with Dr. AbdulAziz A. Al-Faiz, Member of Saudi Consultative Council, Saudi 
Arabia-Riyadh, 15 March 1997. 
Interview with Dr. AbdulReda Assiri, Professor of political Science, College 
Administrative Sciences, Kuwait University Department of Political Sciences,Kuwait,24 
May 1998. 
Interview with Dr. Ahmad Al-baqhdady, Associate Professor, College of Administrative 
Sciences, Kuwait University, Department of Political Sciences, Kuwait,19 May 1998. 
Interview with Dr. Hamed H. Al-Abdullah, Assistant Teacher, College of Administrative 
Sciences, Kuwait University, Department of Political Sciences, Kuwait, 24 May 1998. 
Interview with Dr. Maryam M. A. Hasan, Assistant Teacher, College of Administrative 
Sciences, Kuwait University Department of Political Sciences, Kuwait,19 May 1998. 
Interview with Dr. Masomah Al-Mubarak, Assistant Teacher, College of Administrative 
Sciences, Kuwait University, Department of Political Sciences, Kuwait, 23 May 1998. 
Interview with Dr. Mufid Shhab, The Minister of High Education and Chancellor of Cairo 
University, Cairo, 20 May 1997. 
Interview with Foud Badrawi, Secreatary-General of Al-wafd Party, Cairo,19 May 1997. 
Interview with Yasin Sraj Al-deen, Vice-President of Al-wafd Party,Cairo,19 May 1997. 
Interview with, Dr. Abdullah Al-Shayeji, Assistant Teacher, College of Administrative 
Sciences, Kuwait University Department of Political Sciences, Kuwait, 23 May 1998. 
Interview with, Saleh M. Alathamena, Sr. Public Awareness Assistant United Nations 
Development Program, Saudi Arabia- Riyadh,4 March 1997. 
330 
